This article compares the sections on the qualities desirable in a wife in Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī’s Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn and Bar Hebraeus’s Ethicon, which the West Syrian writer modeled on al-Ghazālī’s work. The article first establishes that al-Ghazālī based his profile of the ideal wife on a jurisprudential discussion of the topic by his teacher, Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī, expanding it, however, by adding anecdotes from Sufi literature and reasoned arguments on how “the good wife” will best facilitate her husband’s devotion (...) to God. The article then moves to consider how Bar Hebraeus appropriates, reconfigures, and reframes as Christian teaching al-Ghazālī’s discussion. Finally, the article argues that the similarity between the two texts demonstrates that both carve out a particular notion of male piety intelligible and resonant in their different religious traditions and in the broader monotheistic culture of the premodern Middle East. (shrink)

Weitz claims that humanistic philosophy requires open concepts. Concepts are said to be "neutral intermediaries between words and things". For Frege they must be sharply defined; for Weitz open concepts are sets of criteria that are either nonnecessary or nonsufficient or both in the definition of something, though they may be rejectable or undebatable. Thus he dismisses with Karl Popper "essentialism," and thus also Platonism and Aristotelianism. He finds early suggestions of open concepts in C. L. Stevenson’s "Persuasive (...) Definitions," Friedrich Waismann’s "Verifiability," H. L. A. Hart’s "defeasible contracts," Wittgenstein’s "family resemblances," and W. B. Gallie’s "Essentially Contested Concepts." He asserts "... the discovery of open concepts—not just ambiguous, vague or woolly words, which open concepts and their conveying words are not—throws new light on the whole problem of conceptualization". Real definitions then can be only of closed concepts, such as may prevail in science; while the fruits of open concepts are especially characteristic of the humanities, though certainly not limited to them. (shrink)

Writing from a scientifically and philosophically informed perspective, the authors provide a critical overview of the conceptual difficulties encountered in many current neuroscientific and psychological theories.

In this paper we undertake an examination of the presence of similar “women-protective” discourses in policy debates occurring over two bills on reproductive-related topics considered during the 2013 California legislature session. The first bill, now signed into law, allows nurse practitioners, certified nurse midwives, and physician assistants to perform first-trimester aspiration abortions. The second bill, had it passed, would remove the prohibition on paying women for providing eggs to be used for research purposes. Using frame analysis we find evidence of (...) similar protective arguments by opponents of both bills, although these advocates do not share ideological positions on abortion rights or women's autonomy. In the case of AB154, anti-abortion advocates use language and frames that call for protecting the health of women against the imputed interests of the “abortion industry.” In the case of AB926, feminists and pro-choice advocates evoke similar frameworks for the protection of women against the interests of the “medical research industry.” Both sides argue for the “protection of women,” from opposing positions on the rights and autonomy of women in relationship to reproductive freedom. (shrink)

A long-standing theme in discussion of perception and thought has been that our primary cognitive contact with individual objects and events in the world derives from our perceptual contact with them. When I look at a duck in front of me, I am not merely presented with the fact that there is at least one duck in the area, rather I seem to be presented withthisthing (as one might put it from my perspective) in front of me, which looks to (...) me to be a duck. Furthermore, such a perception would seem to put me in a position not merely to make the existential judgment that there is some duck or other present, but rather to make a singular, demonstrative judgment, that that is a duck. My grounds for an existential judgment in this case derives from my apprehension of the demonstrative thought and not vice versa. (shrink)

This article explores how women seek power through both resisting and accommodating mainstream norms for female hair and delineates the strengths and limitations of these strategies. The data help to illuminate the complex role the body plays in sustaining and challenging women's subordinate position, how accommodation and resistance lie buried in everyday activities, the limits of resistance based on the body, and why accommodation and resistance are best viewed as coexisting variables rather than as polar opposites. Finally, these data suggest (...) the importance of defining resistance as actions that reject subordination by challenging the ideologies that support subordination. (shrink)

First published in 1988. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This book defends antitheodicism, arguing that theodicies, seeking to excuse God for evil and suffering in the world, fail to ethically acknowledge the victims of suffering. The authors argue for this view using literary and philosophical resources, commencing with Immanuel Kant's 1791 "Theodicy Essay" and its reading of the Book of Job. Three important twentieth century antitheodicist positions are explored, including "Jewish" post-Holocaust ethical antitheodicism, Wittgensteinian antitheodicism exemplified by D.Z. Phillips and pragmatist antitheodicism defended by William James. The authors argue (...) that these approaches to evil and suffering are fundamentally Kantian. Literary works such as Franz Kafka'sThe Trial, Samuel Beckett's Waiting for Godot, and George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, are examined in order to crucially advance the philosophical case for antitheodicism. (shrink)