Ludwig Wittgenstein's _Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus_ and _Philosophical Investigations_ are among the most influential philosophical books of the twentieth century, and also among the most perplexing. Wittgenstein warned again and again that he was not and would not be understood. Moreover, Wittgenstein's work seems to have little relevance to the way philosophy is done today. In _Wittgenstein in Exile_, James Klagge proposes a new way of looking at Wittgenstein -- as an exile -- that helps make sense of this. Wittgenstein's (...) exile was not, despite his wanderings from Vienna to Cambridge to Norway to Ireland, strictly geographical; rather, Klagge argues, Wittgenstein was never at home in the twentieth century. He was in exile from an earlier era -- Oswald Spengler's culture of the early nineteenth century. Klagge draws on the full range of evidence, including Wittgenstein's published work, the complete Nachlaß, correspondence, lectures, and conversations. He places Wittgenstein's work in a broad context, along a trajectory of thought that includes Job, Goethe, and Dostoyevsky. Yet Klagge also writes from an analytic philosophical perspective, discussing such topics as essentialism, private experience, relativism, causation, and eliminativism. Once we see Wittgenstein's exile, Klagge argues, we will gain a better appreciation of the difficulty of understanding Wittgenstein and his work. (shrink)

Is “good” a family-resemblance concept? Wittgenstein holds it is, since cases of goodness may not have anything in common, but there may be a continuous transition from some cases to others. Von Wright and Hacker argue it is not. They hold that family-resemblance concepts satisfy two conditions that goodness does not satisfy. I assess their arguments and then present a constitutivist account of goodness that Wittgenstein seems to endorse. The constitutivist account is what one would expect if goodness was a (...) family-resemblance concept. Finally, I note that Wittgenstein's nod towards non-descriptivism in the Investigations is paralleled by Stevenson's ethical emotivism. (shrink)

In 1844 Marx held that labor alienation was wholly eliminable, primarily through the abolition of private property. Work in the context of private property was alienating because it was performed for wages and the production of exchange-value. With such purposes, work was experienced as selfish and forced. With the abolition of private property, work would be performed for the production of use-¥alue, to satisfy human needs. With this human purpose, work would be experienced as a free and fulfilling expression of (...) life. (shrink)

For Wittgenstein, philosophy was an on-going activity. Only in his dialog with the philosophical community and in his private moments does Wittgenstein's philosophical practice fully come to light.

In 1844 Marx held that labor alienation was wholly eliminable, primarily through the abolition of private property. Work in the context of private property was alienating because it was performed for wages and the production of exchange-value. With such purposes, work was experienced as selfish and forced. With the abolition of private property, work would be performed for the production of use-¥alue, to satisfy human needs. With this human purpose, work would be experienced as a free and fulfilling expression of (...) life. (shrink)

If Socrates were asked “Is Wittgenstein Still an Analytic Philosopher?” he would first want to know the definition of “analytic philosophy.” Hanjo Glock has done an excellent job trying to offer a family-resemblance account, that connects with the method and content of Wittgenstein’s work and its origins. I will look at some further factors—Wittgenstein’s aims and his impact. When we include these considerations, we are led to wonder whether Wittgenstein is still an analytic philosopher.

Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is one of the most important philosophical works of the Twentieth Century, yet it is brief and offers little orientation for the reader. This causes two problems: The first-time reader is left wondering what it could be about, and often leaves off reading in frustration after a few pages. The scholar is left with little guidance for interpretation. This paper recounts selected material from my book Tractatus in Context. While the book includes familiar material from Wittgenstein’s notebooks and (...) letters, it also includes lesser-known material such as untranslated correspondence and notebook entries, later lectures and dictations, notes from Ramsey, and previously unknown reviews. Some of the topics to be examined are: simple objects, atomic facts and elementary propositions, limits and boundaries, superstition, the shape of the visual field, and the role of the will. Given the occasion, I’ll also focus on some ways in which conversations with the Vienna Circle help illuminate obscure passages in the Tractatus. (shrink)

In this volume, a number of renowned scholars of Plato reflect upon their interpretive methods. Topics covered include the use of ancient authorities in interpreting Plato's dialogues, Plato's literary and rhetorical style, his arguments and characters, and his use of the dialogue form.

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy is an annual publication which includes original articles on a wide range of topics in ancient philosophy, and review articles of major books. In this supplementary volume, a number of renowned scholars of Plato reflect upon their interpretative methods. Topics covered include the use of ancient authorities in interpreting Plato's dialogues, Plato's literary and rhetorical style, his arguments and characters, and his use of the dialogue form. The collection is not intended as a comprehensive survey (...) of methodological approaches; rather it offers a number of different perspectives and clearly articulated interpretations by leading scholars in the field. (shrink)

In 2003 I published a survey of Wittgenstein’s lectures in Public and Private Occasions. Much has been learned about his lectures since then. This paper revisits the earlier survey and provides additional material and corrections, which amount to over 25%. In case it is useful, I have provided interlinear pagination from the original publication.

This volume contains twelve essays by friends, colleagues, and former students of Philippa Foot: Anscombe, Blackburn, Hursthouse, Kenny, Lawrence, McDowell, Quinn, Sachs, Scanlon, Michael Thompson, Wiggins, and Williams. The essays concern issues relevant to or raised by Foot's work in moral philosophy, only sometimes specifically addressing her views. Unfortunately, there is no contribution by Foot herself, either in the form of replies or a new paper. This certainly lessens the interest of the volume. Perhaps Foot was driven by modesty in (...) not wanting the focus to be on her comments, or by the need to conserve her time for larger ongoing projects. Whatever the explanation, readers would have benefited from the chance to hear her latest thinking on the issues raised in some of these papers (especially those by Blackburn and McDowell). (shrink)

"Ludwig Wittgenstein's brief Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is one of the most important philosophical works of the Twentieth Century, yet it offers little orientation for the reader. The first-time reader is left wondering what it could be about, and the scholar is left with little guidance for interpretation. In Tractatus in Context, James C. Klagge presents the vital background necessary for appreciating Wittgenstein's gnomic masterpiece. Tractatus in Context contains the early reactions to the Tractatus, including the initial reviews written in (...) 1922-1924. And while we can't talk with Wittgenstein, we can do the next best thing-hear what he had to say about the Tractatus. Klagge thus presents what Wittgenstein thought about germane issues leading up to his writing the book, in discussions and correspondence with others about his ideas, and what he had to say about the Tractatus after it was written-in letters, lectures and conversations. It offers, you might say, Wittgenstein's own commentary on the book. Key Features: Illuminates what is at stake in the Tractatus, by providing the views of others that engaged Wittgenstein as he was writing it. Includes Wittgenstein's earlier thoughts on ideas in the book as recorded in his notebooks, letters, and conversations as well as his later, retrospective comments on those ideas. Draws on new or little-known sources, such as Wittgenstein's coded notebooks, Hermine's notes, Frege's letters, Hänsel's diary, Ramsey's notes, and Skinner's dictations. Draws connections between the background context and specific passages in the Tractatus, using a proposition-by-proposition commentary"--. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Wittgenstein on Non-Mediative CausalityJames C. KlaggeIn the late autumn of 1947 Wittgenstein dictated a selection of manuscript material to a typist1 that contains some remarks so striking that they merit extensive quotation:903. No supposition seems to me more natural than that there is no process in the brain correlated with associating or with thinking; so that it would be impossible to read off thought-processes from brain-processes. I mean this: (...) if I talk or write there is, I assume, a system of impulses going out from my brain and correlated with my spoken or written thoughts. But why should the system continue further in the direction of the centre? Why should this order not proceed, so to speak, out of chaos? The case would be like the following—certain kinds of plants multiply by seed, so that a seed always produces a plant of the same kind as that from which it was produced—but nothing in the seed corresponds to the plant which comes from it; so that it is impossible to infer the properties or structure of the plant from those of the seed that it comes out of—this can only be done from the history of the seed. So an organism might come into being even out of something quite amorphous, as it were causelessly; and there is no reason why this should not really hold for our thoughts, and hence for our talking and writing. (Zettel 608)904. It is thus perfectly possible that certain psychological phenomena cannot be investigated physiologically, because physiologically nothing corresponds to them. (Z 609)905. I saw this man years ago; now I have seen him again, I recognize him, I remember his name. And why does there have to be a cause of this remembering in my nervous system? Why must something or other, whatever it may be, be stored-up there in any form? Why must a trace have been left behind? Why should there not be a psychological regularity to which no physiological regularity corresponds? If this upsets our concepts of causality, then it is high time they were upset. (Z 610) [End Page 653]906. The prejudice in favor of psycho-physical parallelism is also a fruit of the primitive conception of grammar. For when one admits a causality between psychological phenomena, which is not mediated physiologically, one fancies that in doing so one is making an admission of the existence of a soul alongside the body, a ghostly soul-nature. (cf. Z 611)909. Why should not the initial and terminal states of a system be connected by a natural law, which does not cover the intermediary state? (Only don’t think of efficacy/influence [Wirkung]!) (Z 613)918. …Well—but now that the structure of the eye is known—how does it come about that we act, react, in this way? But must there be a physiological explanation here? Why don’t we just leave explaining alone?—But you would never talk like that, if you were examining the behavior of a machine!—Well, who says that a living creature, an animal body, is a machine in this sense?— (Z 614)Lest you think, or hope, these ideas were just a passing fancy of Wittgenstein’s, it is worth noting that these passages were among the ones that he cut from this typescript to save in a box and rearrange and perhaps revise for future use. They were published posthumously as Zettel.2What are we to make of these striking ideas? Do they hint at “mystical vitalism”? Is there an intellectual trajectory along which they can be located and appreciated, even if perhaps ultimately rejected? Or is he simply making a “natural” objection to reductionism about memory?3In an earlier publication I briefly offered a motivation for these views,4 but I now have more to say and wish to try again. Earlier I saw these passages primarily in relation to Wittgenstein’s other views about mental phenomena, but I now think something can be gained by seeing them in relation to his views about causality. Unfortunately causality is not a topic about which Wittgenstein had... (shrink)