This paper has two aims: (1) to point the way towards a novel alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and (2) to delineate a number of different functions that the emotions play in cognition, functions that become visible from outside the framework of cognitive theories. First, I hold that the Higher Order Representational (HOR) theories of consciousness — as generally formulated — are inadequate insofar as they fail to account for selective attention. After posing this dilemma, I resolve it in (...) such a manner that the following thesis arises: the emotions play a key role in shaping selective attention. This thesis is in accord with A. Damasio’s (1994) noteworthy neuroscientific work on emotion. I then begin to formulate an alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and I show how this new account has implications for the following issues: face recognition, two brain disorders (Capgras’ and Fregoli syndrome), the frame problem in A. I., and the research program of affective computing. (shrink)

We first argue that there are cases of “blameless non-belief.” That is, some people—through no fault of their own—fail to enter into a conscious relationship with God. But if so, then it would be unjust of God to make certain particular goods depend upon one having a conscious relationship with God. So, given that God is just, then despite what some theists believe, a relationship with God cannot be a necessary condition for the attainment of these goods; there might, e.g., (...) be atheists in heaven, even assuming that theism is true. This implies that religion is a far less important component of people’s lives than many might think. (shrink)

We first argue that there are cases of “blameless non-belief.” That is, some people—through no fault of their own—fail to enter into a conscious relationship with God. But if so, then it would be unjust of God to make certain particular goods depend upon one having a conscious relationship with God. So, given that God is just, then despite what some theists believe, a relationship with God cannot be a necessary condition for the attainment of these goods; there might, e.g., (...) be atheists in heaven, even assuming that theism is true. This implies that religion is a far less important component of people’s lives than many might think. (shrink)

We formulate a new modal ontological argument; specifically, we show that there is a possible world in which an entity that has at least the property of omnipotence exists. Then we argue that if such an entity is possible, it is necessary as well.

We argue that the set of humanly known mathematical truths (at any given moment in human history) is finite and so recursive. But if so, then given various fundamental results in mathematical logic and the theory of computation (such as Craig’s in J Symb Log 18(1): 30–32(1953) theorem), the set of humanly known mathematical truths is axiomatizable. Furthermore, given Godel’s (Monash Math Phys 38: 173–198, 1931) First Incompleteness Theorem, then (at any given moment in human history) humanly known mathematics must (...) be either inconsistent or incomplete. Moreover, since humanly known mathematics is axiomatizable, it can be the output of a Turing machine. We then argue that any given mathematical claim that we could possibly know could be the output of a Turing machine, at least in principle. So the Lucas-Penrose (Lucas in Philosophy 36:112–127, 1961; Penrose, in The Emperor’s new mind. Oxford University Press, Oxford (1994)) argument cannot be sound. (shrink)

We formulate a sort of "generic" cosmological argument, i.e., a cosmological argument that shares premises (e.g., "contingent, concretely existing entities have a cause") with numerous versions of the argument. We then defend each of the premises by offering pragmatic arguments for them. We show that an endorsement of each premise will lead to an increase in expected utility; so in the absence of strong evidence that the premises are false, it is rational to endorse them. Therefore, it is rational to (...) endorse the cosmological argument, and so rational to endorse theism. We then consider possible objections. (shrink)

Introduction -- Methods for thinking -- The making of the modern subject -- Implications -- Example 1 of a Foucauldian approach : aging and prisons -- Example 2 of a Foucualdian approach : social work -- Summary.

Introduction -- Is the truth stranger than fiction? -- The emergence and analysis of the postmodern -- Baudrillard and his works on social theory -- An assessment of postmodernism and Baudrillard -- Conclusion.

What is social philosophy and age? -- The development of social philosophies of age and aging -- Foucault, age and social philosophy -- Time to recognise personhood and social philosophy : the case of age identity? -- References -- Index.

Introduction -- The development of feminist social theory -- Gender and class -- The aging body and gender -- Conclusion.

Biography of Habermas -- Critical theory -- Habermas and his works -- An assessment of the impact of Habermas -- Conclusion.

The process of engaging in historical empathy holds the potential for significant curricular and dispositional benefits for students in history classrooms. In order to realize these benefits, classroom teachers must be able to integrate historical empathy into their existing planning and teaching; a process that would benefit from empirical examination. This single subject case study examined the pedagogical reasoning process of an experienced classroom teacher who integrated historical empathy into an existing instructional unit designed to foster student knowledge of social (...) control as an enduring historical understanding. The findings of this study suggest that experienced teachers may only be able to partially anticipate the unique pedagogical needs integrating historical empathy requires, and that a holistic examination of pedagogical reasoning during all phases of planning and teaching may be most suitable for the task. (shrink)

For observers of pharmaceutical regulation and the Food and Drug Administration, these are uncertain times. Events in late 2016 raised concerns that the FDA's evidentiary standards were being weakened, compromising the agency's ability to adequately perform its regulatory and public health responsibilities. Two developments most directly contributed to these fears—the approval of eteplirsen, a treatment for Duchenne muscular dystrophy, against the recommendations of both FDA staff and an advisory committee and the December 2016 signing of the 21st Century Cures Act, (...) which encouraged greater use by the FDA of “real-world” evidence not obtained through randomized controlled trials. The arrival of the Trump administration—with its deregulatory, industry-friendly approach—has only amplified concerns over the future of the FDA. It is too early to know whether the recent developments are truly harbingers of an FDA less likely to prevent unsafe or ineffective products from reaching the market. But elements in the two events—the role of patient narratives in deliberations regarding eteplirsen and the enthusiasm for real-world evidence in the 21st Century Cures Act—raise critical issues for the future of evidence in the FDA's work. The rigorous, inclusive approach under way to consider issues related to real-world evidence provides a model for a similarly needed inquiry regarding public participation in FDA decision-making. (shrink)

Introduction -- Social theory and enlightenment project -- Contemporary social theory -- Foucault -- Postmodernism -- References.

Introduction : why Foucault? -- Foucault and impact on applied social science -- The Foucauldian relevance of governmentality and power to helping professions -- Foucault's legacy: Judith Butler, performance and social work -- Conclusion.

Comparative assessments of national bioethics commissions in the United States commonly look at the differences among these groups over their forty‐year history. A particular focus has been differences in the membership, mission, methods, and reports of the President's Council on Bioethics, which was active from 2001 until 2009, compared to those of its predecessors and the recent Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, active from 2009 until 2016. The differences are real, but disproportionate attention to them can obscure (...) the substantial similarities in commissions’ structure and function throughout the history of expert bioethics advice to government. As the Trump administration considers what role, if any, a bioethics commission will play in its work, it would be well served to consider how choices regarding the design of such a group and the topics it examines can best facilitate the unique contributions it can make to the government and to the country. (shrink)

What are the non-monetary dimensions of selling sex? This article offers a cultural approach to the question of sexual labors, drawing on field observations and interviews in a community of gay men in Dakar, Senegal. Removing the notion of sexual labors from the stigmatized zone of “survival sex,” I explore the affective, extramonetary dimensions of sexual labors. The men in this study labor not simply to make money. Instead, I argue that against a highly gendered cultural backdrop, one where male (...) admiration is often written synonymously with money and gift giving, gay men experience a validation of their self-worth and homoerotic attraction through sexual labors. The extent to which they derive recognition from sexual labors not only subverts the gendered heteronormative paradigm, but also is paradoxically conditioned by it. Beyond sexual labors, however, this article also engages a broader question—how do gay men forge a positive sense of self amidst a variety of oppressive forces? The answer is not only through sexual labors, but also through initiation into a gay identity and community, an ethos of generosity and solidarity, kinship ties, and an ethic of sexual discovery, each taking shape alongside these labors. (shrink)

This article approaches the topics of invention and innovation by way of cultural theory. Building on the works of Ferdinand de Saussure and John Austin, the article offers definitions of invention and innovation in semiotic and performative terms. It conceptualizes invention as a process of resignification, and frames innovation as a felicitous performative. Structuralist theory appears to foreclose the potential for these two terms to exist in the empirical world. This article explores these barriers but also locates conceptual spaces for (...) invention and innovation, and identifies these phenomena as they occur in contemporary empirical sites. (shrink)

The position I defend in this paper is that both prisoners and ex-prisoners, at least within present U.S. society, experience a form of oppression that can be distinguished from that inflicted upon other structurally disadvantaged groups. As a result of these U.S. conditions, I also argue that those who have not been or are not currently incarcerated may possess some unearned advantages, similar to but also different from other forms of privilege, such as those based upon race, class, gender, sexuality, (...) and ability. In the first section, I investigate three definitions of oppression to articulate my thesis of prisoner oppression, using the work of Marilyn Frye, Kenneth Clatterbaugh, and Ann E. Cudd. In the second section, I respond to three objections against my thesis. I conclude in the third section with some thoughts on how the preceding arguments should affect the dominant discourse regarding prison reform and abolition. (shrink)

Psychiatry is rapidly adopting digital phenotyping and artificial intelligence/machine learning tools to study mental illness based on tracking participants’ locations, online activity, phone and text message usage, heart rate, sleep, physical activity, and more. Existing ethical frameworks for return of individual research results (IRRs) are inadequate to guide researchers for when, if, and how to return this unprecedented number of potentially sensitive results about each participant’s real-world behavior. To address this gap, we convened an interdisciplinary expert working group, supported by (...) a National Institute of Mental Health grant. Building on established guidelines and the emerging norm of returning results in participant-centered research, we present a novel framework specific to the ethical, legal, and social implications of returning IRRs in digital phenotyping research. Our framework offers researchers, clinicians, and Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) urgently needed guidance, and the principles developed here in the context of psychiatry will be readily adaptable to other therapeutic areas. (shrink)

Scott Aikin recently claimed that pragmatism and phenomenology are incompatible. Pragmatic naturalism is incompatible with phenomenology’s anti-naturalism. Therefore, pragmatists trying to appropriate insights from phenomenology encounter a dilemma: either reject naturalism and thereby pragmatism, or reject anti-naturalism and thereby phenomenology. I will argue that Aikin’s dilemma is unmerited, especially in the case of John Dewey, because he has misidentified its horns. Given his definition of pragmatic naturalism, the classical pragmatists are neither naturalists nor pragmatists. His discussion of “phenomenology” misconstrues phenomenological (...) method as subjective self-reporting, which hamstrings his assessment of phenomenology and its prospects of reconciliation with pragmatism. I hope to engage and dispel not only Aikin’s dilemma, but also common preconceptions about the intersection of pragmatism and phenomenology. They may be reconciled, although there are antipathies, of which I will discuss Dewey’s principle of continuity. (shrink)

Our paper offers a contribution to the growing literature on the sociology of innovation rather than the still dominant economic theory of innovation. We suggest that innovation first and foremost represents a process of cognitive displacement whereby existing metaphorical frameworks are reconstituted to account for new phenomena in a process that changes both the metaphor’s and the new phenomenon’s compositions. We suggest that integral to this process is knowledgeability, or a bundle of social and cognitive competencies that emerge as one (...) of the main prerequisites for innovative thinking. We conclude by examining the most important social and cognitive competencies that structure the possibilities for invention and innovation in the contemporary knowledge economy. (shrink)

This study examined people’s ability to predict and postdict their performance on an event-based prospective memory task. Using nonfocal cues, one group of participants predicted their success at finding animal words and a different group predicted their ability to find words with a particular syllable in it. The authors also administered a self-report questionnaire on everyday prospective and retrospective memory failures. Based on the different strategies adopted by the two groups and correlations among the dependent variables, the authors concluded that (...) people do have a basic awareness of their prospective memory abilities, but that this awareness is far from accurate. The importance of metamemory concerning one’s prospective memory is discussed in terms of how it influences the strategies that people might choose for actually completing their various everyday intentions. (shrink)

Ethics advisory groups, in various forms, have existed for at least 50 years in the United States and other countries. In science and biomedicine, four principal types of committees can be distinguished: policy-making and/or advisory committees, health professional association committees, health care ethics committees, and research ethics committees. Overall, these bodies have been of use to governments, policy makers, health care professionals, and the public in considering ‘what is ethical’ and ‘what is unethical’ in areas such as research involving humans (...) or animals or environmental questions such as whether to use genetically modified crops. This paper concentrates on a particular and... (shrink)

Previous research has shown that emotionally-valenced words are given higher judgements of learning (JOLs) than are neutral words. The current study examined potential explanations for this emotional salience effect on JOLs. Experiment 1 replicated the basic emotionality/JOL effect. In Experiments 2A and 2B, we used pre-study JOLs and assessed memory beliefs qualitatively, finding that, on average, participants believed that positive and negative words were more memorable than neutral words. Experiment 3 utilised a lexical decision task, resulting in lower reaction times (...) (RTs) for positive words than for neutral words, but equivalent RTs for negative and neutral words, suggesting that processing fluency may partially account for higher JOLs for positive words, but not for negative words. Finally, we conducted a series of moderation analyses in Experiment 4 which assessed the relative contributions of fluency and beliefs to JOLs by measuring both factors in the same participants, showing that RTs made no significant contribution to JOLs for either positive or negative words. Our findings suggest that although positive words may be more fluently processed than neutral words, memory beliefs are the primary factor underlying higher JOLs for both positive and negative words. (shrink)

Students’ written argumentation, including historical argumentation, is an important aspect of standardized assessments under the Common Core State Standards (CCSS). This mixed methods study explores the differences in students’ written argumentation when inquiry methods of instruction are employed and a rubric designed for CCSS standardized assessment is used in evaluation. Results indicate that inquiry methods do not necessarily improve students’ argumentative writing when scored on CCSS criteria, though qualitative analysis reveals considerable differences in the demonstration of historical thinking by students (...) in the treatment group. Many of these differences were captured with additional quantitative evaluation using a disciplinary specific instrument, though concerns remain regarding the ability to capture student knowledge through purely quantitative means. Implications for further assessment, research and instruction are discussed. (shrink)

I formulate and defend a version of the many universes (or multiverse) reply to the atheistic argument from evil. Specifically, I argue that (i) if we know that any argument from evil (be it a logical or evidential argument) is sound, then we know that God would be (or at least probably would be) unjustified in actualizing our universe. I then argue that (ii) there might be a multiverse and (iii) if so, then we do not know that God would (...) be (or at least probably would be) unjustified in actualizing our universe. It follows that we cannot know that the atheistic argument from evil is sound, in which case we cannot be certain that the argument succeeds, and so it is rational to refuse to reject theism because of such arguments. (shrink)

We raise various puzzles about the relationship between God and the meaning of life. These difficulties suggest that, even if we assume that God exists, and even if God’s existence would entail that our lives have meaning, God is not and could not be the source of the meaning of life. We conclude by discussing implications of our arguments: these claims can be used in a novel argument for atheism; these claims undermine an extant argument for God’s existence; and they (...) suggest that atheism is consistent with our lives having meaning. (shrink)

We argue that A. Damasio’s (1994) Somatic Marker hypothesis can explain why humans don’t generally suffer from the frame problem, arguably the greatest obstacle facing the Computational Theory of Mind. This involves showing how humans with damaged emotional centers are best understood as actually suffering from the frame problem. We are then able to show that, paradoxically, these results provide evidence for the Computational Theory of Mind, and in addition call into question the very distinction between easy and hard problems (...) in the contemporary philosophy of mind. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIt is proposed that experts are able to integrate prior contextual knowledge with emergent visual information to make complex predictive judgments about the world around them, often under heightened levels of uncertainty and extreme time constraints. However, limited knowledge exists about the impact of anxiety on the use of such contextual priors when forming our decisions. We provide a novel insight into the combined impact of contextual priors and anxiety on anticipation in soccer. Altogether, 12 expert soccer players were required (...) to predict the actions of an oncoming opponent while viewing life-sized video simulations of 2-versus-2 defensive scenarios. Performance effectiveness and processing efficiency were measured under four conditions: no contextual priors about the action tendencies of the opponent and low anxiety ; no CP and high anxiety ; CP and LA; CP and HA. The provision of contextual priors did not affect processing efficiency, but it improved performance effectiveness... (shrink)

I formulate an argument against epiphenomenalism; the argument shows that epiphenomenalism is extremely improbable. Moreover the argument suggests that qualia not only have causal powers, but have their causal powers necessarily. I address possible objections and then conclude by considering some implications the argument has for dualism.

This paper concerns “human symbolic output,” or strings of characters produced by humans in our various symbolic systems; e.g., sentences in a natural language, mathematical propositions, and so on. One can form a set that consists of all of the strings of characters that have been produced by at least one human up to any given moment in human history. We argue that at any particular moment in human history, even at moments in the distant future, this set is finite. (...) But then, given fundamental results in recursion theory, the set will also be recursive, recursively enumerable, axiomatizable, and could be the output of a Turing machine. We then argue that it is impossible to produce a string of symbols that humans could possibly produce but no Turing machine could. Moreover, we show that any given string of symbols that we could produce could also be the output of a Turing machine. Our arguments have implications for Hilbert’s sixth problem and the possibility of axiomatizing particular sciences, they undermine at least two distinct arguments against the possibility of Artificial Intelligence, and they entail that expert systems that are the equals of human experts are possible, and so at least one of the goals of Artificial Intelligence can be realized, at least in principle. (shrink)

In Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Hume (1779/1993) appeals to his account of causation (among other things) to undermine certain arguments for the existence of God. If 'anything can cause anything', as Hume claims, then the Principle of Causal Adequacy is false; and if the Principle of Causal Adequacy is false, then any argument for God's existence that relies on that principle fails. Of course, Hume's critique has been influential. But Hume's account of causation undermines the argument from evil at least (...) as much as it undermines arguments for theism, or so I argue. I then suggest that Hume's account of causation can be used to formulate an alternative argument against classical theism. (shrink)