Mentalism (Dulany 1991; 1997) provides a metatheoretical alternative to the dominant cognitive view. This commentary briefly outlines its main propositions and what I see as strategies for its use and support at this stage. These propositions represent conscious states as the sole carriers of symbolic representations, and mental episodes as consisting exclusively of conscious states interrelated by nonconscious operations.

Connectionism can provide useful theories in which consciousness is the exclusive vehicle of explicit representation. The theories may not, however, handle some phenomena adequately: sense of agency, modes and contents of awareness, propositional and deliberative thought, metacognitive awareness and consciousness of self. They should, however, be useful in describing automatic, activational relations among nonpropositional conscious contents.

The authors report "priming" effects for subjects they classify as "inattentionally blind" and interpret this as evidence for unconscious perception--an interpretation consistent with deeply entrenched metatheory. I question that interpretation, however, on methodological grounds. On these assessment procedures, some subjects could be classified as "inattentionally blind" despite representing the critical stimulus in conscious attention. Still others--presenting a more interesting challenge--could be so classified despite representing the stimulus literally in inattentional awareness. The study is illuminated, I believe, by seeing it in (...) metatheoretical and experimental contexts, with its theoretical interpretation contrasted with an alternative. (shrink)

Difficulty of distinguishing rules and similarity in categorization comes from reliance on relatively simple manipulation-response designs and a style of modeling with abstract parameters, rather than assessment of intervening and controlling mental states. This commentary proposes a strategy in which rules and similarity would be distinguished by their different roles in a theory interrelating reportable conscious contents in deliberative categorization.

Commentary on the Toward a Science of Consciousness Conference, Tucson 2008.

What the title of this article means to me after decades on a university faculty is very broad. It would include topics of my research and writing, of my graduate and undergraduate teaching, and of what I read in the area, including papers that have been submitted to me as editor of the American Journal of Psychology. What I can write here focuses on my research and writing and related metatheoretical views, including what I have considered the deeper and more (...) significant questions formulated in philosophy of mind and submitted to empirical investigation in psychology. Of most active concern today, and over the years, are those asking about the roles of consciousness, symbolic representation, and volition in mental activity and action. Is symbolic representation carried out consciously or unconsciously, or both? This paper recognizes the 19^th century attempt to establish a science of consciousness, a behavioristic movement that rejected consciousness as being the soul of theology, a cognitive metatheory giving some place to consciousness but emphasizing non-conscious symbolic representation. This summarizes our experimental examinations of my theories of the source of intentional action, of causal reasoning, and of explicit and implicit learning. It also summarizes the overarching mentalistic metatheory I have described. (shrink)

Answers to the title's question have been influenced by a history in which an early science of consciousness was rejected by behaviourists on the argument that this entails commitment to ontological dualism and "free will" in the sense of indeterminism. This is, however, a confusion of theoretical assertions with metaphysical assertions. Nevertheless, a legacy within computational and information-processing views of mind rejects or de-emphasises a role for consciousness. This paper sketches a mentalistic metatheory in which conscious states are the sole (...) carriers of symbolic representations, and thus have a central role in the explanation of mental activity and action-while specifying determinism and materialism as useful working assumptions. A mentalistic theory of causal learning, experimentally examined with phenomenal reports, is followed by examination of these questions: Are there common roles for phenomenal reports and brain imaging? Is there defensible evidence for unconscious brain states carrying symbolic representations? Are there interesting dissociations within consciousness? (shrink)

The black hole information loss paradox is a catch-all term for a family of puzzles related to black hole evaporation. For almost 50 years, the quest to elucidate the implications of black hole evaporation has not only sustained momentum, but has also become increasingly populated with proposals that seem to generate more questions than they purport to answer. Scholars often neglect to acknowledge ongoing discussions within black hole thermodynamics and statistical mechanics when analyzing the paradox, including the interpretation of Bekenstein-Hawking (...) entropy, which is far from settled. To remedy the dialectical gridlock, I have formulated an overarching, unified framework, which I call ``Black Hole Paradoxes'', that integrates the debates and taxonomizes the relevant `camps' or philosophical positions. -/- I demonstrate that black hole evaporation within Hawking's semi-classical framework insinuates how late-time Hawking radiation is an entangled global system, a contradiction in terms. The relevant forms of information loss are associated with a decrease in maximal Boltzmann entropy and an increase in global von Neumann entropy respectively, which engender what I've branded the ``paradox of phantom entanglement''. Prospective solutions are then tasked with demonstrating how late-time Hawking radiation is either exclusively an entangled subsystem, in which a black hole remnant lingers as an information safehouse, or exclusively an unentangled global system, in which information is evacuated to the exterior. -/- The disagreement between safehouse and evacuation solutions boils down to the statistical interpretation of thermodynamic black hole entropy, i.e., Bekenstein-Hawking entropy. Safehouse solutions attribute Bekenstein-Hawking entropy to a minority of black hole degrees of freedom, those that are associated with the horizon. Evacuation solutions, in contrast, attribute Bekenstein-Hawking entropy to all black hole degrees of freedom. I argue that the interpretation of Bekenstein-Hawking entropy is the litmus test to vet the overpopulated proposal space. So long as any proposal rejecting Hawking's original calculation independently derives black hole evaporation, globally conserves degrees of freedom and entanglement, preserves a version of semi-classical gravity at sub-Planckian scales, and describes black hole thermodynamics in statistical terms, then it counts as a genuine solution to the paradox. (shrink)

Despite pervasive variation in the content of laws, legal theorists and anthropologists have argued that laws share certain abstract features and even speculated that law may be a human universal. In the present report, we evaluate this thesis through an experiment administered in 11 different countries. Are there cross‐cultural principles of law? In a between‐subjects design, participants (N = 3,054) were asked whether there could be laws that violate certain procedural principles (e.g., laws applied retrospectively or unintelligible laws), and also (...) whether there are any such laws. Confirming our preregistered prediction, people reported that such laws cannot exist, but also (paradoxically) that there are such laws. These results document cross‐culturally and –linguistically robust beliefs about the concept of law which defy people's grasp of how legal systems function in practice. (shrink)

This fascinating new book examines diversity in moral judgements, drawing on recent work in social, personality, and evolutionary psychology, reviewing the factors that influence the moral judgments people make. Why do reasonable people so often disagree when drawing distinctions between what is morally right and wrong? Even when individuals agree in their moral pronouncements, they may employ different standards, different comparative processes, or entirely disparate criteria in their judgments. Examining the sources of this variety, the author expertly explores morality using (...) ethics position theory, alongside other theoretical perspectives in moral psychology, and shows how it can relate to contemporary social issues from abortion to premarital sex to human rights. Also featuring a chapter on applied contexts, using the theory of ethics positions to gain insights into the moral choices and actions of individuals, groups, and organizations in educational, research, political, medical, and business settings, the book offers answers that apply across individuals, communities, and cultures. Investigating the relationship between people⁰́₉s personal moral philosophies and their ethical thoughts, emotions, and actions, this is fascinating reading for students and academics from psychology and philosophy and anyone interested in morality and ethics. (shrink)

Ethics position theory (EPT) maintains that individuals’ personal moral philosophies influence their judgments, actions, and emotions in ethically intense situations. The theory, when describing these moral viewpoints, stresses two dimensions: idealism (concern for benign outcomes) and relativism (skepticism with regards to inviolate moral principles). Variations in idealism and relativism across countries were examined via a meta-analysis of studies that assessed these two aspects of moral thought using the ethics position questionnaire (EPQ; Forsyth, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology39, 175–184, 1980). (...) This review identified 139 samples drawn from 29 different countries, for a total sample of 30,230 respondents, and concluded that (a) levels of idealism and relativism vary across regions of the world in predictable ways; (b) an exceptionist ethic is more common in Western countries, subjectivism and situationism in Eastern countries, and absolutism and situationism in Middle Eastern countries; and (c) a nation’s ethics position predicted that country’s location on previously documented cultural dimensions, such as individualism and avoidance of uncertainty (Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values, 1980). Limitations in these methods and concerns about the validity of these cross-cultural conclusions are noted, as are suggestions for further research using the EPQ. (shrink)

The experimental turn in philosophy has reached several sub-fields including ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics. This paper is among the first to apply experimental techniques to questions in the philosophy of law. Specifically, we examine Lon Fuller's procedural natural law theory. Fuller famously claimed that legal systems necessarily observe eight principles he called "the inner morality of law." We evaluate Fuller's claim by surveying both ordinary people and legal experts about their intuitions about legal systems. We conclude that, at best, we (...) should be skeptical of Fuller's inner morality of law in light of the experimental data. (shrink)

Individuals'' moral judgments of certain business practices and their decisions to engage in those practices are influenced by their personal moral philosophies: (a) situationists advocate striving for the best consequences possible irrespective of moral maxims; (b) subjectivists reject moral guidelines and base judgments on personal values and practical concerns; (c) absolutists assume that actions are moral, provided they yield positive consequences and conform to moral rules; (d) exceptionists prefer to follow moral dictates but allow for exceptions for practical reasons. These (...) variations, which are based on two fundamental dimensions (concern for principles and concern for promoting human welfare) influence a variety of moral processes and have implications for ethical debates over business practices. (shrink)

Almost twenty years ago, a genuinely new school of thought emerged in the field of jurisprudential methodology. It is a pragmatist school. Roughly, the pragmatists contend that, when inquiring about the nature of law, we should evaluate potential answers based on practical criteria. For many legal philosophers, this contention seems both unclear and unhinged. That appearance is lamentable. The pragmatist approach to jurisprudential methodology has received insufficient attention for at least two reasons. First, the pragmatists do not conceive of themselves (...) as comprising a school; in fact, these proponents have different names for their common position, which makes it hard to see the commonalities. Second, the most famous statement of the pragmatist view has received withering criticism, criticism that has not been sufficiently answered, a fact that may lead opponents of pragmatism, as well as potential supporters, to doubt that a viable view of this kind can be held. This Essay aims to serve as a corrective. (shrink)

Legal philosophers make a number of bold, contentious claims about the nature of law. For instance, some claim that law necessarily involves coercion, while others disagree. Some claim that all law enjoys presumptive moral validity, while others disagree. We can see these claims in at least three, mutually exclusive ways: (1) We can see them as descriptions of law’s nature (descriptivism), (2) we can see them as expressing non-descriptive attitudes of the legal philosophers in question (expressivism), or (3) we can (...) see them as practical claims about how we should view law or order our society (pragmatism). This paper argues that we should understand these claims in the pragmatist way, as claims about how we should view law or order society. (shrink)

Metaethical minimalism. sometimes called quietism, is the view that first-order moral judgments can be true but nothing makes them true. This article raises three worries for that view. First, minimalists have no good reason to insist that moral judgments can be true. Second, minimalism, in abandoning the requirement that true judgments need to have truthmakers, leads to a problematic proliferation of truths. Third, most versions of minimalism entail a disjointed and therefore unacceptable theory of language and thought.

For more than a decade, activists, scholars, journalists, and politicians of various stripes have been discussing and decrying mass incarceration. This collection of voices has mostly focused on contingent features of the phenomenon. Critics mention racial disparities, poor prison conditions, and spiraling costs. Some critics have alleged broader problems: they have called for an end to all incarceration, even all punishment. Lost in this conversation is a focus on what is inherently wrong with mass incarceration specifically. This essay fills that (...) void and supplies an answer, drawing on the early modern English philosopher Thomas Hobbes. On the Hobbesian account developed here, mass incarceration is always wrong because it is always inconsistent with having a free society. (shrink)

Beginning with a thought experiment about a mysterious Delphic oracle, this article motivates, explains, and attempts to defend a view it calls Ethical Pragmatism. Ethical Pragmatism is the view that we can and should carry on our practice of moral deliberation without reference to moral truths, or more broadly, without reference to metaethics. The defense the article mounts tries to show that neither suspicions about the tenability of fact-value distinctions, nor doubts about the viability of global pragmatism, nor worries about (...) the “force” of ethical injunctions without reference to moral truths constitute good reason to reject Ethical Pragmatism. (shrink)

Little attention is given to Richard Rorty’s metaethical views. No doubt this stems from the fact that most commentators are more interested in his metaphilosophical views; most see his metaethical views, offered in scattered passages, as just the downstream runoff from higher-level reflection. This article considers Rorty’s metaethics on their own merits, quite apart from whether his global picture works. I ultimately argue that Rorty’s metaethical outlook is attractive but beset by internal difficulties. Specifically, I contend that Rorty does not (...) and cannot remain faithful to the methodological approach to metaethics for which he advocates. At the paper’s close, I gesture at a nearby methodological approach that best approximates Rorty’s metaethical methodology. (shrink)

This chapter offers an overview of experimental legal philosophy with a special focus on questions in general jurisprudence, that part of legal philosophy that asks about the concept and nature of law. Much of the experimental general jurisprudence work has tended to follow the questions that have interested general jurisprudence scholars for decades, that is, questions about the relation between legal norms and moral norms. Wholesale criticism of experimental general jurisprudence is scant, but, given existing debates about experimental philosophy generally, (...) one can anticipate where disagreement is likely to occur. Outside of experimental general jurisprudence, there is plenty of vibrant discussion about how experimental results can enrich our understanding of various concepts that figure in everyday legal thought such as causation, intention, consent, or meaning. In the future, experimental legal philosophers should continue to consider the degree to which their project is purely descriptive or whether it is revisionary or pragmatic in its ambitions. Also, future work might consider whether to focus more attention on legal experts. (shrink)

Does joining groups trigger a cascade of psychological processes that can result in a loss of individuality and lead to such outcomes as social loafing and poor decision-making? Rather than privileging the self comprising primarily individual qualities as the “true self,” a multilevel, multicomponent approach suggests that, in most cases, personal and collective identities are integrated and mutually sustaining.

Ronald Dworkin and Richard Rorty are sometimes thought to be diametrically opposed philosophers, particularly in their approach to foundational questions in moral thought. Dworkin is a champion of truth and objectivity in morality. Rorty, by contrast, is a great pragmatist who subscribed to a deflated vision of truth and unambiguously renounced objectivity, in favor of what he called “solidarity”. If their stated -isms and alliances were not evidence enough of discord, they also criticized one another in print, particularly on these (...) foundational, or metaethical, questions. The point of this chapter is to show that things are not what they seem: Rorty and Dworkin largely agree on metaethics. The difference between them is largely a difference in emphasis. (shrink)

A man, carrying a gun in his waistband, robs a food vendor. In making his escape, the gun discharges, critically injuring the robber. About such instances, it is common to think, “he got what he deserved.” This Article seeks to explore cases like that—cases of “natural punishment.” Natural punishment occurs when a wrongdoer faces serious harm that results from her wrongdoing and not from anyone seeking retribution against her. The Article proposes that U.S. courts follow their peers and recognize natural (...) punishment as genuine punishment for legal, specifically constitutional, purposes. Were U.S. courts to do so, they would need to reduce the amount of punishment they would otherwise bestow on wrongdoers upon conviction if a natural punishment has occurred or foreseeably will occur. A handful of foreign jurisdictions already accept something like this Article’s proposal, but natural punishment has no formal legal recognition in the United States. The goal of this Article is twofold: first, it offers a rigorous and defensible definition of natural punishment by distinguishing it from nearby notions and dispelling any association with supernatural ideas; second, it demonstrates that recognizing natural punishment as genuine punishment will not much disturb existing American legal institutions and understandings. -/- As an added bonus, the concept of natural punishment can be employed to solve a longstanding problem in criminal law theory, the Mystery of Credit for Time Served. The Mystery surrounds the common practice of giving prisoners credit toward their prison sentences for their time served in jail awaiting trial. The Mystery poses a dilemma about whether the detention time was punishment: If it was punishment, then the detainee was punished before trial in violation of Due Process; however, if the time was not punishment, there is no reason to discount the prison sentence. Seeing the time in detention as an instance of natural punishment resolves the Mystery. (shrink)

This essay offers a new way to conceptualize the “police violence against Blacks” phenomenon. I argue that we should see the situation as an instance of what Thomas Hobbes called the state of nature, that is, a state without effective law. This understanding of the phenomenon stands in sharp contrast to that offered by Professor Michelle Alexander in her book The New Jim Crow. Alexander sees the phenomenon as a continuation of centuries-old patterns of state-backed anti-Black racism. My account is (...) that police are not under control of the state in their interactions with Blacks. (shrink)

Scattered skeptical remarks and a general austerity that infused his writings have given Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes a reputation as some type of nihilist. Noted commentators such as Richard Posner and Albert Alschuler have claimed as much. This article seeks to correct this misunderstanding. Holmes was not a nihilist in the sense of being melancholy due to a belief that the world has no absolute moral values or gods. Instead, Holmes was a pragmatist in the spirit of William James and (...) John Dewey. While Holmes had doubts about moral truth and deities, he ultimately thought that their existence (or non-existence) should have no bearing on our behavior or the law. We must, through our collective efforts, find values that work for us. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Thomas Carnes develops a novel argument for reparations for historical injustices. This Reply shows that Carnes succeeds only at the cost of invoking an implausible formalism. The Reply also presents in brief a simpler argument for reparations.

This short review raises a trilemma for Chris Voparil’s reading of Richard Rorty. Voparil must deny one of three things. He must deny that Rorty affirmed a Jamesian approach to metaethics; he must deny that Rorty affirmed a version of Peircean realism; or, he must deny that Rorty treated all domains of discourse roughly the same. Because Rorty is quite clear in his commitment to the first and third theses and far less clear in affirming Peircean realism, I argue that (...) Voparil is forced to give up attributing realism to Rorty or must simply concede that his version of Rorty is incoherent. (shrink)