The article presents an epistemological and partially methodological analysis of cognitive science as a scientific discipline, created as a result of the transformations that took place in the philosophical and psychological concepts of the mind and cognition, which were carried out with the aid of tools and methods of modelling as well as through simulating human cognitive processes and consciousness. In order to describe this interdisciplinary science, and its positions, as well as the stages and directions of its development, it (...) makes use of the epistemological model formulated by Michel Foucault, in which he draws attention to social, ideological and technological conditions of scientific knowledge. The opinions of the leading creators and critics of cognitive science, such as George A. Miller, Howard Gardner, Margaret Boden and José Luis Bermúdez are referenced to and analyzed with the use of this model. The article shows the epistemologically and methodologically divergent status of cognitive science, as well as its cognitive and institutional conditions and challenges, which stand before it after half a century of intensive development. (shrink)

Expert knowledge - a concept associated with Ryle’s distinction of knowledgethat and knowledge-how - functions in distinct areas of knowledge and social expertise. Consisting of both propositional and procedural knowledge, expertise is performative in its essence. It depends not only on expert’s experience and cognitive competences, but also on his or her social and institutional position. The paper considers the role of heuristic and intuitional abilities, including particular experts’ cognitive biases, as the vital and indispensable part of expertise. On the (...) basis of selected managerial and juridical examples it analyzes the epistemological issues: the autonomy versus dependence of expert knowledge as well as the influence of social-cognitive circumstances on expertise. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to determine how metaphors tackle the probable nature of information and uncertainty in the structure of the communication process. Since the cognitive theory of conceptual metaphors holds that metaphoric thinking and doing are unavoidable, they are employed often in explaining the communicating domains. The metaphorical conceptualizing is recognized in Shannon and Weaver’s Mathematical Theory of Communication where such abstract concepts as freedom of choice, choosing probabilities, and uncertainty ware conceived in that way. It is (...) described in accord with Reddy’s conduit metaphor and Ritchie’s toolmakers paradigm. In the paper the issue of both the advantages and disadvantages of metaphors is considered: mainly, how they can explain and predict ways in which people communicate their expectations or uncertainties as well as, more practically, how the probable/informational metaphors enable the management of knowledge in libraries or databases. (shrink)

The paper analyzes the cognitive functions of metaphors present in both colloquial and scientific discourse. First, presented is the history of research into linguistic metaphors, followed by a discussion of the psycholinguistic turn towards metaphors as thought schemas, as well as metaphoricality embodied in gestures, images and behaviors and their socio-cultural contexts. Based on the analysis of metaphors in the natural sciences, mainly in physics as well as in psychology, the heuristic and methodological functions of metaphors in science are discussed. (...) Finally, on this basis, a general model of the cognitive functions of metaphor is constructed in which, apart from the cognitive communicative functions, emphasized are also the pragmatic aspects of metaphorical thinking. (shrink)

The article is devoted the problem of artificial intelligence. The main thesis is that a computer is able to simulate some of human activity, e.g. cognitive activity, but a computer is not substitute for brain (or mind). It can never become an autonomous subject.

W artykule rozważana jest możliwość powstania ogólnej teorii informacji, która miałaby szerszy zakres tematyczny i wyższy stopień ogólności niż matematyczna teoria komunikacji (łączności) Shannona. Uzasadnieniem takiego oczekiwania jest nie tylko dojrzałość wielu współczesnych koncepcji i teorii informacji, głównie formalnych i matematycznych, lecz również znaczące zmiany w sferze masowej komunikacji i komputerowych systemów informacyjnych (dokonujące się w tzw. zwrocie informacyjnym). Omawiane są koncepcje takich autorów, jak C. Shannon, N. Wiener, Y. Bar-Hillel, K. Devlin, F. Adams, F. Dretske, P. Adriaans oraz J. (...) van Benthem. W oparciu o ten materiał ukazane jest bogactwo znaczeń i zastosowań kategorii informacji w naukach i w filozofii. (shrink)

The paper analyzes, on the basis of Ryle’s concepts of knowledge that and knowledge how, both objectified forms of expert knowledge and the performative nature of expertise. Both theoretical and practical aspects of the identified categories are studied from historical and social perspectives as phenomena characteristic of post-modern information society. In virtue of the selected social examples an epistemological model of performative expert knowledge and expertise is constructed in which crucial elements are distinguished: experts’ cognitive attitudes and dispositions, intellectual skills, (...) intuition and mistakes as well as types of interactional versus contributory expertise. Also considered are the epistemological consequences derived from the research concerning expertise in psychiatric treatment where both expert knowledge and expertise fall into line with institutional requirements as well as procedures. (shrink)

The paper presents a survey of traditional problems tackled by epistemology throughout its history, especially its meta-theoretical inclination as well as the old dilemma of its normative versus descriptive nature. I sketch the prevailing models of epistemological normativity (epistemic values such as truth, falsity, justification, or evidence etc.), and show how they function, what their essence and genesis are, how they change and what influences them. I also consider the utility of epistemology for science, education and practice in respect of (...) its critical disposition toward cognition, knowledge, and communication. Finally, I outline some perspectives epistemology could open if it would really analyze and predict the complex and manifold human cognitive phenomena. (shrink)

Classic epistemology is under manifold changes; its categories loose their traditional meanings and gain new ones. Civilization and cultural changes, especially in mass communication and scientific knowledge, make impossible to insist on the concept of knowledge entirely as a true and justified belief. Traditional concepts of individual and subjectivistically conceived agent as well as concept of objects (areas and domains) of human knowledge are to much restrictive and at the same time controversial. Epistemological (pure philosophical) meaning of them is constantly (...) confronted and changed by the scientific discoveries and definitions, coming especially from natural and social sciences (biology, neural sciences, psychology and social sciences). It is long-lasting and manifold process of naturalization that regards not only cognitive phenomena but epistemic categories and epistemological theories as well. The papers presents the concise model of the naturalized theory of human knowledge one can eliminate from different positions and theories. Today types of naturalized epistemology try to go beyond the strict and limited concept of naturalism (Quine’s naturalized epistemology) and go toward anti-scientific, more liberal understanding of it. Naturalizing epistemology opens, as it is argued in the paper, the new perspectives and prospects on human cognition and knowledge that are far from the classic concepts. (shrink)

The paper presents a survey of traditional problems tackled by epistemology throughout its history, especially its meta-theoretical inclination as well as the old dilemma of its normative versus descriptive nature. I sketch the prevailing models of epistemological normativity, and show how they function, what their essence and genesis are, how they change and what influences them. I also consider the utility of epistemology for science, education and practice in respect of its critical disposition toward cognition, knowledge, and communication. Finally, I (...) outline some perspectives epistemology could open if it would really analyze and predict the complex and manifold human cognitive phenomena. (shrink)

The problem of the Toronto School’s theoretical identity emerges from the recognition that the most influential figures of this orientation do not agree regarding the general idea of the School as a coherent theoretical trend. Moreover, the idea of “medium” central to this orientation is fundamentally ambiguous. Therefore the aim of the paper is to consider the identity of the Toronto School by referring to the so called materialistic interpretation of the media. The paper supports the thesis that the minimal (...) definition of communication technologies in terms of physical artifacts comprises the conceptual core of the Toronto School’s identity. The failure to consider the minimalistic definition of media results in the general blurring of the Toronto School’s theoretical identity. (shrink)

The problem of the Toronto School’s theoretical identity emerges from the recognition that the most influential figures of this orientation do not agree regarding the general idea of the School as a coherent theoretical trend. Moreover, the idea of “medium” central to this orientation is fundamentally ambiguous. Therefore the aim of the paper is to consider the identity of the Toronto School by referring to the so called materialistic interpretation of the media. The paper supports the thesis that the minimal (...) definition of communication technologies in terms of physical artifacts comprises the conceptual core of the Toronto School’s identity. The failure to consider the minimalistic definition of media results in the general blurring of the Toronto School’s theoretical identity. (shrink)

This chapter outlines an embodied conception of noise. From an enactive and ecological perspective noise is an inevitable complement to the richness of bodily sensitivities and complex actions. The world around us, the universe, is replete, full of inexhaustible texture available to be explored at every scale at which we are capable, or can become capable, of making distinctions. Drawing on work in ecological psychology I suggest that noise is our experience of that encompassing fullness, and can be encountered in (...) a number of different ways depending on the organisation of our bodies and activities at different scales across a given period. While that fullness can be overwhelming, and create challenges for us to distinguish and coordinate effectively with the particular aspects of the world most relevant to our present concerns - noise can be intrusive and disruptive - I argue that there are significant positive aspects to the phenomenon. Noise is an inherent part of the rich messiness of the world as discussed in recent enactive work, which provides both robustness to developmental processes as well as opportunities for action that support adaptive agency. In a noisy, messy world there are always more options available to explore. (shrink)

Descriptions of bodies within the literature of the enactive approach to cognitive science exhibit an interesting dialectical tension. On the one hand, a body is considered to be a unity which instantiates an identity, forming an intrinsic basis for value. On the other, a living body is in a reciprocally defining relationship with the environment, and is therefore immersed and entangled with, rather than distinct from, its environment. In this paper I examine this tension, and its implications for the enactive (...) approach, particularly the enactive conceptions of life and bodies. Following the lead of others, I argue that enactive cognitive science can benefit from a deeper reading and integration with extant work on the complexity and multiplicity of the living body within feminist philosophy and feminist science studies. (shrink)

Jaśkowski’s discussive logic D2 was formulated with the help of the modal logic S5 as follows (see [7, 8]): \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${A \in {D_{2}}}$$\end{document} iff \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\ulcorner\diamond{{A}^{\bullet}}\urcorner \in {\rm S}5}$$\end{document}, where (–)• is a translation of discussive formulae from Ford into the modal language. We say that a modal logic L defines D2 iff \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\rm D}_{2} = (...) \{A \in {\rm For^{\rm d}} : \ulcorner\diamond{{A}^{\bullet}}\urcorner \in {\it L}\}}$$\end{document}. In [14] and [10] were respectively presented the weakest normal and the weakest regular logic which (†): have the same theses beginning with ‘\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\diamond}$$\end{document}’ as S5. Of course, all logics fulfilling the above condition, define D2. In [10] it was prowed that in the cases of logics closed under congruence the following holds: defining D2 is equivalent to having the property (†). In this paper we show that this equivalence holds also for all modal logics which are closed under replacement of tautological equivalents (rte-logics).We give a general method which, for any class of modal logics determined by a set of joint axioms and rules, generates in the given class the weakest logic having the property (†). Thus, for the class of all modal logics we obtain the weakest modal logic which owns this property. On the other hand, applying the method to various classes of modal logics: rte-logics, congruential, monotonic, regular and normal, we obtain the weakest in a given class logic defining D2. (shrink)

Can we see the expressiveness of other people's gestures, hear the intentions in their voice, see the emotions in their posture? Traditional theories of social cognition still say we cannot because intentions and emotions for them are hidden away inside and we do not have direct access to them. Enactive theories still have no idea because they have so far mainly focused on perception of our physical world. We surmise, however, that the latter hold promise since, in trying to understand (...) cognition, enactive theory focuses on the embodied engagements of a cognizer with his world. In this paper, we attempt an answer for the question What is social perception in an enactive account? In enaction, perception is conceived as a skill, crucially involving action, an ability to work successfully within the set of regularities, or contingencies that characterize a given domain. If this is the case, then social perception should be a social skill. Having thus transformed the question of what social perception is into that of what social skill is, we examine the concept of social contingencies and the manner in which social skills structure—both constrain and empower— social interaction. Some of the implications of our account for how social and physical perception differ, the role of embodiment in social interaction and the distinction between our approach and other social contingency theories are also addressed. (shrink)

Die Beiträge zur Altertumskunde enthalten Monographien, Sammelbände, Editionen, Übersetzungen und Kommentare zu Themen aus den Bereichen Klassische, Mittel- und Neulateinische Philologie, Alte Geschichte, Archäologie, Antike Philosophie sowie Nachwirken der Antike bis in die Neuzeit. Dadurch leistet die Reihe einen umfassenden Beitrag zur Erschließung klassischer Literatur und zur Forschung im gesamten Gebiet der Altertumswissenschaften.

The world of Jedi is very different from our own, that their awareness of the universe is more encompassing, richer. The Jedi call that mystical aspect of reality they perceive the Force. Jedi younglings and padawans must put their body to new uses, perform new tasks, and learn new skills in physical activities that have profound effects on the way they see the world around them. What the Jedi say more than anything else about the Force is that it flows. (...) Jedi who are able to coordinate their actions with that flow can work with the full potency of the universal relationship between all things. Jedi do not need a special Force‐organ to perceive the Force. The Force is not something Jedi just see, or hear, or taste, or touch, but rather it is something they experience on its own terms, probably using their whole body to do it. (shrink)

Enactive and ecological approaches to cognitive science both claim a “mutuality” between agents and their environments – that they have a complementary nature and should be addressed as a single whole system. Despite this apparent agreement, each offers criticisms of the other on precisely this point – enactivists claiming that ecological psychologists over-emphasise the environment, while the complementary criticism, of agent-centred constructivism, is levelled by ecological psychologists at enactivists. In this paper I suggest that underlying the confusion between the two (...) approaches is the complexity of agency, which comes in different forms, at different scales or levels of analysis. Cognitive science has not theorised the relationship between these different forms in a sufficiently disciplined manner, and a task therefore remains of finding a way to map the complex territory of agency. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The Gödel–Dummett logic and Łukasiewicz one are two main many-valued logics used by the fuzzy logic community. Our goal is a quantitative comparison of these two. In this paper, we will mostly consider the 3-valued Gödel–Dummett logic as well as the 3-valued Łukasiewicz one. We shall concentrate on their implicational-negation fragments which are limited to formulas formed with a fixed finite number of variables. First, we investigate the proportion of the number of true formulas of a certain length n (...) to the number of all formulas of such length built with exactly one variable. Then, we investigate such proportion for satisfiable formulas. Second, we generalise our investigation on formulas written with $ k\ge 1 $ k ≥ 1 variables. The primary goal of the paper is the research on the asymptotic behaviour of these fractions when the length n tends to infinity. If such limits exists, they are real numbers between 0 and 1, which are called the density of truth or the density of SAT. To compare the density of truth and the density of satisfiable formulas for both fragments of 3-valued Gödel–Dummett's and Łukasiewicz's logics we use the powerful theory of analytic combinatorics. This paper is a natural continuation of the previous brief conference note by Kostrzycka and Zaionc (2020) as well as enriched with some previous results from Kostrzycka and Zaionc (2003). In the conference note we computed analytically the density of truth and the density of SAT (with a determined precision) for 3-valued Łukasiewicz's logic restricted to a language with only one variable. In Kostrzycka and Zaionc (2003) we computed the same values for exactly the same fragment of the 3-valued Gödel–Dummett logic. This paper answers the more general questions of the existence of density of truth and density of SAT for both many-valued logics with an arbitrary finite number of variables. Therefore this paper gives an an interesting picture of two main families of finite-valued fuzzy logics problems treated quantitatively. This picture is taken from the perspective of classical logic. It shows that unexpectedly there is quantitatively a little distance between these two approaches. (shrink)

THE RUSSIAN MENTALITY The present essay is the conclusion of my two books devoted to Nicolas Berdjaev’s religious philosophy: Amor futuri albo eschatologia zrealizowana Studia nad myślą Mikołaja Bierdiajewa (Amor Futuri or Eschatology Realised Studies on the Thought of Nicolas Berdjaev), [Styczyński 1992] and Umiłowanie przyszłości albo filozofia spraw ostatecznych. Studia nad filozofią Mikołaja Bierdiajewa (Adulation for the Future or the Philosophy of the Ultimate Matters Studies on the Thought of Nicolas Berdjaev), [Styczyński 2001]. The differences between them are mentioned (...) in the latter. They were both written in Polish and as a consequence had no chance of reaching a wider circle of readers. This is, therefore, the reason why I have decided to present this conclusion to an English language readership. I have tried to show the consequences of the unique Russian mentality, whose predominant feature is an ambivalence between a persistent search for good and constantly doing of evil. This “Russian theodicy” expressing itself in the creation of an alternative world, which is to justify the evil done, has its roots in the conviction of man’s principally divine nature revealing itself through the exculpating effect of evil. In the case of the twentieth century of Russian history it yielded a result totally different from the expected one. (shrink)