Moral education is an important topic—both for moral philosophy and for the philosophy of education. Of the many questions that ought to be asked about moral education, certainly the following would be included in any reasonable list: What constitutes a moral education? How does one properly give someone a moral education? and Why provide persons with moral education? I have little to say about question. My main interest in this paper is in the third question, but I shall approach it (...) by first concentrating on question. What does a person have if he possesses a moral education? What is lacking and what is defective in an individual who does not have one? (shrink)

Revision of the author's thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1970. Bibliography: p. 155-158.

Moral education is an important topic—both for moral philosophy and for the philosophy of education. Of the many questions that ought to be asked about moral education, certainly the following would be included in any reasonable list: What constitutes a moral education? How does one properly give someone a moral education? and Why provide persons with moral education? I have little to say about question. My main interest in this paper is in the third question, but I shall approach it (...) by first concentrating on question. What does a person have if he possesses a moral education? What is lacking and what is defective in an individual who does not have one? (shrink)

Because higher education brings members of academic communities in direct contact with students, the reflective higher education student is in an excellent position for developing two important intellectual virtues: confidence and humility. However, academic communities differ as to whether their members reach consensus, and their teaching practices reflect this difference. In this essay, Ward Jones argues that both consensus‐reaching and non‐consensus‐reaching communities can encourage the development of intellectual confidence and humility in their students, although each will do so in (...) very different ways. (shrink)

The neologism post-truth is commonly used to characterize a polity in which false and biased beliefs have corrupted public opinion and policymaking. Simplifying and broadening our use of the adjective beyond its current narrow meaning could make post-truth a useful addition to the lexicons of history, politics, and philosophy. Its current use, however, is unhelpful and distracting (at best), and experienced as demeaning and humiliating (at worst). Contemporary polities are better characterized as post-trust. A polity becames post-trust when testimony from (...) either a community of knowledge workers or a social group of complainants—such as women who give testimony of sexual assault—loses influence upon public opinion and policymaking. (shrink)

Glaucon's Challenge at the beginning of Book 2 of Plato's Republic has long prompted interpretive difficulties, due to a misunderstanding of its central aspect. The task of this essay is to correct...

In _Bioethics in Context_, Gary Jones and Joseph DeMarco connect ethical theory, medicine, and the law, guiding readers toward a practical and legally grounded understanding of key issues in health-care ethics. This book is uniquely up-to-date in its discussion of health-care law and unpacks the complex web of American policies, including the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Useful case studies and examples are embedded throughout, and a companion website offers a thorough, curated database of relevant legal precedents as (...) well as additional case studies and other resources. (shrink)

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

While the nature-grace debate rages in Thomistic circles, St. Bonaventure's theological anthropology and his theology of grace is paid much less attention, with the exception of his argument that Adam was created apart from gratia gratum faciens, or in modern terms habitual or sanctifying grace.1 For this position he has come under some scrutiny. John Milbank connects Adam's short time without habitual grace to Bonaventure's deficient understanding of illumination as proof of an incipient voluntarism and a suspect pure nature theology.2 (...) Turning Milbank upon his head, Fr. Christopher Cullen, S.J. defends the "suspended middle" in Bonaventure by appealing to Adam's creation without grace; human nature has a... (shrink)

Most explanations of beliefs are epistemically or pragmatically rationalizing. The distinction between these two types involves the explainer's differing expectations of how the believer will behave in the face of counter-evidence. This feature suggests that rationalizing explanations portray beliefs as either a consequence of the believer's following a norm, or part of a sub-intentional goal-oriented system. Which properly characterizes pragmatic believing? If there were pragmatic norms for believing, I argue, they would not be consciously followable. Yet an unallowable norm is (...) not a norm at all, and so I conclude that there are no such norms and that pragmatic believing is a sub-intentional, and not a norm-driven, process. /// La mayoría de las explicaciones de las creencias racionalizan de forma epistémica o pragmática. La distinción entre estas dos involucra las diferentes expectativas del que explica acerca de cómo se comportará el creyente frente a evidencia contraria. Este rasgo sugiere que las explicaciones racionalizadoras toman las creencias o bien como una consecuencia de que el creyente siga una norma, o bien como parte de su sistema subintencional orientado a fines. ¿Cuàl caracteriza de manera apropiada el creer pragmático? Aquí argumento que si hubiera normas pragmáticas para creer, no se podrían seguir conscientemente; sin embargo, una norma no seguible no es una norma en ningún sentido, por lo que concluyo que no existen tales normas y que el creer pragmático es un proceso subintencional y no un proceso guiado por normas. (shrink)

ABSTRACTShelley’s “Letter to Maria Gisborne” is a playful improvisational verse epistle, widely praised for its urbanity and its display of the poet’s invention. The verses turn on a catalogue of the collection of odd scientific and mechanical objects that Shelley found scattered around him in the place he composed the letter, the Livorno workshop of Gisborne’s son, a young engineer who was building a new-model steamboat at the time. In the context of that space, the poem reads as a response (...) to competing notions of invention. For Shelley, the engineer’s workshop is an attractive alternative to the poet’s tower—which was uncomfortably close to a Grub Street garret. Verbal and visual images of poets’ and scientists’ workshops, from Hogarth and Mary Robinson, to Joseph Wright of Derby and Frankenstein, illustrate the tensions embodied in the physical location and poetic performance of Shelley’s celebrated “Letter.”. (shrink)

Dark comedies invite us to laugh at something which is, at least ostensibly, not funny at all. They take an act or event that would, under most descriptions or presentations, invite pity or anger, and give it characteristics that invite amusement. It is essential to the humour of the kidnapping in The King of Comedy that it is a kidnapping. The immorality of this event is crucial to its humour.

The proponents of the ‘vindication’ or ‘pragmatic justification’ of induction have attempted to show that induction will work if any method does. This in turn serves as grounds for their claim that we have everything to gain by using induction and nothing to lose. Hence, they conclude that it is rational to use induction. Their claim that induction will work if any mehtod does is based upon the following argument:If nature is uniform, induction will work. If nature is not uniform (...) and some other method works, the success of that method will then constitute a regularity to which induction can be successfully applied. In that case, induction will sanction the continued use of the successful method and hence will be successful as well. (shrink)

In the Monumentum Ancyranum Augustus makes some interesting and, if we can unravel them, undoubtedly important statements, from which certain deductions seem possible as to the number of his legionary soldiers, the rate of mortality among them, their length of service and the provisions made for them after their dicharge. Quite early in the Monument we get the following general assertion: ‘About five hundred thousand Roman citizens were bound to me by the military oath. Of these, after the due expiry (...) of their service, I settled in colonies or sent back to their own municipia somewhat more than three hundred thousand. And to all of them I gave land purchased by myself, or in lieu of land sums of money out of my own resources.’ From the place of this statement in that part of the record relating to his earlier career we might be tempted to infer that the five hundred thousand legionaries were those who formed his armies at the time of Antony's collapse, and that the discharge of three hundred thousand of them, whether planted in colonies or sent back to their domiciles, took place at one and the same time. With regard to the second point, we shall see presently that the vague and indiscriminate statement made here is cleared up by a later passage , from which it appears that the assignation of land belongs to two distinct schemes of colonizations, separated by sixteen years, and that the restoration of discharged soldiers to their municipalities, to whom alone the words ‘pecuniam pro agris dedi’ are applicable, belongs to a still later date. (shrink)

In the April number of the Classical Quarterly, Mr. H. J. Cunningham calls in question my interpretation of a passage in the speech of Claudius on the claims of the Gallic chieftains, which I will follow his good example by quoting in full. It forms the first legible sentence of Column II.

In the Mon. Ancyr. II. 2–11 Augustus makes four statements: He carried out a lectio senatus on three occasions. He held a census in his sixth consulship with Agrippa as his colleague, and completed the lustrum after an interval of forty-two years, the number of citizens registered being four millions and sixty-three thousand. He completed a second lustrum in 8 B.C. invested with the consular imperium and without a colleague, the number of citizens having increased by one hundred and seventy (...) thousand. He completed a third lustrum in 14 A.D. again invested with the consular imperium, but with Tiberius as his colleague, the number of citizens having again increased by seven hundred and four thousand. (shrink)

On those of Professor Elmore's hypotheses which appeared in his original article, I need make very few additional remarks. He restates them with undiminished confidence in this Review in January, 1918, but, except on one or two side issues, he makes no attempt to answer the careful and reasoned criticism to which I subjected them. The further developments of his theories, to which he calls my special attention, call for some examination, which however shall be brief.

I prefix to this paper for convenience of reference the three extant chapters of the law: K.L. III. Quae colonia hac lege deducta quodue municipium praefectura forum conciliabulum constitutum erit, qui ager intra fines eorum erit, qui termini in eo agro statuti erunt, quo in loco terminus non stabit, in eo loco is, cuius is ager erit, terminum restituendum curato, uti quod recte factum esse uolet: idque magistratus, qui in ea colonia municipio praefectura foro conciliabulo iure dicundo praeerit, facito ut (...) fiat. (shrink)

In an interesting article in the Journal of Roman Studies Prof. Jefferson Elmore reopens the vexed question as to the nature and object of the ‘declarations’ provided for in lines 1 to 19 of the Heraclean Table, and claims to have discovered a fresh clue more satisfactory than any so far propounded. As I have recently committed myself in opposition to the hypotheses of Hirschfeld, Legras and Nap, to what is at least a partial reaffirmation of Mommsen's explanation, and as (...) I find Prof. Elmore's suggestions contrary to the evidence, and seriously wanting in cohesion and consistency, I shall venture to subject them to some examination and criticism. (shrink)