The subdiscipline of public philosophy is in its adolescence. The mark of maturity in philosophy is the introduction of a metatheoretical discourse. The niche subfield “experimental philosophy” tries to incorporate social scientific methods, but like public philosophy, it too is in its adolescence, often falling back on haphazard and poorly defined methodologies. The definition of public philosophy distinguishes between professional philosophers and what would best be termed amateurs, where professional philosophers are analogous to professional athletes – credentialed individuals who do (...) philosophy full time, are paid for their work, and are usually affiliated with education or research‐focused institutions. Public philosophy must contend with the problems of expertise and wisdom, in so far as disciplinary specialization presume a certain level of each. Academic philosophy condemns public philosophy for failing to meet a set of imagined idealized standards that professors romanticize but also fail to meet. (shrink)

In this thought-provoking study, Jack Russell Weinstein suggests the foundations of liberalism can be found in the writings of Adam Smith, a pioneer of modern economic theory and a major figure in the Scottish Enlightenment. While offering an interpretive methodology for approaching Smith’s two major works, _The Theory of Moral Sentiments _and _The Wealth of Nations_, Weinstein argues against the libertarian interpretation of Smith, emphasizing his philosophies of education and rationality. Weinstein also demonstrates that Smith (...) should be recognized for a prescient theory of pluralism that prefigures current theories of cultural diversity. (shrink)

In this article, I examine the purpose of public philosophy, challenging the claim that its goal is to create better citizens. I define public philosophy narrowly as the act of professional philosophers engaging with non-professionals, in a non-academic setting, with the specific aim of exploring issues philosophically. The paper is divided into three sections. The first contrasts professional and public philosophy with special attention to the assessment mechanism in each. The second examines the relationship between public philosophy and citizenship, calling (...) into question the effect public philosophy has on political reasoning. The third focuses on the practice of public philosophy, describing actual events to investigate the nature and limits of their outcomes. I conclude that public philosophy aims at future philosophical inquiry but is best considered a form of entertainment. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to investigate appropriate methods for educating students into citizenship within a pluralistic state and to explain why civic education is itself important. In this discussion, I will offer suggestions as to how students might be best prepared for their future political roles as participants in a democracy, and how we, as theorists, ought to structure institutions and curricula in order to ensure that students are adequately trained for political decision making. The paper is divided (...) into six sections. In the first two sections, I argue that community is a learned understanding and that such education,even when it supports liberal commitments,cannot be neutral. I use the social contract tradition as an entrance into the perpetual nature of conflict within a pluralist society. In the third and fourth sections, I develop a pedagogy geared towards educating students into what I call cognitive conflict, and argue that the arts, widely understood, should be privileged over other disciplines. In the fifth section, I examine two difficulties inherent inmy pedagogy — first that it seems to demandthat all perspectives be taught, and second that it seems to promote anxiety among students. In the final section, I ask that political theory reexamine the role of harmony in justice. I conclude that a managed conflictis a more acceptable organizational description of liberal political structures. (shrink)

In this article, I examine the purpose of public philosophy, challenging the claim that its goal is to create better citizens. I define public philosophy narrowly as the act of professional philosophers engaging with nonprofessionals, in a non-academic setting, with the specific aim of exploring issues philosophically. The paper is divided into three sections. The first contrasts professional and public philosophy with special attention to the assessment mechanism in each. The second examines the relationship between public philosophy and citizenship, calling (...) into question the effect public philosophy has on political reasoning. The third focuses on the practice of public philosophy, describing actual events to investigate the nature and limits of their outcomes. I conclude that public philosophy aims at future philosophical inquiry but is best considered a form of entertainment. (shrink)

"This book does not treat Smith as an historical curiosity who has accomplished all that he was capable of. It treats Smith as someone with a contemporary message. That capitalism is the dominant political system in the contemporary world is almost without doubt. That capitalism is succeeding, however, is much more contentious. I will argue that Smith would challenge such claims of success. As the standard of living rises in most of the world, few could challenge the notion that vast (...) numbers of people are being left behind. While some countries gorge themselves into obesity, others starve. Furthermore, while the information revolution has made access to recorded knowledge easier than ever, global cultural experience is becoming whitewashed in a money- and media-driven frenzy of homogeneity. Every generation has complained that their successors are intellectually inferior and poorly educated. Sometimes the weaker of us are forced to wonder whether this time it might be true.". (shrink)

Nicholas Phillipson’s biography of Adam Smith was published just forty-five days before the second edition of Ian Simpson Ross’s definitive biography The Life of Adam Smith (Oxford, 2010).The contrast is telling. Ross’s is a book for scholars with ubiquitous in-text references to recent scholarship. Phillipson’s is a narrative intellectual biography for a wider audience that relegates recent work to the bibliography. Ross is reticent to make claims about Smith’s motivations, but Phillipson thrives on it. Ross is usually explicit when he (...) takes positions on controversial issues, but Phillipson’s interpretations dominate the text. In short, it is easier to see how Ross’s work fits into contemporary debate, but it is .. (shrink)

Liberalism can be defined as that political system in which the state remains neutral on questions of the good life while providing a framework of rights that respects persons as free and independent selves capable of choosing their own values and ends. Neutrality is the priority of the right over the good . In Political Liberalism, John Rawls describes a liberal society in which political debate is based upon an overlapping consensus. An overlapping consensus consists in agreement about those principles (...) of justice which are held in common by all reasonable citizens. While these principles may be justified by appeal to "comprehensive" doctrines, no such "comprehensive" justifications are permitted within the arena of political debate. ;I examine the theories of Alasdair MacIntyre in order to show where Rawls fails. MacIntyre argues that a conception of the good is inherent in any decision-making procedure and the exclusion of that conception from political debate makes such debate impossible. I argue that traditions which justify conceptions of the good are after the fact constructs identified in light of a unifying theme. I also examine the work of William Galston which underlines liberalism's compatibility with a conception of the good, and argue that Galston's rejection of neutrality should be reconsidered. ;Rawls' attempt to solve the problem of managing pluralism limits pluralism to an unacceptable degree. I offer a theory which widens the scope of freedom while avoiding a reliance on the exclusion of moral goods in political debate. ;The foundation of my theory lies in the moral psychology of Adam Smith, a theory of social interaction and moral judgment that does not rely exclusively on rational deliberation. I argue that Smith's market model of competition should be understood as entailing neutrality between groups and not between goods. Neutrality is identified retrospectively by observing how newer or previously excluded members of society have influenced society's conception of the good. I conclude that if a society's conception of the good fluctuates over time in the ways and under the conditions described in my dissertation, then the society is appropriately neutral and liberal. (shrink)

This paper is both a response to the four reviewers in a special symposium on my book Adam Smith’s Pluralism and a substantive discussion of philosophy of education. In it, I introduce what I call “the educative critique,” a mode of analysis similar to Marxist, feminist, or postcolonial critiques, but focusing on the educative role of a text. I argue that choosing education as a theme is itself a solution to interpretive difficulties, not an add-on that only concerns pedagogues and (...) policy-makers. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the claim that Rawls’s overlapping consensus is too narrow to allow most mainstream religions’ participation in political discourse. I do so by asking whether religious exclusion is a consequence of belief or action, using conversion as a paradigm case. After concluding that this objection to Rawls is, in fact, defensible, and that the overlapping consensus excludes both religious belief and action, I examine an alternative approach to managing religious pluralism as presented by Adam Smith. I (...) show that Smith’s so-called “marketplace of religions” assumes and encourages religious conversion. I then offer objections to Smith’s approach from Rawls’s point of view, concluding that, while Rawls cannot adequately respond to the Smithian challenge, in the end the two positions are complimentary. (shrink)

Students sometimes leave introductory courses in philosophy with no deep sense of the connection between the work of Plato and contemporary philosophy, with a view of Plato’s dialogues as a kind of literature, or with a somewhat shallow sense of the thrust of Plato’s philosophy. This paper proposes a pedagogical method that offers students a highly sophisticated understanding of Plato’s philosophy that is both applicable to lower-level survey courses and capable of being delivered in a limited amount of time. By (...) emphasizing the process of dialogue, and that Plato can be understood as a participant in three simultaneous conversations, students are able to access Plato’s work in a more sophisticated manner, one that emphasizes the value of philosophy and its relation to their lives. (shrink)

Students sometimes leave introductory courses in philosophy with no deep sense of the connection between the work of Plato and contemporary philosophy, with a view of Plato’s dialogues as a kind of literature, or with a somewhat shallow sense of the thrust of Plato’s philosophy. This paper proposes a pedagogical method that offers students a highly sophisticated understanding of Plato’s philosophy that is both applicable to lower-level survey courses and capable of being delivered in a limited amount of time. By (...) emphasizing the process of dialogue, and that Plato can be understood as a participant in three simultaneous conversations, students are able to access Plato’s work in a more sophisticated manner, one that emphasizes the value of philosophy and its relation to their lives. (shrink)

The connection between Adam Smith and Alasdair MacIntyre is not evident at first glance. In fact, those who know MacIntyre’s work might bristle at the association. MacIntyre is inherently anticapitalist. He believes that moral people ought to reject the modern state and large-scale corporations.1 He also rejects what he terms the enlightenment project, claiming not only that it failed but that it was doomed to do so.2 Furthermore, MacIntyre’s perspectivalism seems to run counter to any “impartial spectator” theory such as (...) Smith ’s; tradition-bound rationality necessarily assumes partiality.3 In short, MacIntyre regards himself as an opponent of the liberal tradition, that intellectual lineage which is most closely associated with Smith, and, although he rejects association with communitarianism, he holds a similar place in contemporary philosophy. He is liberalism’s critic, not its reformer. But ethics makes strange bedfellows. MacIntyre’s theory of rationality, I contend, provides a useful and important complement to Smith ’s moral psychology. It allows for the intermingling of emotion and reason that is so important for Smith ’s work.4 It creates a structure for bridging Smith ’s individuals and the communities of which they are a part. In essence, I argue, MacIntyre’s work allows us to better understand Smith ’s jump from deliberation on the individual level to the development of cultural standards and norms. I conclude that Smith ’s emphasis on the individual results in an incomplete theory of communal rationality, and that MacIntyre’s emphasis on tradition leaves out a foundation of individual agency. The two theories, however complement each other well. As a bit of preparation, it is worth mentioning that both thinkers, and Smith, in particular, are often portrayed inaccurately. Smith is not the self-interest focused libertarian that he is made out to be. He is, instead a sophisticated moral theorist whose first book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments was celebrated and influential in its time. (shrink)

The Grand Forks Herald’s attack on the UND law school in “Thou shalt not take on such cases†was inexcusable. While discussing the Ten Commandments monument in Fargo, the paper endorsed some of the most dangerous myths about education, showing a profound disrespect for the university, its professors, and its students.

The occasion of this talk was a panel discussion ending the conference on “Radical Politics” sponsored by The University of North Dakota’s chapter to Students for a Democratic Society. Many of the members are self-described Marxists and Anarchists. It is they whom I address here.