The philosophy of mind is one of the fastest-growing areas in philosophy, not least because of its connections with related areas of psychology, linguistics and computation. This _Companion_ is an alphabetically arranged reference guide to the subject, firmly rooted in the philosophy of mind, but with a number of entries that survey adjacent fields of interest. The book is introduced by the editor's substantial _Essay on the Philosophy of Mind_ which serves as an overview of the subject, and is closely (...) referenced to the entries in the Companion. Among the entries themselves are several "self-profiles" by leading philosophers in the field, including Chomsky, Davidson, Dennett, Dretske, Fodor, Lewis, Searle and Stalnaker, in which their own positions within the subject are articulated. In some more complex areas, more than one author has been invited to write on the same topic, giving a polarity of viewpoints within the book's overall coverage. All main entries have a full bibliography, and the book is indexed to the high standards set by other volumes in the Blackwell Companions to Philosophy series. (shrink)

Objects of Metaphor puts forward a philosophical account of metaphor radically different from those currently on offer. Powerful and flexible enough to cope with the syntactic complexity typical of genuine metaphor, it offers novel conceptions of the relationship between simile and metaphor, the notion of dead metaphor, and the idea of metaphor as a robust theoretic kind. Without denying that metaphor can sometimes be merely ornamental, Guttenplan justifies the view of metaphor as fundamental to language and the study of (...) language. His book will be of great interest not only to philosophers in this field, but also to those working across psychology and linguistics. (shrink)

_Mind's Landscape_ is an engaging introduction to the philosophical study of mind and an elegantly persuasive account of how best to understand the nature of mental phenomena. It serves as both a text and as a contribution to the philosophy of mind. Its engaging narrative style will appeal to students, instructors, and general readers alike.

With the same intellectual goals as the first edition, this innovative introductory logic textbook explores the relationship between natural language and logic, motivating the student to acquire skills and techniques of formal logic. This new and revised edition includes substantial additions which make the text even more useful to students and instructors alike. Central to these changes is an Appendix, 'How to Learn Logic', which takes the student through fourteen compact and sharply directed lessons with exercises and answers.

"With the same intellectual goals as the first edition, this innovative introductory logic textbook explores the relationship between natural language and logic, motivating the student to acquire skills and techniques of formal logic. This new and revised edition includes substantial additions which make the text even more useful to students and instructors alike. Central to these changes is an Appendix, 'How to Learn Logic', which takes the student through fourteen compact and sharply directed lessons with exercises and answers"--Google books viewed (...) Feb. 19, 2021. (shrink)

This introductory text encourages students to engage with key problems and arguments in ethics through a series of classic and contemporary readings. The text will inspire students to think about the distinctive nature of moral philosophy, and to draw comparisons between different traditions of thought, between ancient and modern philosophies, and between theoretical and literary writing about the place of value in human life. Each of the book's six chapters focuses on a particular theme: the nature of goodness, subjectivity and (...) objectivity in ethical thinking, justice and virtue, moral motivation, the place of moral obligation, and the idea that literature can be a form of moral philosophy. Each chapter features two or three key readings, drawn from texts as diverse as Plato's Republic, J. S. Mill's Utilitarianism, Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and Rawls' A Theory of Justice. The readings are all accompanied by interactive commentary from the editors. (shrink)

ISSUES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE edited by Alfred M. MacKay and Daniel D. Merrill. (Oberlin Colloquium, 1972.) Yale U.P., 1976. xiv+161 pp. £7.50.TRUTH AND MEANING: Essays in Semantics, edited by Gareth Evans and John McDowell. Clarendon Press: O.U.P., 1976. xxiii+420 pp. £11.50.

Is there room for philosophy in educational research? Is there phenomenology before and beyond its uses and abuses in the applied and social sciences? How are phenomenology and philosophy of education related? What are the methods for phenomenology within the field of philosophy of education? These talks to educational scholars and researchers responds to these questions and appeals for place of philosophy within educational research and the tradition of phenomenology within philosophy of education. Across a genealogy of thought and frequent (...) autobiographical confessions, this book of lectures works from the simple insight that philosophy and education are not so different. (shrink)

Folk is an analog foundation in a digital world. Phenomenology is a big word about a small, impossible task: trying to imagine the real. This book describes this task in relation to its foundation. Most of all, 'Folk phenomenology' is a defense of the integrity and sufficiency of art--thinking, feeling, living, dying. In short, being in love."--Back cover.

Review of Gutteplan and Tamny's introduction to logicA.

Machery and Weiskopf argue that the kind concept is a natural kind if and only if it plays an explanatory role in cognitive scientific explanations. In this paper, we argue against this explanationist approach to determining the natural kind-hood of concept. We first demonstrate that hybrid, pluralist, and eliminativist theories of concepts afford the kind concept different explanatory roles. Then, we argue that we cannot decide between hybrid, pluralist, and eliminativist theories of concepts, because each endorses a different, but equally (...) viable, specification of the explananda of cognitive science. It follows that an explanationist approach to determining the natural kind-hood of concept fails, because there is no consensus about whether or not concept should be afforded an explanatory role in our best cognitive scientific explanations. We conclude by considering what our critique of explanationism could imply for further discussions about the explanatory role of concepts in cognitive science. (shrink)

Some philosophers argue that we should eschew cross-explanatory integrations of mechanistic, dynamicist, and psychological explanations in cognitive science, because, unlike integrations of mechanistic explanations, they do not deliver genuine, cognitive scientific explanations. Here I challenge this claim by comparing the theoretical virtues of both kinds of explanatory integrations. I first identify two theoretical virtues of integrations of mechanistic explanations—unification and greater qualitative parsimony—and argue that no cross-explanatory integration could have such virtues. However, I go on to argue that this is (...) only a problem for those who think that cognitive science aims to specify one fundamental structure responsible for cognition. For those who do not, cross-explanatory integration will have at least two theoretical virtues to a greater extent than integrations of mechanistic explanations: explanatory depth and applicability. I conclude that one’s views about explanatory integration in cognitive science cannot be segregated from one’s views about the explanatory task of cognitive science. (shrink)

Cognitive theorists routinely disagree about the evidence supporting claims in cognitive science. Here, we first argue that some disagreements about evidence in cognitive science are about the evidence available to be drawn upon by cognitive theorists. Then, we show that one’s explanation of why this first kind of disagreement obtains will cohere with one’s theory of evidence. We argue that the best explanation for why cognitive theorists disagree in this way is because their evidence is what they rationally grant. Finally, (...) we explain why our view does not lead to a pernicious kind of relativism in cognitive science. (shrink)

Some philosophers argue that all concepts cannot have the same representational structure, because no single kind of representation has been successful in accounting for the phenomena related to the formation and application of concepts. Here, I argue against this “appeal to cognitive science” by demonstrating that different theories of the kind concept cohere with different interpretations of the argument. To circumvent the threat of relativism, I argue that theories of concept should be understood as working hypotheses, which are provisionally accepted (...) to facilitate the investigation and explanation of the mind/brain. From this perspective, theories of concept are to be evaluated as part of a comparative analysis of the different kinds of cognitive science they inspire. (shrink)

The epistemic theory of causality views causality as a tool that helps us to predict, explain and control our world, rather than as a relation that exists independently of our epistemic practices. In this chapter, we first provide an introduction to the epistemic theory of causality. We then outline four considerations that motivate the epistemic theory: the failure of standard theories of causality; parsimony; the epistemology of causality; and neutrality. We illustrate these four considerations in the contexts of the social (...) sciences and the cognitive sciences. We argue that the epistemic theory provides a very natural account of causality across these contexts. (shrink)

Representationalists and anti-representationalists disagree about whether a naturalisation of mental content is possible and, hence, whether positing mental representations in cognitive science is justified. Here, I develop a novel way to think about mental representations based on a philosophical description of (cognitive) science inspired by cognitive instrumentalism. On this view, our acceptance of theories positing mental representations and our beliefs in (something like) mental representations do not depend on the naturalisation of content. Thus, I conclude that if we endorse cognitive (...) instrumentalism about mental representations, then we can finally leave the dispute between representationalism and anti-representationalism behind. (shrink)

Kaplan and Craver :601–627, 2011) and Piccinini and Craver :283–311, 2011) argue that only mechanistic explanations of cognition are genuine causal explanations, because only evidence of mechanisms reveals the causal structure of cognition. I first argue that this claim is grounded in a commitment to the mechanistic account of causality, which cannot be endorsed by a defender of causal-nonmechanistic explanations. Then, I defend the epistemic theory of causality, which holds that causal explanations are not genuine to the extent that they (...) reveal mechanistic causal structure, but, rather, to the extent that they have evidential support and yield successful prediction, explanation, and control inferences. Finally, I enact an epistemic unification of causal explanation in cognitive science, according to which both mechanistic and nonmechanistic explanations of cognition can be genuine causal explanations. (shrink)

A tension has been identified between the acquisition and participation metaphors for learning, and it is generally agreed that this tension has still not been adequately resolved. In this paper, we offer an alternative to the acquisition and participation metaphors for learning: the metaphor of mastering. Our claim is that the mastering metaphor, as grounded in inferentialism, allows one to treat both the acquisition and participation dimensions of learning as complementary and mutually constitutive. Inferentialism is a semantic theory which explains (...) concept formation in terms of the inferences individuals make in the context of an intersubjective practice of acknowledging, attributing, and challenging one another's commitments. We first introduce the key concepts of inferentialism and consider the perspective on learning that inferentialism inspires. Then, we condense the lessons of the inferentialist concepts into a single mastering metaphor for learning and argue that learning consists in the process by which learners come to master concepts and practices. We conclude by discussing how the mastering metaphor could be put to work in a theoretical reconciliation of the cognitive and sociocultural dimensions of learning. (shrink)

A tension exists between those who do—e.g. Meyer (The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71:959–985, 2020 ) and Chemero ( 2011 )—and those who do not—e.g. Kaplan and Craver (Philosophy of Science 78:601–627, 2011 ) Piccinini and Craver (Synthese 183:283–311, 2011 )—afford nonmechanistic explanations a role in cognitive science. Here, I argue that one’s perspective on this matter will cohere with one’s interpretation of the tasks of cognitive science; that is, of the actions for which cognitive scientists are (...) specially fitted. To make this point concrete, I consider two tasks of cognitive science—establishing causal claims and unifying—and show how these tasks are interpreted differently by mechanists and nonmechanists respectively. I then argue that, as a result of these different interpretations, we cannot expect to resolve the tension between mechanists and nonmechanists by appeal to cognitive scientific practice. I conclude that we should give up on the debate between mechanists and nonmechanists, and search for progress elsewhere. (shrink)

Here, I take alethic views of understanding to be all views that hold that whether an explanation is true or false matters for whether that explanation provides understanding. I then argue that there is (as yet) no naturalistic defence of alethic views of understanding in cognitive science, because there is no agreement about the correct descriptions of the content of cognitive scientific explanations. I use this claim to argue for the provisional acceptance of afactivism in cognitive science, which is the (...) view that the truth or falsity of an explanation of cognition is irrelevant to whether that explanation provides understanding. I conclude by discussing the relation between understanding in cognitive science and understanding in other domains. (shrink)

Matching in observational studies faces complications when units enroll in treatment on a rolling basis. While each treated unit has a specific time of entry into the study, control units each have many possible comparison, or “pseudo-treatment,” times. Valid inference must account for correlations between repeated measures for a single unit, and researchers must decide how flexibly to match across time and units. We provide three important innovations. First, we introduce a new matched design, GroupMatch with instance replacement, allowing maximum (...) flexibility in control selection. This new design searches over all possible comparison times for each treated-control pairing and is more amenable to analysis than past methods. Second, we propose a block bootstrap approach for inference in matched designs with rolling enrollment and demonstrate that it accounts properly for complex correlations across matched sets in our new design and several other contexts. Third, we develop a falsification test to detect violations of the timepoint agnosticism assumption, which is needed to permit flexible matching across time. We demonstrate the practical value of these tools via simulations and a case study of the impact of short-term injuries on batting performance in major league baseball. (shrink)

This book evaluates whether or not we can decide on the best theory of concepts by appealing to the explanatory results of cognitive science. It undertakes an in-depth analysis of different theories of concepts and of the explanations formulated in cognitive science. As a result, two reasons are provided for thinking that an appeal to cognitive science cannot help to decide on the best theory of concepts.

Can the Internet reach beyond the U. S. college samples predominant in social science research? A sample of 564,502 participants completed a personality questionnaire online. We found that 19% were not from advanced economies; 20% were from non-Western societies; 35% of the Western-society sample were not from the United States; and 66% of the U. S. sample were not in the 18–22 (college) age group.

"Sam Rocha's primer reminds me of a French adage: la philo descends dans la rue--philosophy comes to the street. Rocha's little book can be read and talked about, with profit, on the street, in the home, in the school, in the garden, anywhere the human heart beats and the human mind thinks." --David T. Hansen, Weinburg Professor in the History and Philosophy of Education, Teachers College Columbia University "Rocha gives us a compelling experience of first-hand philosophizing, in which the ordinary (...) is shown in its powerful features, and the discipline of philosophy of education reclaims its necessity." --Cristina Cammarano, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Salisbury University "Rocha's illustrated primer is an eye-opening introduction to the philosophy of education. And, unlike too many illustrated texts, its pen and ink drawings are a thought provoking complement to this highly readable introduction." --David Mosley, Professor of Philosophy, Bellarmine University "An elegantly written invitation to students and the general reader to a frame of mind where one is ready to learn from and think about philosophy and education. Sam Rocha calls us all back, in heart-felt yet precise prose, to philosophy's ancient role of dialogue, wonder, and reflection. A joy to read and treasure." --AG Rud, Distinguished Professor, Washington State University "A charming and clearly written introduction to the philosophy of education, inspired by the writings of William James." --Graham Harman, Associate Provost for Research Administration and Professor of Philosophy, The American University in Cairo.embed-container { position: relative; padding-bottom: 56.25%; height: 0; overflow: hidden; max-width: 100%; }.embed-container iframe,.embed-container object,.embed-container embed { position: absolute; top: 0; left: 0; width: 100%; height: 100%; }. (shrink)

With Day One, Genesis 1.1 5, as a focus and informed by the understanding that all texts are intertexts, S. D. Giere shapes and employs a method that harnesses the idea of intertextuality for the purpose of exploring the history of interpretation of a biblical text. With a unique compilation of intertexts of Gen 1.1-5, the work explores the intertexual reach of Day One in Hebrew and Greek texts up to c. 200 CE. What emerges is a glimpse of the (...) intertextuality of Day One that provides insight into the complexity of the intertextuality of a biblical text and the relationship of intertextuality and interpretation. ". (shrink)

Much of the understanding of the nature of science in contemporary psychology is founded on a positivistic philosophy of science that cannot adequately account for meaning as experienced. The phenomenological tradition provides an alternative approach to science that is attentive to the inherent meaningfulness of human action in the world. Emmanuel Levinas argues, however, that phenomenology, at least as traditionally conceived, does not provide sufficient grounds for meaning. Levinas argues that meaning is grounded in the ethical encounter with the Other (...) such that meaning arises in rupture. For Levinas, the physical world and the I provide constraints on the meaning given by the Other, even as the Other is logically prior to all other experience. This Levinasian perspective advocates an epistemology that is open to the rupture of the Other as a way to knowledge. This emphasis on openness to rupture entails a methodology in which psychologists must allow the objects of study to guide their methods of research. Finally, the Levinasian perspective implies a scientific community that is sensitive to the rupture occasioned by the encounter with the Other. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Chomsky's current Biolinguistic methodology is shown to comport with what might be called 'established' aspects of biological method, thereby raising, in the biolinguistic domain, issues concerning biological autonomy from the physical sciences. At least current irreducibility of biology, including biolinguistics, stems in at least some cases from the very nature of what I will claim is physiological, or inter-organ/inter-component, macro-levels of explanation which play a new and central explanatory role in Chomsky's inter-componential explanation of certain properties of the syntactic component (...) of Universal Grammar. Under this new mode of explanation, certain physiological functions of cognitive mental organs are hypothesized, in an attempt to explain aspects of their internal anatomy. Thus, the internal anatomy of the syntactic component exhibits features that enable it to effectively interface with other 'adjacent' organs, such as the Conceptual-Intensional system and the Sensory- Motor system. These two interface systems take as their inputs the assembled outputs of the syntactic component and, as a result of the very syntactic structure imposed by the syntax are then able to assign their sound and meaning interpretations. If this is an accurate characterization, Chomsky's long-standing postulation of mental organs, and I will argue, the advancement of new hypotheses concerning physiological inter-organ functions, has attained in current biolinguistic Minimalist method a significant unification with foundational aspects of physiological explanation in other areas of biology. (shrink)