Are propositions of law true or false? If so, what does it mean to say that propositions of law are true and false? This book takes up these questions in the context of the wider philosophical debate over realism and anti-realism. Despite surface differences, Patterson argues that the leading contemporary jurisprudential theories all embrace a flawed conception of the nature of truth in law. Instead of locating that in virtue of which propositions of law are true, Patterson argues (...) that lawyers use forms of argument to show the truth of propositions of law. Additionally, Patterson argues that the realism/anti-realism debate in jurisprudence is part of a larger argument over the role of postmodernism in jurisprudence. For this, Patterson offers an analytic account of postmodernism and charts its implications for legal theory. This book will be of interest to those in legal theory, philosophy, social and political theory, and ethics. (shrink)

Bringing together the latest work from leading scholars in this emerging and vibrant subfield of law, this book examines the philosophical issues that inform the intersection between law and neuroscience.

Ronald Dworkin famously argued that legal positivism is a defective account of law because it has no account of Theoretical Disagreement. In this article I argue that legal positivism—as advanced by H.L.A. Hart—does not need an account of Theoretical Disagreement. Legal positivism does, however, need a plausible account of interpretation in law. I provide such an account in this article.

In a recent comment on H.L.A. Hart’s ‘Postscript’ to The Concept of Law, Ronald Dworkin claims that the meaning of legal and political concepts may be understood by analogy to the meaning of natural kind concepts like ‘tiger’, ‘gold’ and ‘water’. This article questions the efficacy of Dworkin’s claims by challenging the use of natural kinds as the basis for a semantic theory of legal and political concepts. Additionally, in matters of value there is no methodological equivalent to the scientific (...) method. Thus, there is little hope of finding hidden essences to explain the meaning of legal and political concepts. Finally, even if there are natural kinds, Dworkin’s arguments for their efficacy in jurisprudence are problematic and unpersuasive. The problem for Dworkin is that his embrace of natural kinds undermines the ‘fit’ side of the fit/justification model of adjudication that lies at the heart of his theory of law. (shrink)

The articles in this new edition of A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory have been updated throughout, and the addition of ten new articles ensures ...

Robert Alexy has built his original theory of law upon pervasive claims for “necessary” features of law. In this article, I show that Alexy's claims suffer from two difficulties. First, Alexy is never clear about what he means by “necessity.” Second, Alexy writes as if there have been no challenges to claims of conceptual necessity. There have been such challenges and Alexy needs to answer them if his project is to succeed.

Arguments for the importance of neuroscience reach across many disciplines. Advocates of neuroscience have made wide-ranging claims for neuroscience in the realms of ethics, value, and law. In law, for example, many scholars have argued for an increased role for neuroscientific evidence in the assessment of criminal responsibility. In this article, we take up claims for the explanatory role of neuroscience in matters of morals and law. Drawing on our previous work together, we assess the cogency of neuroscientific explanations of (...) three issues that arise in these domains: rule-following, interpretation, and knowledge. We critique these explanations and in general challenge claims as to the efficacy of the neuroscientific accounts. (shrink)

Taking up a single question--"What does it mean to say a proposition of law is true?"--this book advances a major new account of truth in law. Drawing upon the later philosophy of Wittgenstein, as well as more recent postmodern theory of the relationship between language, meaning, and the world, Patterson examines leading contemporary jurisprudential approaches to this question and finds them flawed in similar and previously unnoticed ways. He offers a powerful alternative account of legal justification, one in which (...) linguistic practice--the use of forms of legal argument--holds the key to legal meaning. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's distinction between understanding and interpretation is fundamental to the account of meaning in _Philosophical Investigations. In his discussion of rule-following, Wittgenstein explicitly rejects the idea that understanding or grasping a rule is a matter of interpretation. Wittgenstein explains meaning and rule-following in terms of action, rejecting both realist and Cartesian accounts of the mental. I argue that in his effort to employ Wittgenstein's views on meaning and rule-following, Professor Morawetz embraces the position Wittgenstein rejects. In the course of making (...) his case for law as a "deliberative practice", Professor Morawetz embraces interpretation as a fundamental element of human practices, thereby taking up precisely the view Wittgenstein rejects. (shrink)

The question What makes a promise binding? has received much attention both from philosophers and lawyers. One argument is that promises are binding because the act of making a promise creates expectations in the promisee, which expectations it would be morally wrong to disappoint. Another argument is grounded in the effects engendered by the making of a promise, specifically actions taken in reliance upon the promise. These two positions, the so-called expectation and reliance theories, have traditionally been thought to be (...) incommensurable. In a recent article, Promises and Practices, Thomas Scanlon advances a theory of promising developed out of both of these positions. This article argues that Scanlon 's argument fails because it cannot avoid the incommensurability of the expectation and reliance principles. (shrink)

John Hyman makes a good case for the proposition that duress defeases what would otherwise be a voluntary act. In this article, I consider Hyman's arguments in the context of economic duress and conclude that while Hyman makes an excellent case for the proposition that duress vitiates voluntariness, there may be cases where the law might not want to allow the defence of duress.

In this cutting edge volume. Dennis Patterson has put together a collection of essays on the topic of law and justice in postmodern society. While trying to avoid a singular point of view for this compilation, Patterson has carefully chosen articles which highlight common themes, problems, and questions.

This carefully selected set of readings presents some of the most important articles in the field. The collection is essential reading for anyone with an interest in legal philosophy. Gathers together some of the most important articles in the field of philosophy of law and legal theory. Complements Dennis Patterson's _A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory _. Represents essential reading for the beginning law student.

This carefully selected set of readings presents some of the most important articles in the field. The collection is essential reading for anyone with an interest in legal philosophy. Gathers together some of the most important articles in the field of philosophy of law and legal theory. Complements Dennis Patterson's _A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory_. Represents essential reading for the beginning law student.

Discussions of metaphysical grounding have recently found their way into general jurisprudence. It is becoming increasingly common to frame the debate between positivism and antipositivism as a disagreement about what facts metaphysically ground legal facts. In this article we critically evaluate this grounding turn. First, we argue that articulating the debate about the nature of law in terms of grounding holds the promise of recasting it in a common vocabulary. Second, we argue that this comes at a cost: framing the (...) debate in this way obscures a range of further disagreements that cannot be usefully analyzed in terms of metaphysical grounding. We conclude that grounding may give us a clearer picture of what we already knew, while obfuscating a number of important questions to which it cannot, and is not intended to, provide answers. (shrink)

Populists are often cast as deniers of rationality, creators of a climate of “post-truth,” and valuing tribe over truth and the rigors of science. Their critics claim the authority of rationality and empirical facts. Yet the critics no less than populists enable an environment of spurious claims and defective argumentation. This is especially true in the realm of science. An important case study is the account of scientific trust offered by a leading public intellectual and historian of science, Naomi Oreskes, (...) and the misapplication of that theory during the coronavirus pandemic. (shrink)

Can we know what the law is? This is the question to which Alexander Somek directs his attention in Knowing What the Law Is.1 The book is erudite, panoptic, exquisitely written and more than a litt...

Featuring contributions from renowned scholars,_ A Companion to European Union Law and International Law_ presents a comprehensive and authoritative collection of essays that addresses all of the most important topics on European Union and international law. Integrates the fields of European Union law and international law, revealing both the similarities and differences Features contributions from renowned scholars in the fields of EU law and international law Covers a broad range of topical issues, including trade, institutional decision-making, the European Court of (...) Justice, democracy, human rights, criminal law, the EMU, and many others. (shrink)

I begin, in Parts I-III, by presenting the details of the Baker and Hacker/community consensus debate over the nature of rule-following in the later Wittgenstein. In Part IV this philosophical debate is related to the law through the argument that there is both an internal and an external element to rule-following in law. I here assert one of the principal claims of my position: viz., that legal argument is directed at constructing the point of law. Part V introduces the distinction (...) between the formal and the material elements of a concept. As I shall show in detail, form is a heuristic for illuminating conceptual understanding. In Part VI, I move on to provide several examples in support of the form/matter distinction. Part VI also provides arguments in support of the proposition that understanding is internal to a practice and thus not necessarily coextensive with regularity in behavior. Parts VII-IX examine relevant claims made by Wittgenstein and their application to law. Finally, Parts X-XI sketch and illustrate my ultimate claim, a narrative approach to law. (shrink)

Empirical claims are factual claims validated by the methods of science. Conceptual claims involve matters of sense. Empirical inquiry that proceeds from conceptual confusion can never yield fruitful results (i.e., knowledge). John Mikhail's speculations about UMG are an example of conceptual confusions that lead not to knowledge but to claims and assertions that lack sense.

This chapter contains sections titled: Modernism Postmodern Thought Law and Postmodernism The Postmodern State Conclusion References.

(1991). The importance of asking the right questions. Social Epistemology: Vol. 5, Social epistemology of the law, pp. 75-77. doi: 10.1080/02691729108578600.

Introduction to the Philosophy of Law: Readings and Cases employs a combination of case-based and theory-based materials to show novices in the field how the philosophy of law is related to concrete and actual legal practice. Ideal for undergraduates, it engages their curiosity about the law without sacrificing philosophical content. The authors emphasize a command of legal concepts and doctrine as a prelude to philosophical analysis. Designed to acquaint students with the fundamentals of jurisprudence and legal theory, Part I of (...) the book includes readings from influential philosophers representing eight different types of jurisprudence: natural law theory, positivism, constructivism, consequentialism, critical legal studies, feminist theory, practice theory, and new natural law theory. In Part II, the authors present a variety of cases that allow students to apply the theories in Part I to the actual practice of law. Unlike similar texts, which focus primarily on public law, this unique book addresses both private and public law, and includes cases on statutory interpretation, contract law, and tort law. Brief essays precede and discussion questions follow each case. Introduction to the Philosophy of Law: Readings and Cases serves as an exceptional text for courses in the philosophy of law, jurisprudence, and legal theory. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the theory of international law. In analytic jurisprudence, at least since the latter half of the twentieth century, the primary debate in general jurisprudence has been between legal positivism and its most ardent critic, Ronald Dworkin. The positivist tradition is represented here by its two most important theorists, Hans Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart. During their careers, Kelsen and Hart clashed over the best understanding of legal positivism. For his part, Dworkin devoted the bulk of his critical attention (...) to Hart's work. The chapter also focuses on the way in which each theorist builds his view of international law against the background of a more general jurisprudence. Hart argues that the differences between international law and municipal law might eventually be overcome. International law might be in a stage of transition that will bring it nearer in structure to a municipal system. (shrink)

This book addresses the philosophical questions that arise when neuroscientific research and technology are applied in the legal system. The empirical, practical, ethical, and conceptual issues that Pardo and Patterson seek to redress will deeply influence how we negotiate and implement the fruits of neuroscience in law and policy in the future.

What is a text? What does it mean to understand a text? How does one know that one understands a text? These are some of the principal questions raised in this interesting and provocative book. Of particular interest is the fact that the author forthrightly adopts a stance contrary to much contemporary philosophical opinion. For Gracia, no proper answer to these questions may come from anything less than a systematic theory of texts. In its most provocative formulation, Gracia's thesis is (...) that the understanding of texts is a matter of theory. It is the task of philosophy, so Gracia argues, "to put together a systematic view of the world or any of its parts that is consistent and comprehensive". (shrink)