The first edition of the Handbook of Philosophical Logic (four volumes) was published in the period 1983-1989 and has proven to be an invaluable reference work ...

Deontic logic, as traditionally conceived, provides only a deductive theory that constrains the states or possible worlds within which an agent should try to remain.

The essays in this collection are the outgrowth of a workshop, held in June 1976, on formal approaches to the semantics and pragmatics of natural languages. They document in an astoundingly uniform way the develop ments in the formal analysis of natural languages since the late sixties. The avowed aim of the' workshop was in fact to assess the progress made in the application of formal methods to semantics, to confront different approaches to essentially the same problems on the one (...) hand, and, on the other, to show the way in relating semantic and pragmatic explanations of linguistic phenomena. Several of these papers can in fact be regarded as attempts to close the 'semiotic circle' by bringing together the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic properties of certain constructions in an explanatory framework thereby making it more than obvious that these three components of an integrated linguistic theory cannot be as neatly separated as one would have liked to believe. In other words, not only can we not elaborate a syntactic description of (a fragment of) a language and then proceed to the semantics (as Montague pointed out already forcefully in 1968), we cannot hope to achieve an adequate integrated syntax and semantics without paying heed to the pragmatic aspects of the constructions involved. The behavior of polarity items, 'quantifiers' like any, conditionals or even logical particles like and and or in non-indicative sentences is clear-cut evidence for the need to let each component of the grammar inform the other. (shrink)

Commonsense reasoning often relies on the perception of similarity as well as dissimilarity between objects or situations.

This second edition of the Handbook of Philosophical Logic reflects great changes in the landscape of philosophical logic since the first edition. It gives readers an idea of that landscape and its relation to computer science and formal language and artificial intelligence. It shows how the increased demand for philosophical logic from computer science and artificial intelligence and computational linguistics accelerated the development of the subject directly and indirectly. This development in turn, directly pushed research forward, stimulated by the needs (...) of applications. New logic areas becameestablished and old areas were enriched and expanded. At the same time, it socially provided employment for generations of logicians residing in computer science, linguistics and electrical engineering departments which of course helped keep the logic community to thrive. The many contributors to this Handbook are active in these application areas and are among the most famous leading figures of applied philosophical logic of our times. (shrink)

This eighteenth volume of the acclaimed Handbook of Philosophical Logic includes many contributors who are among the most famous leading figures of applied philosophical logic of our time. Coverage includes deontic logic, practical reasoning, homogeneous and heterogeneous logical proportion, and talmudic logic. Overall, it will appeal to students, practitioners, and researchers looking for an authoritative resource in these areas. The contributors first explore models in terms of dynamic logics for information-driven agency. The paradigm they use is dynamic-epistemic logics for knowledge (...) and belief and their current extensions to the statics and dynamics of agents’ preferences. Next, in the presentation of preference based agency, coverage examines a large number of themes, including interactive social agents and scenarios with long term patterns emerging over time. From here, the book moves on to offer an introduction to homogeneous and heterogeneous logical proportions. Readers will also learn more about the general challenge that the problem of formalizing practical reasoning presents to logical theory. The contributors survey the existing resources that might contribute to the development of such a formalization. They conclude that, while a robust, adequate logic of practical reasoning is not yet in place, the materials for developing such a logic are now available. The last chapter explores topics that deal with the logic of Jewish law and the logic of the Talmud. This includes obligations and prohibitions in Talmudic deontic logic, the handling of loops in Talmudic logic, Temporal Talmudic logic, and quantum states and disjunctive attacks in Talmudic logic. The Talmudic logic system presented are also exported to general logic and to Artificial Intelligence. (shrink)

When one thinks—knows, believes, imagines—that something is the case, one’s thought has a topic: it is about something, towards which one’s mind is directed. What is the logic of thought, so understood? This book begins to explore the idea that, to answer the question, we should take topics seriously. It proposes a hyperintensional account of the propositional contents of thought, arguing that these are individuated not only by the set of possible worlds at which they are true, but also by (...) their topic: what they are about. The book then builds epistemic, doxastic, probabilistic, and conditional logics based on this view. It applies them to issues ranging from dogmatism, scepticism, and epistemic fallibilism, to imagination and suppositional reasoning, belief revision, framing effects, and the acceptability of indicative conditionals. (shrink)

Jury theorems are mathematical theorems about the ability of collectives to make correct decisions. Several jury theorems carry the optimistic message that, in suitable circumstances, ‘crowds are wise’: many individuals together (using, for instance, majority voting) tend to make good decisions, outperforming fewer or just one individual. Jury theorems form the technical core of epistemic arguments for democracy, and provide probabilistic tools for reasoning about the epistemic quality of collective decisions. The popularity of jury theorems spans across various disciplines such (...) as economics, political science, philosophy, and computer science. This entry reviews and critically assesses a variety of jury theorems. It first discusses Condorcet's initial jury theorem, and then progressively introduces jury theorems with more appropriate premises and conclusions. It explains the philosophical foundations, and relates jury theorems to diversity, deliberation, shared evidence, shared perspectives, and other phenomena. It finally connects jury theorems to their historical background and to democratic theory, social epistemology, and social choice theory. (shrink)

We need to understand the impossible. Francesco Berto and Mark Jago start by considering what the concepts of meaning, information, knowledge, belief, fiction, conditionality, and counterfactual supposition have in common. They are all concepts which divide the world up more finely than logic does. Logically equivalent sentences may carry different meanings and information and may differ in how they're believed. Fictions can be inconsistent yet meaningful. We can suppose impossible things without collapsing into total incoherence. Yet for the leading philosophical (...) theories of meaning, these phenomena are an unfathomable mystery. To understand these concepts, we need a metaphysical, logical, and conceptual grasp of situations that could not possibly exist: Impossible Worlds. This book discusses the metaphysics of impossible worlds and applies the concept to a range of central topics and open issues in logic, semantics, and philosophy. It considers problems in the logic of knowledge, the meaning of alternative logics, models of imagination and mental simulation, the theory of information, truth in fiction, the meaning of conditional statements, and reasoning about the impossible. In all these cases, impossible worlds have an essential role to play. (shrink)

Various theories try to give accounts of how measures of this confidence do or ought to behave, both as far as the internal mental consistency of the agent as ...

Degrees of belief are familiar to all of us. Our confidence in the truth of some propositions is higher than our confidence in the truth of other propositions. We are pretty confident that our computers will boot when we push their power button, but we are much more confident that the sun will rise tomorrow. Degrees of belief formally represent the strength with which we believe the truth of various propositions. The higher an agent’s degree of belief for a particular (...) proposition, the higher her confidence in the truth of that proposition. For instance, Sophia’s degree of belief that it will be sunny in Vienna tomorrow might be .52, whereas her degree of belief that the train will leave on time might be .23. The precise meaning of these statements depends, of course, on the underlying theory of degrees of belief. These theories offer a formal tool to measure degrees of belief, to investigate the relations between various degrees of belief in different propositions, and to normatively evaluate degrees of belief. (shrink)

Suppose several individuals (e.g., experts on a panel) each assign probabilities to some events. How can these individual probability assignments be aggregated into a single collective probability assignment? This article reviews several proposed solutions to this problem. We focus on three salient proposals: linear pooling (the weighted or unweighted linear averaging of probabilities), geometric pooling (the weighted or unweighted geometric averaging of probabilities), and multiplicative pooling (where probabilities are multiplied rather than averaged). We present axiomatic characterisations of each class of (...) pooling functions (most of them classic, but one new) and argue that linear pooling can be justified procedurally, but not epistemically, while the other two pooling methods can be justified epistemically. The choice between them, in turn, depends on whether the individuals' probability assignments are based on shared information or on private information. We conclude by mentioning a number of other pooling methods. (shrink)

Jenseits von Gut und Böse? - Ein provozierendes Plädoyer für einen realistischen Moralkodex - Eine Autopsie der menschlichen Moralfähigkeit - Argumente wider eine Diktatur der Moral Finanzkrise, Doping-Skandale, Wissenschaftsbetrug, Kriege, Mord und Totschlag - ist es wirklich so, dass die Moral schwindet? Oder ist der Mensch überfordert, weil er möglicherweise weniger Moral verträgt, als er sich selbst verordnet? Wie alle anderen Lebewesen sind Menschen Egoisten, die in erster Linie das Problem des Überlebens zu lösen haben. Dazu benötigt der Mensch Ressourcen, (...) um die er mit anderen im Wettbewerb steht. Von Natur aus ist der Mensch also weder gut noch böse, sondern er macht nur, was ihm sein biologischer Imperativ gebietet. Als soziales Lebewesen ist nun der Mensch auf ein Miteinander mit Artgenossen angewiesen und kann obendrein sein Verhalten und Handeln kritisch reflektieren, was zur Schaffung eines Wertesystems geführt hat. Franz M. Wuketits untersucht Herkunft und Zweck moralischen Verhaltens und macht Vorschläge für eine Werteordnung, die an die Bedürfnisse des Individuums angepasst sein muss, wenn sie in der Realität unserer gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse eine Chance haben soll. (shrink)

Menschen überschätzen ihre Rationalität erheblich. Psychologische Informiertheit kann die Ethik davor bewahren, diese Selbstüberschätzung unhinterfragt aufzugreifen. Wir Menschen halten zumindest uns selbst im Grossen und Ganzen für rational. Wir glauben zu wissen, warum wir uns auf eine bestimmte Weise verhalten, und wir können auf Nachfrage viele Gründe für unsere Einstellungen und Handlungen angeben. Die psychologische Forschung zeigt jedoch die Unzulänglichkeit dieses rationalistischen Selbstverständnisses auf. Gerade in Bezug auf tiefsitzende Einstellungen und wertebezogene Handlungen sind Selbsttäuschungen eher der Regelfall als die Ausnahme. (...) Eine psychologisch informierte Ethik versucht, diese beschränkte menschliche Selbsttransparenz umfassend zu berücksichtigen. Dadurch kann sie nicht nur philosophisch-psychologische Grenzfragen beantworten, sie überzeugt vor allem durch ein realitätsnahes Menschenbild."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

diefes thut Ariftoteles. indem er die verfchiedenen Bedeutungen. die nach feiner Beobachtung der Name des Seienden umfaßt. unterfcheidend. die eigentlichen von den uneigentlichen fondert und die let-,tern von der metaphyfifchen ...

F. Brentano. Franz Brentano ARISTOTELES LEHRE VOM URSPRUNG DES_ MENSOHLIOI-IEN GEISTES VON FRANZ BREN'I'ANO. Aristoteles Lehre vom Ursprung des menschlichen Geistes. Front Cover.

Die 1990 gegründete Reihe, die auf eine Anregung von Mazzino Montinari zurückgeht, publiziert Quellenmaterialien zu Nietzsches Leben, seinem Umkreis und seiner Wirkung. Die Supplementa stellen somit eine Ergänzung zu den Kritischen Ausgaben von Nietzsches Werken (KGW) und Briefen (KGB) dar.

Tractatus 4.024 inspired the dominant semantics of our time: truth-conditional semantics. Such semantics is focused on possible worlds: the content of p is the set of worlds where p is true. It has become increasingly clear that such an account is, at best, defective: we need an ‘independent factor in meaning, constrained but not determined by truth-conditions’ (Yablo 2014, p. 2), because sentences can be differently true at the same possible worlds. I suggest a missing comment which, had it been (...) included in the Tractatus, would have helped semantics get this right from the start. This is my 4.0241: ‘Knowing what is the case if a sentence is true is knowing its ways of being true’: knowing a sentence’s truth possibilities and what we now call its topic, or subject matter. I show that the famous ‘fundamental thought’ that ‘the “logical constants” do not represent’ (4.0312) can be understood in terms of ways-based views of meaning. Such views also help with puzzling claims like 5.122: ‘If p follows from q, the sense of “p” is contained in the that of “q”’, which are compatible with a conception of entailment combining truth-preservation with the preservation of topicality, or of ways of being true. (shrink)

A probability aggregation rule assigns to each profile of probability functions across a group of individuals (representing their individual probability assignments to some propositions) a collective probability function (representing the group's probability assignment). The rule is “non-manipulable” if no group member can manipulate the collective probability for any proposition in the direction of his or her own probability by misrepresenting his or her probability function (“strategic voting”). We show that, except in trivial cases, no probability aggregation rule satisfying two mild (...) conditions (non-dictatorship and consensus preservation) is non-manipulable. (shrink)

Franz Overbeck war Nietzsches bester Freund. Er blieb es über dessen geistigen Zusammenbruch im Januar 1889 hinaus, weil er Nietzsches bedingungslose Ansprüche an seine Apostel stets ablehnte. Den Freund betrachtet er in diesen Erinnerungen nicht als Genie, sondern als einen sensiblen, vielfach gebrochenen Menschen.Nietzsche erscheint hier nicht als Ausnahmemensch, sondern als Zeitgenosse, weniger seiner Zeit voraus als vielmehr ganz und gar ein Teil von ihr. Neben den Erinnerungen stehen hier auch die erschütternden Briefe, die Overbeck zur Zeit von Nietzsches (...) Zusammenbruch an dessen ergebenen Jünger Heinrich Köselitz, alias Peter Gast schrieb. Sie erscheinen hier, ebenso wie die Erinnerungen, zum ersten Mal als Buch. Franz Overbeck, geboren 1837, gestorben 1905, war Professor für Neues Testament und Alte Kirchengeschichte an der Universität Basel, wo er zu den Freunden von Jacob Burckhardt gehörte. Seine scharfe Kritik moderner Theologie und insbesondere der religiös begründeten Selbstlegitimation des Bismarck-Reichs machten ihn an den deutschen Universitäten zur persona non grata. (shrink)

Das Buch stellt eine Alternative zur gängigen Sicht der Entstehungsgeschichte des Deutschen Idealismus vor, indem eine spezielle Rezeption des Platonismus, wie sie in Tübingen am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts möglich war, als Ausgangspunkt der prinzipiellen Überlegungen der Tübinger Freunde nachgewiesen wird. Im Gegensatz zu den bewußtseins- und wissenschaftstheoretischen Rekonstruktionen der System-Sukzessionen (von Kant über Reinhold und Fichte zu Schelling und Hegel) wird hier der philosophische Ansatz der drei Tübinger aus dem Versuch erklärt, die platonische Prinzipienlehre (in ihrer neuplatonisch überarbeiteten Form) (...) unter den Bedingungen der transzendentalen Wende Kants zu reformulieren. (shrink)

Das Bose hat Konjunktur - und bleibt doch unberechenbar. Lassen sich dennoch angemessene Strategien des Umgangs entwickeln, die weder die prekare Faktizitat des Bosen noch seine historische Tiefendimension ausblenden? Ausgehend von dieser Leitfrage nahert sich der vorliegende, interdisziplinar breit angelegte Band dem vielschichtigen Phanomen des Bosen in praxeologischer Perspektive. So fokussiert er Moglichkeiten eines - asthetisch wie wissenschaftlich reflektierten -, guten' Umgangs mit dem Bosen. Dabei zeigt sich, dass dies nur unter Beachtung der unaufhebbaren Verwiesenheit von Gut und Bose gelingen (...) kann. Im facherubergreifenden Dialog der Beitrage entstehen so Reflexionen auf Dialektik, Differenz und Paradoxien der Fundamentalkategorien Gut und Bose von wissenschaftsethischer wie grundlagentheoretischer Brisanz.Der Band bietet einen gesonderten Schwerpunkt zu Marcel Beyers 'Kaltenburg', einem Schlusselroman zu Konrad Lorenz, dem Autor von 'Das sogenannte Bose'. (shrink)

Pets are truly great companions. Some individuals feel that owning a pet can help them prepare for a growing family by giving them a taste of what it would be like to have children. This study also looks into the psychological well-being and life experiences of LGBT fur parents. Employing the Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis, the findings of this study were: (1) With the presence of fur babies, participants had the ease to overcome stressful events, especially the ones that affect their (...) mental health. With these, they have the desire to take care of their fur babies under all circumstances because they see their fur babies as family members. Fur babies are excellent sources of motivation, confidence, and happiness for fur parents. They are treated as family members because they contribute to the mental and emotional aspects of fur parents. Moreover, the majority of respondents valued their pets far more than their actual family members, however, some didn't spend as much time with their relatives and friends. This study comes to the conclusion that a stronger bond with one's dog was also linked to higher anxiety about being unloved and rejected by family members and people surrounding us, which was linked to a heavier impact on one's psychological well-being. In reality, fur parents, especially LGBT parents, offer their fur babies a lot of love and attention compared to other things. (shrink)

Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs, and other mental states in social-scientific theories are nothing but constructs re-describing people's behaviour. Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, on a par with the unobservables in science, such as electrons and electromagnetic fields. While behaviourism has gone out of fashion in psychology, it remains influential in economics, especially in ‘revealed preference’ theory. We defend mentalism in economics, construed as a positive science, and show that it fits best scientific practice. (...) We distinguish mentalism from, and reject, the radical neuroeconomic view that behaviour should be explained in terms of brain processes, as distinct from mental states. (shrink)