I draw on earlier research to develop contrasts between interpreting the conception of God in the Divine Names in terms of Neoplatonic, Latin Scholastic(specifically Albertinian and Thomistic), and Byzantine / Eastern Christian frameworks. Based on these contrasts, I then explore whether Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas were influenced, and possibly led astray, by John Sarracen’s translation of key terms and phrases in the Divine Names such as (Greek), (Greek)and its cognates, (Greek), (Greek), and (Greek). I conclude that Sarracen’s (...) mistranslation of (Greek) by essentia clearly reinforces an essentialist interpretation of God in the Divine Names—that is, the view that God is an absolutely simple being identical to its essence. It is not clear that his translations of the other terms do the same, although they are most often read in an essentialist fashion by Albert and Aquinas. (shrink)

The paper develops a preliminary framework for confronting poverty within the Eastern Orthodox Christian tradition. In the first section, I draw on St. Gregory of Nazianzus’s Oration 14 to discuss what is called the stigma of poverty. Although stigmatization is not essentially linked to everyday economic poverty, poor people as such are often subjected to stigmatization. For example, disaffiliation grounded in social rejection was often a distinguishing mark between pôtchos and penês. Moreover, stigmatization in itself constitutes its own form of (...) poverty since those who are stigmatized are imputed to be fundamentally impoverished or defective as person. In the second section, I focus on the writings of St. John Chrysostom and argue that the central problem for Chrysostom is not poverty but wealth, or more properly the ways in which we acquire and use wealth and the ends to which it is put. Put simply, for Chrysostom, a critical, engaged and spiritual response to poverty presupposes a critical and spiritual response to wealth. (shrink)

The paper develops a preliminary framework for confronting poverty within the Eastern Orthodox Christian tradition. In the first section, I draw on St. Gregory of Nazianzus’s Oration 14 to discuss what is called the stigma of poverty. Although stigmatization is not essentially linked to everyday economic poverty, poor people as such are often subjected to stigmatization. For example, disaffiliation grounded in social rejection was often a distinguishing mark between pôtchos and penês. Moreover, stigmatization in itself constitutes its own form of (...) poverty since those who are stigmatized are imputed to be fundamentally impoverished or defective as person. In the second section, I focus on the writings of St. John Chrysostom and argue that the central problem for Chrysostom is not poverty but wealth, or more properly the ways in which we acquire and use wealth and the ends to which it is put. Put simply, for Chrysostom, a critical, engaged and spiritual response to poverty presupposes a critical and spiritual response to wealth. (shrink)

Multiculturalism has not yet systematically addressed, much less challenged, dominant approaches to poverty and welfare reform. This lacuna must be rectified since the widespread poverty experienced by people of color poses a substantive threat to the development of a truly inclusive and multicultural society. Present approaches to poverty, defined in the context of welfare reform, are defective for three reasons: First, welfare reform basically aims to reduce welfare “dependency” by moving so-called able-bodied welfare recipients off welfare and into the labor (...) market. This project seems destined to fail given a chronic scarcity of jobs, and especially decent paying jobs. Second, welfare reform does not provide an adequate framework for the general alleviation of poverty since many poor receive little or no welfare assistance. Third, welfare assistance is based on an invidious, stigmatizing distinction between the able-bodied poor (viewed as unworthy and disreputable) and the disabled poor. Thus, given disproportionate rates of poverty among people of color as well as a general (but mistaken) impression that US poverty is principally a “minority” problem, present policies and attitudes toward the poor insure that many people of color will bear the brunt of economic and symbolic marginalization despite gains which accrue to some people of color as the result of greater racial and cultural inclusiveness. (shrink)

I argue that stigmatization and inferiorization constitute the most destructive form of everyday poverty, the meaning of which is shown through a phenomenological interpretation of skid row. There are three parts to the paper. First, there is a brief discussion of poverty as a philosophical problem. Second, and ancillary to the analysis of skid row, there are discussions of the character of human dignity, everyday meaningful action and the psycho-social dynamics of stigmatization. Third, there is an analysis of skid row (...) which, drawing on Heidegger’s death-analysis in Being and Time, concludes by characterizing skid row poverty as a kind of living death. (shrink)

I argue that stigmatization and inferiorization constitute the most destructive form of everyday poverty, the meaning of which is shown through a phenomenological interpretation of skid row. There are three parts to the paper. First, there is a brief discussion of poverty as a philosophical problem. Second, and ancillary to the analysis of skid row, there are discussions of the character of human dignity, everyday meaningful action and the psycho-social dynamics of stigmatization. Third, there is an analysis of skid row (...) which, drawing on Heidegger’s death-analysis in Being and Time, concludes by characterizing skid row poverty as a kind of living death. (shrink)

This article provides critical analysis of Aquinas’s designation of poverty as unqualifiedly evil. This paper provides an analysis of two different meanings of poverty: (a) in relation to things or to the external conditions in which people live and (b) in relation to an action in which people engage or are thwarted. Next, the paper discusses the sense in which poverty is an evil—and particularly, an unqualified evil—in relation to both of these meanings of poverty. Since Aquinas claims that poverty (...) is an unqualified evil so far as it prevents people from attaining the ends of sustaining themselves and assisting others, the final section of the paper discusses possible interpretations of these ends, suggesting that each end can be taken in a narrow, minimalist or subsistence sense and a broader, more holistic or contextualized sense. (shrink)

This article provides critical analysis of Aquinas’s designation of poverty as unqualifiedly evil. This paper provides an analysis of two different meanings of poverty: (a) in relation to things or to the external conditions in which people live and (b) in relation to an action in which people engage or are thwarted. Next, the paper discusses the sense in which poverty is an evil—and particularly, an unqualified evil—in relation to both of these meanings of poverty. Since Aquinas claims that poverty (...) is an unqualified evil so far as it prevents people from attaining the ends of sustaining themselves and assisting others, the final section of the paper discusses possible interpretations of these ends, suggesting that each end can be taken in a narrow, minimalist or subsistence sense and a broader, more holistic or contextualized sense. (shrink)

L'article analyse comment Saint Thomas définit la nature de la pauvreté en faisant référence à la controverse moderne, à savoir si la pauvreté doit être définie seulement en termes de subsistance physique. Selon l'A., le théologien a deux conceptions différentes de la nature de la pauvreté. La première définit la pauvreté en termes de subsistance. L'autre en donne une définition rationnelle. L'article indique l'emplacement de ces deux conceptions dans l'œuvre de Saint Thomas, les explique et les compare pour les mettre (...) en contraste de façon critique. (shrink)

This interdisciplinary collection of essays highlights the relevance of Buddhist doctrine and practice to issues of globalization. From philosophical, religious, historical, and political perspectives, the authors show that Buddhism—arguably the world’s first transnational religion—is a rich resource for navigating todays interconnected world.

For the Life of the World (FLW), part IV, offers a thought-provoking discussion about the problems of poverty, wealth and civil justice. Poverty, basic needs and a living wage are central to the concerns and proposed goals for action in this part. While understandably referred to in a general sense since FLW is ‘a preliminary step for further discussion’, in the contemporary world, these issues are highly ambiguous, controversial and difficult to measure. Hence, to promote further dialogue, I explore and (...) highlight critical issues that must be addressed. I also offer a brief discussion of the stigmatization of poverty that cruelly affects many who are poor. I argue that to develop a more expansive theological and normative discourse about poverty and wealth, we should first aim to clearly understand key terms such as poverty in a fully multidimensional, holistic manner that explicitly considers the dynamics of the stigmatization of poverty. (shrink)

A dilemma exists when a doctor is faced with a child or young person who refuses medically indicated treatment. The Gillick case has been interpreted by many to mean that a child of sufficient age and intelligence could validly consent or refuse consent to treatment. Recent decisions of the Court of Appeal on a child's refusal of medical treatment have clouded the issue and undermined the spirit of the Gillick decision and the Children Act 1989. It is now the case (...) that a child patient whose competence is in doubt will be found rational if he or she accepts the proposal to treat but may be found incompetent if he or she disagrees. Practitioners are alerted to the anomalies now exhibited by the law on the issue of children's consent and refusal. The impact of the decisions from the perspectives of medicine, ethics, and the law are examined. Practitioners should review each case of child care carefully and in cases of doubt seek legal advice. (shrink)

In December 2013, the Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) filed a petition for a common law writ of habeas corpus in the New York State Supreme Court on behalf of Tommy, a chimpanzee living alone in a cage in a shed in rural New York (Barlow, 2017). Under animal welfare laws, Tommy’s owners, the Laverys, were doing nothing illegal by keeping him in those conditions. Nonetheless, the NhRP argued that given the cognitive, social, and emotional capacities of chimpanzees, Tommy’s confinement constituted (...) a profound wrong that demanded remedy by the courts. Soon thereafter, the NhRP filed habeas corpus petitions on behalf of Kiko, another chimpanzee housed alone in Niagara Falls, and Hercules and Leo, two chimpanzees held in research facilities at Stony Brook University. Thus began the legal struggle to move these chimpanzees from captivity to a sanctuary, an effort that has led the NhRP to argue in multiple courts before multiple judges. The central point of contention has been whether Tommy, Kiko, Hercules, and Leo have legal rights. To date, no judge has been willing to issue a writ of habeas corpus on their behalf. Such a ruling would mean that these chimpanzees have rights that confinement might violate. Instead, the judges have argued that chimpanzees cannot be bearers of legal rights because they are not, and cannot be persons. In this book we argue that chimpanzees are persons because they are autonomous. (shrink)

We submit this brief in support of the Nonhuman Rights Project’s efforts to secure habeas corpus relief for the elephant named Happy. We reject arbitrary distinctions that deny adequate protections to other animals who share with protected humans relevantly similar vulnerabilities to harms and relevantly similar interests in avoiding such harms. We strongly urge this Court, in keeping with the best philosophical standards of rational judgment and ethical standards of justice, to recognize that, as a nonhuman person, Happy should be (...) released from her current confinement and transferred to an appropriate elephant sanctuary, pursuant to habeas corpus. (shrink)

Eastern Orthodox accounts of acedia are often neglected in Catholic and Protestant circles, yet offer a range of insights for contemporary virtue ethics and moral psychology. Acedia is a complex concept with shades of apathy, hate, and desire that poses grave problems for the moral life and human wellbeing. This is because acedia disorders reasoning, desiring, willing, and acting, and causes various harms to relationships. Evagrius Ponticus and John Cassian discuss acedia in the context of a virtue ethic ordered (...) to human flourishing that includes practices to combat vices and build character. The result is an Orthodox conception of virtue and moral psychology that rewards ecumenical attention. (shrink)

L'article traite l'analyse que fait Thomas d'Aquin de la remarque faite par Aristote que, si il est estimé en termes de biens minimaux, le bonheur naturel comme auto-suffisant peut être augmenté. L'analyse de l'Aquinate est comparée avec de semblables analyses par Eustratius et Albert le Grand. Celle de Thomas semble comprendre l'auto-suffisant comme ne nécessitant rien dans le sens de ne manquant rien de ce qui est nécessaire pour la vie humaine. Deux sens des nécessités de la vie sont ici (...) proposés. L'article examine ensuite la relation entre la tempérance et les nécessités de la vie pour montrer que l'Aquinate admet une certaine classe de plaisirs non nécessaires qui sont une sorte de biens minimaux rendant le bonheur comme auto-suffisant meilleur s'ils s'y ajoutent. Enfin, l'article conclut en montrant que Thomas tient de façon cohérente que le bonheur naturel comme auto-suffisant est strictement compris dans le bonheur naturel en tant que bien parfait et final. (shrink)

The idea for this collection of essays arose out of conversations I had with D. Z. Phillips in Claremont in 2000: a set of philosophical essays recognizing and arising out of something I took to be both interesting and good going on at University College, Swansea, roughly from the 1950s into the 1990s. I envisioned eight essays, each in some way taking up the work of one of eight individuals - Rush Rhees, Peter Winch, R. F. Holland, J. R. (...) class='Hi'>Jones, H. O. Mounce, D. Z. Phillips, Ilham Dilman, and R. W. Beardsmore - each of whom taught at Swansea for a substantial period during those years, these being followed by a ninth essay providing something of an overview of the other eight essays and thereby of philosophy at Swansea during the same period. (shrink)

After a detailed analysis of just what radical theology means, as a concept and in its relationship to traditional theology, this volume offers a selection of essays written for both academic and wider audiences which show aim at catching radical theology in action, in the church and in the culture at large.