Mr. Hulton has made interesting comments, 139–42) on my earlier article, 1–10), from which I note that he is in favour of the construction, and also sees emphatic meaning in some examples. I am afraid, however, that I do not find his arguments convincing. Perhaps some brief remarks on them may be helpful.

The use of and roughly ‘to be as naught’, and of the comparable phrases employing nominally, is well known, especially in tragedy, and has been frequently commented upon. None the less I think there is still some misapprehension about the nature of the use, seen in its most acute form where and μη- occur in conjunction. We may think of Soph. Aj. 1231 on which much ink has been spilt.

It will be best to explain here, at the start, that I do not propose new etymologies for the words εὒξεινος and πόντος. I regard, then, εὒξεινος πόντος as meaning ‘the hospitable way’. My purpose is to show how such a name came to be given to the Black Sea by the Greeks. First, the word πόντος. The familiar explanation connects it with a series of words, of which I give the most important: Gk. πάτος ‘trodden path’; Skt. pάnthā ‘way’, (...) fem. pathyā ‘id.’; Zend paθ ‘id.’; Arm. hun ‘ford, road’; Lat. pons ‘bridge’. Further, as a verb the root appears in Gk. πατεν ‘tread down’ and is given in Walde-Pokorny as *pent- ‘tread, go’: W.-P. points out that the derived nouns mean ‘way’, and particularly a way that goes over or through water, as can be seen from the Armenian and Latin. (shrink)

There are in iambic trimeters a number of examples of hiatus where is followed by forms of , mainly in Comedy but also in Tragedy. These are notable because they fall outside the usual range of hiatus in drama, which covers passages with interrogative and , invocatory exclamations such as , and interjections. The use seems to deserve closer attention.

The following notes are the result of an examination of all the early Epic passages containing λλ which I made for the purposes of the lexicon of Homer and the older Epic now under preparation by the Archiv für griechische Lexikographie at Hamburg. The texts surveyed were Homer, including the Hymns, Hesiod, and the Epic fragments. I also examined Apollonius Rhodius for the purpose of comparison.

It is one of the attractions of Greek syntax that it provides an abundance of usages which require careful discrimination, if we are to appreciate their value; and which at the same time present problems of interpretation which have not been completely solved. This is particularly the case with the use of the negatives, and it is one of these constructions with which we are concerned here.

It will be seen that has twofold prosodic value: in passage it equals but in the others It is usual to connect the word with Alc, Pind. i.e. Lejeune, Traité de phon. grecque, p. 155note), thus following a lead given by Hesychius This is indeed the only suggestion advanced in the respective etymological dictionaries of Boisacq, Hofmann, and Frisk, and by Seiler ; though all but Seiler express more or less of doubt, particularly on the ground of meaning.

The construction of ν with the future has been hotly denied as impossible, so far as Attic Greek and indeed post-Homeric Greek generally are concerned. The opponents of the construction have had among their number such scholars as Dawes and Cobet; and of late, it seems, editors of texts generally. The view of Cobet is given on p. 469 of his Miscellanea Critica, with reference to Demosth. 9. 70 πάλαι τις δέως ν σως ρωτήσων κάθηται. Cobet, who has been followed (...) by later editors, altered ρωτήσων to ρωτήσας, commenting ‘ubi semel Constiterit δέως ν ρωτήσω, δέως ν πεύσομα aut simile quid pro ρωτήσαιμι vel πυθοίμην recte dici, turn demum librorum lectioni acquiescemus. quod equidem nunquam futurum esse satis scio.’ This view, which must of course be understood as excepting Homer from its scope, is nothing more than a blank denial of the possibility of the construction. We see more of an argument in Kühner-Gerth , where it is remarked that the construction, frequent in Homer, was later given up because ν with the optative was sufficient to express a future possibility; and that possibly emenders have done right to alter passages in Attic which contain it. This is not expressed with any great certainty. Nevertheless it has become to such an extent the prevailing view among editors that in modern texts it is extremely rare to find the construction allowed to remain. (shrink)

The root *pent-1 has achieved wide distribution in the IE. languages. In the course of its long history considerable modification of meaning has affected it, both as a primary verb and as it appears in derivative nouns, and here I refer particularly to Go. finpan ‘find’ and to Gk. πάτη ‘deceit’. With little ingenuity—against mere ingenuity, of course, the etymologist is bound to be on his guard—it is possible to trace the train of thought that connects the various forms. But (...) though the explanations here offered may well seem obvious, they have not, so far as I am aware, been previously published. The familiar dictionaries of Boisacq, Walde-Hofmann, and Walde-Pokorny do provide attempts at explanation, but these have little power of convincing. (shrink)

Etymology, especially that of an ancient language like Greek, is not as a rule a field in which one expects to get conclusive demonstration; and between rival explanations one is often provided with a choice which cannot be made with much confidence. But despite this I think that I should reply to the article by W. S. Allen on ‘The Name of the Black Sea in Greek’ , pp. 86–8), which has raised again the question dealt with in my article (...) ‘The Name of the Euxine Pontus’ , pp. 123–8). This is not so much because I do not feel satisfied with Allen's explanation , as because this particular etymology has considerable historical, in addition to linguistic, interest. (shrink)

The question of the source of the pronominal forms , and of the later fully declined forms, presents an unusual situation. It seems clear from earlier work that we should not look for the answer outside Greek, nor probably even outside colloquial Attic Greek of the fifth century. These are strong advantages, but despite them one cannot have much confidence in the solutions so far provided, and there is room for a fresh approach. In addition to this, the usage of (...) the forms does not seem to have been explained satisfactorily, and I shall attempt to clarify it. (shrink)

occurs in two classical contexts. They are: Alc. 320 L.-P. Democr. 156 Diels Elm. Sec. Hipp. 1. 2.

In line 1171 of Aeschylus' Agamemnon the MSS. read μ The remainder of the sentence, after μ, is much disputed, but I am not concerned with finding the true reading of it. The whole sentence runs, in the MSS., as follows: κος δ' οδν πρκεσαντ μ πλιν μν σπερ ον χει παθεν: which appears in Thomson's Oresteia as:… πρκεσεν τ μ ok χειν πλιν μν σπερ ον χει. It is the note on this passage in Thomson to which I wish (...) to draw attention. It is from Headlam, and says, in justification of reading μ οκ, that in such phrases the scribes, finding μο, constantly omitted ο as περιττν. It adds that ο should always be restored, at any rate where there is any trace of it. (shrink)

Aristotle, in chapter 22 of the Poetics , has some remarks on poetic diction. He lays it down that, while poetry should be clear in meaning, it should avoid meanness of expression, σεμν δ κα ξαλλττουσα τò διωτικòν τος ξενικος κεχρημνη—it becomes dignified and elevated above the commonplace when it employs unusual words; ξενικòν δ λγω γλτταν κα μεταφορν κα πκτασιν κα πν τò παρ τò κριον—and examples of unusual words are rare words, metaphors, lengthened forms, and everything that differs (...) from normal speech. He then gives specimens of poetry, to show how the poetic effect can be spoilt by the substitution of τ κρια for τ ξενικ, and of these the two that follow are taken from the Odyssey. The first is Od. 9. 515. (shrink)

The colour adjectives and have been discussed by R. Strömberg, who has removed misconceptions about their meaning. So has been shown to mean, not ‘quite white’, but a faded white, or one which has lost its essential whiteness: so often where the ‘natural colour has yielded to a dull dirty whitish colour’.

It is proposed to account here for a number of words with closely allied forms but different meanings: περιοτερα ‘pigeon’ περωτερις ‘vervain’ and ‘a woman's ornament’ ‘vervain’, ‘a woman's ornament’, and diminutive of περωτερις There are several other by-forms, as may be seen by reference to LSJ, but they add nothing to the well-established partition of meaning in this stem between the three senses ‘pigeon’, ‘vervain’, and ‘a woman's ornament’. It is my belief that we must explain the three senses (...) together, and this I shall attempt to do. (shrink)

Our best scientific theories explain a wide range of empirical phenomena, make accurate predictions, and are widely believed. Since many of these theories make ample use of mathematics, it is natural to see them as confirming its truth. Perhaps the use of mathematics in science even gives us reason to believe in the existence of abstract mathematical objects such as numbers and sets. These issues lie at the heart of the Indispensability Argument, to which this Element is devoted. The Element's (...) first half traces the evolution of the Indispensability Argument from its origins in Quine and Putnam's works, taking in naturalism, confirmational holism, Field's program, and the use of idealisations in science along the way. Its second half examines the explanatory version of the Indispensability Argument, and focuses on several more recent versions of easy-road and hard-road fictionalism respectively. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Notes.

Developmental biology is the science of explaining how a variety of interacting processes generate an organism’s heterogeneous shapes, size, and structural features that arise on the trajectory from embryo to adult, or more generally throughout a life cycle. It represents an exemplary area of contemporary experimental biology that focuses on phenomena that have puzzled natural philosophers and scientists for more than two millennia.

T. H. Green was a leading member of the British Idealist movement, which adopted the continental philosophy of Hegel and Kant while rejecting utilitarianism. As well as being a prominent philosopher, Green was an influential educational reformer and an active member of the Liberal party. Green's writings can be placed into three categories: religion, philosophy and politics. This work was the most complete statement of Green's philosophy, although it remained unfinished at his death. Edited by A. C. Bradley, a former (...) student and brother of Green's fellow Idealist F. H. Bradley, the book, which contains four parts, was published posthumously in 1883. Like other Idealists, Green criticised empiricism for creating an unnecessary dualism between thought and the real. (shrink)

Rechtsfilosofische studie over de Italiaanse denker (1668-1744).

Duty or Pleasure? The new bestseller from one of Britain's most pre-eminent, and arguably best known, philosophers.

A. C. Grayling's lucid and stimulating books, based on the idea that philosophy should engage with the world and make itself useful, invariably cause discussion. The Challenge of Things joins earlier collections such as The Reason of Things and Thinking of Answers, collecting Grayling's recent writings on the world in a time of war and conflict. In describing and exposing the dark side of things, he also explores ways out of the habits and prejudices of mind that would otherwise trap (...) us forever in the deadly impasses of conflicts of all kinds. Whether he is writing about the First World War and its legacy, free speech, the advantages of an atheist prime minister or the role of science in the arts, his essays are always enlightening, enlivening, and hopeful. (shrink)

A focussed issue of The Reasoner on the topic of 'Infinitary Reasoning'. Owen Griffiths and A.C. Paseau were the guest editors.

A traditional approach to teaching medical ethics aims to provide knowledge about ethics. This is in line with an epistemological view on ethics in which moral expertise is assumed to be located in theoretical knowledge and not in the moral experience of healthcare professionals. The aim of this paper is to present an alternative, contextual approach to teaching ethics, which is grounded in a pragmatic-hermeneutical and dialogical ethics. This approach is called moral case deliberation. Within moral case deliberation, healthcare professionals (...) bring in their actual moral questions during a structured dialogue. The ethicist facilitates the learning process by using various conversation methods in order to find answers to the case and to develop moral competencies. The case deliberations are not unique events, but are a structural part of the professional training on the work floor within healthcare institutions. This article presents the underlying theory on ethics and illustrates this approach with an example of a moral case deliberation project in a Dutch psychiatric hospital. The project was evaluated using the method of responsive evaluation. This method provided us with rich information about the implementation process and effects the research process itself also lent support to the process of implementation. (shrink)

In Towards the Light, A.C. Grayling tells the story of the long and difficult battle for freedom in the West, from the Reformation to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, from the battle for the vote to the struggle for the right to freedom of conscience. As Grayling passionately affirms, it is a story - and a struggle - that continues to this day as those in power use the threat of terrorism in the 21st century to roll-back the liberties (...) that so many have fought and died to win for us. Including an appendix of landmark documents, including the British and American Bills of Rights and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, the Bloomsbury Revelations edition also includes a new preface by the author reflecting on developments since the book's original publication. (shrink)

The Euclidean Programme embodies a traditional sort of epistemological foundationalism, according to which knowledge – especially mathematical knowledge – is obtained by deduction from self-evident axioms or first principles. Epistemologists have examined foundationalism extensively, but neglected its historically dominant Euclidean form. By contrast, this book offers a detailed examination of Euclidean foundationalism, which, following Lakatos, the authors call the Euclidean Programme. The book rationally reconstructs the programme's key principles, showing it to be an epistemological interpretation of the axiomatic method. It (...) then compares the reconstructed programme with select historical sources: Euclid's Elements, Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, Descartes's Discourse on Method, Pascal's On the Geometric Mind and a twentieth-century account of axiomatisation. The second half of the book philosophically assesses the programme, exploring whether various areas of contemporary mathematics conform to it. The book concludes by outlining a replacement for the Euclidean Programme. (shrink)