There is a constructive method to define a structure of simple k -cyclic Post algebra of order p , L p , k , on a given finite field F ( p k ), and conversely. There exists an interpretation Φ 1 of the variety $${\mathcal{V}(L_{p,k})}$$ generated by L p , k into the variety $${\mathcal{V}(F(p^k))}$$ generated by F ( p k ) and an interpretation Φ 2 of $${\mathcal{V}(F(p^k))}$$ into $${\mathcal{V}(L_{p,k})}$$ such that Φ 2 Φ 1 ( B ) (...) = B for every $${B \in \mathcal{V}(L_{p,k})}$$ and Φ 1 Φ 2 ( R ) = R for every $${R \in \mathcal{V}(F(p^k))}$$. In this paper we show how we can solve an algebraic system of equations over an arbitrary cyclic Post algebra of order p, p prime, using the above interpretation, Gröbner bases and algorithms programmed in Maple. (shrink)

Peer review is a widely accepted instrument for raising the quality of science. Peer review limits the enormous unstructured influx of information and the sheer amount of dubious data, which in its absence would plunge science into chaos. In particular, peer review offers the benefit of eliminating papers that suffer from poor craftsmanship or methodological shortcomings, especially in the experimental sciences. However, we believe that peer review is not always appropriate for the evaluation of controversial hypothetical science. We argue that (...) the process of peer review can be prone to bias towards ideas that affirm the prior convictions of reviewers and against innovation and radical new ideas. Innovative hypotheses are thus highly vulnerable to being “filtered out” or made to accord with conventional wisdom by the peer review process. Consequently, having introduced peer review, the Elsevier journal Medical Hypotheses may be unable to continue its tradition as a radical journal allowing discussion of improbable or unconventional ideas. Hence we conclude by asking the publisher to consider re-introducing the system of editorial review to Medical Hypotheses. (shrink)

There is a constructive method to define a structure of simple k-cyclic Post algebra of order p, L p,κ, on a given finite field F, and conversely. There exists an interpretation Ф₁ of the variety V generated by L p,κ into the variety V) generated by F and an interpretation Ф₂ of V) into V such that Ф₂Ф₁ = B for every B ϵ V and Ф₁₂ = R for every R ϵ V). In this paper we show how we (...) can solve an algebraic system of equations over an arbitrary cyclic Post algebra of order p, p prime, using the above interpretation, Gröbner bases and algorithms programmed in Maple. (shrink)

This paper traces the development of enactive concepts of value and normativity from their roots in the canonical work of Varela et al. through more recent works of Ezequiel Di Paolo and others. It aims to show the central importance of these concepts for enactive theory while exposing a potentially troublesome ambiguity in their definition. Most definitions of enactive normativity are purely proscriptive, but it seems that enactive theories of cognitive agency and experience demand something more. On the other hand, (...) it is not clear that anything other than proscriptive normativity can be made compatible with the enactive tenet of autonomy and the rejection of representations. (shrink)

Context: The problems that are most in need of interdisciplinary collaboration are “wicked problems,” such as food crises, climate change mitigation, and sustainable development, with many relevant aspects, disagreement on what the problem is, and contradicting solutions. Such complex problems both require and challenge interdisciplinarity. Problem: The conventional methods of interdisciplinary research fall short in the case of wicked problems because they remain first-order science. Our aim is to present workable methods and research designs for doing second-order science in domains (...) where there are many different scientific knowledges on any complex problem. Method: We synthesize and elaborate a framework for second-order science in interdisciplinary research based on a number of earlier publications, experiences from large interdisciplinary research projects, and a perspectivist theory of science. Results: The second-order polyocular framework for interdisciplinary research is characterized by five principles. Second-order science of interdisciplinary research must: 1. draw on the observations of first-order perspectives, 2. address a shared dynamical object, 3. establish a shared problem, 4. rely on first-order perspectives to see themselves as perspectives, and 5. be based on other rules than first-order research. Implications: The perspectivist insights of second-order science provide a new way of understanding interdisciplinary research that leads to new polyocular methods and research designs. It also points to more reflexive ways of dealing with scientific expertise in democratic processes. The main challenge is that this is a paradigmatic shift, which demands that the involved disciplines, at least to some degree, subscribe to a perspectivist view. Constructivist content: Our perspectivist approach to science is based on the second-order cybernetics and systems theories of von Foerster, Maruyama, Maturana & Varela, and Luhmann, coupled with embodied theories of cognition and semiotics as a general theory of meaning from von Uexküll and Peirce. (shrink)

Context: Society is faced with “wicked” problems of environmental sustainability, which are inherently multiperspectival, and there is a need for explicitly constructivist and perspectivist theories to address them. Problem: However, different constructivist theories construe the environment in different ways. The aim of this paper is to clarify the conceptions of environment in constructivist approaches, and thereby to assist the sciences of complex systems and complex environmental problems. Method: We describe the terms used for “the environment” in von Uexküll, Maturana & (...) Varela, and Luhmann, and analyse how their conceptions of environment are connected to differences of perspective and observation. Results: We show the need to distinguish between inside and outside perspectives on the environment, and identify two very different and complementary logics of observation, the logic of distinction and the logic of representation, in the three constructivist theories. Implications: Luhmann’s theory of social systems can be a helpful perspective on the wicked environmental problems of society if we consider carefully the theory’s own blind spots: that it confines itself to systems of communication, and that it is based fully on the conception of observation as indication by means of distinction. (shrink)

Cognitive science, as an interdisciplinary school of thought, may have recently moved beyond the bandwagon stage onto the throne of orthodoxy, but it does not make a favorable first impression on many people. Familiar reactions on first encounters range from revulsion to condescending dismissal--very few faces in the crowd light up with the sense of "Aha! So that's how the mind works! Of course!" Cognitive science leaves something out, it seems; moreover, what it apparently leaves out is important, even precious. (...) Boiled down to its essence, cognitive science proclaims that in one way or another our minds are computers, and this seems so mechanistic, reductionistic, intellectualistic, dry, philistine, unbiological. It leaves out emotion, or what philosophers call qualia, or value, or mattering, or . . . the soul. It doesn't explain what minds are so much as attempt to explain minds away. (shrink)

Cognitive science, as an interdisciplinary school of thought, may have recently moved beyond the bandwagon stage onto the throne of orthodoxy, but it does not make a favorable first impression on many people. Familiar reactions on first encounters range from revulsion to condescending dismissal--very few faces in the crowd light up with the sense of "Aha! So that's how the mind works! Of course!" Cognitive science leaves something out , it seems; moreover, what it apparently leaves out is important, even (...) precious. Boiled down to its essence, cognitive science proclaims that in one way or another our minds are computers, and this seems so mechanistic, reductionistic, intellectualistic, dry, philistine, unbiological. It leaves out emotion, or what philosophers call qualia, or value, or mattering, or . . . the soul. It doesn't explain what minds are so much as attempt to explain minds away. (shrink)

This talk, delivered at De l''autopoièse à la neurophénoménologie: un hommage à Francisco Varela; from autopoiesis to neurophenomenology: a tribute to Francisco Varela, June 18–20, at the Sorbonne in Paris, explicates several links between Varela''s neurophenomenology and his biological concept of autopoiesis.

The author reconstructs the theory of F. Varela with relevance to the hard problem of consciousness. This problem was touched by Varela in relatively late period of his work. However, the implications for dissolution of this problem can be found in his earlier works with H. Maturana. Theory of autopoietic systems ties life and cognition together, resulting in natural historical comprehension of consciousness and its functioning. Autopoiesis, understood as network of processes of production of components used as resources for maintaining (...) these processes, sets organizational invariances, distinguishing living system from its milieu. The main criterion of living system is an ability to maintain autopoietic organization while undergoing structural transformations with environment. Structural plasticity leads to multiple realizability of autopoietic organizations, which, in turn, leads to radical conclusion on nature of knowledge. One can distinguish the knower and the known only contingently, as the structure of knowledge reflects cognitive structure of the knower. This intertwinement permits Varela to introduce the enactivist program, which presupposes not simply reform in the scientific research of consciousness but also rethinking the implications of scientific knowledge itself. Cognition is a sensorimotor constitution of the world. Therefore, consciousness is not an object of material nature among other objects but provides our cognitive access to nature. Varela intended to abandon the theoretical approach to the problem of consciousness. His aim was not to provide a new argument. This is a consequence of the enactivist position which, according to theory of autopoiesis, must be applicable to the knower himself. (shrink)

Resumen En este artículo analizaremos, a través de una serie de actividades diseñadas para implementar en el aula, el modo en el que un grupo de jóvenes gallegos co-construyen el conocimiento metalingüístico y metapragmático acerca de las diferentes variedades locales del español y gallego. La exposición de su trayectoria biográfica permite que afloren diversos saberes y conocimientos metalingüísticos que los estudiantes han ido adquiriendo a lo largo de su escolarización y, además, surgen diversas categorizaciones sobre lenguas y variedades que ponen (...) de manifiesto sus ideologías lingüísticas, pp. 157–174). A través del análisis de las prácticas metalingüísticas y metapragmáticas comprobaremos cómo se reproducen las ideologías lingüísticas de estos jóvenes; por una parte, las ideologías de la institución académica y escolar; y por otra, las ideologías lingüísticas de los jóvenes presentes en el aula, en donde etiquetan, clasifican y establecen jerarquizaciones y valoraciones de su repertorio comunicativo. Finalmente, se comprueba cómo las diferentes variedades del español y del gallego actúan como índices de identidad social diferente de la reconocida en el ámbito institucional y académico, con distintos valores en el mercado lingüístico. (shrink)

Pedro Alvares Cabral's ships left Portugal on 9 March 1500 en route for the territory that he first named Terra de Vera Cruz and that later came to be known as Brazil. On the 22 March they called at the island of São Nicolau [Caminha, 1500], one of the northernmost islands of the Cape Verde group; this was about forty years after the discovery of the archipelago in 1460-62 [Albuquerque, 1991]. It is known that Vasco da Gama had stopped at (...) the island of Santiago in 1498 on his voyage to India, and also in 1499 on the return journey. Straight after the discovery of Brazil Cabral sailed for India and on the way back also dropped anchor at Santiago. Indeed, our archipelago, which is situated off Cape Verde in Senegal (the place from which it appears to take its name), was to become an important stopover point for maritime traffic between Europe, Asia and the Americas in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, both to allow crews to rest and to take on water, wood and some food supplies. It also became important as a holding point for slaves (a large number of whom came from around thirty Guinean ethnic groups and subgroups). They were dispatched from Santiago, known then as Cape Verde island, to territories such as Brazil from the early sixteenth century onwards, since these territories, which had only recently been discovered and were little known, needed people to work and populate them. (shrink)

Classification of sciences; Moslem scholars; Africa, North.

I discuss Aristotle’s opening argument against Platonic Forms in _Metaphysics_ A.9, ‘the Razor’, which criticizes the introduction of Forms on the basis of an analogy with a hypothetical case of counting things. I argue for a new interpretation of this argument, and show that it involves two interesting objections against the introduction of Forms as formal causes: one concerns the completeness and the other the adequacy of such an explanatory project.

In Practicing Safe Sects F. LeRon Shults provides scientific and philosophical resources for having “the talk” about religious reproduction: where do gods come from – and what are the costs of bearing them in our culturally pluralistic, ecologically fragile environment?

A partir da questão da existência de filosofias adjectiva ou substantivamente nacionais, pretende traçãr-se o panorama do pensamento filosófico brasileiro contemporâneo. Oriunda do tronco comum portugues. a filosofia brasileira adquiriu, desde o início de oitocentos. com Silvestre Pinheiro Ferreira e Diogo António Feijó, individualidade própria. Hoje distribui-se por quatro grandes tradiçóes: a tradição metafisica. tomista e neotomista, a positivista e naturalista, a hermenêutica, incluindo várias tendéncias. da fenomenologia e existencialismo ao culturalismo, e uma quarta vinculada ao dominio da práxis. Na (...) tendência hermenêutica se inscreve designadamente a Escola de São Paulo, polarizada nos dois grandes focos do pensamento brasileiro contemporâneo: Vicente Ferreira da Silva e Miguel Reale. /// Starting from the question of the existence of national philosophies, be it in an adjetive or in a substantive sense, we intend to trace the contemporary situation of the brasilian philosophical thought. Growing out of a common, Portuguese heritage, the brasilian philosophy acquired from the XVIIIth century onwards its own characteristics, especially through the work of both Silvestre Pinheiro Ferreira and Diogo António Feijó. Nowadays, it is composed by four great traditions: the metaphysical one, tomist and neo-tomist; the positivist and naturalist; the hermeneutical, which includes various tendencies, such as phenomenology, existencialism and culturalism; and a fourth tradition related to the domain of praxis. St. Paul School belongs to the hermeneutical tradition, where the two main authors of contemporary brasilian thought are to be considered: Vicente ferreira da Silva and Miguel Reale. (shrink)

Neste esboço de teodiceia que deveria intitular-se "Amorim Viana", Sampaio Bruno critica o optimismo leibniziano daquele autor para quem o mal não tinha essência real.nesta "teosofia", ou "teurgia" mística e heterodoxa, Bruno contesta a "creatio ex nihilo", propondo a Cisão como mistério primordial, causa da degradação do Espírito puro e de todos os outros seres. Aliado aos temas da Cisão e do Mal, o Tempo surge como categoria fundamental.A razão e a revelação, a "sofia" e a profecia, entrelaçam-se paradoxalmente nesta (...) "teurgia" mística em que a Cisão, o Tempo e o Mal são as coordenadas ônticas de uma viagem quase iniciática do visível ao invisível, do racional ao meta-racional, da razão ao místério. /// Dans cette esquisse de théodicée qui devrait s'intituler "Amorim Viana", Sampaio Bruno critique l'optimisme leibnizien de cet auteur, pour lequel le mal n'avait pas d'essence réelle.Dans cette "théosophie" ou "théurgie" mystique et hétérodoxe, Bruno conteste la dégradation du pur Esprit et de tous les autres êtres. En liaison avec les thèmes de la Scission et du Mal, le Temps surgit comme catégorie fondamentale.La raison et la révélation, la "sophia" et la prophétie, s'entrelacent paradoxalement en cette "théurgie" mystique dans laquelle la Scission, le Temps et le Mal sont les coordonnées ontiques d'un voyage pour ainsi dire initiatique du visible à l'invisible, du rationnel au métarationnel, de la raison au mystère. /// In this sketch of theodicy which should rather be entitled "Amorim Viana", Sampaio Bruno does criticize the leibnizian optimism of that author for whom the evil had no real essence.In this "theosophy" or mystical and heterodoxal "theurgy", Bruno denies the "creatio ex nihilo", and proposes the Scission as primary mystery, cause of the degradation of pure Spirit and all other beings. Associated to the subjects of Scission and Evil, Time appears as a fundamental category.The reason and the revelation, the "sophia" and the prophecy, interlace themeselves paradoxally in this mystical "theurgy" in wich the Scission, the Time and Evil are ontical coordenates of a fast initial journey from the visible to the invisible, from the rational to the meta-rational, from reason to the mystery. (shrink)

Aristóteles parece negar el estatuto ontológico de los artefactos que no serían sustancias. Se analizan los textos básicos al respecto y sus principales interpretaciones. Se discute la opinión de R. Katayama, para mostrar que acierta en remarcar la importancia de la separabilidad de los compuestos, pero se equivoca en la noción de separación. Se sostiene que las formas no son separables de sus compuestos tanto naturales como artefactos, pero los primeros poseen un tipo de separación de otras formas o especies (...) que no poseen los segundos y, por ello, son substancias. Aristotle seems to deny the ontological status of artifacts which are not substances. In this paper I discuss the basic regarding this topic and its main intepretations. I discuss R. Katayama's opinion to show that he is right to underline the importance of the trait of separation, but he is wrong regarding the the notion of separation. My thesis is that neither the forms of natural things nor those of artifacts are separable from the composites, but the former possess a different kind of separation from other forms or species, which the latter do not possess. Hence, the former are substances. (shrink)