According to orthodoxy, the most fundamental kind of causation involves one event causing another event. I argue against this event‐causal view. Instead, the most fundamental kind of causation is thing causation, which involves a thing causing a thing to do something. Event causation is reducible to thing causation, but thing causation is not reducible to event causation, because event causation cannot accommodate cases of fine‐grained causation. I defend my view from objections, including C. D. Broad's influential “timing” argument, and I (...) conclude with implications for agent‐causal theories of free will. (shrink)

A popular principle about grounding, “Internality”, says that if A grounds B, then necessarily, if A and B obtain, then A grounds B. I argue that Internality is false. Its falsity reveals a distinctive, new kind of explanation, which I call “ennobling”. Its falsity also entails that every previously proposed theory of what grounds grounding facts is false. I construct a new theory.

Why do we so often care about the outcomes of games when nothing is at stake? There is a paradox here, much like the paradox of fiction, which concerns why we care about the fates and threats of merely fictional beings. I argue that the paradox threatens to overturn a great deal of what philosophers have thought about caring, severing its connection to value and undermining its moral weight. I defend a solution to the paradox that draws on Kendall Walton's (...) solution to the paradox of fiction, developing his idea that it be extended to games. The solution takes games to involve make‐believe: in particular, players and spectators make‐believe that the outcome of the game matters. I also explore how the phenomenon extends beyond games. And I explore some moral implications: in particular, my view preserves the idea that we have reason not to impede others in their pursuit of what they care about. (shrink)

Carl Schmitt and the Problem of the Realization of Law 1. The famous pithy aphorisms that Carl Schmitt used to open his major works - 'the sovereign is he who decides on the exception', 'the concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political', etc. - have become a part of the common discourse of contemporary scholarship on politics and the law. The theoretical framework that animates these slogans, however, has remained somewhat opaque. It has often been (...) argued that there is no such framework, that Schmitt was a situational thinker whose works are best understood as interventions in concrete political debates that do not add up to a grand theoretical vision. (shrink)

Dying is part of life. Dying and Human Dignity offers the reader a complete overview and a profound evaluation of the knowledge we have about dying. Experts from a wide range of disciplines cast light on this subject from their specific perspectives. This handbook is an essential reference work for everyone who wants to inform himself about dying for either professional or personal reasons.

Theories of epistemically justified belief have long assumed individualism. In its extreme, or Lockean, form individualism rules out justified belief on testimony by insisting that a subject is justified in believing a proposition only if he or she possesses first-hand justification for it. The skeptical consequences of extreme individualism have led many to adopt a milder version, attributable to Hume, on which a subject is justified in believing a proposition only if he or she is justified in believing that there (...) is testimony in favor of the proposition deriving from a reliable source. I argue that this Humean individualism also leads to skepticism in a wide range of cases; it makes it impossible for a layperson to be justified on expert testimony. In addition, I argue that the apparent motivation for the Humean view, an insistence on intellectual autonomy in justification, does not succeed in motivating it. I then explore the contours of a collectivist view of justification on testimony, with special attention to the place of a subject's intellectual autonomy in such justification. I try to bring empirical results of the psychology of persuasion to bear on the epistemological issues. (shrink)

In Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise, Louis Loeb ascribes to Hume a naturalistic account of justified belief, one on which Hume is fundamentally concerned with the question whether stable belief can be achieved. Loeb's interpretation is systematic, richly explanatory, and powerfully argued. He makes a compelling case that stability plays a central role in Hume's epistemology. Loeb's case is so compelling indeed that anyone who wants to defend an alternative interpretation will now have to assimilate or deflect the massive (...) textual evidence in favor of the stability interpretation. I will argue here that, for some passages Loeb cites in favor of the stability interpretation, a veritistic interpretation explains the text at least as well as the stability interpretation does. (shrink)

Schmitt, C. Die Tyrannei der Werte.--Jüngel, E. Wertlose Wahrheit.--Schelz, S. Der Wert als ideologischer Begriff.

I. Die Gnosis des Altertums.--II. Die Gnosis des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit.

We argue that supererogation cannot be understood just in terms of reasons for action. In addition to reasons, a theory of supererogation must include prerogatives, which can make an action permissible without counting in favor of doing it.

Homeosis is a developmental abnormality corresponding to the transformation of a part of the body into another one. This term was introduced in 1894 by William Bateson, who aimed to make an inventory of all kinds of biological variation in order to understand how evolution proceeds. But, immediately afterwards experimental embryology, or Entwicklungsmechanik in Germany, adopted and redefined this term to refer to abnormal regenerations in which the newly developed organ was not identical to the initial one but rather resembled (...) another part of the body. At that time, many experimental embryologists, such as Wilhelm Roux, were calling for the elimination of any phylogenetic explanation of development and were attempting to promote more mechanistic, proximate explanations. Despite these recommendations, several biologists continued to account for developmental processes by turning to phylogeny instead of mechanical forces. The case of homeosis is representative. Indeed, abnormal regenerations were often seen as examples of atavisms, or recurrence of ancestral characteristics, and many embryologists appealed to Ernst Haeckel's 'fundamental biogenetic law' to explain these strange phenomena. The break between Haeckelian tradition and Entwicklungsmechanik is thus less radical than often assumed, and the homeosis concept represents one of the factors of this continuity. (shrink)

Sets itself the Herculean task of comparing and reconciling the modern and Platonic concepts of rationality.

Einfuhrung Carl Schmitt: Der Schatten Gottes. INtrospektionen, Tagebucher und Briefe 1921 bis 1924 Teil I: Tagebuch August 1921 bis August 1922 Bearbeitet von Gerd Giesler und Ernst Husmert Teil II: Tagebuch 1923 und 1924 Bearbeitet von Wolfgang H. SPindler Teil III: Der Schatten Gottes. AUfzeichnungen aus den Jahren 1922 bis 1924 Bearbeitet von Gerd Giesler, Ernst Husmert und Wolfgang H. SPindler Anhang Briefe, Dokumente und Abbildungen Verzeichnis der mehrfach genannten Literatur Quellen und Nachschlagewerke Abbildungs- und Quellennachweis Personenverzeichnis.

Der logische Status dessen, was in der Hegelschen Terminologie «Begriff» heisst, kann nur als seine eigene Genese zur Darstellung kommen. In ihm sind die Formen der Positivität, die durch die Subjekt-Objekt-Relation charakterisiert sind, als Momente enthalten. Die Einsicht in die einzelnen Formen der Positivität ermöglicht es, sich einen Begriff von der Sprachlichkeit des Selbstbewusstseins zu machen.

This volume provides the first English translation of Hans Kelsen's and Carl Schmitt's influential Weimar-era debate on constitutional guardianship and the legitimacy of constitutional review. It includes Kelsen's seminal piece, 'The Nature and Development of Constitutional Adjudication', as well as key extracts from the 'Guardian of the Constitution' which present Schmitt's argument against constitutional review. Also included are Kelsen's review of Schmitt's 'Guardian of the Constitution', as well as some further material by Kelsen and Schmitt on (...) presidential dictatorship under Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution. These texts show Kelsen and Schmitt responding to one another, in the context of a debate focused on a concrete constitutional crisis, thus allowing the reader to assess the plausibility of Kelsen's and Schmitt's legal and constitutional theories. (shrink)