The ‘received view’ of the analog–digital distinction holds that analog representations are continuous while digital representations are discrete. In this paper I first provide support for the received view by showing how it (1) emerges from the theory of computation, and (2) explains engineering practices. Second, I critically assess several recently offered alternatives, arguing that to the degree they are justified they demonstrate not that the received view is incorrect, but rather that distinct senses of the terms have become entrenched (...) specific fields, perhaps most notably in the cognitive psychology of mental imagery. (shrink)

Traditional approaches to modeling cognitive systems are computational, based on utilizing the standard tools and concepts of the theory of computation. More recently, a number of philosophers have argued that cognition is too subtle or complex for these tools to handle. These philosophers propose an alternative based on dynamical systems theory. Proponents of this view characterize dynamical systems as (i) utilizing continuous rather than discrete mathematics, and, as a result, (ii) being computationally more powerful than traditional computational automata. Indeed, the (...) logical possibility of such super-powerful systems has been demonstrated in the form of analog artificial neural networks. In this paper I consider three arguments against the nomological possibility of these automata. While the first two arguments fail, the third succeeds. In particular, the presence of noise reduces the computational power of analog networks to that of traditional computational automata, and noise is a pervasive feature of information processing in biological systems. Consequently, as an empirical thesis, the proposed dynamical alternative is under-motivated: What is required is an account of how continuously valued systems could be realized in physical systems despite the ubiquity of noise. (shrink)

Embedded and embodied approaches to cognition urge that (1) complicated internal representations may be avoided by letting features of the environment drive behavior, and (2) environmental structures can play an enabling role in cognition, allowing prior cognitive processes to solve novel tasks. Such approaches are thus in a natural position to oppose the ‘thesis of linguistic structuring’: The claim that the ability to use language results in a wholesale recapitulation of linguistic structure in onboard mental representation. Prominent examples of researchers (...) adopting this critical stance include Andy Clark, Michael Wheeler, and Mark Rowlands. But is such opposition warranted? Since each of these authors advocate accounts of mental representation that are broadly connectionist, I survey research on formal language computation in artificial neural networks, and argue that results indicate a strong form of the linguistic structuring thesis is true: Internal representational systems recapitulate significant linguistic structure, even on a connectionist account of mental representation. I conclude by sketching how my conclusion can nonetheless be viewed as consistent with and complimentary to an embedded/embodied account of the role of linguistic structure in cognition. (shrink)

Some researchers claim that simulations of the emergence of communication in populations of autonomous agents provide empirical support for 'use' theories of meaning. I argue that this claim faces at least two major challenges. First, the empirical adequacy of such simulations must be justified, or the inference from simulation results to real-world linguistic behavior must be dropped; and second, the proffered simulations are in fact compatible with all of the competing theories of meaning surveyed, suggesting that theories of meaning are (...) not the kinds of theories for which simulations provide evidence. To conclude, I consider what impact this has on the project of developing a naturalized theory of language. (shrink)

I find myself ambivalent with respect to the line of argument that Schonbein offers. I certainly want to acknowledge and emphasize at the outset that Schonbein’s discussion has brought to the fore a number of central, compelling and intriguing issues regarding the nature of the dynamical approach to cognition. Though there is much that seems right in this essay, perhaps my view is that the paper invites more questions than it answers. My remarks here then are in the (...) spirit of scouting some of the surrounding terrain in order to see just what Schonbein’s claim is and what arguments or options may be open to the dynamicist. (shrink)

: Recently developed projective models of consciousness and its contents challenge received schemas in which all contents of consciousness are held to be well contained in the skull. Working our way into this from several angles, it becomes evident that there are inconsistencies in how we frame classes of mental contents which are arguably equivalent in being. Particular examples of imagery, of dancing and of words, are brought forward to highlight the clash in our apprehensive assumptions, focusing on possible cognitive (...) as well as psychological costs of such inconsistency. A coherent way to blend the container and projector schemas is pointed out; yet such a blend does not support the standard claim for any kind of purely inner voice, contained but not projected. Conscious reflection may in all instances depend on projection, with reflection in imagery - visual, audible, even tactile and otherwise felt - placed just the far side of what can schematically be grasped as the sensory horizon where, in the space-time just beyond here and now, our imaginative expectations backstop recognition of here-now present things. Resumo: Os modelos projetivos de consciência e de seus conteúdos, recentemente desenvolvidos, desafiam os esquemas tradicionais, nos quais todos os conteúdos da consciência são mantidos bem contidos dentro do crânio. Trabalhando desta forma, a partir de vários ângulos, torna-se evidente que existem inconsistências na forma como emolduramos classes de conteúdos mentais que são possivelmente equivalentes em seu ser. Exemplos particulares de imagens, de dança e de palavras são apresentados para ressaltar o choque em nossas suposições apreensivas, focalizando possíveis custos cognitivos e psicológicos de tal inconsistência. Uma maneira coerente de misturar os esquemas do “continente” e do “projetor” é apontada; no entanto, tal combinação não suporta as exigências gerais, encontradas na literatura, para qualquer tipo de fala puramente interna, que esteja contida, mas não projetada. A reflexão consciente pode, em todos os casos, depender da projeção, com reflexo na imagem - visual, audível, até tátil e sentida - situada apenas no lado distante do que pode ser esquematicamente compreendido como o horizonte sensorial onde, no espaço-tempo e agora, nossas expectativas imaginativas apóiam o reconhecimento das coisas presentes e atuais. (shrink)

FOREWORD Every spirit makes its house, but afterwards the house confines the spirit. Conduct of Life: Fate, Ralph Waldo Emerson. The duty of an anthologist, ...

Whit Stillman’s films depict characters attempting to gain relevant knowledge of their historical situation so that they can shape their lives. Through an analysis of scenes from each of Stillman’s films, this essay demonstrates that historical knowledge is presented as a kind of self-understanding in the films. That historical knowledge is useful for gaining control over one’s future as well as for properly evaluating one’s life reveals a philosophically interesting approach to self-knowledge. Stillman’s complex approach of layering contexts further (...) suggests an elusive account of the self. (shrink)

앙리의 현상학은 두 가지 말, ‘삶의 말’과 ‘세계의 말’을 상정한다. 따라서 앙리의 현상학에서도 두 가지 언어를 상정하는 다른 철학에서와 마찬가지로 두 언어 사이에 번역의 문제가 발생한다. 문제는 앙리가 반복해서 밝히고 있는 바, 삶은 결코 자신을 세계 속에서 보여주지 않는다는 사실이다. 따라서 앙리의 현상학 역시 세계의 말로 작성되고 세계 속에서 전개되는 철학인 한, 삶의 나타남을 드러내려는 앙리 현상학의 기획은 그 자체로 모순인 것처럼 보인다. 앙리의 현상학에서 번역의 문제는 단순히 하나의 문제가 아니라, 앙리 현상학의 가능성 자체를 위협하는 심각한 문제로 제기된다. 그러나 앙리 (...) 현상학의 주된 주장 가운데 하나인 ‘나타남의 이중성’, 즉 세계와 삶의 본질적 동시성에 대한 이해는 이 문제에 대한 답을 제시해 준다. 본 글에서는 앙리 현상학에서 삶에 대한 번역 가능성의 문제가 어떻게 해결되는지, 보다 정확히 말하자면, 어떻게 이 문제가 앙리 현상학의 체계 속에서 일종의 거짓문제로 밝혀짐으로써 해결되기보다는 해소되어 버리는지 살펴볼 것이다. (shrink)

Whit the aim of clariflying what exactly is the human phenomenon of akrasía or incontinence in the fullest sense, in Nicomachean Ethics VII.4-10 Aristotle introduces a type of incontinence by analogy, that is, incontinence due to thymós or courage. Despite his intentions, the explanation of the latter only complicates understanding the former, and the reader ends up without a clear understandingof either. The purpose of this article is to shed some light on the subject of akrasía due to thymós, (...) trying, specifically, to answer three questions: what exactly is this passion? Who are worse, those who get carried away by their appetites or those who get carried away by their anger, and why? Finally, are we responsible for the mistakes we make in a fit of anger? (shrink)

This work aims to a critical edition of an Aristotle’s Categories commentary, transmitted by M2 codex of St. Ambrose’s Chapter Archive in Milan. Written in Northern Italy, in the 12th century, it was probably a handbook for Chapter School. It is based upon some passages from the auctoritates, as it’s evident from the heading: incipiunt flores glosse categoriarum. It deals whit fundamental logical issues, and it presents a widespread use of the status’s theory, in order to solve some of (...) the logical, physical and metaphysical problems in Aristotle’s Categories. (shrink)

ACCORDING TO HUSSERL, THE REVOLUTION brought about by the new mathematical science of the seventeenth century was primarily an ontological one: a shift in the conception of the real. That Husserl opposes the new Galilean-Cartesian ontology is clear. This much is evident from the potent rhetoric of the Crisis declaiming Galileo as an "entdeckender und verdeckender Genius", forgetful of the lifeworld, failing to grasp what the mathematical-empirical method he brought to such a degree of perfection actually achieves. Indeed, even without (...) the ringing Crisis passages, one could already expect that Husserl, the phenomenologist, would oppose the Platonizing scientific realism of a Galileo or a Descartes. However, Husserl's critique of Galileo poses many puzzling questions, questions which are not directly addressed in the Crisis, and which can be answered only in terms of the broader position outlined by Husserl elsewhere. To whit: what is the more precise content of Husserl's objections against Galileo, and how are these justified? Further, if scientific realism is to be rejected on phenomenological grounds, does this imply that a phenomenological approach is necessarily instrumentalist? Finally, what solution does Husserl's thought offer to the realism/instrumentalism debate? (shrink)

This article examines the responses of two communities to hate crimes in their cities. In particular it explores how community understandings of responsibility shape collective responses to hate crimes. I use the case of Bridesberg, Pennsylvania to explore how anti-racist work is restricted by backward-looking conceptions of moral responsibility (e.g. being responsible). Using recent writings in feminist ethics.(1) I argue for a forward-looking notion that advocates an active view: taking responsibility for attitudes and behaviors that foster climates in which hate (...) crimes are more likely to occur, even when a person's individual actions do not contribute directly to harms. Using the case of Billings, Montana, I explain how recent Not In Our Town campaigns take responsibility for hate crimes in the ways feminist literature suggests. -/- I take as my point of departure hate crimes committed against the family of Bridget Ward, an African American woman, who moved into the suburb of Bridesburg in 1996. When issues of responsibility for racism arose in the local press, most Bridesbergers insisted that their community was not racist; they blamed only the individual vandals. This narrow blame-assigning focus is in keeping with most Anglo-American definitions of responsibility as belonging essentially to individuals and not to communities. Traditionally, moral and legal theory construct responsibility from a perspective that looks downward and back. These perspectives are preoccupied with punishment and reward, praise and blame; they assume justice is done when guilty parties are found and tried. -/- This focus masks deeper community problems. As Elizabeth Spelman remarks, "tolerance is easy if those who are asked to express it need not change a whit." (2) Focus on praise and blame is, in part, a function of race privilege. Bridesberg is 98% white, and part of "the arrogance whitely behavior" is positioning one's self as a judge, expert, and problem solver. (3) The view from this particular subject position limits attention to individuals and their actions, rather than to communities and their practices; it shifts attention away from the fact that Bridesberger's collective practice of distrusting outsiders has lead to hate crimes in the past. Pointing to vandals and claiming "they are racist" does not free one's community of racism. It reinscribes a community spirit that is resistant to change. -/- The second part of this essay explores what communities like Bridesberg might have done to prevent violence. Often there is little individuals alone can do to stop racial violence, but that there is a sense in which community members are obligated to organize themselves. Strategies that focus community responsibility on retribution rather than long-term change, are short lived and ineffective. Anti-racist activism requires a forward-looking view of responsibility: one that aims at inoculating the community against increased risk of violence. This requires taking responsibility for the fact that one's town might foster climates in which hate crimes are more likely to occur. It requires that we begin inquiry in the lives of those harmed. -/- Collective citizen efforts to prevent Aryan groups from gaining a foothold in Billings, Montana offers a clear illustration of how to take responsibility for hate crimes using strategies designed consciously to prevent further hate crimes (e.g., when Black Churches were threatens, all community members attended services there; when a rock was thrown through a window with a menorah, many homes displayed menorahs). The community responses in Billings are a stark contrast to those of Bridesburg, and serve as a powerful example of how forward-looking notions of responsibility can translate into effective political strategy. Although, these strategies are not in and of themselves feminist, they are powerful illustrations of what feminists mean by forward-looking views. The success of resident's collective action and coalition building gave rise to a national Not In Our Town campaign used in about a dozen cities today. (shrink)

Along with Sahîh-i Bukhari, many commentaries and memoirs have been made on Sahîh-i Muslim, which is accepted as the most reliable source of hadith and consists of sound narrations. Among the commentaries written today, the comprehensive commentary, which is a product of labor that cannot be ignored and stands out whit some features, is Ethiopian scholar Mohammed b. The commentary of Ali al-İtyubî’s Sahîh-i Muslim commentary on al-Bahru’l-muhît and his holy book is Kurratü ayni’l-muhtâc. This article aims to briefly (...) introduce İtyûbî with his educational life and Works, the method he followed in his annotations, the sources he used, his reports that do not require many works, his criticisms and evaluations, his perspective, his world of thought, and to reveal and evaluate his different approaches and ideas on certain subjects. Reaching 47 volumes together with the Commentary on the Muqaddima, the work has the feature of being the widest commentary of Sahîh-I Muslim. By transmitting the information in the previous works in a compact and collective manner, he did not leave the need to apply to them, and he made the hadiths easier to understand whit the memzuc method that explains word by word. The extensive interpretation of hadiths, the mention of different narrations, and the fact that the judgments derived from hadiths are regarded as material are some of the issues that make commentary important. This article aims to briefly introduce İtyûbî with his educational life and works, the method he followed in his commentaries, the resources he used, his transmissions that do not reguire many works, his criticisms and evalua-tions, his perspective, his world of thought, and to reveal and evaluate his different approaches and ideas on certain subjects. (shrink)

Introduction The act of caring in nursing requires previous deliberation and decision, however this perception only arises when an ethical problem emerges. Objective: Identify ethical problems of nurses action in the area of beginning of human life Method: Exploratory and descriptive method, with a qualitative approach. Semi-structured interviews were used to collect data, who were submitted to content analysis. The sample was constituted by 26 nurses. Results 18 categories of problem areas and 56 ethical problems in early human life were (...) identified. The results obtained are very diverse, including areas such as termination of pregnancy, informed consent or maintaining privacy. However, other problem areas also emerge and numerous new subcategories/ethical problems, including: dealing with miscarriage, extreme situations, minors’ pregnancy, serious malformations detected at birth, consent regarding care during childbirth, Non- identification of a ethical problem, nurse social recognition and non-involvement of the person in labour. Conclusion Nurses face different ethical problems that impact their lives. We intend to contribute in helping to make decisions in this field, which the outset is of hope and joy, but which hides, behind this evidence, countless situations of suffering for everyone involved. The identification of ethical problems in this field, it is the first step to reflect about theme and helping decision-making for nurses that are taking care in this area of beginning of human life, when confronted whit the same type of ethical problems. (shrink)

In this article, we will study the constitution of the subject as described by Foucault in L’Herméneutique du Sujet and we will try to establish the relation between this constitution and the political gesture that irrupts in the every day life, which sets the subjectivity in opposition with the actual culture or society — called Parrêsia in Le courage de la Vérité. The parrêsiastic act, which disrupts the social order by its subjectivity affirmation, is a risky act, which puts the (...) subject in the limit situation of a self-affirmation that goes against what we may understand as a social or political act. It means the subject gets free of the local and cultural conditions to seek for a realization of the highest freedom of expression and action. The subject of such act, so, takes position as its own reference, and then acquires a character that reveals the issues of a civilisation and at the same time becomes the representative of an emancipated an free humanity. The democracy, understood in its most rigorous sense, in this perspective, depends on the possibility of the parrêsia, which effect is to open a dialogue between the society and the political subject. The importance of such phenomenon is really huge when we try to think about education and its social and political effects. The relation between education and democracy is the condition for us to have a true democracy, in which the citizen is included in the community in total freedom and aware of its participation to the common work. But, as suggests Foucault’s analysis, this political and social insertion, which is also a cultural insertion, that depends on education, doesn’t happens as a natural and linear process that would follow the simple fact of going to school or being present in the socially formed groups. On the contrary, it’s in rupture, in opposition, in the violent and irrevocable subjectivity’s affirmation, against what is generally admitted, that the subject erects itself upon the immediate situation to defend what it estimates as outside the range of established social rules and historical conditions. It’s this paradox, of a subject that realises itself against a society it belongs, but that, acting like this, opens the possibility to free its members from the weight of institutions that could be denatured or corrupted, in such way that can be constituted, founded upon this opening, a new social structure, more democratic and which respects more the nature of the humanity, that we want to indicate here and if possible understand better. If the parrêsia really has this character needed to the constitution of the democracy, how can we think about it in the domain of education? How can we conciliate the knowledge transmission, the learning of social rules and usages, whit the possibility of a free action, independent from the same rules? These questions will be raised, to open a discussion upon the relation between subjectivity, society and education. (shrink)

As frequently pointed out in this discussion, one of the most characteristic features of Mayr's approach to the history of biology stems from the fact that he is dealing to a considerable degree with his own professional history. Furthermore, his main criterion for the selection of historical episodes is their relevance for modern biological theory. As W. F. Bynum and others have noted, the general impression of his reviewers is that “one of the towering figures of evolutionary biology has now (...) written a towering history of his discipline.”138 Bynum is here referring to The Growth of Biological Thought, but this observation holds equally true for Mayr's other historical writings: One must surely read this book [One Long Argument] not only for its content in itself, but for what it tells of its author. And certainly as one does so, one comes away full-handed. Many, if not all, of the disputes and controversies that have driven Mayr through his long intellectual life reappear, stated as forcefully and elegantly as ever.139Up to this point, most reviewers agree; the bone of contention is, rather, how to evaluate Mayr's historical work, considering this observation. The two related characteristics of his work-I will call them subjectivity and presentism-stand in opposition to a widespread approach in the history of science exemplified by Kuhn's suggestion that “insofar as possible..., the historian should set aside the science that he knows. His science should be learned from the textbooks and journals of the period he studies.”140 There are, however, historians who consider the close connection between Mayr and the subject matter of his historical studies to be an advantage.141On the other hand, it is assumed that the connection between past and present must result in a distortion of the historical truth and lead to a historiographical fallacy, commonly referred to as “Whig history”. Herbert Butterfield, who in 1931 gave the term its now generally accepted meaning, believed that “real historical understanding is not achieved by the subordination of the past to the present, but rather by our making the past our present and attempting to see life with the eyes of another century than our own”142. Unfortunately, Butterfield's definition of what he considers Whig history remains somewhat vague, and modern authors have emphasized what they consider most important. Butterfield's “subordination of the past to the present” is referred to in respect to the selection of subjects (there are more biographies of Charles Darwin than of, let's say, Louis Agassiz),143 to the evaluation of historical authors,144 or, more generally, to all kinds of histories “with one eye, so to speak, upon the present.”145 The underlying tendency of Whig historians is to produce a “historical account told from the viewpoint of those in power,”146 leading to a “glorification of the present.”147 It is obvious that Mayr's strongly presentist approach to the history of biology can be called Whiggish, if we apply the criteria of “selection” or “reference.” However, it might be worth mentioning that the program of writing a strictly historicist account of the history of science is challenged by various authors.148 For Mayr, it is not only legitimate but necessary to compare the present situation with the past. “Whiggish” is only the evaluation of an author in terms of our time.149I cannot discuss the Whit/anti-Whig controversy in any detail here, apart from saying that Mayr has defended himself rather extensively against the charges of being Whiggish.150 Nevertheless, it may be useful to touch on some of the criticisms that are predominant in reviews of his writings. First, we encounter the notion that historians can write a true and convincing historical account only if they have no personal interest or interpretation of their own; Mayr, on the other hand, because he “has such strong interpretations of his own, ... cannot possibly convince everyone that he is right about everything.”151 It makes one wonder, what historian has ever been able to convince everyone that he or she is right about everything? But apart from this peculiar idea, it unquestionably poses certain dangers if the subject matter of historical scrutiny and the author are identical. At the same time, this identity brings certain advantages with it, especially firsthand experiences of the period in discussion. Whether these personal memories ultimately result in a distorted picture of the past has to be decided in every particular instance. The notion that a scientific study can be conducted by a completely detached observer from a neutral standpoint has been shown to be impossible in physics, and it is also an illusion in historiography. The question is not whether, but which kind of interest are the underlying motivation for a historian. At this point, Mayr is ahead of his critics when he suggests that our understanding of the past always has a subjective component: The main reason, however, why histories are in constant need of revision is that at any given time they merely reflect the present state of understanding; they depend on how the author interpreted the current zeitgeist of biology and on his own conceptual framework and background. Thus, by necessity the writing of history is subjective and ephemeral.152Second, the temporal proximity between the event and the historical analysis makes difficulties inevitable and will finally result in certain false assessments. But this applies to all historians when they discuss recent problems, regardless of whether they are personally involved or not: As long as the battle between Darwinism and Lamarckism was raging, it was quite impossible to undertake an unbiased evaluation of Lamarck. ...[The] definite refutation of Lamarck's theory of evolutionary causation clears the air. We can now study him without bias and emotion and give him the attention that this major figure in the history of biology clearly deserves.153Third, Mayr is primarily interested in biological problems and not, for instance, historiographical, sociological, or psychological questions. Several authors have remarked that since the beginning of the professionalization of the history of science in the 1960s, a rift between two groups has developed, resulting from the heterogeneous professional backgrounds and interests of the people involved: the authors who were originally biologists and became interested in the history of their discipline only later on, and the authors who were trained as historians.154 Whereas the first group, the “biologists,” tend to be laymen in history proper, the “historians” are in most cases laymen in biology. Different professional backgrounds obviously shape the historical perspective in both groups, but neither approach is necessarily superior. The great number of important books in the history of biology written by “biologist” documents how valuable this point of view can be. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the writings of biologists in the history of science tend to have a strong “internalist” tendency and often neglect the professional, cultural, and political context of science. Mayr's approach is that of a “biologist”; it is “internalist,” and typical for scientists who turn to the history of their discipline.I want to conclude my analysis with a quotation from a review by Douglas J. Futuyma, which gives a perceptive glimpse of Mayr's personality and style: One cannot help standing in awe of the germanic capacity for vast, allembracing synthesis: consider the lifelong devotion of Goethe to Faust, or Wagner's integration of the arts into a Gesamtkunstwerk in which all of human history and experience is wrought into epic myth. It is perhaps in this tradition that Ernst Mayr's The Growth of Biological Thought stands: a history of all of biology, a Ring des Nibelungen complete with leitmotivs such as the failures of reductionism, the struggle of biology for independence from physics, and the liberation of population thinking from the bounds of essentialism.155 Within this style of thinking Mayr has “to offer...nothing less than a vision of biology that places neodarwinian evolutionary theory firmly at the centre.”156 There may be other visions of biology, but few of them have as indefatigable and able representatives as Darwinism has in Ernst Mayr. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide an intuitive semantics for systems of justification logic which allows us to cope with the distinction between implicit and explicit justifiers. The paper is subdivided into three sections. In the first one, the distinction between implicit and explicit justifiers is presented and connected with a proof-theoretic distinction between two ways of interpreting sequences of sentences; that is, as sequences of axioms in a certain set and as sequences proofs constructed from that set (...) of axioms. In the second section, a basic system of justification logic for implicit and explicit justifiers is analyzed and some significant facts about it are proved. In the final section, an adequate semantics is proposed, and the system is proved to be sound and complete whit respect to it. (shrink)

In a now famous thought experiment, Frank jackson asked us t0 imagine an omniscient scientist, Mary, who is coniincd in a black-and-white room and then released into the world 0f color . Assuming that she is omniscicnt in respect of all physical facts—roughiy, all the facts available to physics and all the facts that they in turn Hx or determine-physicalism would suggest that there is no new fact Mary can discover after emancipation; physicalism holds that all facts are physical in (...) the relevant sense . Yet we cannot help but feel that coming out of that room would be an occasion of dramatic enlightenment and, in particular, an occasion for learning facts to do with how red or yellow or blue 100ks or, as it is usually said, with what it is like t0 sec red or yellow or blue. Many in the black-and—whit<—: room knew all the physical facts about the world, where these may be taken to include three sorts of color facts: objcctual facts, as to what surface colors different objects have, assuming as I shall do throughout—that colors are properties of objects; intentional facts, as to which colors different objects 0r apparent objects are represented as having in the subjc-:ct’s experience, rightly or wrongly; and nonintentional facts, about what such color experiences are like in their effects on subiccts—wh<—:ther they are comforting, or arousing, or whatever. But, according to the argument, Mary didn’t know how any color looks or, equivalently, what color experience is like in itself, not just in its effects O1'1 subjects. This particular nonintentional fact about the quality of color c-zxpc-2ri<—:ncc-—this phenomenal fact, as it is often describcd—she did not. (shrink)

Centramos la atención en la noción de crítica del pensamiento de Arturo Andrés Roig. El problema se aborda partiendo del vínculo que se establece entre la crítica y la noción de vigilancia epistemológica de Gastón Bachelard. Consideramos a continuación la crítica como ejercicio de la sospecha. Finalmente, se analiza el aspecto social de la crítica, esto permite relacionar la producción teórica de Roig con la teoría crítica, especialmente con el pensamiento de Max Horkheimer. En este sentido, enfatizamos la indagación sobre (...) la función social de la filosofía ya que implica una ampliación de la crítica. We focus our attention on the concept "criticism" thinking by Arturo Andrés Roig. We tackle this question starting from the link between "criticism" and "epistemological vigilance" of Gaston Bachelard. We then consider the criticism like suspicion. Finally, we analize the social aspect of the criticism, that allow to link the theoretical production of Arturo Roig whit the critical theory, especially whit Horkheimer´s thinking. In this respect, we emphasize the inquiry about the social function of the philosophy, because that involves an enlargement of criticism. (shrink)

Nadie puede negar que la figura de Edmund Husserl constituye la llave de acceso para el horizonte filosófico de nuestro tiempo, tanto en su versión continental como analítica. Pero ¿en qué medida un mismo planteamiento pudo dar suelo y sustento al despliegue de corrientes tan distintas? Aunque mucho se ha trabajado ya para desembrollar el renovado sentido que filosofía y ciencia adquieren en su propuesta, el camino que siguió para llegar a esas conclusiones todavía no goza de suficiente claridad. Por (...) ello, en este artículo nos hemos propuesto esclarecer algunos intersticios de la transformación de su pensamiento, tomando como hilo conductor las preocupaciones de juventud que, a la larga, desembocarán en la formulación de su contundente crítica al conocimiento. Para lograr nuestro objetivo daremos seguimiento al itinerario husserliano, comenzando por la Filosofía de la aritmética, para luego finalizar con su concepción de la filosofía como la más estricta de las ciencias. Nobody can deny that the figure of Edmund Husserl represents the key to the philosophical horizon of our time in both version, as continental as analytical one. But, how can the same approach give ground and support to the development of such diverse topics? Although much work has been done to explain the renewed sense that science and philosophy acquire inside their proposal, the way Husserl reached that conclusion is not sufficiently clear yet. That is why in this article we intend to clarify some aspects of his thought transformation, keeping it up whit his early concerns that will lead, inevitably, in his critique of knowledge. To achieve this, we will follow the husserlian itinerary from The philosophy of arithmetic to his conception of philosophy as the strictest science. (shrink)

To define the concept of reason, to determine its modus operandi and its scope has constituted the philosopher's task from its origins till today. What follows does not intend to exhaust the meaning of reason, not even within the frame of Agustinian philosophy, since the term itself is not univocal in Agustinian philosophy, but rather to offer an analysis of rationality, in its cognitive function, and point out its relationship whit the soul, and its possible objects of knowledge -God (...) among 9thers- and in doing so, to offer a perspective which reconciles points of view somewhat reductionist. (shrink)

The Two Faces of Stoicism: Rousseau and Freud AMI~LIE OKSENBERG RORTY Nor do the Stoics mean that the soul of their wisest man resists the first visions and sudden fantasies that surprise [him]: but [he] rather consents that, as it were to a natural subjection, he yields .... So likewise in other passions, always provided his opinions remain safe and whole, and.., his reason admit no tainting or alteration, and he in no whit consents to his fright and sufferance. (...) Montaigne, Essays, I. 1 THE STOICS ARE A WEIGHTY EMBARRASSMENT to their friends who, like myself, want to defend them from the charges that their views are at best vague or ludicrous, perhaps offensive or inconsistent. There is no doubt that some of their pronouncements seem material for Aristophanic comedy, others callous and yet others incoherent. And there is also no doubt that they openly defy common sense and deliberately change the terminology they inherit, introduc- ing neologisms ad hoc. And yet, and yet -- it is no accident that they continue, rightly continue, to have a powerful hold on ordinary belief and acute philo- sophical reflection. Here -- in what is itself a parody -- are some of the commonplaces famil- iarly attributed to the Stoics.' First, the notorious matter of Stoic apatheia. Diogenes Laertius reports that I believe, but cannot here argue, that despite the signficant differences between early, middle and late Stoics, the classical Stoics shared a common agenda. It is.. (shrink)

This article’s objetive is to present four application examples of Herbrand’s theorem to decide the validity of reasoning on first order language, in accordance whit Church’s Undecidability’s theorem. Also, to tell which is the principal problem around it. The logical resolution calculus will be worked on this article, which is a method used in artificial intelligence.

Living with a chronic condition represents a strenuous experience that often could be lived as a sequence of waiting and crisis times. Therapeutic path incidents could represent however a catalysts and revelatory time, useful to patients to discover their own resources. A qualitative study according to the phenomenological hermeneutic perspective was conducted to understand the kind of skills expressed by the patients during a difficult episode, and the characteristics that identify patients who can overcome them better. From September 2019 to (...) August 2020 twenty-three patients followed-up in four Hospital Units of Northeastern of Italy were enrolled. All the patients described an episode linked whit their pathological condition; they mentioned mainly supportive, reactive, or behavioral strategies and an acceptance attitude. The sample characteristics may explain the recurring acceptance attitude; however, the younger individuals, those with a higher level of education and those who faced precedent negative life experiences seem to better overcome challenging events. It can’t be taken for granted that patients possess all the skills necessary to overcome the frequent challenging episodes they have to face; for this reason, healthcare professionals should assess their learning and reactive attitude in order to tailor for them therapeutic education paths. (shrink)

This article debates about the interrelation between the music and myth as a creative model in the archaic Greece. The idea is to show how the myth gives form and content to the narrative intonation of events in the nomos [νόμος], the first musical form of history that emerge in a close relation between the musical practice and mythology, expressed throughout the archaic poetry and the musical contests in Delphos. The article’s title synthetized the archetypical idea of the ancient Greek (...) culture about the notion of harmony proportion and measurement in which the Greeks developed his artistic ideal. So, The Gorgon’s shout is a phrase that coined the sonorous description of monstrosity that the ancient Greeks expressed whit fantasy in their music, giving to this shout an artistic order and form of expression. (shrink)

Ethics cannot present a positive judgement for that which there is no consensus within our pluralistic society. As a result, "Do good and avoid evil" is proposed as the orienting principie for action. The later part (of the article) deals whit prenatal diagnostics, specifically the good contribution and bad utilizations of prenatal diagnostics employed by parents.

The aim of the paper is to discuss the basic concepts developed in Ferraris’ book Documentalità, in particular the first two items of the conceptual triad trace-registration-inscription. The alleged priority of icnology on semiotics can hardly be justified; due to the overlooking of the notions of rule and code, the law of the production of traces remains obscure. On the other hand, the notion of registration as presence of traces in the mind conflicts whit some of our knowledge about (...) the brain and cannot avoid a logical circularity, since the trace is defined as something which can exist only if a mind is recognizing it as such. (shrink)

Paradigm-shifts, termed scientific revolutions, occur periodically in the course of sciences development. The twentieth century witnessed o number of revolutions, first by Albert Einstein and then by Niels Bohr in physics, and subsequently in biology, cosmology and, trough the pioneering work of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, in the transdisciplinary area that includes human mind and consciousness. But scientific development did not come to a standstill: while the spirit of Einstein and Teilhard is as present as ever their specific theories are (...) object to the dynamic of theory development troughs periods of "normal" and "revolutionary" science. Today another revolution lo about to occur, bringing science to the threshold of a more comprehensive and integrated account of the observed phenomenon. The currently emerging transdisciplinary unified theory is consistent whit the goals and vision of both Albert Einstein and Teilhard de Chardin. It penetrates deeper into the domains of reality than the 2Otis century's mainstream physical, biological and psychological theories did - below the level of the quanta that populate space-time, to the quantum vacuum, better termed cosmic plenum, that generates the quanta and interconnects them throughout space and time. In the twentieth century Einstein 's general relativity gave us the relativistically interlinked universe, where all things are connected by signals propagating across the geometric structure of space-time, and Teilhard de Chardin laid the foundations of a unified theory where life and mind emerge consistently out of the physical world. In the twenty-first century transdisciplinary unified theory will extend these conceptions and give us the coherent universe, where all things are intrinsically connected by a fundamental information and virtual-energy field at a fundamental level of physical reality. (shrink)

Its broad, winding river, crossed by a multitude of bridges; its surrounding hills, amongst which stands conspicuous the long line of the Hradcine, topped by a continuous stretch of stately buildings with the cathedral of St. Vitus towering above them; the wide expanse of its numerous streets, over which rise the spires of many churches, ancient towers, and the lofty walls of numerous municipal and university buildings; the long history to which its architecture bears everywhere striking witness and of which (...) its inhabitants are justly proud, rendered the city of Prague a no less fitting background for the eighth philosophical Congress than that which Oxford provided four years ago for the seventh. Nor was the hospitality which Czechoslovakia offered to its members a whit less cordial or less generous than that of England. The delegates who gathered together from all parts of Europe, from America, China, and from Japan, were welcomed both by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Beneš by the Minister of Public Instruction, Dr. Krčmář, by the Mayor of Prague; and, were it not for his unfortunate illness, would have been received by the President of the Republic himself. The Společenský club was placed at their disposal. They were entertained at the Foreign Office to tea, and at the palace of the President to supper by his daughter, Dr. Alice Masaryk. Their railway fares and even their tram fares were considerably reduced. On Thursday they were conveyed by motor-cars to Konopišté, a beautiful castle, soaring above pine forests and overlooking an extensive lake, formerly the residence of the Archduke Franz-Ferdinand, now taken over by the State, but maintained exactly as it was when the unfortunate heir of the Emperor Franz-Joseph was living there. The arrangements for the Congress were excellent, thanks to its President, Dr. Rádl, and to an extremely efficient organizing committee which placed itself unreservedly and unremittingly at the disposal of the 350 active and 150 associated members who attended the various meetings. (shrink)

The article attempts to examine Walter Benjamin’s relationship whit the academic institution. A significant fact of this situation is the one that occurs whith the attempt to achieve teaching qualification, and, as we know, it ends up being an unfavorable and unfortunate experience. However, we believe that from this scene, beyond the purely anecdotal, it encompasses a critical exercise with academia in general and, specifically, with normative forms of writing production to which it submits. Along with the above, an (...) attempt is made to explore Benjamin’s relationship with the university institution and the place that could correspond to it. (shrink)

This paper makes reading a key theme explored by Jürgen Habermas – The depoliticization of the public sphere – in the epistemological perspective. In this way, the depoliticization is characterized by conducting scientific practice policy with the use of technical knowledge to influence the public sphere in its political practice; the idea that positivist knowledge, reduce to a mere instrument of science and technology, incorporates in the public sphere. This is an analysis of the process of modernization and rationalization, revealing (...) the false personification of reason in modern science and bourgeois political institutions. The progressive rationalization of modern society did penetrate the criteria of instrumental action, inevitably, also in the public sphere, in a progressive influence of technical systems on the institutional framework of society, reducing the practical problems to a solution of technical rationality. In the public sphere, political praxis dissolves into political technique. Whit the scientific conduct of practical politics, there is the emptying of the practical activity and the political discussions fall outside the scope of public discussion. The substitutions of practical for technical reasons to exclude these practical issues of the discussion from the public sphere. Thus politics, when to convert into technical task, excludes any possibility of a communicative sphere linguistically sanctioned. The paper is divided into three sections: the resumption of the transition from classical to modern political doctrine of political science (1); the scientific aspect of the policy, the political implications of scientific rationality in practical life, excluding practical issues from the public sphere (2); and the relationship between technical progress and social lifeworld (3). (shrink)

One of the most significant aspects of twelfth-century theological development is the success of Peter Lombard’s Sententiarum libri quatuor. Since 1160 this text became the subject of fierce debates but also of an increasing use in the teaching activity of the Parisian masters. Peter Comestor, one of Peter Lombard’s pupils and his successor as master, composed an introitus to the Sentences whose contents were immediately seen as the proper perspective to understand Lombard’s work. The essay provides a study of Comestor’s (...) introitus whit a critical edition of the text. A special attention is also devoted to the literary and doctrinal influence of the text, whit the edition of two texts connected with it, namely the prologue of ps.-Peter of Poitier’s Glossae and the prologue to Hugh of Saint-Cher’s commentary on the Sentences. (shrink)

The following article studies the liberalitas as the roman virtue that causes the roman elites' munificent behaviour. We study what liberalitas means for Cicero's De Officiis (his best-known philosophical and political work) and compare his idea of this virtue whit others ancient writer's ideas on the same subject. We discover that sometimes the munificent behaviour we know by epigraphical documentation was not liberalis as Cicero wanted to be, and was only the exhibition of elites' pride that doesn't follow the (...) limits that from an ethical point of view this virtue should have. (shrink)

The following article studies the liberalitas as the roman virtue that causes the roman elites’ munificent behaviour. We study what liberalitas means for Cicero’s De Officiis (his best-known philosophical and political work) and compare his idea of this virtue whit others ancient writer’s ideas on the same subject. We discover that sometimes the munificent behaviour we know by epigraphical documentation was not liberalis as Cicero wanted to be, and was only the exhibition of elites’ pride that doesn’t follow the (...) limits that from an ethical point of view this virtue should have. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:If the Buddha Is So Great, Why Are These People Christians?Grace G. BurfordSince I began to study Buddhism as a Swarthmore College undergraduate and recognized my worldview as Buddhist, I have been puzzled about Christians who care about the Buddha. Why would a Christian care about the Buddha? I don’t care a whit about Jesus, hence my difficulty in fathoming how a Christian could get all caught up (...) in the Buddha. To put it another way, especially when I was first “turned on” to Buddhism (it was, after all, the seventies), I had trouble understanding why people who had studied Buddhism extensively, and whom I respected as otherwise quite smart and sensible, seemed to be doggedly determined to stay Christians! All of my Buddhism teachers in the course of my undergraduate and graduate study (with the notable exception of Walpola Rahula) fell in this category, it seemed—though we never really discussed it. Why didn’t we discuss it? I did wonder about how they could dedicate their professional lives to—and be such effective teachers of—a tradition they did not believe in. If they were so taken by Buddhism, why did they hang on to Christianity? If they were Christians, why did they study and teach Buddhism? I guess I assumed it would be impertinent to pursue this question with my teachers and mentors; they were probably (justifiably) somewhat embarrassed by this backwards attachment to Christianity in the face of an obviously superior religion, Buddhism.Why was I so ready to pitch Christianity and take up Buddhism, and my Buddhism teachers were not? Unlike these mentors, by the time I began my study of Buddhism I had already rejected the Christianity in which I was raised. I don’t know why exactly I rejected Christianity so decisively; I had not experienced any trauma in Sunday school and had always loved the community my church provided. But during my junior year in high school I came to the point where I felt certain that I did not believe, nor had I ever really believed, a single word of the Christian creed I could recite so flawlessly. From that time until I discovered Buddhism, I made science-and-rationality my religion. In retrospect, I find it telling that the science I immersed myself in was astronomy—where there was plenty of room for mystery and wonder as I gazed two nights a week through Sproul Observatory’s powerful [End Page 129] twenty-four-inch refractor telescope into the night skies, in the coolest job a college student ever had. I will forever be an advocate of college course-distribution requirements, since it was these—and a friend who confided that “religion courses are not too bad”—that led me to take my first course from Donald Swearer. That same friend avers that I became a religion major because of my work at the telescope. Whatever the explanation, I felt fortunate to have run across Buddhism, to have found a mentor who could teach it so well, and to have discovered a religious path I could embrace enthusiastically. So why did my teacher hold back? Now there was a mystery.I have confessed before in the pages of this journal that my motives for participating in Buddhist-Christian dialogue and cross-religious discussions in general might seem ignoble, or at least not up to the usual expectations of this group. For some reason, my total abandonment of Christianity in my teen years has stuck (well into my forties, anyway). I honestly do not expect my predominantly Buddhist worldview to be enriched by learning more about Christianity. Nevertheless, I am fascinated with and continually enriched by other people and their religions. Despite my aversion to Christianity, I see that Christians are people, too. In fact, I am surrounded by Christians who, for better or worse, operate out of a Christian worldview. I am convinced we need each other, that we must work together to make the world a better place, especially in terms of the environmental crisis and social justice issues. So I am stuck with needing to understand Christians, especially the ones (such as the members of this... (shrink)