During an interview on human rights in a TV programme, the interviewer all of a sudden said that, so far as he could understand, I was establishing a connection between philosophy and torture, and asked me what this connection was. I was shocked.In a couple of seconds I tried to guess how he could have come to such a conclusion. My response was: there is no connection between philosophy and torture, still when you look at the fact of torture with (...) philosophical-ethical knowledge, you can realize that torture does not damage, nor ‘degrade’, the human dignity of the victim of torture, as is usually accepted – e.g. in the formulation of the title of the ‘Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’. It causes damage to the human dignity of the person who tortures. We protect or damage human dignity, but our own human dignity, by what we do and not by what we suffer, since we are responsible for what we do and not for what others do to us. What we do, or refrain from doing, depends on each of us, i.e. acting in accordance with human dignity in our relations with other human beings is a problem in our ethical relation with ourselves, in spite of the fact that our actions are directed to somebody else. (shrink)

Two main but discrepant tendencies characterize the intellectual climate of our world at the turn of the century. We promote, on the one hand, “respect for human rights,” i.e. for certain universal norms, but on the other hand, equally promote “respect to all cultures,”which are differentiated among themselves by their different world-views and their parochial norms. Not rarely do we see that the demands that such parochial norms bring are contradictory to those of human rights.

Two opposite tendencies characterize the intellectual and political developments in our world as a whole at the end of the twentieth century: on the one hand, we promote respect for human rights, i.e., for certain “universal” norms; on the other, we promote equal respect for all cultures, i.e., respect also for sets of parochial, “relative” norms, which are not only often discrepant among themselves, but often discrepant vis-à-vis human rights as well. In light of this, I argue that we need (...) paideia for a sagacious implementation of human rights in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

Günümüzde eğitim, rotasını kimi zaman çeşitli türden izm’lerin, ideolojilerin, kültürel veya ahlaki normların, kimi zaman ise ulusal ya da bireysel çıkarların belirlediği, “her şey gider” anlayışından hareket eden, içi tıklım tıklım yolcularla dolu bir trene benzemektedir. Ancak dur durak bilmeksizin yol alan, hangi istasyonda duracağı da belli olmayan bu tren, yolcularına, kendilerini, diğer insanları, dünyayı ve hayatı, insan olmanın değerinin bilgisine açılan bir pencereden değil, rotasını belirleyenin istediği ve seçtiği pencereden göstermekte, onları her geçen gün insanın olmanın ne demek olduğundan (...) hızla uzaklaştırmaktadır. Başka bir deyişle, yolcularının çoğunluğunu, kendisi dışında geride kalanı umursamayan, insanın değerini hiçe sayan, sınır tanımazlığı, yararcılığı baş değer yapan, basmakalıp düşüncelere saplanıp kalmış, insanlaşamamış bireyler olarak uğurlayan ve geride nakarat olarak sadece koca bir “boşuna” çınlatan bu tren, insanlığı hızla sıradanlığın, sorumsuzluğun, başıboşluğun ve anlamsızlığın yamacından aşağıya, dekadansa doğru sürüklemektedir. Nitekim dünya genelinde artan şiddet, terör olayları, açlık, yoksulluk, çevre kirliliği, salgın bulaşıcı hastalıklar gibi yaşamı yaşanmaya değer olmaktan çıkaran, gözlerimizin hemen her gün şahitlik ettiği insanlık dışı manzaralar, günümüz eğitim anlayışına ve bu anlayışın yetiştirdiği insan tipine yönelik böyle bir tespitin en açık kanıtıdır. Bu nedenle, aslında çoktan ıskartaya çıkmış olan bu kara treni zaman kaybetmeden durdurmamız ve “insan nedir?” sorusuyla bağlantılı olarak eğitimin neliğini ve amacını yeniden düşünmemiz gerekmektedir. Bu noktada, eğitimi, insan onuruna yakışır bir yaşamı inşâ edebilmenin olanağının koşullarından biri olarak gören ve eğitime ilişkin felsefi bilginin realiteye bakarak nasıl ve ne şekilde ortaya konulabileceğini gösteren Kuçuradi’nin, ontolojik temelli felsefi antropolojiye dayanan insan, değer ve eğitim görüşüne kulak vermek bizler için yol gösterici olacaktır. Dolayısıyla bu çalışma, eğitimin kişilere öncelikle “insan kimliği bilinci” kazandırması gerektiğini düşünen Kuçuradi’nin insan ve değer görüşünü, buradan hareketle dile getirdiği eğitimin neliğine ilişkin düşüncelerini irdelemeyi konu edinmekte, eğitimin her şeyden önce olanaklar varlığı olan insan için bir insanlaşma sorunu olduğuna dikkat çekmeyi amaçlamaktadır. (shrink)

Words, as well as ways of behavior, can be the objects of value judgments. The term ‘rational’ is such a word: to be rational is to be good. This is probably why, as a reaction to ‘western rationality’, people began to speak of many ‘rationalities’, a claim propounded by postmodernists. Rather than dwelling on the historical developments that led to such a claim, the author looks at concepts relevant to the colloquium ‘The encounter between rationalities’ (on which this issue of (...) Diogenes is based), within their intellectual framework: the modernist–postmodernist debate. (shrink)

The author of the paper starts by calling our attention to problems that make it necessary to rethink philosophy and puts her finger on one common factor at the origin of these problems. This is what she calls “the loss of the object of knowledge” in epistemology.After she shows how the object of knowledge is lost in two prevailing epistemologies of the twentieth century—in pragmatism and logical empiricism—and the consequences of this loss for our lives, she gives examples of rethinking (...) certain philosophical questions. These are the questions of what knowledge is and problems of norms related to the lack of distinction between epistemological kinds of norms. This rethinking also implies the necessity of rethinking philosophical education. (shrink)

How you can respect a culture with blood feuds? A culture with polygamy? It’s not possible. You can be rightly against something or wrongly against it, but if you are against something, you cannot respect it. If you say that you respect it, it would be hypocritical.

Inmunhak iran muŏt in'ga (T'onghap ŭi inmunhak, 2009) -- Tungji ŭi ch'ŏrhak (2010) -- Chonjae wa p'yohyŏn (2010) -- Mallarŭme ka mal hanŭn 'idea' ŭi kaenyŏm (Sorŭbon Taehakkyo paksa nonmun) -- P'ol Palleri e issŏsŏ chisŏng kwa hyŏnsil kwaŭi pyŏnjŭngpŏp ŭrosŏŭi si (Sŏul Taehakkyo sŏksa nonmun).

Ch'ŏrhak iran muŏt in'ga (1976) -- Hyŏnsanghak kwa punsŏk ch'ŏrhak (1977) -- Inyŏm kwa chilli, kŭrigo todŏk.

By focusing on the works and intellectual network of the Timurid historian Sharaf al Dīn ʻAlī Yazdī (d.1454), this book presents a holistic view of intellectual life in fifteenth century Iran. İlker Evrim Binbaş argues that the intellectuals in this period formed informal networks which transcended political and linguistic boundaries, and spanned an area from the western fringes of the Ottoman State to bustling late medieval metropolises such as Cairo, Shiraz, and Samarkand. The network included an Ottoman revolutionary, a Mamluk (...) prophet, and a Timurid occultist, as well as physicians, astronomers, devotees of the secret sciences, and those political figures who believed that the network was a force to be taken seriously. Also discussing the formation of an early modern Islamicate republic of letters, this book offers fresh insights on the study of intellectual history beyond the limitations imposed by nationalist methodologies, established genres, and recognized literary traditions. (shrink)