For people to contribute to discourse, they must do more than utter the right sentence at the right time. The basic requirement is that they add to their common ground in an orderly way. To do this, we argue, they try to establish for each utterance the mutual belief that the addressees have understood what the speaker meant well enough for current purposes. This is accomplished by the collective actions of the current contributor and his or her partners, and these (...) result in units of conversation called contributions. We present a model of contributions and show how it accounts for a variety of features of everyday conversations. (shrink)

This book deals in narrative form with the theme of recovering lost wholeness—with the perennial question of beginnings and what role a human being must play in order to find meaning in his or her life.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:378 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY these churches to deal reasonably with frontier conditions and popular prejudices is common knowledge, but it is often forgotten that their founder and guide during the critical days of growth was also an exponent of the late Scottish Enlightenment. To make this careful analysis of Campbell's philosophy, as an extraordinary specimen of empirical method, is a welcome achievement by an experienced empiricist. The volume also (...) contains a Foreword by President Perry E. Gresham of Bethany College, and a comprehensive bibliography of Campbell's writings compiled by Claude E. Spencer. HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER Claremont, Cali]ornia Hegel's First American Followers, The Ohio Hegelians: J. B. Stallo, Peter Kau]mann, Moncure Conway, August WiUich. By Loyd D. Easton. (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1966. Pp. lx + 353. $7.00.) This expansion of the theme outlined in Professor Easton's article of 1962 gives us fulllength accounts of the careers and ideas of four picturesque characters of the Ohio River Valley during the 19th century. The four had little in common except Hegel, and even him they did not really share, for they interpreted him differently and used him for different interests. The author is somewhat generous in calling them "Hegelians" and "followers" of Hegel, for like practically all those Americans who have been influenced by Hegel, they followed him at a safe distance and not very long. But this diversity makes Easton's account all the more fascinating. He portrays not only four characters but also the culture of Cincinati and its environment. J. B. Stallo is better known among American historians and philosophers than the other three, and deservedly so, for he was more philosophical. But he gains in stature here, noteworthy not only for his philosophy of nature but also as a prominent citizen, judge of a Superior Court, and political leader of a large German community. Stallo had two very different careers: the early Catholic student and teacher of Oken's philosophy of nature, mixed liberally with Schelling's similar system and with Hegel's Encyclopedia and his Phenomenology. Emerson was probably right in getting out of Stallo's General Principles an idea of "nature's rhythmic unfolding" rather than an idea of historical dialectic. Then came the later Stallo (after 1855), a convert from Catholicism and transcendentalism to empiricism, and a devoted follower of Ernst Mach. It is this later Stallo, author in 1881 of The Concepts and Theories oJ Modern Physics, who is better known, and who used the term "relativity" to indicate that physics deals not with things-in-themselves but with the data given to observers. Peter Kaufmann is an excellent representative of those pietists who, when they came to the open spaces and free manners of America, made serious attempts to give their religious "perfectionism" a practical social embodiment in utopian, communal economies. He became a teacher in the Rappite "Community of Equality and Social Harmony" and after a few years founded his own "Society of Germans at Teutonia." The members of this society agreed to devote their communal surplus to the education of orphans, the conversion of Indians, the spreading of the Gospel to "the four corners of the earth", and publishing a weekly Herald o] Better Times. After four years of this Society he moved northward to Canton, Ohio, where he settled down comfortably as a publisher and promoter of public education. His major publication, The Temple oJ Truth, incorporated some ideas on dialectic taken from Hegel. He continued his contacts with many utopian communities and urged his fellow citizens to help in making the United States of America "a saviour nation of the rest of mankind." Moncure Conway, a native of Virginia and graduate of Dickinson College, became an itinerant Methodist minister. But in 1853 the Harvard Divinity School made a Unitarian of him and an enthusiast for the higher criticism of Strauss and the transcendentalism of Hegel. In 1858 his wife introduced him to her home town, Cincinnati, and there he became BOOK REVIEWS 379 the minister of a very influential and liberal congregation. In 1860 he began publication in Cincinnati of The Dial, successor to the New England transcendentalist journal, and used its... (shrink)

The lyric speaker begins by turning his or her will into words, but begins to be a Browningesque speaker when this conversion leads to a turning of the will against words. This inversion, or perversion, of the will against its own expression requires a reader to entertain a complex notion of the relationship between intention and language—or, more accurately, to hold in suspension two competing versions of that relationship. A reader learns not only to conceive interpretation in the simple lyric (...) sense, as a prevailing assertion of the will, but also to conceive any given assertion of the will, any intention given over to articulation in language, as an interpretation and therefore a potential falsification inviting further refinement. The playful competition Browning urges between these two conceptions of intentionality frees meaning to wander somewhere beyond the ken of each lyric speaker, somewhere in the future of lyric utterance. Meaning is to the dramatic lyric what action is to the drama proper; and much as the curious "action in character" of Browning's dramas defers dramatic action and makes room for play, so Browning defers meaning in the lyrics by enlisting the patterning forces of the self-interfering will.1· 1. Browning remarked in the preface to Strafford that his play turned on "Action in the Character rather than Character in Action".Herbert F. Tucker, Jr., an assistant professor of English at Northwestern University, has published articles on Hopkins and Browning. An expanded version of the present essay appears in his Browning's Beginnings: The Art of Disclosure. (shrink)

Herbert, Dilinie Christmas is a special time in the Christian calendar. The Christmas story begins with a heavily pregnant Mary riding on the back of a donkey alongside her husband into the city of Bethlehem. Their search for board to see them till the morning is futile. A somewhat kind Inn keeper shows them to his stable, where the animals are accommodated.. That night Mary gives birth to baby Jesus and she lays the newborn down in a manger. The (...) Inn is symbolic of prosperity for those fortunate to share in its comforts. To have to reside instead in the stable reflects that there is not space in the Inn and some people, for not immediately apparent reasons, live on the outside. (shrink)

The political problem John Locke inherited from Thomas Hobbes was to produce a theory of natural rights that would not preclude the possibility of entering peacefully into civil association. If political existence is grounded on an unmediated theory of natural right, where every individual has a natural right to whatever he or she conceives to be useful in assuring his or her preservation, and where there are no moral limits to what one's rights will justify, civil association cannot come about (...) without invoking the coercive power of absolute sovereign authority. The problem with that, Locke insisted, is that absolute political authority transforms citizens into slaves.To avoid the necessity for invoking Hobbesian absolutism, Locke needed philosophical evidence that, in the natural situation, man is limited by natural duties. Locke produces an idea of natural duty which relocates the source of man's identity as a person bearing rights in what might be called the labor of consciousness. For Locke, it is the labor of consciousness itself - i.e. the act of self-imputation and self-ownership implicit in self-consciousness - that connects self-interest with an assumption of responsibility, and that transforms natural right into a natural principle of morality which does not need the mediating authority of sovereign power or the legitimating authority of God. The result is, we do not need to draw on theological foundations or call upon natural law doctrines as moral substitutes for the Hobbesian sovereign in order to legitimate Locke's political philosophy. Unvarnished natural duty is, for Locke, enough to ground civil association. The result is a natural morality that enables humans to enter into conditions of community and mutual trust without enlisting the intervening authority of sovereign power. Das staatsphilosophische Problem, das Locke von Hobbes geerbt hatte, war das Problem, eine Theorie natürlicher Rechte zu formulieren, die dem friedlichen Übertritt in eine bürgerliche Gesellschaft nicht entgegensteht. Wenn die Existenz des Staates mit der unkritisiert bleibenden Vorstellung verbunden wird, jedem Individuum komme ein natürliches Recht auf alles zu, was es als für seine Selbsterhaltung nützlich erachtet, und außerdem die moralischen Grenzen, denen ein derartig umfassendes Recht unterliegt, ebenfalls nicht reflektiert werden, dann läßt sich eine bürgerliche Gesellschaft nicht ohne die zwingende Gewalt einer absolut souveränen Macht begründen. Das Problem eines solchen Konzepts, so betont Locke nachdrücklich, besteht darin, daß unter einer absoluten politischen Autorität Bürger zu Sklaven werden.Um einen Absolutismus Hobbes'scher Prägung zu vermeiden, mußte Locke den Beweis dafür führen, daß der Mensch im Naturzustand durch natürliche Pflichten gebunden ist. Dazu schuf er die Vorstellung von einer natürlichen Verpflichtung, die den Ursprung der Identität des Menschen als einer Person, die Rechte hat, auf etwas zurückführt, was als "Tätigkeit des Bewußtseins" bezeichnet werden könnte. Für Locke ist es die Tätigkeit des Bewußtseins, d.i. der im Selbstbewußtsein gegründete Akt, sich die eigenen Handlungen selbst zuzuschreiben, überhaupt der Akt der Inbesitznahme des eigenen Selbst, der das Eigeninteresse mit der Annahme von Verantwortlichkeit verknüpft und das natürliche Recht in ein natürliches Prinzip der Moralität verwandelt, das der regulierenden Autorität einer souveränen Gewalt oder der legitimierenden Autorität Gottes nicht mehr bedarf. Um Lockes politische Philosophie zu rechtfertigen, sind daher weder theologische Begründungen nötig noch Naturrechtsdoktrinen als moralischer Ersatz für den Hobbes'schen Souverän. Locke betrachtet die bloße natürliche Verpflichtung als hinreichend für die Begründung einer bürgerlichen Gesellschaft. Das Resultat ist eine natürliche Moralität, die Menschen erlaubt, sich ohne die Intervention einer souveränen Gewalt in einen Zustand der Gemeinschaft und des gegenseitigen Vertrauens zu begeben. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:112 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Gallie's Peirce and Pragmatism (1952). She believes that the translation of Peirce's theory of the categories into the conceptual framework of British empiricism and naturalism misrepresents Peirce's cosmology which had very peculiar traits--traits which the author associates with the Platonic tradition. She shows in detail how Peirce tried at first (1868) to relate his three categories to the Scotist, Scholastic, concepts of "essence" and "substance," (...) and how, in his various phaneroscopic experiments, he gradually repudiated the Scholastic languages and by 1902 was ready to interpret his three categories as an adequate ontology. What led Peirce in this direction was his critique of perceptual judgment. He realized that subject and object are in dynamical, social, and historical relation to each other. A logical object is, therefore, also a "dynamic object" or objective. This insight led him at first to regard his doctrine of signs and their interpretation as a humanist or idealist doctrine, for the idealists had also recognized objects as objectives. Nynfa Bosco is quick to appreciate that this interpretation of acts of knowing is closely related to Gentile's idealism. But gradually a more ontological and Platonic interpretation emerges in Peirce, until in the end "thirdness" is a modernist version of the reality of universals. She believes Peirce's greatest achievement was his exposition of "thirdness" as an ontological mediation between modern idealism and Scholastic realism and his theory of evolution as a continuity of physical and mental events. The volume closes with chapters on Peirce's mathematics, ethics, esthetics, philosophy of religion, theology, and psychology. Those chapters are not mere expositions but critical evaluations. To review Nynfa Bosco's criticisms would take us far beyond the limits of an historical review. Suffice it to say that her criticisms are acute as well as sympathetic, and that they reflect well some of the differences between Italian and American tendencies in philosophical analysis. For several reasons, in short, this work deserves to be known internationally. It probably deserves also to be translated, though a translator would find it difficult to maintain the liveliness of her Italian style, which makes reading the book a pleasure as well as an instruction. HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER Claremont, Calilornia L'Iddalism de Lachelier. By Gaston Mauchaussat. (Paris: Presses Universitaires, Biblioth6que de Philosophie Contemporaine [N.F. 18], 1961. Pp. 224.) This is really an intellectual biography of Jules Lachelier (1832-1918); it traces the development of his idealism from 1866 to 1913 and of his moral BOOK REVIEWS I13 philosophy from 1868 to 1918. According to Lachelier himself, there was a significant change in his thinking when, in 1875, he ceased being a teacher, but M. Mauchaussat finds significant elements of the later development even in his earliest works. In general, according to this account, there was a continuous development from subjective to Platonic idealism and from empirical ethics to his axiological theodicy. The documentation and exposition are detailed and precise. The figure of Lachelier emerges as an important historical link between the romantic idealism of the early nineteenth century and the objective value theory or "philosophie de l'esprit" of the twentieth. Though Lachelier himself seems to have forgotten or discounted the early influence on him of Maine de Biran, the author of this biography finds good evidence that his early "Berkeleyan" idealism was derived largely from Maine de Biran and led him to make a careful study of the empirical psychology of thinking and of the importance of habit. D~s 1858, lisant l'introduction du M6moire de Maine de Biran sur l'influence de I'habitude, il en tire cette cons6quence que les esprits ne peuvent d6velopper leurs diverses puissances que par leur union avec le corps et qu'en somme l'homme pense parce qu'il parle (p. 13). It is evident that Lachelier's primary concern was to find in an empirical idealism a mediator between dogmatic naturalism and the equally dogmatic "spiritualism" which the school of Victor Cousin had established in academic circles. It was Ravaisson who guided him in this search. His course at the Ecole Normale Superieur, to which he was called in 1864, gave him an opportunity to work... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:112 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Gallie's Peirce and Pragmatism (1952). She believes that the translation of Peirce's theory of the categories into the conceptual framework of British empiricism and naturalism misrepresents Peirce's cosmology which had very peculiar traits--traits which the author associates with the Platonic tradition. She shows in detail how Peirce tried at first (1868) to relate his three categories to the Scotist, Scholastic, concepts of "essence" and "substance," (...) and how, in his various phaneroscopic experiments, he gradually repudiated the Scholastic languages and by 1902 was ready to interpret his three categories as an adequate ontology. What led Peirce in this direction was his critique of perceptual judgment. He realized that subject and object are in dynamical, social, and historical relation to each other. A logical object is, therefore, also a "dynamic object" or objective. This insight led him at first to regard his doctrine of signs and their interpretation as a humanist or idealist doctrine, for the idealists had also recognized objects as objectives. Nynfa Bosco is quick to appreciate that this interpretation of acts of knowing is closely related to Gentile's idealism. But gradually a more ontological and Platonic interpretation emerges in Peirce, until in the end "thirdness" is a modernist version of the reality of universals. She believes Peirce's greatest achievement was his exposition of "thirdness" as an ontological mediation between modern idealism and Scholastic realism and his theory of evolution as a continuity of physical and mental events. The volume closes with chapters on Peirce's mathematics, ethics, esthetics, philosophy of religion, theology, and psychology. Those chapters are not mere expositions but critical evaluations. To review Nynfa Bosco's criticisms would take us far beyond the limits of an historical review. Suffice it to say that her criticisms are acute as well as sympathetic, and that they reflect well some of the differences between Italian and American tendencies in philosophical analysis. For several reasons, in short, this work deserves to be known internationally. It probably deserves also to be translated, though a translator would find it difficult to maintain the liveliness of her Italian style, which makes reading the book a pleasure as well as an instruction. HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER Claremont, Calilornia L'Iddalism de Lachelier. By Gaston Mauchaussat. (Paris: Presses Universitaires, Biblioth6que de Philosophie Contemporaine [N.F. 18], 1961. Pp. 224.) This is really an intellectual biography of Jules Lachelier (1832-1918); it traces the development of his idealism from 1866 to 1913 and of his moral BOOK REVIEWS I13 philosophy from 1868 to 1918. According to Lachelier himself, there was a significant change in his thinking when, in 1875, he ceased being a teacher, but M. Mauchaussat finds significant elements of the later development even in his earliest works. In general, according to this account, there was a continuous development from subjective to Platonic idealism and from empirical ethics to his axiological theodicy. The documentation and exposition are detailed and precise. The figure of Lachelier emerges as an important historical link between the romantic idealism of the early nineteenth century and the objective value theory or "philosophie de l'esprit" of the twentieth. Though Lachelier himself seems to have forgotten or discounted the early influence on him of Maine de Biran, the author of this biography finds good evidence that his early "Berkeleyan" idealism was derived largely from Maine de Biran and led him to make a careful study of the empirical psychology of thinking and of the importance of habit. D~s 1858, lisant l'introduction du M6moire de Maine de Biran sur l'influence de I'habitude, il en tire cette cons6quence que les esprits ne peuvent d6velopper leurs diverses puissances que par leur union avec le corps et qu'en somme l'homme pense parce qu'il parle (p. 13). It is evident that Lachelier's primary concern was to find in an empirical idealism a mediator between dogmatic naturalism and the equally dogmatic "spiritualism" which the school of Victor Cousin had established in academic circles. It was Ravaisson who guided him in this search. His course at the Ecole Normale Superieur, to which he was called in 1864, gave him an opportunity to work... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:262 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY (p. 86). Since a category is a type of concept, it appears from this account that Kant holds a linguistic theory of concepts in general. According to Bird, Kant identifies concepts with language (pp. 61, 121, 123-124); they are, for him, linguistic entities (pp. 100, 104). On one occasion he refers to Kant's theory as a "picture of language" (p. 102). Kant seems thus to (...) be transformed by Bird into an ordinary language nominalist--and that a century and a half before Wittgenstein. The trouble with all this is that it simply is not supported by the text. Rather than giving a linguistic interpretation of concepts in general and categories in particular, Kant constantly analyzes them in conceptual terms. He speaks of them as forms of thought, ideas, conditions or criteria of thought, acts of pure thought, and so on. Their origin is always the human understanding. But, as Bird states in the passage quoted, Kant believes that our language sets a limit to our understanding. This might be taken to mean that language controls our thought so that we can conceive only what we can verbally describe. Or it could have a stronger meaning--that thought is reducible to verbalization. Bird seems to accept the latter as the proper interpretation of Kant for he contends that Kant holds the view that to conceive something is to describe it linguistically (pp. 127-129). If these words are to be understood in their ordinary meanings, one seems forced to the conclusion that in Bird's mind Kant is a linguistic behaviorist. If this is what Bird means to imply, it hardly seems worthwhile to pursue his linguistic reformulation of the critical philosophy any further. Nevertheless, the question remains in the reader's mind, "Why should any student, particularly one who has shown such understanding and appreciation of Kant, depart from his scholarly approach to the Critique to attribute to Kant a theory which, instead of having any plausibility as an interpretation of the Kantian epistemology, seems rather to be a parody of the argument it is meant to explain?" OLIVERA. JOHNSON University of California,Riverside Chauncey Wright and the Foundations of Pragmatism. By Edward H. Madden. (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1963. Pp. vii + 203. $5.00.) The importance of Chauncey Wright in the history of American philosophy is being increasingly realized. Professor Madden's work is the first comprehensive account of his life, his writings, and his ideas. The sources are scanty and often obscure, but Madden has made exhaustive use of them and gives us a bibliography and critical notes. This is a product of first-class scholarship, bringing together what the author had published in scattered BOOK REVIEWS 263 articles, and supplementing his anthology of Wright (Liberal Arts Press). The biographical chapter presents Wright as an attractive character among devoted friends and also as a solitary, original scientist. Wright's primary achievement was to apply utilitarian principles to Darwinian natural selection theory. Since Darwin himself made no such attempt, nor did John Stuart Mill, and since Darwin showed an evident interest in Wright's attempt, this represents a major contribution to evolutionary theory. On the negative side, too, Wright was incisive in his criticisms of Spencer, Mivart, Hamilton, Mansel, and Lewes. The pragmatic strains in Wright's philosophical method were incidental to his primary interest in showing that sciences are metaphysically "neutral." But his influence on Peirce and James was direct and strong, both on their cosmological and methodological doctrines. He deserves to be mentioned as the prime mover in this trinity of early pragmatism and naturalism, but since his own writings were relatively few and scattered, his historical importance rests largely on the use which Peirce and James made of his ideas and the development which they gave to his philosophy. HER~VRTW. SCHNEIDER Claremont, California Propos sur Jules Lequier: Philosophe de la libert~--R~flexions sur sa vie et sur sa pens~e. Par s Callot. (Paris: l~ditions Marcel Rivi~re et Cie, 1962. Pp. 142 [1]. Biblioth6que Philosophique.) L'oeuvre de Jules Lequier est importante. Nos philosophes am~ricains Charles Hartshorne et William L. Reese en ont fait... (shrink)

Cambridge’deki büyük akademik cemaatin sakinleri olan bizler bir araya geldik ve hoşgörü ve onun egemen politik iklim içerisindeki yeri hakkında dostça ama ateşli bir tartışma yürüttük. Okuyucu, bizim nerelerde aynı düşüncede olmadığımızı bulmakta hiçbir zorluk çekmeyecektir. Diğer taraftan, farklı başlangıç noktalarından ve farklı yollardan hareketle yaklaşık olarak aynı yere ulaştık. Her birimiz için, egemen hoşgörü kuramı ve pratiğinin, incelendiği takdirde, korkunç politik gerçekleri gizlemeye yarayan bir maske olduğu ortaya çıktı. Kızgınlığın tonu makaleden makaleye keskin bir şekilde artmakta; belki de boş (...) yere, okuyucuların bu noktaya getiren akıl yürütmeyi takip edeceklerini umuyoruz. Nihayetinde bu kızgınlık hem kafa hem de kalpte ikamet etmektedir…. (shrink)

George Herbert Mead was a dedicated progressive and internationalist who strove to realize his political convictions through participation in numerous civic organizations in Chicago. These convictions informed and were informed by his approach to philosophy. This article addresses the bonds between Mead's philosophy, social psychology, and his support of women's rights through an analysis of a letter he wrote to his daughter-in-law regarding her plans for a career.

Predication and the problems of universals and individuation have preoccupied philosophers from Plato (if not before) to the present. Concerns about relations and the special problems posed by relational predication came later - along with the explicit recognition of facts as purported entities that make a judgment true, rather than false, and resultant questions about the structure of such grounds of truth. The essays in the volume explore aspects of the history of the classic issues raised as well as alternative (...) attempts to deal with such issues. (shrink)

The poor survival rate of primary sources for the history of Irish women in the early modern period is mitigated by the sophistication with which extant sources are now being analysed. When re-examined without reference to the demands of the traditional historical grand narrative, when each text itself is permitted to guide its own interrogation, previously undervalued texts are revealed to be insightful of individual existential experience. The memoir of eighteenth-century Dorothea Herbert, hitherto much ignored due to the authors (...) mental illness, is becoming increasingly respected not just for its historic evidential value but for the revelations it contains of a distressed individuals use of literature to manage her circumstances. The interpretive tools deployed on such a text by different research specialisms necessarily lead to divergent conclusions; this in turn may lead to creative re-imagining of history although they cannot all equally reflect what was likely to have been the lived reality of the original author. (shrink)

-- Douglas Kellner, University of Texas, Austin.

Herbert Spencer, Victorian philosopher, biologist, sociologist and political theorist, one of the founders of Social Darwinism and author of the phrase 'survival of the fittest', was nominated for the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1902, losing out to Theodor Mommsen. Spencer left his post at The Economist in 1857 to focus on writing his ten-volume System of Synthetic Philosophy, a work that offers an ethics-based guide to human conduct to replace that provided by conventional religious belief. Published in 1879, (...) this volume seeks to demonstrate that social evolution tends towards greater individualism, altruism and co-operation. Spencer argues that it is possible to establish rules of right conduct on a scientific basis, and declares that this work is the culmination of his life's study. He was anxious to publish it outside the planned order of the System, because he feared that his death would prevent its completion. (shrink)

Continuing his exploration of the organization of complexity and the science of design, this new edition of Herbert Simon's classic work on artificial ...

The foundation of historical materialism.--A study on authority.--Sartre's existentialism.--Karl Popper and the problem of historical laws.--Freedom and the historical imperative.

Existential-Ontologie und historischer Materialismus bei Herbert Marcuse, von A. Schmidt.--Das Ganze und das ganz Andere; zur Kritik der reinen revolutionären Transzendenz, von W.F. Haug.--Technik und Eindimensionalität; eine Version der Technokratiethese? Von C. Offe.--Technologische Rationalität und spätkapitalistische ökonomie, von J. Bergmann.--Die geschichtliche Dimension des Realitätsprinzips, von H. Berndt und R. Reiche.--Marcuse and the New Left in America, by P. Breines.--Ausgewählte Bibliographie der Schriften Herbert Marcuses (p. 155-[161]).

This chapter presents new findings about Maria von Herbert's life. Building on this, an interpretation is offered of what she means when she calls upon Kant "for solace ... or for counsel to prepare [her] for death". It is then argued that Kant's reply is more satisfactory than is commonly appreciated, as he explicitly defines the roles which he is prepared to adopt – that of a "moral physician" and of a "mediator" -- and thus the standards by which (...) to judge his reply. Having said that, his letter does not address what has been viewed as a challenge to Kantian ethics. It is a matter of dispute what exactly this challenge consists in. This chapter identifies the challenge and the terms in which it is most productively stated. Finally, it provides sufficient reasons to establish that a portrait that resurfaced in November 2016 does indeed depict Maria von Herbert. (shrink)

The original publication of this volume drew Herbert into the epistemological debate with John Stuart Mill. It was to be of relevance to future psychologists, including William James, a pioneer of experimental psychology.

With a new chapter This new edition of Herbert Fingarette's classic study in philosophical psychology now includes a provocative recent essay on the topic by the author. A seminal work, the book has deeply influenced the fields of philosophy, ethics, psychology, and cognitive science, and it remains an important focal point for the large body of literature on self-deception that has appeared since its publication. How can one deceive oneself if the very idea of deception implies that the deceiver (...) knows the truth? The resolution of this paradox leads Fingarette to fundamental insights into the mind at work. He questions our basic ideas of self and the unconscious, personal responsibility and our ethical categories of guilt and innocence. Fingarette applies these ideas to the philosophies of Sartre and Kierkegaard, as well as to Freud's psychoanalytic theories and to contemporary research into neurosurgery. Included in this new edition, Fingarette's most recent essay, "Self-Deception Needs No Explaining (1998)," challenges the ideas in the extant literature. (shrink)