Many believe that traditional consequentialist moral theories are incapable of incorporating the allegedly important phenomenon of supererogation. After surveying the “ties at the top,” “satisficing,” and “egoistic-adjustment” strategies to avoid the supererogation objection, I argue that a recent formulation of utilitarianism incorporating the self-other asymmetry exhibits interesting supererogatory properties. I then incorporate this asymmetry into a version of egoistically-adjusted act utilitarianism, arguing that such a view exhibits very rich supererogatory properties, properties that should assuage the theoretical worries of a vast (...) number of supererogation critics. (shrink)

G.E. Moore’s open question arguments have been targeted by unsympathetic philosophers for close to a century. Perhaps the most serious criticism directed towards Moore’s OQAs is that they be...

§13 of Principia Ethica contains G. E. Moore’s most famous open question arguments. Several of Moore’s contemporaries defended various forms of metaethical nonnaturalism—a doctrine Moore himself endorsed—by appeal to OQAs. Some contemporary cognitivists embrace the force of Moore’s OQAs against metaethical naturalism. And those who posit noncognitivist meaning components of ethical terms have traditionally used OQAs to fuel their own emotivist, prescriptivist, and expressivist metaethical programs. Despite this influence, Moore’s OQAs have been ridiculed in recent decades. Their deployment has been (...) labeled “accident prone,” “simple to dismiss,” and just plain invalid. Critics accuse Moore of begging the question. Others argue that his OQAs founder upon the paradox of analysis. And still others argue that Moore’s open question argumentation is incompatible with the Kripke–Putnam causal theory of reference and thus it “simply fails; it is bankrupt”. I aim to show that there is something of continuing value in Moore’s open question efforts. I present and criticize Nicholas Sturgeon’s influential interpretation of Moore’s OQAs as a means to motivate and explicate my own interpretation of Moore’s thoughts in §13 of Principia Ethica. I then articulate the role that OQAs are intended to play in Moore’s overall argumentative strategies to undermine metaethical naturalism and thereby provide some theoretical support for metaethical nonnaturalism. Finally, I attend to the most prominent objections to Moore’s theorizing and attempt to evaluate the extent to which Moore’s efforts are successful. My hope is to display both the promising portions of Moore’s metaethical argumentation in Principia Ethica as well as its limitations. (shrink)

That all subjunctive conditionals with true antecedents and trueconsequents are themselves also true is implied by every plausibleand popularly endorsed account. But I am wary of endorsing thisimplication. I argue that all presently endorsed accounts fail tocapture the nature of certain subjunctive conditionals in contextsof consequentialist reasoning. I attempt to show that we must allowfor the possibility that some subjunctive conditionals with trueantecedents and true consequents are false, if we are to believethat certain types of straightforward consequentialist reasoningare coherent. I (...) begin by evaluating a pair of morally releventcounterfactuals in a case via David Lewis's account. I then turnto a slight modification of the case, arguing that Lewis'ssemantics fails to generate the correct truth values of thesubjunctive conditionals in the modified case. Finally, I presenta modified version of Lewis's semantics that generates the correctresults in all of the cases. (shrink)

There is a heated dispute among consequentialists concerning the following deontic principle.

In Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality, Douglas Portmore introduces a novel position regarding the actualist securitism – a position he argues is theoretically superior to the standard views in both the actualist and possibilist camps. After distinguishing the two camps through an examination of the original Procrastinate case, I present Portmore's securitism and its implications regarding his modified Procrastinate case. I level two serious objections against securitism: that it implausibly implies that morality is radically more demanding for the virtuous (...) than it is for the vicious and that it fails to recognize moral vice in a wide range of cases. I close by arguing that a possibilist variant of Portmore's securitist view is impervious to such objections and thus appears theoretically superior to the actualist version Portmore promotes. (shrink)

Theorists have consistently maintained that the most plausible forms of objective consequentialism must be probabilistic if and only if indeterminism is true. This standard position, however popular, lacks sufficient motivation. Assume determinism to be true and an attempt will be made to show that attractive forms of objective consequentialism must be probabilistic - and not for reasons related to our epistemic limitations either. -/- Here it is argued that all extant objective formulations of consequentialism fail to deliver the normative implications (...) that the spirit of objective consequentialism requires. My argument rests upon the claim that certain pairs of subjunctive conditionals with identical antecedents and incompatible consequents are such that neither of the pair is true. -/- Upon leveling the objection, the concept of an "objective" subjunctive probability is introduced and utilized in the transformation of a subjective version of expected act utility consequentialism into an objective version, one that is capable of dealing with the difficulties posed by the objection. I end by indicating some ways in which the closest thing to a plausible, objective form of consequentialism might be developed. (shrink)

Recent decades have witnessed a surge in philosophical attention to the moral standing of non-human animals. Kantians, Neo-Kantians, utilitarians, and radical animal rights theorists have staked their claims in the literature. Here Fred Feldman’s desert-adjusted utilitarianism is introduced into the fray. After canvassing the prominent competitors in the dialectic, a conception of an overall moral ranking consonant with desert-adjusted utilitarianism is developed. Then the conception’s implications regarding the particular locations of individual people and animals in such rankings across various scenarios (...) is explored. Ultimately, it is argued that when it comes to evaluating whether or not some benefit morally ought to be bestowed upon some specific person or animal, this new conception of an overall moral ranking is sensitive to a wider range of morally relevant phenomena than its more prominent competitors. (shrink)

Utilitarianism seems to imply that there cannot be any supererogatory acts, since no act can be above or beyond the call of utilitarian moral duty. Many argue, however, that there can be, indeed are, supererogatory acts, and so utilitarianism is wrong if it really implies that there cannot be any such acts. Vessel aim to respond to this challenge in two ways. First, he argues that even classical hedonistic utilitarianism doesn’t imply the impossibility of supererogation. Second, he discusses and (...) – perhaps – supports some amendments to classical utilitarianism that provides further room for supererogatory actions within a utilitarian frame work. I’ll comment on those two responses to the objection from supererogation, but first I’d like to make some remarks on the relation between supererogation and utilitarianism in general. (shrink)

James Cain issues forth a two-pronged attack against classical forms of act utilitarianism, elucidating objections from infinite utility streams and distributive justice through his novel examples.1 In his first example, we are to imagine an infinite number of immortals, living on an infinitely long street (Elm Street), bracing to suffer an infinite amount of migraine pain with the onset of this horrific disease. Left untreated, the disease would wreak havoc among our immortals in the following way. Year 1: P1 Year (...) 2: P1, P2, P3 Year 3: P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7 Year 4: P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8, P9, P10, P11, P12, P13, P14, P15.. (shrink)

I consider metaethics to be a sub-branch of moral philosophy. Some of the most central questions in metaethical inquiry include the following: What are the natures of the meanings of moral terms? If there are such things as moral properties (rightness, wrongness, goodness, badness, etc.), what are their natures?

Moore's Open Question Arguments are among the most influential arguments in 20th Century metaethical thought. But, surprisingly, there is a fair amount of confusion concerning what the Open Question Arguments actually are, how the Moorean passages should be interpreted, and what they are intended to show. Thus, the early chapters are devoted to clarificatory matters, including the exposing of a variety of contemporary attacks upon Moore's arguments as misguided by indicating where they rest upon faulty interpretations of Moorean passages. Providing (...) what I take to be accurate formulations of Moore's famous arguments, responding to historically important preliminary objections, and, finally, presenting various shortcomings of these arguments constitute the remaining themes of the early chapters. ;Next, I pursue an explanation of what I call the 'Open Question phenomenon': the inclination that many have to endorse Moore's "open question" premises. I survey a variety of popular noncognitivist explanations, arguing that each of them is unsatisfactory. I then present a novel semantic explanation of the phenomenon and use it to construct an augmented Moorean Open Question Argument, one capable of overcoming the shortcomings of Moore's originals. ;The latter chapters are dedicated to an investigation of Moore's preferred normative theory---a version of objective consequentialism. I argue that the standard semantic account of subjunctive conditionals fails to capture the nature of certain subjunctive conditionals relevant to the normative evaluation of alternatives from an objective consequentialist perspective. I then present a modified version of the standard account in an effort to remedy the problem. ;Next, I present a novel objection against all extant versions of objective consequentialism. I then introduce and utilize the concept of an "objective" subjunctive probability in the transformation of a subjective version of consequentialism into an objective version, one capable of dealing with the difficulties posed by the objection. ;I conclude the dissertation with a final chapter in which I defend possibilist versions of consequentialism from a contemporary objection. In doing so, I elucidate a theoretical advantage that possibilist theories have over their subjunctive counterparts. (shrink)

Coleman suggests three central things in her commentary: (i) SUB is just as well-suited to deal with our case as PROB SUB is; thus, there aren’t any interesting reasons to prefer PROB SUB to SUB; (ii) I may have failed to describe Feldman’s possibilist view accurately; and (iii) an “intentionally accessible” version of possibilism will solve all our problems without appealing to objective subjunctive probabilities. Let me attend to each point.

Theorists who endorse a subjunctive formulation of consequentialism with a “possibilist”-modified similarity relation are not plagued by this problem of incompatible obligations. Without some other interesting theoretical support, the burden is upon the actualists. Here’s a sketch of my favorite objective, weakly-centered, subjunctive brand of consequentialism containing the appropriate possibilist injection.

Theorists have consistently maintained that the most plausible forms of objective consequentialism must be probabilistic if and only if indeterminism is true.2 They claim: If indeterminism is true, then objective probabilities used to map such indeterminacies must be utilized by objective consequentialist moral theories; however, if determinism is true, probabilities play no role in objective consequentialist theorizing. I beg to differ. Assume determinism is true and I will show you that attractive forms of objective consequentialism must be probabilistic—and not for (...) reasons related to our epistemic limitations either. In this way, I hope to shed some light upon the nature of objective consequentialism. Here’s my case. Consequentialist normative theories can be classified into two groups: subjective and objective. Subjective consequentialist theories might be characterized as those in which an agent’s beliefs concerning the possible consequences of an alternative play a prominent role in determining that alternative’s normative. (shrink)

Le pouvoir est au coeur du questionnement politique. L'émergence de l'Etot, au sens moderne, s'appuie sur différentes conceptions du pouvoir, qui évoluent au cours des siècles. L'intérêt de cet ouvrage collectif réside dans la diversité des auteurs étudiés, de Thomas d'Aquin à Hobbes, en passant par Vitorio, jusqu'aux très contemporaines analyses de Claude Lefort.

Jean-Paul Sartre's famous autobiography of his first ten years has been widely compared to Rousseau's Confessions. Written when he was fifty-nine years old, The Words is a masterpiece of self-analysis. Sartre the philosopher, novelist and playwright brings to his own childhood the same rigor of honesty and insight he applied so brilliantly to other authors. Born into a gentle, book-loving family and raised by a widowed mother and doting grandparents, he had a childhood which might be described as (...) one long love affair with the printed word. The Words explores and evaluates the whole use of books and language in human experience. (shrink)

Sartre explains the theory of existential psychoanalysis in this treatise on human reality.

Toute sa vie, Jean Guitton s'est abondamment raconté, avec parfois une grande complaisance. De ce fait il a laissé dans l'ombre certains épisodes de sa vie, comme l'arbitrage suite à l'occupation de l'église Saint-Nicolas-du-Chardonnet, ou la mission auprès de monseigneur Lefebvre, demeurés infructueux. L'auteur, neveu de l'académicien, donne son éclairage sur ces circonstances, en vue de contribuer à son portrait. À partir d'archives familiales il traite de son amour passionné pour la vallée de la Tardes, en Creuse, dans laquelle (...) il a situé le portrait de sa mère, des relations très étroites avec son frère Henri, de son expérience de la chose militaire, de son parcours universitaire, avec la douloureuse épreuve de l'Épuration, et de sa fièvre verte académique. Il évoque ses flirts avec des illustres. Il raconte un certain nombre de souvenirs familiaux, avec quelques précisions sur sa vie quotidienne. Ainsi il apporte des éléments pour une future biographie plus complète d'un homme, sans doute surdoué, très habile et très attachant, qui devrait laisser une trace dans l'histoire."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

A new ethics for the global practice of curating Today, everyone is a curator. What was once considered a hallowed expertise is now a commonplace and global activity. Can this new worldwide activity be ethical and, if yes, how? This book argues that curating can be more than just selecting, organizing, and presenting information in galleries or online. Curating can also constitute an ethics, one of acquiring, arranging, and distributing an always conjectural knowledge about the world. Curating as Ethics is (...) primarily philosophical in scope, evading normative approaches to ethics in favor of an intuitive ethics that operates at the threshold of thought and action. It explores the work of authors as diverse as Heidegger, Spinoza, Meillassoux, Mudimbe, Chalier, and Kofman. Jean-Paul Martinon begins with the fabric of these ethics: how it stems from matter, how it addresses death, how it apprehends interhuman relationships. In the second part he establishes the ground on which the ethics is based, the things that make up the curatorial--for example, the textual and visual evidence or the digital medium. The final part focuses on the activity of curating as such--sharing, caring, preparing, dispensing, and so on. With its invigorating new approach to curatorial studies, Curating as Ethics moves beyond the field of museum and exhibition studies to provide an ethics for anyone engaged in this highly visible activity, including those using social media as a curatorial endeavor, and shows how philosophy and curating can work together to articulate the world today. (shrink)

Existentialismen är en humanism är en populär startpunkt för att närma sig och diskutera exisentialistiskt tänkande. Här återfinns resonemangen om friheten, valet och ångesten som människans existentiella livsvillkor, vilket sammanfattas i Jean-Paul Sartres välbekanta devis: "existensen föregår essensen".

'Caractère', 'densité', 'texture', 'bloc', 'trait', 'profil', 'figure' ou encore 'énergie'... : ces termes, s'ils sont souvent convoqués dans le discours musicologique se référant aux oeuvres des XXe et XXIe siècles, résistent à la clôture d'une définition. De telles notions mobilisent différentes dimensions de l'écriture mais aussi - et peut-être surtout - cherchent chacune à désigner un aspect qualitatif du musical, ce 'devenir illimité' du discours, difficile à neutraliser et à rationaliser. Le colloque organisé à l'Université Paris 8, intitulé 'Manières d'être (...) du musical', dont nous éditons aujourd'hui les actes, proposait ainsi de 'connaître l'individu à travers l'individuation plutôt que l'individuation à partir de l'individu' en interrogeant les outils compositionnels et les catégories qualitatives de l'écriture ayant pour fonction de différencier le musical en comportements ou manières d'être singuliers'"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Sténographie intégrale de la controverse du 7 décembre 1961, à la Mutualité, sur la thème : "La dialectique est-lle seulement une loi de l'histoire ou est-elle aussi une loi de la nature?".

The lush surreal illustrations of this book and its short humoristic story telling make it a fun, quick read for all ages and for anyone obliquely interested in our thirst for development and the nature of who we are. Through a poetic parody of human's desires for more of everything, we become aware that such a quest does not bring us any closer to knowing ourselves or seeing, as contemporary scientific or spiritual leaders are telling us: all things and beings (...) of our planet are intimately related, alive and ultimately "One." While each colorful painting alludes to our close relationship with the world, short lines innocently and wryly comment on the predicaments of our lives pertaining to the industrial world, where dream and reality often appear intertwined. Through the shifting identities of forms, this album gives us a glance at our own formless nature and how our excessive wish for love, home, comfort, power, and productivity inexorably transforms our worldview and make us bypass our deep infinite nature, which cannot be contained through words. As some indigenous traditions have taught us: "life is like a dream. One wonders whether it is by living that we dream or by dreaming that we live.". (shrink)

volume 1. L'héritage et le débat contemporain: I, L'héritage: Formes platoniciennes et universel suarézien -- Cicéron et Suárez : les métamorphoses du droit naturel : enjeux éthiques et politiques -- Sénèque et Suárez : le bien, principe et fin de l'existence? -- Statut ontologique et politique de l'individu chez Suárez : la persistance de la trace de l'héritage d'Occam dans la modernité -- Paix et pouvoir chez Marsile de Padoue et Suárez : les enjeux d'un débat furtif et pourtant décisif (...) sur le théologico-politique -- Alphonse de Madrigal, Thomas More et Suárez : la question des limites du possible en politique -- Machiavel/Suárez ou une rencontre inattendue-attendue -- II, Le débat contemporain: Loi naturelle et humanité chez Domingo de Soto et Suárez -- Cervantès et Suárez : incarnation de l'âme et spiritualisation du corps : l'humain en débat -- Suárez, El Greco (1541-1614), Zurbarán (1598-1664) et Velázquez (1599-1660) : l'art et la perfection du sensible : un prolongement inattendu de la métaphysique par d'autres moyens -- Suárez et Diego Mas (1533-1608) : la métaphysique restituée à elle-même par le renouvellement de la compréhension de l'étant -- Suárez et Diego de Zúñiga : l'étant, objet de la métaphysique, à quel titre. (shrink)

La parole du mille-pattes Titre etrange pour un essai de philosophie politique qui convoque les auteurs qui, depuis Platon, s'efforcent de cerner ce qui fonde notre existence sociale. " C'est avec de bonnes paroles que le mille-pattes traverse un champ fleuri de fourmis. " Selon ce dicton de Cote-d'Ivoire, ce n'est qu'avec ces bonnes paroles, sinceres et raisonnables, que le mille-pattes a evite un conflit avec les fourmis. Noble ancienne tradition qui a souvent permis a la discussion collective de prevenir (...) la violence des vengeances. Au siecle des Lumieres, substituer le droit et le libre debat aux rapports de force fut une promesse liee a tout ideal democratique. Or les siecles qui ont suivi ont comme jamais deploye des violences massives, souvent au nom de la liberte et du droit. Ici et la, malgre tout, le debat public et le souci de reconciliation ont permis de depasser des contradictions qui paraissaient insurmontables. La metaphore du mille-pattes vient rappeler que ce fut longtemps une regle commune. Apres avoir depasse la logique des vengeances individuelles et collectives, la justice civile et internationale devient parfois une forme legale de vengeance des vainqueurs, qu'elle pretend pourtant remplacer. La popularite de Gandhi, Luther King et Mandela, qui ont triomphe par les vertus de la simple parole, est-elle un echo du passe de l'humanite ou la promesse d'une reinvention a venir de la politique? En reprenant ces questions a la lumiere de l'heritage de vingt-cinq siecles de pensee, tentons de tracer les contours de cette " philosophie du mille-pattes " que le monde actuel, plus violent et inegalitaire que jamais, laisse affleurer comme un avenir possible. (shrink)

La transcendance de l’ego signe à la fois l’entrée de Sartre en phénoménologie et la première mise en cause de l’idée de sujet au sein des philosophies du Cogito. En montrant que l’Ego se constitue comme illusion nécessaire, Sartre libère un champ transcendantal déshumanisé, allégé du moi et du psychique, polarisé par ses entours. C’est pourquoi son article sur l’intentionnalité précède cette réédition critique de la Transcendance : ce texte ne prépare pas L’être et le néant mais scelle la redéfinition (...) sartrienne du moi, du monde et de la conscience, puisée dans une lecture rigoureuse de Husserl, mais aussi dirigée contre lui. Le troisième texte de ce volume, Conscience de soi et connaissance de soi, une conférence devenue presque introuvable où se résume une bonne part de L’être et le néant approfondit la visée anti-humaniste de cette théorie inédite du Cogito, qui jette la conscience dans le monde sans jamais les réconcilier. (shrink)