This is a straightforward, elementary textbook for beginning students of philosophy. The general aim is to provide a clear introduction to the main issues arising in the philosophy of mind. Part I discusses the Cartesian dualist view which many find initially appealing, and contains a careful examination of arguments for and against. Part II introduces the broadly functionalist type of physicalism which has Aristotelian roots. This approach is developed to yield accounts of perception, action, belief and desire, and the emerging (...) theory of the mind is compared at each stage with rival historical and contemporary views. In Part III the functionalist approach is further explored in giving analyses of sensation, thought and freedom of will. The discussions throughout are exceptionally clear, and the writing uncomplicated, to make available to the students a wealth of detailed argument in the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

In his book, Theory of Knowledge , Roderick Chisholm distinguishes very precisely between, amongst others, what he calls acceptable, reasonable and evident propositions. A proposition is acceptable if with-holding it is not more reasonable than believing it; a proposition is reasonable if believing it is more reasonable than with-holding it; and a proposition is evident for a person provided it is reasonable for him, and there is no other proposition such that the latter is more reasonable than the former. The (...) notion of being more reasonable is obviously pivotal, and Chisholm explains what it is for an attitude to be more reasonable than another in the following words: “If the person in question were a rational being, if his concerns were purely intellectual, and if he were to choose between the two attitudes, then he would choose the more reasonable in preference to the less reasonable”. The wording of this conditional suggests that Chisholm does not think a person is necessarily rational, so it is imperative that we ask: When is a person rational? (shrink)

This is a straightforward, elementary textbook for beginning students of philosophy. The general aim is to provide a clear introduction to the main issues arising in the philosophy of mind. Part I discusses the Cartesian dualist view which many find initially appealing, and contains a careful examination of arguments for and against. Part II introduces the broadly functionalist type of physicalism which has Aristotelian roots. This approach is developed to yield accounts of perception, action, belief and desire, and the emerging (...) theory of the mind is compared at each stage with rival historical and contemporary views. In Part III the functionalist approach is further explored in giving analyses of sensation, thought and freedom of will. The discussions throughout are exceptionally clear, and the writing uncomplicated, to make available to the students a wealth of detailed argument in the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

O. R. Jones; VIII—Things Known Without Observation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 61, Issue 1, 1 June 1961, Pages 129–150, https://doi.org/10.

O. R. Jones; VIII—Things Known Without Observation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 61, Issue 1, 1 June 1961, Pages 129–150, https://doi.org/10.

It is argued that "a's statement, That x is eligible, Is true" says, And not merely presupposes as williams holds, That x is eligible. A brief summary is given of williams' analysis of what is said about a statement when it is said to be true. An attempt is made to show that the predicable in williams' definition is anomalous by contrasting it with genuine conjunctive predicables. Finally, It is suggested that williams' predicable, Even if suitably modified, Would not be (...) the formal equivalent of "things are as a says they are", Which is what williams had claimed. (shrink)