Here, we revise Pietraszewski's model of groups by assigning participant pairs with two triplets, denoting: the type of game that models the interaction, its critical switching point between alternatives, and the perception of strategic similarity with the opponent. These triplets provide a set of primitives that accounts for individuals' strategic motivations and observed behaviors.

Here we revise Glowacki's model by proposing a simple and empirically tested mechanism that is applicable to a comprehensive set of social interactions. This parsimonious mechanism accounts for the choice of both cooperative and peaceful alternatives and explains when each choice benefits the interacting parties. It is proposed that this mechanism is key to the evolution of both peace and conflict.

The computer simulation study explores the impact of the duration of social impact on the generation and stabilization of cooperative strategies. Rather than seeding the simulations with a finite set of strategies, a continuous distribution of strategies is being defined. Members of heterogeneous populations were characterized by a pair of probabilistic reactive strategies: the probability to respond to cooperation by cooperation and the probability to respond to defection by cooperation. This generalized reactive strategy yields the standard TFT mechanism, the All-Cooperate, (...) All-Defect and Bully strategies as special cases. Pairs of strategies interacted through a Prisoner's Dilemma game and exerted social influence on all other members. Manipulating: (i) the initial distribution of populations' strategies, and (ii) the duration of social influence, we monitored the conditions leading to the emergence and stabilization of cooperative strategies. Results show that: (1) The duration of interactions between pairs of strategies constitutes a crucial factor for the emergence and stabilization of cooperative strategies, (2) Unless sufficient learning intervals are provided, initializing the simulations with cooperative populations does not guarantee that cooperation will sustain. (shrink)

The Group Calibration Index (GCI) provides a means of assessing the quality of forecasters’ predictions in situations that lack external feedback or outcome data. The GCI replaces the missing outcome data with aggregated ratings of a well-defined reference group. A simulation study and two experiments show how the GCI classifies forecaster performance and distinguishes between forecasters with restricted information and those with complete information. The results also show that under certain circumstances, where members of the reference group have high-quality information, (...) the new GCI will outperform expert classification that is based on traditional calibration indices. (shrink)

This book critically analyzes important current issues in international development-growth, poverty, inequality, participation, consumption, corruption, gender, race, LGBT politics, revolution, universalism-by deploying key psychoanalytic concepts-enjoyment, fantasy, antagonism, fetishism, envy, drive, perversion, hysteria. It draws on the work of Lacan and Žižek, and on psychoanalytic postcolonial and feminist scholarship.

This is a selection of essays on moral responsibility that represent the major components of John Martin Fischer's overall approach to freedom of the will and moral responsibility. The collection exhibits the overall structure of Fischer's view and shows how the various elements fit together to form a comprehensive framework for analyzing free will and moral responsibility. The topics include deliberation and practical reasoning, freedom of the will, freedom of action, various notions of control, and moral accountability. The (...) essays seek to provide a foundation for our practices of holding each other (and ourselves) morally and legally accountable for our behavior. A crucial move is the distinction between two kinds of control. According to Fischer, "regulative control" involves freedom to choose and do otherwise ("alternative possibilities"), whereas "guidance control" does not. Fischer contends that guidance control is all the freedom we need to be morally responsible agents. Further, he contends that such control is fully compatible with causal determinism. Additionally, Fischer argues that we do not need genuine access to alternative possibilities in order for there to be a legitimate point to practical reasoning. Fischer's overall framework contains an argument for the contention that guidance control, and not regulative control, is associated with moral responsibility, a sketch of a comprehensive theory of moral responsibility (that ties together responsibility for actions, omissions, consequences, and character), and an account of the value of moral responsibility. On this account, the value of exhibiting freedom (of the relevant sort) and thus being morally responsible for one's behavior is a species of the value of artistic self-expression. (shrink)

Seria um abuso sexual o príncipe roubar um beijo da Bela Adormecida? Quem brinca de polícia e ladrão pode virar bandido? Games violentos criam assassinos? Mas quem nunca matou uma formiga? E quem nunca "roubou pão na casa do João"? O filósofo Luiz Felipe Pondé se une aqui a Ilan Brenman, psicólogo e premiado autor de livros infantis, para fazer um panorama do politicamente correto e discutir suas influências na formação das crianças e, consequentemente, dos adultos que elas se (...) tornarão. Os autores mostram que essa verdadeira patrulha do pensamento tem nos feito perder a capacidade de interpretar a vida, com seus símbolos e suas ironias. Com isso, vemos um número cada vez maior de pessoas com dificuldades em lidar com as emoções que sentem, deprimidas e inseguras. A obra provoca a refletir: talvez o lobo mau não viva apenas nos contos de fadas, mas esteja a nos espreitar na escola, na família, na política, na sociedade, enfim. Para enfrentá-lo, ser livre para pensar e se expressar é fundamental. (shrink)

I am going to argue that it is a cost of libertarianism that it holds our status as agents hostage to theoretical physics, but that claim has met with disagreement. Some libertarians regard it as the cost of doing business, not a philosophical liability. By contrast, Peter van Inwagen has addressed the worry head on. He says that if he were to become convinced that causal determinism were true, he would not change his view that humans are free and morally (...) responsible. Rather, he would give up at least one of the formerly-thought-to-be a priori truths that are elements in his argument for the incompatibility of causal determinism and the relevant sort of freedom. Thus, according to van Inwagen, our status as free and morally responsible agents would not be held hostage to the physicists or hang on a thread I think that van Inwagen’s strategy for securing our freedom and responsibility is unattractive. Somewhat tendentiously, I have called the rejection of an a priori ingredient in the incompatibilist’s argument, contingent upon learning that causal determinism is true, ‘metaphysical fip-flopping.’ -/- And it does seem that van Inwagen’s approach is implausible insofar as he is open to such metaphysical fip-fopping. That he is open to it—that he would fip-fop if he became convinced of the truth of causal determinism—is a problem for his actual philosophical position. Or so I will argue. (shrink)

In this paper I explore in a preliminary way the interconnections among narrative explanation, narrative value, free will, an immortality. I build on the fascinating an suggestive work of David Velleman. I offer the hypothesis that our acting freely is what gives our lives a distinctive kind of value - narrative value. Free Will, then, is connected to the capacity to lead a meaningful life in a quite specific way: it is the ingredient which, when aded to others, enows us (...) with a meaning over an above the cumulative value erived from ading together levels of momentary welfare. In acting freely, we are writing a sentence in the story of our lives, and the value of acting freely is thus a species of the value of artistic creativity or self-expression (understood appropriately). Finally, I contend that the fact that our lives are stories need not entail that they have endings, or that immortality would necessarily be unimaginable or essentially different from ordinary, finite human life. Yes, a certain sort of narrative understanding of our lives as a whole would be impossible in the context of immortality; but much of what we care about, and value, in our stories might remain. (shrink)

In the present article we argue that emotional interactions are not appropriately captured in present emotion research and theorizing. Emotional stimuli or antecedents are dynamic and change over time because they often interact and have a specific relationship with the subject. Earlier emotional interactions may, for example, intensify later emotional reactions to a specific person, or our anger reactions towards powerful or powerless others may differ considerably. Thus, we suggest that such social factors not only affect the intensity, but also (...) the nature of emotional experiences and expressions, and specifically the nature of the social movement (e.g., moving towards, away, or against). We discuss different processes that are implicated in the relation between the social environment and our emotions, describe how emotional expressions shape social behavior, and provide suggestions for incorporating the social dimension of emotion in future research. (shrink)

This article focuses on three recent controversies in which Žižek has been embroiled and for which he has taken positions that rest on the notion of antagonism. His views on Eurocentrism, the European refugee crisis and trans politics have been the subject of notable disapproval, if not denunciation. Critics reproach him for being Eurocentric, racist and transphobic, charges which he has repeatedly countered. The article will examine the differing theoretical and political positions in these debates, underlining what Žižek’s critics miss (...) or misunderstand about his notion of antagonism. While I side firmly with Žižek on the substance of these issues, I nonetheless consider the extent to which at least part of the disagreement here centres on the performative rather than the strictly “theoretical”: Might his critics be reacting to his overexposure? Could such overexposure be interpreted as an attempt at having the last word? And to what extent does the antagonistic form of Žižek’s interventions militate against their theoretical content? (shrink)

Introduction: "meaning in life and death : our stories" -- John Martin Fischer and Anthony B rueckner, "Why is death bad?", Philosophical studies, vol. 50, no. 2 (September 1986) -- "Death, badness, and the impossibility of experience," Journal of ethics -- John Martin Fischer and Daniel Speak, "Death and the psychological conception of personal identity," Midwest studies in philosophy, vol. 24 -- "Earlier birth and later death : symmetry through thick and thin," Richard Feldman, Kris McDaniel, Jason R. (...) Raibley, eds., The good, the right, life and death (Aldershot : Ashgate Publishing, 2006) -- "Why immortality is not so bad," International journal of philosophical studies, vol. 2, no. 2 (September 1994) -- John Martin Fischer and Ruth Curl, "Philosophical models of immortality in science fiction," in George Slusser et. al., eds., Immortal engines : life extension and immortality in science fiction and fantasy (Athens, Ga. : University of Georgia Press, 1996) -- "Epicureanism about death and immortality," Journal of ethics, vol. 10, no. 4 -- "Stories," Midwest studies in philosophy, vol. 20 -- "Free will, death, and immortality : the role of narrative," Philosophical papers (Special issue : meaning in life) volume 34, number 3, November 2005 -- "Stories and the meaning of life," revised and expanded version of "A reply to Pereboom, Zimmerman, and Smith," part of a book symposium on John Martin Fischer, my way : essays on moral responsibility, philosophical books, vol. 47, no. 3. (shrink)

In the Corpus Aristotelicum there are two different theories of substance which apply to the sublunary world. The first theory is found in the Categories and selects the individual concrete as a primary substance. The second is found in the Metaphysics and selects the Form and the Essence as a primary substance. Most of the interpretations of modern Aristotelian scholarship claim an inconsistency. They suggest that if at all Aristotle has a theory of substance, then it is either the substance (...) theory of the Categories or the one of the Metaphysics but not both of them. The supposition of all these interpretations is that Aristotle’s theory of substance is unambiguous and that there can be only a single primary substance. These interpretations suppose that the theory of substance is applicable only to a single domain, namely to ontology.In my paper I argue that this supposition is false. I suggest that Aristotle’s theory of substance is applicable not only to ontology but also to the domain of determinology whose meaning is explained in the paper. The theory of substance of the Categories applies to ontology whereas the one of the Metaphysics applies to determinology. The two theories are consistent with each other in a way that there are two commensurate sorts of primary substance: the individual concrete as the ontological primary substance of the Categories and the Form‑Essence as the determinative primary substance of the Metaphysics.Furthermore, I claim that Aristotle’s concept of substance is manifold and flexible. The concept evolves and is expanded in the Metaphysics. It is manifold because his theory of substance has a certain structure which includes the following three criteria for selecting a primary substance: subjecthood viz. being a subject, independence and determined individuality. Aristotle’s concept of substance is flexible because these criteria do not have an absolute signification per se but are general and relative. They get a final signification when they are applied either to the ontology in the Categories or to the determinology in the Metaphysics. Their application to a certain domain establishes a theory of substance according to the domain in question and selects a primary substance according to the same domain. Aristotle’s concept of substance is flexible also because in the Metaphysics he enlarges his first concept of substance expressed by the three criteria by adding a new sort of substancehood expressed by the idion criterion. (shrink)

Several terms encountered in Mesopotamian sources stand for titles of persons who served either in the palace or in the temple and displayed ambiguous gender qualities. Some of these persons, albeit being males, were characterized by feminine traits and were therefore considered by their society to be effeminate. One of the terms related to these gender-ambiguous persons was kulu’u, whose exact meaning has never been fully determined, mainly because of the scarcity of its textual attestations. On several occasions this term (...) is mentioned in contexts expressing scorn and contempt and was thus used as a pejorative expression. This paper aims at elucidating this phenomenon by clarifying the nature of the vague term kulu’u and subsequently the reasons for its use as a derogatory term. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: References.

In the future, when we compare the welfare of a being of one substrate (say, a human) with the welfare of another (say, an artificial intelligence system), we will be making an intersubstrate welfare comparison. In this paper, we argue that intersubstrate welfare comparisons are important, difficult, and potentially tractable. The world might soon contain a vast number of sentient or otherwise significant beings of different substrates, and moral agents will need to be able to compare their welfare levels. However, (...) this work will be difficult, because we lack the same kinds of commonalities across substrates that we have within them. Fortunately, we might be able to make at least some intersubstrate welfare comparisons responsibly in spite of these issues. We make the case for cautious optimism and call for more research. (shrink)

I argue that racism is essentially a civic character trait: to be a racist is to have a character that rationally reflects racial supremacist sociopolitical values. As with moral vice accounts of racism, character is my account’s primary evaluative focus: character is directly evaluated as racist, and all other racist things are racist insofar as, and because, they cause, are caused by, express or are otherwise suitably related to racist character. Yet as with political accounts of racism, sociopolitical considerations provide (...) my account’s primary evaluative standard: satisfying the sociopolitical standard of racial supremacy is what makes racist character racist. (shrink)

Nelson Pike’s article, “Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action,” is one of the most influential pieces in contemporary Philosophy of Religion. Published over forty years ago, it has elicited many different kinds of replies. We shall set forth some of the main lines of reply to Pike’s article, starting with some of the “early” replies. We then explore some issues that arise from relatively recent work in the philosophy of time; it is fascinating to note that views suggested by recent work (...) in this area and related areas of metaphysics have implications for Pike’s argument - implications perhaps not previously noticed. (shrink)

Diese Festschrift für Michael Fischer ist ein Patchwork und eine wunderbare Mischung aus Wissenschaft, Persönlichem, Freundschaft und Genuss. Sie setzt sich aus unterschiedlichen und vielseitigen Texten, Zeichnungen und Bildern zusammen, von Menschen, die ihn begleitet haben, manche viele Jahre, manche nur eine kurze, aber entscheidende Zeit. Studentinnen und Studenten, die von ihm gelernt haben, Kolleginnen und Kollegen, die mit ihm Ideen entwickelt, Projekte initiiert und geforscht haben, Freunden aus Kunst und Kultur, Theater, Oper und den Bühnen des Lebens, nämlich: (...) Eric Hobsbawm, Claudio Magris, André Glucksmann, Wolf Singer, Johannes Hahn, Volker Gerhardt, Thomas Fischer, Rudolf (+) und Gundl Hradil, Helga Rabl-Stadler, Gerard Mortier, Jürgen Flimm, Brita Steinwendtner, Veit Heinichen, Peter Ruzicka, André Tubeuf, Thomas Oberender, Stefan Zweifel, Hermann Lübbe, Eduardo Chitas, Wilhelm Donner, Hans Eichhorn, Reinhard Kacianka, Tina Perisutti, Ulrich H. J. Körtner, Markus Hengstschläger, Henriette und Conrad Ulrich-Hürlimann, Michael Hagner, Thomas Macho, Johann Weyringer, Birgit Recki, Walther Ch. Zimmerli, Andreas Cesana, Kurt Seelmann. (shrink)

Do cinematic representations of the natural world only put us in further remove from nature? A phenomenological approach shows that nature screened can produce a richer understanding of human–nature relations as these unfold in visual contact. If vision accesses the world in a unique relationship of sight, in which our contact with the world is defined by vision prior to any other interaction, the cinema offers a special setting for a phenomenology that seeks to draw-out the significance of human relations (...) with the world of nature that come before utility or action. A detailed analysis of the opening sequence of Terrence Malick’s The New World demonstrates how the act of viewing positions the viewer in relation to what she sees. This position, prior to action and with the impossibility to act is seen here as an ethical position, a position of responsibility in the Levinasian sense. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of vision is put here to use alongside the hermeneutic phenomenology of Heidegger and the existential responsibility of Levinas, while subverting Levinas’ anthropocentrism and rejecting Heidegger’s limiting view of technology. The approach taken in this essay, of bringing phenomenology into productive and reflexive interaction with ecology and with film is dubbed an “eco-film-phenomenology.”. (shrink)

Recently, we proposed a fundamental subdivision of the human cortex into two complementary networks—an “extrinsic” one which deals with the external environment, and an “intrinsic” one which largely overlaps with the “default mode” system, and deals with internally oriented and endogenous mental processes. Here we tested this hypothesis by contrasting decision making under external and internally-derived conditions. Subjects were presented with an external cue, and were required to either follow an external instruction or to ignore it and follow a voluntary (...) decision process . Our results show that a well defined component of the intrinsic system—the right inferior parietal cortex—was preferentially activated during the “free-will” condition. Importantly, this activity was significantly higher than the base-line resting state. The results support a self-related role for the intrinsic system and provide clear evidence for both hemispheric and regional specialization in the human intrinsic system. (shrink)

Arguments for veganism don’t make many vegans, or even many who think they ought to be vegans, at least when they’re written by philosophers. Others — such as the one by Jonathan Safran Foer — seem to do a bit better. Why? To answer this question, I sketch a theory of ordinary moral argumentation that highlights the importance of meaning-based considerations in arguing that people ought to act in ways that deviate from normal expectations for behaviour. In particular, I outline (...) an eclectic theory, where we draw on a variety of moral frameworks and don’t assume that morality is generally overriding. I suggest that meaning-based considerations help us sort through the array of reasons available to us, as well as explain why, in a particular case, what we ought to do morally is what we ought to do all things considered. (shrink)

'Philosophische Anthropologie' meint in dieser Studie nicht eine philosophische Subdisziplin, sondern eine besondere Theorierichtung in der deutschsprachigen Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, die mit den Namen Max Scheler, Helmuth Plessner, Erich Rothacker, Arnold Gehlen, Adolf Portmann u.v.a. mehr verbunden ist. Der erste Teil erzählt die verwickelte, teils abenteuerliche Entstehungs-, Aufstiegs- und Entfaltungsgeschichte dieser Denkergruppe von 1919 bis 1975 - einschließlich ihrer beachtlichen Wirkungsgeschichte in verschiedenen Disziplinen wie der Soziologie, Psychologie, Biologie und der Philosophie selbst. Im zweiten Teil wird der philosophische Identitätskern (...) dieser Philosophischen Anthropologie als Denkansatz präzisiert. (shrink)

1. bd. Descartes' leben, werke und lehre. 4. neu bearb. aufl. 1897.--2. bd. Spinozas leben, werke und lehre. 4. neu bearb. aufl. 1898.--3. bd. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Leben, werke und lehre. 4. aufl. 1902.--4-5. bd. Immanuel Kant und seine lehre. 4. neu bearb. aufl. 1898-99.--6. bd. Fichtes leben, werke und lehre. 3. durchgesehene aufl. 1900.--7. bd. Schellings leben, werke und lehre. 3. aufl. 1902.--8. bd. l.-2. th. Hegels leben, werke und lehre. 1901.--9. bd. Schopenhauers leben, werke und lehre. 2. neu (...) bearb. und verm. aufl. 1898.--10. bd. Francis Bacon und seine schule. Entwicklungsgeschichte der erfahrungsphilosophie. 3. aufl. 1904. (shrink)

English summary: The philosophy of play during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance has been largely neglected by scholars, despite the fact that influential thinkers, such as Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, perceived recreational play to be a vital part of a philosopher's life. By exploring a heterogeneous collection of diverse philosophical approaches to ludic practices, this innovative study provides the first in-depth discussion of the complexity of medieval and early-modern ludic philosophy. Particular attention is devoted to the relationship between (...) play and philosophy, which the influential Aristotelian discourse on play, initiated by Albert and Thomas, conceptualized as a contradictory dichotomy. By focusing on the manifold epistemic transformations which occurred during the Renaissance, this study analyses how philosophers in various contexts developed alternative or complementary theories of the connection between ludus and philosophia. German description: Die philosophische Geschichte des Spielens nach der Antike lasst man in der Regel mit Friedrich Schillers von Kant inspirierten Briefen Uber die asthetische Erziehung des Menschen beginnen, ohne die ihnen vorausgehende Vielfalt philosophischer Auseinandersetzung mit ludischen Praktiken naher zu betrachten. Vorliegende Studie versteht sich als erster Beitrag zur Erschliessung dieser bislang vernachlassigten spielphilosophischen Ansatze zwischen Mittelalter und Fruher Neuzeit. Dabei wird insbesondere das Verhaltnis von Spielen und Philosophieren in den Blick genommen, das schon bei scholastischen Autoren im Zentrum ludischer Reflexionen stand. So etablierten Gelehrte wie Albertus Magnus oder Thomas von Aquin bereits im 13. Jahrhundert eine strenge Trennung zwischen dem als Rekreation konzipierten Spielen und dem Ernst des Philosophierens, indem sie ludische Erholung mit Ruckgriff auf Aristoteles zum notwendigen Gegenstuck der Kontemplation erklarten. Die Arbeit zeigt, wie Philosophen zwischen Spatmittelalter und Fruher Neuzeit im Zuge vielfaltiger epistemischer Transformationen das Verhaltnis von philosophia und ludus komplementar oder alternativ zu diesem einflussreichen aristotelischen Deutungsschema bestimmten. Unter diesen heterogenen Ansatzen finden sich ein allegorisches Globusspiel des Nikolaus von Kues, die erste philosophischen Therapie ubermassiger Spielleidenschaft und eine naturphilosophische Beschreibung des Tennisspiels am rinascimentalen Hof von Ferrara. (shrink)

A dialogic commentary on the ethics of the sages (tractate avot).

This book claims that there is a negativity at the core of all social articulations that provides the basis for a universal politics. Drawing principally on the work of Slavoj Žižek, the book suggests that the social is punctured by an impossibility-an incompletion-which rather than serving as a barrier to politics, lays a foundation for shared struggle. The book thus argues for a negative universality, rooted not in a positive element (e.g., identity-based politics) but a discordant one, so that under (...) our current global capitalist system, solidarity is to be forged on the basis of social antagonism (i.e., shared experiences of exploitation and marginalization). Such a conception of shared struggle avoids the trap of both a neocolonial universalism (e.g., the rights of white men parading as universal rights) and the narrow particularism of identity-based politics. Most importantly, it foregrounds the struggles of the systematically dispossessed and excluded (the permanently unemployed, migrants, refugees, sweatshop laborers, etc.), who stand as symptom of our global capitalist order. The book compares "negative universality" with four competing contemporary versions of universalism-conservative, liberal, postcolonial, and Marxist. It also brings "negative universality" into dialogue with present-day critics of universalism-postmodernists, post-Marxists, queer theorists, decolonial pluriversalists, and new materialists. Finally, it examines what a universal politics might look like today in the context of such key global sites of struggle as climate change, the refugee crisis, the Palestinian question, Black Lives Matter, #MeToo, Political Islam, workers' struggles, the Bolivian state under Morales, the European Union, and COVID-19. (shrink)

Video assistant referee was officially introduced into soccer regulations in 2018, after many years in which referee errors were justified as being “part of the game.” The technology’s penetration into the soccer field was accompanied by concerns and much criticism that, to a large degree, continues to be voiced with frequency. This paper argues that, despite fierce objections and extensive criticism, VAR represents an important revision in modern professional soccer, and moreover, it completes a moral revolution in the evolution of (...) the sport as a whole. Theoretically speaking, this technology enables an improvement in the sport’s professional standards and its public image and prestige, and especially its moral standards – Fair play. Furthermore, the introduction of this technology makes it possible to discover additional weaknesses (Standardization for extra time, a clear definition of a handball offense and more) that professional soccer regulations will probably be forced to address in the future. (shrink)

Dialectic IV convenes contributions with new takes on the long held proposition that architects are providers of design services. They service everyone from the status quo all the way to the subaltern. We know well how architects have historically fashioned themselves to be able to procure the most valued building commissions a people have to offer. There are temples, churches, and shrines, palaces and private villas, and surely monuments, state institutions, and corporate headquarters. But how have the members of the (...) same profession managed to fashion themselves as the custodians of the public good? (shrink)

mischer Entwicklung: da werden selbst die Grundlagen der Einzel­ wissenschaften in Frage' gestellt, und der Forscher kann nicht umhin, sich iiber die Probleme der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis Gedanken zu machen. Heute leben wir in einer solchen Epoche gesteigerten erkenntnistheoretischen Interesses: Mathematiker, Astronomen, Phy­ siker, Biologen und Arzte fiihlen das Bediirfnis, sich mit philo­ sophischen Problemen auseinanderzusetzen, wie sich anderseits die Fachphilosophen immer mehr in die Problematik der Einzelwissen­ schaften vertiefen, urn die Geltung ihrer Gedankenkonstruktionen an der verwickelten Wirklichkeit der Wissenschaften zu (...) erproben. Erkenntnistheoretische Darstellungen verfallen oft in den Fehler einseitiger Orientierung, indem sie entweder lediglich die psycho­ logische oder allein die logische Seite der Erkenntnistatigkeit ihren Betrachtungen zugrunde legen. Um dieser Gefahr mit allen ihren Folgen vorzubeugen, wurden vor dem eigentlichen erkenntnistheo­ retischen Abschnitt sowohl die psychologischen wie die logischen Grundlagen der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis in besonderen Kapiteln besprochen. Die beste Methode, einen in einschlagigen Studien haufig anzutreffenden Psychologismus zu vermeiden, ist nicht die absicht­ liche Ignorierung der psychologischen Faktoren der Erkenntnistatig­ keit, sondern die Darstellung der Denkpsychologie und die daraus sich ergebende scharfe Grenzziehung zwischen Psychologie, Logik und Erkenntniskritik. Wenn die vorliegende Darstellung der Erkenntnislehre die philosophisch interessierten Wissenschaftler zum weiteren Nachden­ ken iiber die Grundlagen ihrer Sondergebiete anregt, so hat sie ihren Zweck erfiillt. Moge sie in bescheidenem MaEe dazu beitragen, das unter dem Eindruck agnostizistischer Stromungen ins Wanken geratene Selbst­ vertrauen der Wissenschaft wiederherzustellen und der Wissen­ schaft jene Stellung in unserem Wertsystem wiederzugeben, welche ihr, als der hochsten Leistung der menschlichen Vernunft, gebiihrt. (shrink)

'Philosophische Anthropologie' meint in dieser Studie nicht eine philosophische Subdisziplin, sondern eine besondere Theorierichtung in der deutschsprachigen Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, die mit den Namen Max Scheler, Helmuth Plessner, Erich Rothacker, Arnold Gehlen, Adolf Portmann u.v.a. mehr verbunden ist. Der erste Teil erzählt die verwickelte, teils abenteuerliche Entstehungs-, Aufstiegs- und Entfaltungsgeschichte dieser Denkergruppe von 1919 bis 1975 - einschließlich ihrer beachtlichen Wirkungsgeschichte in verschiedenen Disziplinen wie der Soziologie, Psychologie, Biologie und der Philosophie selbst. Im zweiten Teil wird der philosophische Identitätskern (...) dieser Philosophischen Anthropologie als Denkansatz präzisiert. (shrink)

ABSTRACTBeing able to resist temptation at a young age is crucial for successful functioning yet it can be challenging. According to the Selection, Optimization, and Compensation with Emotion Regulation framework, one central element of successful functioning is selection which involves choosing among regulatory options whose resource requirements fits with the amount of available resources an individual possesses. Although conceptually important, direct empirical evidence is lacking. Accordingly, the present study utilised performance based measures to examine the interactive effect of regulatory selection (...) to resist temptation, and individual differences in executive resources, on functioning in young children. Specifically, 39 first grade children that varied in executive resources, selected between two major regulatory strategies to resist temptation, that varied in their resource demands, and were evaluated on successful functioning... (shrink)

Nothing seems more possible to me than that people some day will come to the definite opinion that there is no copy in the… nervous system which corresponds to a particular thought, or a particular idea, or, memory.WittgensteinIn a recent essay it was emphasized that brain and mind appear to the mind as complementary and reciprocally recursive domains of a hermeneutic circle (Fischer, 1987). An outstanding and not yet recognized feature of this hermeneutic circle is that interpretation within this (...) circle is not rule-governed and hence appears self-organized: individual features of the world (or the brain) become intelligible in terms of the whole context (of the mind)… while the entire context becomes intelligible through individual features (or brain functions). How, or from where then is significance arising? (shrink)