In Section 38 of the Theory of Vision Vindicated, George Berkeley claims that he had used the method of analysis throughout the Theory of Vision. What does that mean? I first show that "analysis" denoted a fairly well-defined method in the early modern period: it was regularly described as a method of discovery. Then I show that the discussion of distance perception in the Theory of Vision exemplifies the method of analysis and may be seen as a modification of a (...) non-geometrical account of distance vision in Rene Descartes' Optics. (shrink)

Irish philosopher George Bishop Berkeley was one of the greatest philosophers of the early modern period. Along with David Hume and John Locke he is considered one of the fathers of British Empiricism. Berkeley is a clear, concise, and sympathetic introduction to George Berkeley’s philosophy, and a thorough review of his most important texts. Daniel E. Flage explores his works on vision, metaphysics, morality, and economics in an attempt to develop a philosophically plausible interpretation of Berkeley’s oeuvre as (...) whole. Many scholars blur the rejection of material substance with the claim that only minds and things dependent upon minds exist. However Flage shows how, by distinguishing idealism from immaterialism and arguing that Berkeley’s account of what there is is dependent upon what is known, a careful and plausible philosophy emerges. The author sets out the implications of this valuable insight for Berkeley’s moral and economic works, showing how they are a natural outgrowth of his metaphysics, casting new light on the appreciation of these and other lesser-known areas of Berkeley’s thought. Daniel E. Flage’s Berkeley presents the student and general reader with a clear and eminently readable introduction to Berkeley’s works which also challenges standard interpretations of Berkeley’s philosophy. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION Anyone who reads David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature cannot but be struck by the diversity of philosophical issues Hume addresses, ...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:168 HUME ON MEMORY AND CAUSATION In the first part of this paper I shall argue that an examination of Hume's second criterion for distinguishing between ideas of the memory and ideas of the imagination shows that Hume's ideas of the memory are relative ideas corresponding to definite descriptions of the general form, "the complex impression that is the (original) cause of a particular positive idea m and which (...) exactly (or closely) resembles m," where 'm' is a variable ranging over positive ideas (mental images). I shall show that if this is correct, there is a clear basis for distinguishing ideas of the memory both from ideas of the imagination and from beliefs regarding spatially and temporally located objects that are not based upon the memory. But since there is often a significant temporal distance between the impression remembered and the positive component of one's relative idea of the memory, it is incumbent upon me to explain how the remembered impression and the positive idea can be causally related even though they are not temporally contiguous. In the second part of the paper I shall argue that, contrary to his "definitions" of causation in the Treatise,2 Hume took neither spatial nor temporal contiguity to be essential to causation. In Book I, Part I, Section 3 and again in Book I, Part III, Section 5 of his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume provides two criteria for distinguishing between ideas of the memory and ideas of the imagination. I shall refer to these two criteria as "the phenomenal criterion" and "the formal criterion". In this section I shall show that while the phenomenal criterion 169 expresses the means one actually employs in distinguishing an idea of the memory from an idea of the imagination, the formal criterion provides one with insight into the complex structure of an idea of the memory, and therefore allows one to distinguish ideas of the memory from both ideas of the imagination and from other ideas of and beliefs regarding spatially and temporally located objects. In Book I, Part I,- Section 3 of the Treatise, Hume introduces the phenomenal criterion as follows: We find by experience, that when any impression has been present with the mind, it again makes its appearance there as an idea; and this it may do after two different ways: either when in its new appearance it retains a considerable degree of its first vivacity, and is somewhat intermediate betwixt an impression and an idea; or when it entirely loses that vivacity, and is a perfect idea. The faculty, by which we repeat our impressions in the first manner, is called the MEMORY, and the other the IMAGINATION. 'Tis evident at first sight, that the ideas of the memory are much more lively and strong than those of the imagination, and that the former faculty paints its objects in more distinct colours, than any which are employ'd by the latter. When we remember any past event, the idea of it flows in upon the mind in a forcible manner; whereas in the imagination the perception is faint and languid, and cannot without difficulty be preserv'd by the mind steddy and uniform for any considerable time. Here then is a sensible difference betwixt one species of ideas and another. (T 8-9; cf. T 85) It is clear that Hume took this to be a phenomenal criterion, i.e., to specify a sensible characteristic by which one can distinguish an idea of the memory from an idea of the imagination. Not only does he state that he has found "a sensible difference betwixt one species of ideas and another" (T 9), in the parallel 170 passage in Part III, Section 5 he claims to "search for the characteristic [of the idea], which distinguishes the memory from the imagination" (T 85, Hume's emphasis). The characteristic that allows one to "distinguish them in their operation" (T 85) is the difference in the force and vivacity of the ideas involved. Ideas of the memory are "much more lively and strong than those of the imagination," "the former faculty paints its objects in more distinct colours", and ideas of the memory... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:168 HUME ON MEMORY AND CAUSATION In the first part of this paper I shall argue that an examination of Hume's second criterion for distinguishing between ideas of the memory and ideas of the imagination shows that Hume's ideas of the memory are relative ideas corresponding to definite descriptions of the general form, "the complex impression that is the (original) cause of a particular positive idea m and which (...) exactly (or closely) resembles m," where 'm' is a variable ranging over positive ideas (mental images). I shall show that if this is correct, there is a clear basis for distinguishing ideas of the memory both from ideas of the imagination and from beliefs regarding spatially and temporally located objects that are not based upon the memory. But since there is often a significant temporal distance between the impression remembered and the positive component of one's relative idea of the memory, it is incumbent upon me to explain how the remembered impression and the positive idea can be causally related even though they are not temporally contiguous. In the second part of the paper I shall argue that, contrary to his "definitions" of causation in the Treatise,2 Hume took neither spatial nor temporal contiguity to be essential to causation. In Book I, Part I, Section 3 and again in Book I, Part III, Section 5 of his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume provides two criteria for distinguishing between ideas of the memory and ideas of the imagination. I shall refer to these two criteria as "the phenomenal criterion" and "the formal criterion". In this section I shall show that while the phenomenal criterion 169 expresses the means one actually employs in distinguishing an idea of the memory from an idea of the imagination, the formal criterion provides one with insight into the complex structure of an idea of the memory, and therefore allows one to distinguish ideas of the memory from both ideas of the imagination and from other ideas of and beliefs regarding spatially and temporally located objects. In Book I, Part I,- Section 3 of the Treatise, Hume introduces the phenomenal criterion as follows: We find by experience, that when any impression has been present with the mind, it again makes its appearance there as an idea; and this it may do after two different ways: either when in its new appearance it retains a considerable degree of its first vivacity, and is somewhat intermediate betwixt an impression and an idea; or when it entirely loses that vivacity, and is a perfect idea. The faculty, by which we repeat our impressions in the first manner, is called the MEMORY, and the other the IMAGINATION. 'Tis evident at first sight, that the ideas of the memory are much more lively and strong than those of the imagination, and that the former faculty paints its objects in more distinct colours, than any which are employ'd by the latter. When we remember any past event, the idea of it flows in upon the mind in a forcible manner; whereas in the imagination the perception is faint and languid, and cannot without difficulty be preserv'd by the mind steddy and uniform for any considerable time. Here then is a sensible difference betwixt one species of ideas and another. (T 8-9; cf. T 85) It is clear that Hume took this to be a phenomenal criterion, i.e., to specify a sensible characteristic by which one can distinguish an idea of the memory from an idea of the imagination. Not only does he state that he has found "a sensible difference betwixt one species of ideas and another" (T 9), in the parallel 170 passage in Part III, Section 5 he claims to "search for the characteristic [of the idea], which distinguishes the memory from the imagination" (T 85, Hume's emphasis). The characteristic that allows one to "distinguish them in their operation" (T 85) is the difference in the force and vivacity of the ideas involved. Ideas of the memory are "much more lively and strong than those of the imagination," "the former faculty paints its objects in more distinct colours", and ideas of the memory... (shrink)

Does George Berkeley provide an argument for the existence of the Judeo-Christian God at Principles of Human Knowledge, part I, section 29? The standard answer is that he does. In this paper, we challenge that interpretation. First, we look at section 29 in the context of its preceding sections and argue that the most the argument establishes is that there are at least two minds, that is, that the thesis of solipsism is false. Next, we examine the argument in section (...) 29 in light of the conclusions Berkeley draws in sections 30–33. There Berkeley concludes that there is one cause of the ordered world of ideas, a cause he calls the "Author of Nature." We argue that Berkeley's Author of Nature is conceptually distinct from, although numerically identical with, the Judeo-Christian God, for whose existence Berkeley argues in section 146. Finally, we ask whether, if our conclusion is correct, it is significant that Berkeley drew a conceptual distinction between the Author of Nature and the Judeo-Christian God. (shrink)

This book, first published in 1987, offers a reconstruction of Berkeley's doctrine on notions by examining the implications of his repeated suggestion that there is a close relationship between his doctrine and his semantic theory. The study ties in with some of the most important topics in modern analytic philosophy, and casts important light on modern philosophical concerns as well as on Berkeley's thought.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:158. RELATIVE IDEAS REVISITED: A REPLY TO THOMAS In "Hume's Relative Ideas" I argued that what Hume called a "relative idea" is the cognitive analogue of a definite description, that relative ideas are nonimagistic, and that recognizing the distinction between positive ideas (images) and relative ideas sheds light on various issues that remain opaque apart from that distinction. Thomas has recently taken exception to my position, contending that I (...) have "produced a 2 theory without application in Hume's framework." In reply I shall present the three cornerstones of my view and then turn to Thomas's criticisms. I. On Relative Ideas 1.What relative ideas are: In claiming that a relative idea is the cognitive analogue of a definite description, I mean only that a relative idea functions in the cognitive realm (realm of ideas) in the same way that a definite description functions in the linguistic realm. Just as the statement expressing the contextual definition of a definite description specifies the truth conditions for a statement containing that description, the statement expressing the contextual definition of a definite description corresponding to a relative idea indicates the (factual) conditions that must obtain if that relative idea succeeds in singling out an entity, i.e., it specifies the "truth conditions" for a relative idea (see T 448, T 458, and T 84 for Hume's use of 'truth'). 2.The intellectual milieu: The expressions 'relative idea' and 'relative notion' seem to have at least two uses in eighteenth century philosophy. Some philosophers used such expressions to refer to an idea 4 or a conception of a relation. Nonetheless, since no 159. substance theorist held that a substance is a relation, this can hardly be the sense in which Locke used the expression when he claimed that one has an "obscure and relative idea of substance in general." Further, Locke's discussion of the relationship between positive ideas (images) and the relative idea of substance clearly indicates that relative ideas provide an indirect means of allowing one to know what something is on the basis of its relation to something known directly, i.e., on the basis of its relation to a C positive idea. Locke also claimed that one's idea of 7 infinity is a relative idea, he seems to have held that the idea of power is a relative idea, and given his account of perception, it is at least reasonable to suggest that relative ideas are found in perceptual contexts. Similarly, Berkeley maintained that one has a relative notion of immaterial substance, but no relative notion of material substance, since in the former case, but not in the latter, one has a notion 9 of the relation between: a substance and its attributes. Outside the "way of ideas" one finds the distinction between direct and relative "conception" clearly spelled out in Reid' s Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind. Reid wrote: Of some things, we know what they are in themselves; our conception of such things I call direct. Of other things, we do not know what they are in themselves, but only that they have certain properties or attributes, or certain relations to other things; of these our conception is only relative. 10 Reid contended that our conceptions of mind, of body, of powers, and of secondary qualities are relative conceptions, that at least some of our conceptions of large numbers of things and of polygons are relative conceptions, and that relative conceptions are operative in memory. Now given that there seems to have been a fairly 160. widely recognized doctrine of relative conception in the eighteenth century, given that the contexts in which Hume used the term 'relative idea' are contexts in which proponents of relative conception employed that term, and given that Hume stated philosophical issues in terms of the conceptual system of his time, I consider it reasonable to suggest that Hume recognized and held a doctrine of relative conception even though he did not devote so much as a paragraph to stating that doctrine. 3. The relation of images to relative ideas: A relative idea is inherently complex: it includes a positive idea (or ideas) and a relation... (shrink)

In the Third Meditation, Descartes suggests that God, and only God, is self-caused. This claim results in objections, first from Caterus and then from Arnauld, that an efficient cause must be distinct from its effect, and therefore the notion of self-causation is unintelligible. In the course of his reply to Arnauld, Descartes distinguishes between a formal cause and an efficient cause, contends that God's essence is properly the formal cause of God's existence, and attempts to find a cause midway between (...) a formal cause and an efficient cause. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume's Hobbism and His Anti-Hobbism Daniel E. Flage Thomas Hobbes posed a crise morale to which British philosophers attempted to reply for over a century.1 Hobbes maintained that the terms 'good' and 'evil' have no import beyond individual self-interest and the fulfilment or failure to fulfil one's desires.2 While alluding to lawsofnature knownbyreason,3whetherone deems suchlaws dictates ofprudence4 or laws of some moral import,5 Hobbes held: (1) that (...) the notion ofjustice arises only after the institution of a commonwealth, and (2) that the dictates of justice are merely the dictates of the sovereign.6 Hence, justice is strictly a matter ofconvention. In this paper I argue that the Hume ofthe Treatise was a mitigated Hobbist.7 Like Hobbes, Hume held that the notions of justice and obligation reston a setofconventional social rules. Hume distinguished himselffrom Hobbes primarily with respecttoquestions ofmoral value, and though he provided an account of moral obligation, this was secondary to his considerations of moral value. To establish this, I briefly examine the 'is'-'ought' paragraph before turning to Hume's discussions of obligation and value. 1. 'Is' and Ought' To understand the 'is'-'ought' paragraph, one must consider it in the context of Treatise 3.1.1. There Hume examines the source of one's knowledge ofmoral value, namely, "Whether 'tis by means ofour ideas or impressions we distinguish betwixt vice and virtue, and pronounce an action blameable or praise-worthy?"s Hume's discussion, however, moves rather freely between considerations ofmoral value ('good' and 'evil', 'virtue' and Vice') and considerations of moral obligation Cright' and'wrong"). Evenin the 'is'-'ought'paragraph, a paragraph that seems to be concerned with purported relations between questions offact and questions ofmoral obligation, Hume explicitly alludes to value claims at the end of the paragraph (T 470). Since a moral philosopher might make any one of three claims regarding the relations between value and obligation, namely, (a) value claims are primary and obligation claims are dependent on them;9 (b) obligation claims are primary and value claims are dependent upon them;10 or (c) there are independent grounds for claims of value and obligation, I argue that Hume was attempting to dispel position (b). If this is correct, then Hume's Volume XVIII Number 2 369 DANIEL E. FLAGE arguments both pave the way for a conventionalist theory ofobligation and undercut Hobbes's rationalistic account ofnatural law.11 Hume's discussion in Treatise 1.1.1 is a critique of moral rationalism. It consists of two types of arguments. First, there is an argument from motivation that since moral qualities influence the passions, but whatis known by reason does notinfluence the passions, moral qualities are not known by reason (T 458-63). Second, there is a series of arguments to show that moral qualities cannot be known by reason. In examining some ofthe latter discussions, we shall see how in rejecting a rationalistic ground for moral obligation, Hume also undercuts any rationalistic ground for claims ofmoral value.12 Remember, Hume's question was "Whether 'tis by means of our ideas or impressions we distinguish betwixt vice and virtue, and pronounce an action blameable or praise-worthy?" (T 456). The rationalists answered this question in terms ofideas, claiming, that there are eternal fitnesses and unfitnesses of things, which are the same to every rational being that considers them; thattheimmutable measures ofrightand wrongimpose an obligation, not only on human creatures, but also on the Deity himself: All these systems concur in the opinion, that moraUty, like truth, is discern'd merely by ideas, and by their juxta-position and comparison. (T 456-57) In this, his initial account ofthe rationalists' position, Hume seems to focus on moral obligation, rather than moral value: the alleged eternal fitnesses seem to be moral rules such as, "All cases ofwilful murder are wrong," rather than rules such as, "All cases of wilful murder are vicious (evil)." If it were possible to establish that a rule of moral obUgation is true, a moralist might accept an additional putatively self-evident bridge-principle that, "Any action that is right (wrong) is virtuous (vicious)," and thereby deduce a claim of moral value... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:On Friedman's Look Daniel E. Flage In a pair of articles and a book (Flage 1985a, 1985b, 1990), I argued that Hume's ideas of memory are relative ideas. In "Another Look at Flage's Hume" (this volume), Lesley Friedman challenges my account on four points. She argues (1) that it is possible to remember simple ideas in their simplicity; (2) that I have misrepresented Humean impressions (...) ofreflection; (3) that I have overlooked the importance of force and vivacity in Hume's account ofmemory; and (4) that there is no textual evidence for claiming that Humean ideas of memory are relative ideas. In addition, she contends that my interpretation cannot account for mis-remembering. In this paper I show that some of the problems Friedman finds with myinterpretation arise from myreading of Lockean distinctions into the Treatise while others stem from my conflation of distinctions drawn in the first Enquiry with comparable distinctions in the Treatise. 1. Remembering simple ideas My argument that Humean ideas ofmemory are relative ideas is based primarily on Hume's remarks in three passages. In Treatise 1.1.3, one finds this: "the imagination is not restrain'd to the same order and form with the original impressions; while the memory is in a manner tytt down in that respect, without any power of variation."1 Later in the same passage one finds this: Tis evident, that the memory preserves the original form, in which its objects were presented, and that where-ever we depart from it in recollecting any thing, it proceeds from some defect or imperfection in that faculty.... The chiefexercise of memory is not to preserve the simple ideas, but their order and position. (T 9) And in Treatise 1.3.5, one finds this: These faculties [memory and imagination] are as little distinguish'd from each other by the arrangement of their complexideas. For tho'itbe apeculiar propertyofthe memory to preserve the original order and position of its ideas, while the imagination transposes and changes them, as it pleases; yet this difference is not sufficient to distinguish them in their Volume XLX Number 1 187 DANIEL E. FLAGE operation, or make us know the one from the other; it being impossible to recai the past impressions, in order to compare them with our present ideas, and see whether their arrangement be exactly similar. (T 85) This is only one characteristic ofideas ofmemory, the other being the greater degree of"force andvivacity" in an idea ofthe memory vis-à-vis an idea ofthe imagination (T 9, 85). I call this characteristic the formal criterion (Flage 1985a, 171); Friedman calls it the external difference (p. 178). These passages show that ideas of the memory represent earlier impressions, or ideas, or "events," or things known.2 How do they do so? Given the remarks on the preservation of"order and form" and "order and position," and given that resemblance alone is not sufficient to distinguish nonmnemonic ideas from mnemonic ideas (see T 9), I argued that there is an implicit causal thesis: an idea ofmemory singles out the impression that was its original cause. It is a relative idea corresponding to a definite description ofthe form, "the impression that is the (original) cause of and exactly (or closely) resembles m," where 'm' denotes a particular positive idea. (Flage 1985a, 172)3 If my account of memory is correct, there is a positive idea ("mental image") that provides the basis for every relative idea of memory. Further, this positive idea must be complex. Friedman objects (pp. 180-81) that insofar as my account requires that there be a complex positive idea that provides the basis for one's relative idea of memory, this conflicts with several passages in the Treatise. She cites the ink spot experiment (T 42) as showing that one can have a simple impression of colour. She remarks, "Since we can have such a simple impression, we can also remember it" (p. 180), adding, "It seems clear that Hume thinks that in the [ink spot] experiment, all that is present in one's visual field is the spot of ink" (ibid.). Since I had argued that "Hume's example ofseeing a minimum... (shrink)

This article shows that Descartes’ ontological argument in Meditation V is needed to ground essential distinctions, particularly the mind/body distinction. It does this by tracing out Descartes’ di...

Berkeley’s Principles is a curious work. The nominal topic is epistemic. The actual topic is ontological. And it is not uncommon to suggest that ‘Berkeley’s system presents us with unique puzzles, particularly at its foundation.’.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:173. PERCHANCE TO DREAM: A REPLY TO TRAIGER1 In "Hume on Memory and Causation" I argued that Hume took ideas of the memory to be relative ideas corresponding to definite descriptions of the general form "the complex impression that is the (original) cause of a particular positive idea m and which exactly (or closely) resembles m, " where 'm' is a variable ranging over positive ideas (mental images). My (...) argument was based primarily upon what I called Hume's formal criterion, i.e., Hume's contention that, unlike the imagination, memory preserves "the same order and form with the original impressions" (T9), it preserves "the original order and position of its ideas" (T85). Saul Traiger has recently taken exception to my interpretation of Hume, suggesting that my interpretation suffers from at least four defects. First, Traiger maintains that there is evidence that Hume took some ideas of the memory to be simple, while my account requires that they are all complex. Secondly, he maintains that my interpretation will not allow Hume to remember dreams or the contents of his imaginings, and Traiger contends that this provides at least prima facie evidence against my interpretation. Thirdly, he maintains that my account of the formal criterion is not sufficient to distinguish ideas of the memory from ideas of the imagination. Finally, he raises several questions regarding the temporal reference of ideas of the memory. I do not believe that any of Traiger's points require a significant modification of my account. I shall begin by discussing his third and fourth points and then focus 2 on his first and second points. 1. Memories and fictions. Traiger suggests that if my account of the formal criterion is correct, the formal criterion is not sufficient to distinguish 174, ideas of the memory from ideas of the imagination, "because there are complex ideas which are caused by resembling complex impressions but which are not memories" (FHAM, p. 170). He illustrates this by appealing to a writer of fiction who might appeal to some of his memories in constructing his fictitious world. Why, then, would not the resulting ideas of fiction count as ideas of the memory, since they meet both the causal conditions and the order and position requirements? The answer is that in the case of an idea of fiction one does not conceive of one's positive idea as a representative of some other perception. It is only because one conceives of the positive idea of which one is aware in memory as a representative of some other particular perception or perceptions that questions of form and order come into play. 2. Temporal reference. At several places in his paper, Traiger raises questions concerning the temporal reference of ideas of the memory. He suggests, first, that Hume's concern with "order" was with temporal order, rather than the order and arrangement of simple ideas in the complex positive component of an idea of the memory (FHAM, p. 168), and, secondly, that "when we remember, we place an impression in its temporal context, its place among a temporal sequence of perceptions" and this "temporal reference is generally not secured by the causal and resemblance relations an idea bears to an antecedent impression" (FHAM, p. 171). Regarding the first of these claims, it is clear that an idea of the memory can be "true" only if it represents a past impression or event, and since Hume construed representation in terms of resemblance (T233), this indicates that at least part of his concern with "order" must be with the arrangement of simple ideas in the complex positive component of an idea of the memory. Were it not for 175. such a correspondence between the "order" of simple ideas in the positive component of one's relative idea of the memory and the "order" of the simple impressions in the original impression, one's idea of the memory could not represent the original impression. Resemblance, however, plays no role in determining what the temporal position of the original impression was, and this brings us to Traiger's second point. Since Hume's account of time would seem to require that one locate a past impression within a series... (shrink)

A fundamental tenet of the primary/secondary quality distinction is that objects possessing only primary qualities cause (or cause ideas of ) secondary qualities. While Berkeley acknowledged the causal hypothesis "that colours, sounds, heat, cold, and such like secondary qualities,... depend on and are occasioned by the different size, texture and motion of the minute particles of matter" ( Principles §10), he seems to provide no reply to it. This paper defends the thesis that Principles §10 contains an implicit reply to (...) the causal hypothesis.It was a widely accepted principle that the cause of a phenomenon must be numerically distinct from its effect. Call this the distinctness thesis. Insofar as Berkeley shows that the primary qualities cannot be conceived as entities distinct from all secondary qualities, there is no ground for claiming numerical distinctness between the alleged cause and its effect. So, the causal hypothesis is rejected. The paper shows that the distinctness thesis was widely accepted and provides evidence that Berkeley accepted it. It sketches a distinction between an ontological and an epistemological approach to the Berkeley's works. It concludes with some speculation on why Berkeley did not make his criticism of the causal hypothesis explicit. (shrink)

This book, first published in 1990, is a detailed examination of David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature. It shows that the theory of mind developed in the Trestise is a thread which ties together many of the seemingly unrelated philosophical issues discussed in the work. Hume's primary objective was to defend a 'bundle theory' of mind, and, through a close examination of the texts, this book provides a thorough account of how Hume understood this theory and the problems he discovered (...) with it. (shrink)

RésuméL'auteur soutient que Locke, dans l'Essai, est un égoïste en éthique. Bien que la position de Locke à propos des modes mixtes implique que les vérités morales soient aussi démontrables que les mathématiques, elle apparaît incompatible avec les principes de base de la doctrine traditionnelle de la loi naturelle. Portant attention aux discussions mensés par Locke au sujet des tendances psychologiques en rapport avec ses conceptions du bien, du bien moral et de l'obligation, on soutient ici que Locke s'est fait (...) le champion d'une forme d'égoïsme naturaliste qui fournit les bases de l'obligation morale et épistémique. L'article montre, en conclusion, comment l'égoïsme lockien fournit la base d'une théorie de la loi naturelle. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:236 REMEMBERING THE PAST In his recent article "'Lively' Memory and 'Past' Memory," Oliver Johnson argues that the remarks in Treatise I. iii. 5 entail that Hume rejects all mnemonic knowledge of the past and that "we must drop the concept of the past, as it is ordinarily understood as something that once existed, from our account of memory." While I shall grant that Hume could claim no knowledge (...) of the past, I do not believe Johnson has shown that Hume rejects the past from his account of memory. In this paper I argue that Johnson misconstrues the relationship between Hume's two 'criteria' for distinguishing between ideas of memory and ideas of the imagination. I also show that if Johnson's account were correct, much of Hume's philosophy would be incoherent. Johnson begins by claiming that in Treatise I.i.3, Hume introduces two criteria for distinguishing between ideas of the memory and ideas of the imagination, namely, a criterion based on the greater force and liveliness of the idea of memory vis-a-vis the idea of imagination ('lively' memory) and a criterion based on the correspondence of the idea of memory to the impression from which it was derived ('past' memory). After commenting that these criteria follow one's common sense beliefs regarding memory (LMPM 345-346), Johnson suggests that Hume came to realize that there is a problem with his initial characterization of the distinction. He sets the problem in the form of a question: How do we go about distinguishing a memory-idea from an imagination idea in practice? Or, to sharpen the problem. How are we able to tell when we are really remembering some past 237 event instead of only imagining that we remember it? The answer to this question would seem to be simple. Since we have at our disposal two marks by which to distinguish memoryideas from imagination-ideas, all that we need to do is to determine whether the idea in question satisfies one of them. If it satisfies either, it is a memory-idea; if it satisfies neither, it must be an imaginationidea. Furthermore, since every memory-idea satisfies both criteria, it should be immaterial to which we appeal in making our test. (LMPM 346) Johnson goes on to show that in Treatise I. iii. 5 Hume claims that the criterion for past memory "is not sufficient to distinguish them [ideas of the memory from ideas of the imagination] in their operation, or make us show the one from the other; it being impossible to recai the past impressions, in order to compare them with our present ideas, and see whether their arrangement be exactly similar," which he takes to mark Hume's rejection of the criterion of past memory (LMPM 347). If a criterion is a principle that can be used to divide a class of objects into two subclasses without remainder, then, as Johnson presents them, both of Hume's 'criteria' are inadequate because each is too broad. The 'criterion' for past memory is concerned with the truth of an idea (cf. T 448 and 458), and, as such, it is equally applicable to ideas of memory and the imagination. For example, a historian 's reconstruction of a past event might be true, but the reconstruction is certainly an idea of the imagination, not an idea of the memory. Similarly, the 'criterion' for lively memory ('force and vivacity') is used to distinguish impressions from ideas (T 1) and beliefs regarding events of any temp- 238 oral location from ideas that are not believed (T 96) as well as ideas of the memory from ideas of the imagination. Thus, neither 'criterion' can singularly mark the distinction between ideas of the memory and ideas of the imagination. But if there is a problem with inadequate criteria, it is not clear that the problem is Hume's, for Hume did not claim that the 'criteria' can operate independently of one another. In Treatise I.i.3, Hume first discusses the 'criterion' for lively memory (T 8-9), and then he indicates that "There is another difference betwixt these two kinds of ideas, which is no less evident," viz.. that... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:173. PERCHANCE TO DREAM: A REPLY TO TRAIGER1 In "Hume on Memory and Causation" I argued that Hume took ideas of the memory to be relative ideas corresponding to definite descriptions of the general form "the complex impression that is the (original) cause of a particular positive idea m and which exactly (or closely) resembles m, " where 'm' is a variable ranging over positive ideas (mental images). My (...) argument was based primarily upon what I called Hume's formal criterion, i.e., Hume's contention that, unlike the imagination, memory preserves "the same order and form with the original impressions" (T9), it preserves "the original order and position of its ideas" (T85). Saul Traiger has recently taken exception to my interpretation of Hume, suggesting that my interpretation suffers from at least four defects. First, Traiger maintains that there is evidence that Hume took some ideas of the memory to be simple, while my account requires that they are all complex. Secondly, he maintains that my interpretation will not allow Hume to remember dreams or the contents of his imaginings, and Traiger contends that this provides at least prima facie evidence against my interpretation. Thirdly, he maintains that my account of the formal criterion is not sufficient to distinguish ideas of the memory from ideas of the imagination. Finally, he raises several questions regarding the temporal reference of ideas of the memory. I do not believe that any of Traiger's points require a significant modification of my account. I shall begin by discussing his third and fourth points and then focus 2 on his first and second points. 1. Memories and fictions. Traiger suggests that if my account of the formal criterion is correct, the formal criterion is not sufficient to distinguish 174, ideas of the memory from ideas of the imagination, "because there are complex ideas which are caused by resembling complex impressions but which are not memories" (FHAM, p. 170). He illustrates this by appealing to a writer of fiction who might appeal to some of his memories in constructing his fictitious world. Why, then, would not the resulting ideas of fiction count as ideas of the memory, since they meet both the causal conditions and the order and position requirements? The answer is that in the case of an idea of fiction one does not conceive of one's positive idea as a representative of some other perception. It is only because one conceives of the positive idea of which one is aware in memory as a representative of some other particular perception or perceptions that questions of form and order come into play. 2. Temporal reference. At several places in his paper, Traiger raises questions concerning the temporal reference of ideas of the memory. He suggests, first, that Hume's concern with "order" was with temporal order, rather than the order and arrangement of simple ideas in the complex positive component of an idea of the memory (FHAM, p. 168), and, secondly, that "when we remember, we place an impression in its temporal context, its place among a temporal sequence of perceptions" and this "temporal reference is generally not secured by the causal and resemblance relations an idea bears to an antecedent impression" (FHAM, p. 171). Regarding the first of these claims, it is clear that an idea of the memory can be "true" only if it represents a past impression or event, and since Hume construed representation in terms of resemblance (T233), this indicates that at least part of his concern with "order" must be with the arrangement of simple ideas in the complex positive component of an idea of the memory. Were it not for 175. such a correspondence between the "order" of simple ideas in the positive component of one's relative idea of the memory and the "order" of the simple impressions in the original impression, one's idea of the memory could not represent the original impression. Resemblance, however, plays no role in determining what the temporal position of the original impression was, and this brings us to Traiger's second point. Since Hume's account of time would seem to require that one locate a past impression within a series... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:158. RELATIVE IDEAS REVISITED: A REPLY TO THOMAS In "Hume's Relative Ideas" I argued that what Hume called a "relative idea" is the cognitive analogue of a definite description, that relative ideas are nonimagistic, and that recognizing the distinction between positive ideas (images) and relative ideas sheds light on various issues that remain opaque apart from that distinction. Thomas has recently taken exception to my position, contending that I (...) have "produced a 2 theory without application in Hume's framework." In reply I shall present the three cornerstones of my view and then turn to Thomas's criticisms. I. On Relative Ideas 1.What relative ideas are: In claiming that a relative idea is the cognitive analogue of a definite description, I mean only that a relative idea functions in the cognitive realm (realm of ideas) in the same way that a definite description functions in the linguistic realm. Just as the statement expressing the contextual definition of a definite description specifies the truth conditions for a statement containing that description, the statement expressing the contextual definition of a definite description corresponding to a relative idea indicates the (factual) conditions that must obtain if that relative idea succeeds in singling out an entity, i.e., it specifies the "truth conditions" for a relative idea (see T 448, T 458, and T 84 for Hume's use of 'truth'). 2.The intellectual milieu: The expressions 'relative idea' and 'relative notion' seem to have at least two uses in eighteenth century philosophy. Some philosophers used such expressions to refer to an idea 4 or a conception of a relation. Nonetheless, since no 159. substance theorist held that a substance is a relation, this can hardly be the sense in which Locke used the expression when he claimed that one has an "obscure and relative idea of substance in general." Further, Locke's discussion of the relationship between positive ideas (images) and the relative idea of substance clearly indicates that relative ideas provide an indirect means of allowing one to know what something is on the basis of its relation to something known directly, i.e., on the basis of its relation to a C positive idea. Locke also claimed that one's idea of 7 infinity is a relative idea, he seems to have held that the idea of power is a relative idea, and given his account of perception, it is at least reasonable to suggest that relative ideas are found in perceptual contexts. Similarly, Berkeley maintained that one has a relative notion of immaterial substance, but no relative notion of material substance, since in the former case, but not in the latter, one has a notion 9 of the relation between: a substance and its attributes. Outside the "way of ideas" one finds the distinction between direct and relative "conception" clearly spelled out in Reid' s Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind. Reid wrote: Of some things, we know what they are in themselves; our conception of such things I call direct. Of other things, we do not know what they are in themselves, but only that they have certain properties or attributes, or certain relations to other things; of these our conception is only relative. 10 Reid contended that our conceptions of mind, of body, of powers, and of secondary qualities are relative conceptions, that at least some of our conceptions of large numbers of things and of polygons are relative conceptions, and that relative conceptions are operative in memory. Now given that there seems to have been a fairly 160. widely recognized doctrine of relative conception in the eighteenth century, given that the contexts in which Hume used the term 'relative idea' are contexts in which proponents of relative conception employed that term, and given that Hume stated philosophical issues in terms of the conceptual system of his time, I consider it reasonable to suggest that Hume recognized and held a doctrine of relative conception even though he did not devote so much as a paragraph to stating that doctrine. 3. The relation of images to relative ideas: A relative idea is inherently complex: it includes a positive idea (or ideas) and a relation... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume's Hobbism and His Anti-Hobbism Daniel E. Flage Thomas Hobbes posed a crise morale to which British philosophers attempted to reply for over a century.1 Hobbes maintained that the terms 'good' and 'evil' have no import beyond individual self-interest and the fulfilment or failure to fulfil one's desires.2 While alluding to lawsofnature knownbyreason,3whetherone deems suchlaws dictates ofprudence4 or laws of some moral import,5 Hobbes held: (1) that (...) the notion ofjustice arises only after the institution of a commonwealth, and (2) that the dictates of justice are merely the dictates of the sovereign.6 Hence, justice is strictly a matter ofconvention. In this paper I argue that the Hume ofthe Treatise was a mitigated Hobbist.7 Like Hobbes, Hume held that the notions of justice and obligation reston a setofconventional social rules. Hume distinguished himselffrom Hobbes primarily with respecttoquestions ofmoral value, and though he provided an account of moral obligation, this was secondary to his considerations of moral value. To establish this, I briefly examine the 'is'-'ought' paragraph before turning to Hume's discussions of obligation and value. 1. 'Is' and Ought' To understand the 'is'-'ought' paragraph, one must consider it in the context of Treatise 3.1.1. There Hume examines the source of one's knowledge ofmoral value, namely, "Whether 'tis by means ofour ideas or impressions we distinguish betwixt vice and virtue, and pronounce an action blameable or praise-worthy?"s Hume's discussion, however, moves rather freely between considerations ofmoral value ('good' and 'evil', 'virtue' and Vice') and considerations of moral obligation Cright' and'wrong"). Evenin the 'is'-'ought'paragraph, a paragraph that seems to be concerned with purported relations between questions offact and questions ofmoral obligation, Hume explicitly alludes to value claims at the end of the paragraph (T 470). Since a moral philosopher might make any one of three claims regarding the relations between value and obligation, namely, (a) value claims are primary and obligation claims are dependent on them;9 (b) obligation claims are primary and value claims are dependent upon them;10 or (c) there are independent grounds for claims of value and obligation, I argue that Hume was attempting to dispel position (b). If this is correct, then Hume's Volume XVIII Number 2 369 DANIEL E. FLAGE arguments both pave the way for a conventionalist theory ofobligation and undercut Hobbes's rationalistic account ofnatural law.11 Hume's discussion in Treatise 1.1.1 is a critique of moral rationalism. It consists of two types of arguments. First, there is an argument from motivation that since moral qualities influence the passions, but whatis known by reason does notinfluence the passions, moral qualities are not known by reason (T 458-63). Second, there is a series of arguments to show that moral qualities cannot be known by reason. In examining some ofthe latter discussions, we shall see how in rejecting a rationalistic ground for moral obligation, Hume also undercuts any rationalistic ground for claims ofmoral value.12 Remember, Hume's question was "Whether 'tis by means of our ideas or impressions we distinguish betwixt vice and virtue, and pronounce an action blameable or praise-worthy?" (T 456). The rationalists answered this question in terms ofideas, claiming, that there are eternal fitnesses and unfitnesses of things, which are the same to every rational being that considers them; thattheimmutable measures ofrightand wrongimpose an obligation, not only on human creatures, but also on the Deity himself: All these systems concur in the opinion, that moraUty, like truth, is discern'd merely by ideas, and by their juxta-position and comparison. (T 456-57) In this, his initial account ofthe rationalists' position, Hume seems to focus on moral obligation, rather than moral value: the alleged eternal fitnesses seem to be moral rules such as, "All cases ofwilful murder are wrong," rather than rules such as, "All cases of wilful murder are vicious (evil)." If it were possible to establish that a rule of moral obUgation is true, a moralist might accept an additional putatively self-evident bridge-principle that, "Any action that is right (wrong) is virtuous (vicious)," and thereby deduce a claim of moral value... (shrink)

How does Descartes justify his claim that conceiving of a mind as a thinking thing and a body as an extended thing show that mind and body are distinct substances? The paper attempts to answer that question by following a clue Descartes gave Arnauld that virtually everything in Meditations Three through Five is germane to the real distinction between mind and body. The paper develops the distinction between material truth and formal truth from Descartes’s discussions of falsity in Meditation Three. (...) In Meditation Three, clear and distinct ideas are materially true. They are consistent. They represent the possibility that there is something that corresponds to the idea (de dicto possibility). God is not a deceiver. Since it is psychologically impossible to doubt a clear and distinct idea, Descartes concludes Meditation Four by arguing that clear and distinct ideas are formally true (representative). Clear and distinct ideas represent true and immutable natures (essences). It is in virtue of true and immutable natures that it is possible that there are things of determinate kinds. Hence, in Meditation Five, clear and distinct ideas represent de re possibilities. Since the mind/body distinction is a distinction between true and immutable natures, Descartes takes clearly and distinctly conceiving a thinking thing as distinct from an extended thing to be sufficient for claiming a real distinction between mind and body. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:236 REMEMBERING THE PAST In his recent article "'Lively' Memory and 'Past' Memory," Oliver Johnson argues that the remarks in Treatise I. iii. 5 entail that Hume rejects all mnemonic knowledge of the past and that "we must drop the concept of the past, as it is ordinarily understood as something that once existed, from our account of memory." While I shall grant that Hume could claim no knowledge (...) of the past, I do not believe Johnson has shown that Hume rejects the past from his account of memory. In this paper I argue that Johnson misconstrues the relationship between Hume's two 'criteria' for distinguishing between ideas of memory and ideas of the imagination. I also show that if Johnson's account were correct, much of Hume's philosophy would be incoherent. Johnson begins by claiming that in Treatise I.i.3, Hume introduces two criteria for distinguishing between ideas of the memory and ideas of the imagination, namely, a criterion based on the greater force and liveliness of the idea of memory vis-a-vis the idea of imagination ('lively' memory) and a criterion based on the correspondence of the idea of memory to the impression from which it was derived ('past' memory). After commenting that these criteria follow one's common sense beliefs regarding memory (LMPM 345-346), Johnson suggests that Hume came to realize that there is a problem with his initial characterization of the distinction. He sets the problem in the form of a question: How do we go about distinguishing a memory-idea from an imagination idea in practice? Or, to sharpen the problem. How are we able to tell when we are really remembering some past 237 event instead of only imagining that we remember it? The answer to this question would seem to be simple. Since we have at our disposal two marks by which to distinguish memoryideas from imagination-ideas, all that we need to do is to determine whether the idea in question satisfies one of them. If it satisfies either, it is a memory-idea; if it satisfies neither, it must be an imaginationidea. Furthermore, since every memory-idea satisfies both criteria, it should be immaterial to which we appeal in making our test. (LMPM 346) Johnson goes on to show that in Treatise I. iii. 5 Hume claims that the criterion for past memory "is not sufficient to distinguish them [ideas of the memory from ideas of the imagination] in their operation, or make us show the one from the other; it being impossible to recai the past impressions, in order to compare them with our present ideas, and see whether their arrangement be exactly similar," which he takes to mark Hume's rejection of the criterion of past memory (LMPM 347). If a criterion is a principle that can be used to divide a class of objects into two subclasses without remainder, then, as Johnson presents them, both of Hume's 'criteria' are inadequate because each is too broad. The 'criterion' for past memory is concerned with the truth of an idea (cf. T 448 and 458), and, as such, it is equally applicable to ideas of memory and the imagination. For example, a historian 's reconstruction of a past event might be true, but the reconstruction is certainly an idea of the imagination, not an idea of the memory. Similarly, the 'criterion' for lively memory ('force and vivacity') is used to distinguish impressions from ideas (T 1) and beliefs regarding events of any temp- 238 oral location from ideas that are not believed (T 96) as well as ideas of the memory from ideas of the imagination. Thus, neither 'criterion' can singularly mark the distinction between ideas of the memory and ideas of the imagination. But if there is a problem with inadequate criteria, it is not clear that the problem is Hume's, for Hume did not claim that the 'criteria' can operate independently of one another. In Treatise I.i.3, Hume first discusses the 'criterion' for lively memory (T 8-9), and then he indicates that "There is another difference betwixt these two kinds of ideas, which is no less evident," viz.. that... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Descartes’s Legacy: Minds and Meaning in Early Modern Philosophy by David B. Hausman, Alan HausmanDaniel E. FlageDavid B. Hausman and Alan Hausman. Descartes’s Legacy: Minds and Meaning in Early Modern Philosophy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997. Pp. xiv + 149. Paper, $19.95.David and Alan Hausman have written a fascinating study of Descartes, Berkeley, and Hume. It is an examination of what the Hausmans call the “information problem,” (...) that is, “how an information-processing entity receives input from a source outside itself and processes it” (1), and how those philosophers attempted to solve the problem. It does not examine the writings of these philosophers in their historical context.At the heart of their work is an argument that Cartesian ideas are intentional. Noting the remark in the Comments on a Certain Broadsheet that all ideas—including ideas of color—are innate, they argue that innate ideas intend exemplars or archetypes, entities whose existence is eternal but in principle, even if not in fact, independent of God. Only such a position, they argue, can solve the semantic problem posed by the third Cartesian demon, namely, that “if our thoughts could mean something other than what we believe they mean, then no proof for the actual existence of anything, including God and the cogito, could give us results” (38). This implies that all ideas are meaningful, have objective reality, and represent genuine possibilities, a point that Descartes himself came to recognize only in the years following the publication of the Meditations (39). Further, it solves the problem posed by the ex nihilo principle: “If the ex nihilo principle as a constraint on efficient causality requires that the meaningfulness of ideas have an intentional structure such that a complex of such ideas necessitates which possibilities must be actualized in order for the ideas to be true; there are necessary connections between ideas and their intentions” (40). Contending that the ex nihilo principle is the basis for Cartesian rationality (41), they argue that their position disposes [End Page 465] of a significant element of the Cartesian circle: the meaningfulness of an idea is independent of the existence and goodness of God (42). Since ideas intend exemplars, it is possible to explain the notion of eminent containment of extension without contending that God is extended (43–46). With the introduction of ideas as intentional entities—not entities which inherently resemble their objects—the mind/body distinction becomes a logical outgrowth of the necessity of solving a new philosophical problem, viz., how to deal with the fact that intentional entities have an entirely different logical structure from physical entities.Descartes’s second demon concerns individuals (49). The Hausmans attempt to solve this problem by way of a discussion of the distinction between simple and complex ideas: “Complex ideas will get meaning as a function of the simple ideas they ‘contain’ ” (49). Simple ideas intend exemplars. Complex ideas are ideas of complex individuals. The Hausmans argue that Descartes deals with the problem of individuation on the basis of some version of a substratum theory of substance, a claim based in part on an analysis of the piece of wax argument (54–57). “[G]iven the causal principles of the Third Meditation, the only way we can account for our judgements about individual physical things is to posit the existence of a physical world” (57): the problem is a semantic problem resting on the necessity of the ex nihilo principle (58).Their first Cartesian demon is discussed in terms of the “inverted spectrum” problem, e.g., the possibility that cubes produce sphere ideas and vice versa, a possibility that results systematically in false judgments: there is a physical world, but it is systematically different from the way we believe it to be (58–61). Unlike the earlier demons, the first demon can be exorcised only if there is a good God, although behaviorally such a systematic deception would be indistinguishable from behavior based on ideas corresponding to a physical reality.In their last three chapters, the Hausmans focus on related issues in the philosophies of Berkeley and Hume. They argue that Berkeley’s account of reality blurs the distinction between idea... (shrink)

The paper provides an account of necessary truths in Berkeley based upon his divine language model. If the thesis of the paper is correct, not all Berkeleian necessary truths can be known a priori.