Why does Kant, who extensively wrote on sexual life in all its diversity, never mention paedophilia? I elaborate a hypothesis on the basis of the work of Foucault and Hacking: paedophilia as a “possibility of personhood” only came into being at the end of the nineteenth century. This “possibility” is linked to the introduction of a “deployment of sexuality” over and against a “deployment of alliance.” It is only at the very moment that sexuality starts being conceived in terms of (...) feelings, fantasies, and capacities that can be different in adults and children that propositions on paedophilia become intelligible. This was not yet the case in Kant’s day. I illustrate the distinction between these two “deployments” further through analysis of the approach of the Hungarian psychoanalyst Sándor Ferenczi. Finally, I state that this debate should not be reduced to epistemology and that Foucault’s “deployments” or Hacking’s “possibilities of personhood” are rooted in the material conditions of our existence. (shrink)

In this article we show how the Lacanian theory of the Imaginary , as elaborated in Lacan's earlier texts, is strongly influenced by the Hegelianism of Alexandre Kojève. In the first part we explain how Lacan is giving a fresh interpretation of Freud's theory of Narcissism by making use of the category of the Imaginary. The second part indicates how the Kojèvian interpretation of the dialectics of Self-consciousness serves as a paradigm for imaginary intersubjectivity. Imaginary intersubjectivity, however, leads to an (...) impasse since authentic recognition requires a symbolic context. That is why Lacan's theory of a fundamental desire for recognition is intrinsically linked up with his theory of the Symbolic. According to Lacan this aspect has been neglected by Hegel . Hegel did not see the importance of the symbolic order. This affirmation, however, implies a severe misinterpretation of Hegel's text. In the last part we elaborate the relation between the Imaginary and the Symbolic as a dialectical one. The Lacanian interpretation of Freud's theory, ' Hegelianizes' Freud. We illustrate this in reference to the Freudian concept of 'libido'. (shrink)

This book reflects on the problematic relation of ethics to politics in our 'democratic' era.

In this article, I question the actuality of Freud's ideas on sexuality. First, I investigate why Freud thinks that the main psychopathological syndromes are determined by problems related to sexuality. I then show in what sense Freud's theories on sexuality make it impossible to simply think of psychoanalysis as yet another developmental psychology. Then, I turn to Fonagy's recent claim that sexual emotions cannot be mirrored and that this is the reason why sexuality can only be an imposed burden. Or, (...) rather, this impossibility explains why sexuality belongs to the borderline spectrum. Fonagy further links this idea to Laplanche's theory of a generalized seduction that it is meant to explain. I argue that it is the other way around: the theory of a generalized seduction explains the lack of mirroring in the case of sexuality. In my conclusion, I state that although the metapsychological claims of both Fonagy and Laplanche allow us to reaffirm the special place sexuality has in understanding the human being, their theories fall short when it comes to defending an exclusive primacy of sexuality. (shrink)

In his seminar on 'Desire and its Interpretation' Lacan gives a detailed interpretation of Shakespeare's Hamlet. We present this interpretation as an alternative to the psychobiographic approach which has been dominant in the psychoanalytic tradition. According to Lacan Hamlet is a poetic creation and nothing else. In order to understand it wedon't have to look at the unconscious motives of the author, but at the composition of the text. The deliberate articulation of the signifier accounts for the effect of the (...) play on its readers. According to Lacan Hamlet is a tragedy of desire that informs us onthe truth of human existence. It also shows how we can get access to this truth. In that sense Shakespeare's text can, according to Lacan, also learn us something about the aim of the psychoanalytic process. The conclusion argues that Lacan's interpretation of the nature of the psychoanalytic process is heavily dependent on the phenomenological tradition and more particularly that it ressembles the problematic of the 'phenomenological reduction'. (shrink)

In this article we discuss Foucault's genealogical critique of psychoanalysis as it was articulated in the first volume of The History of Sexuality. We first show on what grounds Foucault claims that psychoanalytic theory and practice can be considered to be the acme of the 'repressive hypothesis'. Through an analysis of the Freudian and Lacanian theory of the the law we then try to make plausible that Foucaults interpretation of this theory might be nothing but a philosophical translation of the (...) analysant's fantasies regarding the therapy and his/her analyst in the beginning of the cure, rather than an accurate account of it. However, this analysis of Foucault's misreading of psychoanalytic theory allows for a re-evaluation of his relation towards this theory. In our conclusion we suggest that Foucault might be much closer to Lacanian psychoanalysis then he himself realized. (shrink)

Sigmund Freud's 1905 Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality is a founding text of psychoanalysis and yet it remains to a large extent an "unknown" text. In this book Freud's 1905 theory of sexuality is reconstructed in its historical context, its systematic outline, and its actual relevance. This reconstruction reveals a non-oedipal theory of sexuality defined in terms of autoerotic, non-objectal, physical-pleasurable activities originating from the "drive" and the excitability of erogenous zones. This book, consequently, not only calls for (...) a reconsideration of the development of Freudian thinking and of the status of the Oedipus complex in psychoanalysis but also has a strong potential for supporting contemporary non-heteronormative theories of sexuality. It is as such that the 1905 edition of Three Essays becomes a highly relevant document in contemporary philosophical discussions of sexuality. This book also explores the inconsistencies and problems in the original theory of sexuality, notably the unresolved question of the transition from autoerotic infantile sexuality to objectal adult sexuality, as well as the theoretical and methodological shifts present in later editions of Three Essays. It will be of great interest to psychoanalysts and those with an academic interest in the history of psychoanalysis and sexuality. (shrink)

A deep dive into the influences of Hegelian thought on the work of revolutionary and postcolonial theorist Frantz Fanon Hegel is most often mentioned – and not without good reason – as one of the paradigmatic exponents of Eurocentrism and racism in Western philosophy. But his thought also played a crucial and formative role in the work of one of the iconic thinkers of the ‘decolonial turn’, Frantz Fanon. This would be inexplicable if it were not for the much-quoted ‘lord-bondsman’ (...) dialectic – frequently referred to as the ‘master-slave dialectic’ – described in Hegel's The Phenomenology of Spirit. Fanon takes up this dialectic negatively in contexts of violence-riven (post-)slavery and colonialism; yet in works such as Black Skin, White Masks and The Wretched of the Earth he upholds a Hegelian-inspired vision of freedom. The essays in this collection offer close readings of Hegel’s text, and of responses to it in the work of twentieth-century philosophers, that highlight the entangled history of the translations, transpositions and transformations of Hegel in the work of Fanon, and more generally in colonial, postcolonial and decolonial contexts. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: I The Extended Auction II Working in the Peep Show, Flirting in the Square III Insurance Behind a Veil of Ignorance IV Dworkin's Hybrid Scheme V Four Objections to Dworkin VI Ackerman Generalized VII Not Enough Redistribution? VIII Too Much Redistribution? Acknowledgement.

The conception of social justice presented and defended in Philippe Van Parijs, "Real Freedom for All" entails, among other implication, the justification of an unconditional basic income. It was the subject of seven critical comments that forms issue 22 and part of 23 of ANALYSE & KRITIK. In this article, Van Parijs offers a comprehensive reply.

ABSTRACT:In response to criticism of empirical or “positive” approaches to corporate social responsibility (CSR), we defend the importance of these approaches for any CSR theory that seeks to have practical impact. Although we acknowledge limitations to positive approaches, we unpack the neglected but crucial relationships between positive knowledge on the one hand and normative knowledge on the other in the implementation of CSR principles. Using the structure of a practical syllogism, we construct a model that displays the key role of (...) empirical knowledge in fulfilling a firm’s responsibility to society, paying special attention to the implications of the “ought implies can” dictum. We also defend the importance of one particular class of empirical claims; namely, claims from the field of economics. Even positive economic theory, which is often criticized for endorsing profits rather than values, can cooperate in intriguing ways with non-economic concepts in the implementation of CSR goals. (shrink)

How is it possible, at the same time, to claim that there is a causal primacy of the productive forces over the relations of production and to recognize that the development of the productive forces causally depends on the nature of the relations of production? This irritating puzzle, which threatens the very core of historical materialism, had never received a satisfactory solution until G. A. Cohen's Karl Marx's Theory of History. The latter asserts that only a functional interpretation of historical (...) materialism can effect the required reconciliation. On one reading of the "primacy puzzle", however, this claim turns out to be trivial, while on the only other plausible reading it turns out to be false. Having delineated this dilemma, the article sketches an alternative solution. (shrink)

If one is committed to a “Rawlsian” conception of justice, is one not also necessarily committed to a “Christian” personal ethics? MOE explicitly, if one believes that social justice requires the maximinning of material conditions, should one not use one's time and resources as well as one can in order to assist the poorest? The paper offers a very partial answer to these questions by arguing for the following two claims: (1) Contrary to what is implied by some egalitarian critics (...) of Rawls, the idea of a well‐ordered society does not require maximin‐guided choices at the individual level, and hence leaves room for legitimate incentive payments.(2) Despite Rawls's own neglect of this fact, a limited form of patriotism does constitute an individual “natural duty” following from a commitment to maximin social justice. (shrink)