RésuméDepuis l'ékpoque du Cercle de Vienne on consière l'explication en tant que tâche centrale de la philosophie analytique. Cependant il n'y a pas unanimité autour de la compréhension du concept d'explication. Dans cet article nous suggérons, tout en suivant Bachelard, de considérer une explication d'un concept en tant que sa généralisation propre dans le cadre d'une théorie explicative. Nous examinons notre approche en envisageant l'explication des concepts logiques , mathématiques et de la philosophie des sciences.

El ¿fisicalismo acerca de los colores¿ considera que los colores son propiedades físicas de los objetos. Durante más de tres siglos esa posición filosófica ha estado bloqueada por considerarse que no era científicamente seria. En este artículo se hace una lectura crítica de la vigencia de esa grave acusación para concluir que la supuesta incompatibilidad entre la mejor ciencia y el fisicalismo debe ser, cuanto menos, revisada.

In this paper some classical representational ideas of Hertz and Duhem are used to show how the dichotomy between representation and intervention can be overcome. More precisely, scientific theories are reconstructed as complex networks of intervening representations (or representational interventions). The formal apparatus developed is applied to elucidate various theoretical and practical aspects of the in vivo/in vitro problem of biochemistry. Moreover, adjoint situations (Galois connections) are used to explain the relation between empirical facts and theoretical laws in a new (...) way. (shrink)

Contents: Preface. Introduction. J. ECHEVERRIA, A. IBARRA and T. MORMANN: The Long and Winding Road to the Philosophy of Science in Spain. REPRESENTATION AND MEASUREMENT. A. IBARRA and T. MORMANN: Theories as Representations. J. GARRIDO GARRIDO: The Justification of Measurement. O. FERNÁNDEZ PRAT and D. QUESADA: Spatial Representations and Their Physical Content. J.A. DIEZ CALZADA: The Theory-Net of Interval Measurement Theory. TRUTH, RATIONALITY, AND METHOD. J.C. GARCÍA-BERMEJO OCHOA: Realism and Truth Approximation in Economic Theory. W.J. GONZALEZ: Rationality in (...) Economics and Scientific Predictions: A Critical Reconstruction of Bounded Rationality and Its Role in Economic Predictions. J.P. ZAMORA BONILLA: An Invitation to Methodonomics. LOGICS, SEMANTICS, AND THEORETICAL STRUCTURES. J.L. FALGUERA: A Basis for a Formal Semantics of Linguistic Formulations of Science. A. SOBRINO and E. TRILLAS: Can Fuzzy Logic Help to Pose Some Problems in the Philosophy of Science? J. de LORENZO: Demonstrative Ways in Mathematical Doing. M. CASANUEVA: Genetics and Fertilization: A Good Marriage. C.U. MOULINES: The Concept of Universe from a Metatheoretical Point of View. List of Contributors. Index of Names. (shrink)

In this paper we use some ideas of Hertz and Duhem to propose a new concept of representation that overcomes the dichotomy between representation and intervention. It is based on the category-theoretical notion of adjoint situations and is used to explain the relation between empirical facts and theoretical laws in a new way.

In this paper we use some ideas of Hertz and Duhem to propose a new concept of representation that overcomes the dichotomy between representation and intervention. It is based on the category-theoretical notion of adjoint situations and is used to explain the relation between empirical facts and theoretical laws in a new way.

La metateoría estructuralista concibe las teorías científicas como redes formadas por elementos teóricos que poseen la misma estructura conceptual y están interconectados por relaciones de especialización. Además, postula que gran parte de la práctica científica tiene como fin concretar el elemento básico de estas redes añadiéndoles elementos más especializados. Así, pues, concibe el núcleo básico de elementos de una teoría como el paradigma que guía su evolución y la práctica científica normal como la adición, a redes preexistentes, de nuevos elementos (...) teóricos. En el artículo se propone que, en la ecología de poblaciones, el patrón de la actividad científica es diferente, pues es habitual el uso conjunto de elementos de distintas redes. Se introduce la noción de “constelación teórica” para dar cuenta de estas prácticas científicas de integración, en una misma unidad epistémica, de elementos teóricos de redes distintas. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss three examples of the appropriation of Kuhn’s ideas in philosophy of science. First we deal with classical logical empiricism. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the arch-logical empiricist Carnap considered Kuhn’s socio-historical account as a useful complementation, and not as a threat of the philosophy of science of logical empiricism. As a second example we consider the attempt of the so-called struc- turalist philosophy of science to provide a “rational reconstruction” of Kuhn’s approach. Finally, we will deal with (...) Friedman’s proposal to apply Kuhn’s ideas to the formulation of a modernized, historically enlightened Kantian approach that is based on the concept of a non-apodictic constitutive and historically moving a priori. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that philosophy of science is in need of a comprehensive and deep theory of scientific representation. We contend that such a theory has to take into account the conceptual evolution of the notion of representation in the empirical science and mathematics.In particular, it is pointed out that the category-theoretical notion of an adjoint situation may be useful to shed new light on the intricate relation between the empirical and the theoretical by showing that scientific representations (...) do not mirror reality but are to be conceived as devices for establishing scenarios for a variety of possible representational interventions and interpretations. (shrink)

In this paper we argue for the thesis that theories are to be considered as representations. The term "representation" is used in a sense inspired by its mathematical meaning. Our main thesis asserts that theories of empirical theories can be conceived as geometrical representations. This idea may be traced back to Galileo. The geometric format of empirical theories should not be simply considered as a clever device for displaying a theory. Rather, the geometrical character deeply influences the theory s ontology. (...) We argue that it would be desastrous for philosophy if it followed Rorty s "neo-pragmatic" proposal to discard the concept of representation from philosophical discourse. (shrink)

https://revistes.uab.cat/enrahonar/article/view/v11-ibarra.

May 2020 marked the 25th anniversary of the death of Miguel Sánchez-Mazas, founder of Theoria. An International Journal of Theory, History and Foundations of Science, and regarded as the person who brought mathematical logic to Spain. Here we present some of his biographical features and a summary of his contributions, from his early work in the 1950s - introducing contemporary advances in logic and philosophy of science in a philosophically backward milieu dominated by the scholasticism of that era in Spain (...) - to the development of a project of Lebnizian lineage aimed at producing an arithmetic calculation that would elude some of the difficulties confronting Leibniz’s calculus. (shrink)

El debate entre representacionistas y fenomenistas acerca del realismo de los qualia parece no avanzar. Este artículo defiende una solución que no es ni representacionista ni fenomenista. En contra de los representacionistas mantenemos que no todo contenido perceptual es reducible a su contenido representacional. En contra de los fenomenistas sostenemos que todo contenido perceptual es contenido intencional. Negamos así la existencia de los qualia, de aquellos, al menos, caracterizados de manera más estándar. Finalmente, mostramos que nuestra propuesta --situada entre el (...) representacionismo y el fenomenismo-- no ha sido explorada, porque se ha asumido, erróneamente, que todo contenido no representacional debe ser contenido no intencional. \\\ The debate between representationalists and phenomenalists on the reality of qualia has stagnated. The present article argues for a solution that is neither representationalist nor phenomenalist. Unlike the representationalists, we hold that not all perceptual content is reducible to its representational content. Against the phenomenalists, we claim that all perceptual content is intentional content. We therefore discard the existence of qualia, at least in their standard guise. Finally, we show that our intermediate proposal has not been explored because until now all non-representational content has been erroneously understood to be non-intentional content. (shrink)

En la estructura de una teoría se han distinguido tradicionalmente dos niveles conceptual y metodológicamente distintos: el nivel empirico y el teórico. Sostenemos que este enfoque de! doble nivel es incompleto y que conduce además a distorsiones, tanto en la comprensión filosofíca de las teorías como en la de su uso en la praxis científica. En este artículo se diseña un nuevo enfoque, segun el cual las teorías se conciben como estructuras representacionales tripartitas, que comprenden tres niveles conceptual y metodológicamente (...) distintos: el nivel de los datos, el de los fenómenos y el de los constructos teóricos. Se exploran las relaciones estructurales básicas entre los tres niveles y se muestran algunas aplicaciones relativas a los problemas de la idealización.Traditionally two different conceptual and methodological levels are distinguished within a theory: the empirical and the theoretical level. We argue that this two-level account is incomplete, leading to distortions of the philosophical understanding of theories and their usage in scientific praxis. We sketch a new account according to which theories are conceptualizad as three-tiered representational structures comprising three conceptually and methodologically different levels, to wit, the levels of data, phenomena and the level of theoretical constructs. Basic structural relations between these differentlevels are studied, some applications concerning problems of idealization are given. (shrink)

En esta réplica a la crítica que Sergio Martínez hace de nuestro artículo "Una teoría combinatoria de las representaciones científicas" sostenemos que su posición está basada en una aceptación acrítica de algunas dicotomías tradicionales y en una interpretación algo distorsionada de la historia de la filosofía. Indicamos que el enfoque expuesto en UTC no puede calificarse de formalista. En filosofía de la ciencia la distinción entre el enfoque "formalista" y el "historicista" es ya obsoleta. Por ello, tanto las herramientas formales (...) como las informales son de utilidad en la elucidación del concepto de representación, concepto clave de UTC. Además, sostenemos que los argumentos que Martínez recaba de la historia de la filosofía contra nuestro enfoque no son atinados. \\\ In this reply to Martínez's discussion of our paper "Una teoría combinatoria de las representaciones científicas" we argue that his criticism is informed by the uncritical acceptance of some traditional dichotomies and a rather distorted interpretation of the history of philosophy. We point out that UTC should not be characterized as a formalist approach. The distinction between "formalist" and "historicist" accounts in philosophy of science is obsolete. Henee, formal and informal means are useful for the explication of the concept of representation to be considered as a key concept of UTC. Moreover, we argue that the arguments from history of philosophy Martínez launches against our account are ill-founded. (shrink)

Physicalism claims that colors are physical properties of physical objects. For more than three centuries this philosophical stand has been denied because it was considered not to be “scientifically serious”. In this article we offer a critical review of the history of this accusation to conclude that the apparent incompatibility between the best science and physicalism must be, at least, re-examined.

The aim of this paper is twofold: on the one hand we want to make a contribution to the ongoing debate concerning an adequate explication of the concept of reduction. On the other hand we deal with the explication of the concept of explication itself. More precisely, first we discuss some current explicata of explication, then we show that they are inadequate for explication of concepts like implication, reduction, etc. Finally we propose a new and more adequate explicatum of explication (...) and apply it to the concept of reduction. (shrink)