It has been argued by Hull and others that a remnant of essentialism impeded taxonomic progress until systematists abandoned attempting to define taxa on the basis of characters necessary and sufficient for group membership. The advent of cladistics suggests instead that it is an essentialistic view of characters, not of taxa, that should be abandoned, and that only a transformational view of characters allows evolutionary novelties to be identified, much less explained. Conventional Darwinian explanations are not tautologous but are difficult (...) to test and scarcely explain evolutionary novelties, probably because of their emphasis on genetic rather than epigenetic (developmental) processes. (shrink)

All biologists use classifications to one degree or another, and those of us who work on classifications use the results of all other biologists to one degree or another, so you might reasonably expect that biologists in general would share some common conception of how classifications should be constructed and how they can be used. Certainly one might expect that all taxonomists, at least, would share such a perspective. But this is not the case; in fact, the theory of taxonomy (...) is at present a very controversial subject, with much of the controversy revolving around the question of how to go about constructing an ideal classification.Surprisingly, there is relatively little controversy about what properties an ideal classification would have. Admittedly, different terms are used to describe these properties, various workers arguing that classifications should be maximally stable, or maximally useful, or maximally informative, or maximally testable, or maximally refutable, or maximally predictive, and so on. (shrink)

This article reports results from a program that produces high‐quality animation of facial expressions and head movements as automatically as possible in conjunction with meaning‐based speech synthesis, including spoken intonation. The goal of the research is as much to test and define our theories of the formal semantics for such gestures, as to produce convincing animation. Towards this end, we have produced a high‐level programming language for three‐dimensional (3‐D) animation of facial expressions. We have been concerned primarily with expressions conveying (...) information correlated with the intonation of the voice: This includes the differences of timing, pitch, and emphasis that are related to such semantic distinctions of discourse as “focus,”“topic,” and “comment,”“theme” and “rheme,” or “given” and “new” information. We are also interested in the relation of affect or emotion to facial expression. Until now, systems have not embodied such rule‐governed translation from spoken utterance meaning to facial expressions. Our system embodies rules that describe and coordinate these relations: intonation/information, intonation/affect, and facial expressions/affect. A meaning representation includes discourse information: What is contrastive/background information in the given context, and what is the “topic” or “theme” of the discourse? The system maps the meaning representation into how accents and their placement are chosen, how they are conveyed over facial expression, and how speech and facial expressions are coordinated. This determines a sequence of functional groups: lip shapes, conversational signals, punctuators, regulators, and manipulators. Our algorithms then impose synchrony, create coarticulation effects, and determine affectual signals, eye and head movements. The lowest level representation is the Facial Action Coding System (FACS), which makes the generation system portable to other facial models. (shrink)

A powerful work of moral and political philosophy.The idea which I shall present here came to me more or less out of the blue. I was on a train some five years ago, on my way to spend a day at Headingley and I was reading a book about the death camp at Sobibor... The particular, not very appropriate, conjunction involved for me in this train journey... had the effect of fixing my thoughts on one of the more dreadful features (...) of human coexistence, when in the shape of a simple five-word phrase the idea occurred to me. In The Contract of Mutual Indifference, Norman Geras discusses a central aspect of the experience of the Holocaust with a view to exploring its most important contemporary implications. In a bold and powerful synthesis of memorial, literary record, historical reflection and political theory, he focuses on the figure of the bystander -- the bystander to the destruction of the Jews of Europe and the bystander to more recent atrocities -- to consider the moral consequences of looking on without active response at persecution and great suffering. Geras argues that the tragedy of European Jewry, so widely pondered by historians, social scientists, psychologists, theologians and others, has not yet found its proper reflection within political philosophy. Attempting to fill the gap, he adapts an old idea from within that tradition of enquiry, the idea of the social contract, to the task of thinking about the triangular relation between perpetrators, victims and bystanders, and draws a somber conclusion from it. Geras goes on to ask how far this conclusion may be offset by the hypothesis of a universal duty to bring aid. The Contract of Mutual Indifference is an original and challenging work, aimed at the complacent abstraction of much contemporary theory. It is supplemented by three shorter essays on the implications of the Jewish catastrophe for conceptions of human nature and progress and for certain types of Marxist explanation. (shrink)

The rapidly increasing numbers of elderly people in our society have raised some important moral questions: How should we distribute social resources among different age groups? What does justice require from both the young and the old? In this book, Norman Daniels offers the first systematic philosophical discussion of these urgent questions, advocating what he calls a "lifespan" approach to the problem: Since, as they age, people pass through a variety of institutions, the challenge of caring for the elderly (...) becomes the prudent allocation of public resources among the various stages of people's lives. Using this philosophical approach, Daniels addresses specific public policy issues such as the allocation of medical funds, the adequacy of long-term care, current Medicare cost-containment measures, and the equitable distribution of income support over the lifespan and between generations. (shrink)

When Did I Begin? investigates the theoretical, moral, and biological issues surrounding the debate over the beginning of human life. With the continuing controversy over the use of in vitro fertilization techniques and experimentation with human embryos, these issues have been forced into the arena of public debate. Following a detailed analysis of the history of the question, Reverend Ford argues that a human individual could not begin before definitive individuation occurs with the appearance of the primitive streak about two (...) weeks after fertilization. This, he argues, is when it becomes finally known whether one or more human individuals are to form from a single egg. Thus, he questions the idea that the fertilized egg itself could be regarded as the beginning of the development of the human individual. The author also differs sharply, however, from those who would delay the beginning of the human person until the brain is formed, or until birth or the onset of conscious states. (shrink)

A permanent state of suspension or deferment -- How theory became history -- "Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences" -- "I will teach you differences" -- An assembling of reminders -- ". . . a complicated network of similarities, overlapping and criss-crossing" -- Gedankenwegen: on import and interpretation -- "Of which we cannot speak . . .": philosophy and the humanities -- What is (film) philosophy? -- Order out of chaos -- Idea, image, and intuition -- The world, (...) time -- The ordinary necessity of philosophy -- "Art now exists in the condition of philosophy" -- Falling in love with the world -- Ontology and desire, or a moving response to skepticism -- Automatism and the declaration of existence in time -- Ethical practices of the ordinary -- Perfectionism as self-disobedience -- Comedy and community -- A digression on difference and interpretation -- Perfectionism's ironic transport -- An elegy for theory. (shrink)

Some people will confront Alzheimer's with a measure of resignation, a determination to struggle against the progressive debilitation and to extract whatever comforts and benefits they can from their remaining existence. They are entitled to pursue that resolute path. For other people, like myself, protracted maintenance during progressive cognitive dysfunction and helplessness is an intolerably degrading prospect. The critical question for those of us seeking to avoid protracted dementia is how best to accomplish that objective.One strategy is to engineer one's (...) own death while still mentally competent to do so (even in the stage of mild dementia). If I were to use a preemptive strategy in the face of a dementia diagnosis, I would probably choose to stop eating and drinking, a process known as voluntarily stopping eating and drinking. An alternative tactic for avoiding prolonged dementia would be to allow oneself to decline into moderate dementia—thus losing capacity to perform self‐deliverance or even to make serious medical decisions—but before getting to that point to provide advance instructions rejecting prospective life‐sustaining medical interventions. These advance instructions would authorize palliative but not curative measures. My current personal instructions define the point of intolerable cognitive decline triggering medical nonintervention as “mental deterioration to a point when I can no longer read and understand written material such as a newspaper or financial records such as a checkbook.” These instructions dictate allowing my demise at a point of moderate dementia when I may not be perceptibly suffering, when I may still be getting some rudimentary satisfaction from my debilitated life, and when I no longer recall the preoccupation with personally intolerable indignity that motivated my instructions. Can I expect that my advance instructions will be implemented in those circumstances? Is it lawful, and is it moral for a surrogate decision‐maker and associated caregivers to allow an uncomprehending, ostensibly content but demented individual to die? My analysis herein contends that it is not only lawful and moral but also legally required to implement clear, considered advance instructions even at a stage of moderate dementia. (shrink)

Dr. Norman L. Geisler has been called the "father of evangelical Christian philosophy." He has written more than one hundred books and taught at universities and top seminaries for some fifty-six years. He was the first president of the Evangelical Philosophical Society and the founder and first president of the International Society of Christian Apologetics. He has spoken or debated in more than two dozen countries and held pastoral/pulpit ministries in four states. Many view him as a cross between (...) Thomas Aquinas and Billy Graham. No one has done more to communicate the modern challenges of the Faith to the "average" Christian, to the church, and to the academy. This volume offers creative and constructive essays from twenty-three contributors, all notable in their own right, who preserve and propagate Dr. Geisler's ideas and express appreciation for his influence. Those who know him best say he is "true, faithful, and blessed by God!" -- from book cover. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 7, July 2020, Page 77-80.

Certain kinds of medical treatment are often held to be morally unacceptable because they are an 'interference with nature'. I suggest a way in which we can make sense of such ideas. We can make significant choices only against a background of conditions which we regard as 'natural', and these will typically include such facts as those of birth and death, of youth and age, and of sexual relations. I argue, however, that such ideas, though intelligible, do not establish any (...) valid moral objection to, for instance, the use of ovarian tissue for assisted conception. (shrink)

I analyze the hierarchy of large cardinals between a supercompact cardinal and an almost-huge cardinal. Many of these cardinals are defined by modifying the definition of a high-jump cardinal. A high-jump cardinal is defined as the critical point of an elementary embedding j:V→M\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${j: V \to M}$$\end{document} such that M is closed under sequences of length sup{j|f:κ→κ}\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\sup\{{j\,|\,f: \kappa \to \kappa}\}}$$\end{document}. Some of the other (...) cardinals analyzed include the super-high-jump cardinals, almost-high-jump cardinals, Shelah-for-supercompactness cardinals, Woodin-for-supercompactness cardinals, Vopěnka cardinals, hypercompact cardinals, and enhanced supercompact cardinals. I organize these cardinals in terms of consistency strength and implicational strength. I also analyze the superstrong cardinals, which are weaker than supercompact cardinals but are related to high-jump cardinals. Among the results, I highlight the following. Vopěnka cardinals are the same as Woodin-for-supercompactness cardinals.There are no excessively hypercompact cardinals.Furthermore, I prove some results relating high-jump cardinals to forcing, as well as analyzing Laver functions for super-high-jump cardinals. (shrink)

Healthcare (including public health) is special because it protects normal functioning, which in turn protects the range of opportunities open to individuals. I extend this account in two ways. First, since the distribution of goods other than healthcare affect population health and its distribution, I claim that Rawls's principles of justice describe a fair distribution of the social determinants of health, giving a partial account of when health inequalities are unjust. Second, I supplement a principled account of justice for health (...) and healthcare with an account of fair process for setting limits or rationing care. This account is provided by three conditions that comprise "accountability for reasonableness.". (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 63.3 (2002) 501-519 [Access article in PDF] Nietzsche and Early Romanticism Judith Norman Nietzsche was in many ways a quintessentially romantic figure, a lonely genius with a tragic love-life, wandering endlessly (through Italy, no less) before going dramatically mad, taken by his gods into the protection of madness (to quote Heidegger's epithet on Hölderlin, one of Nietzsche's childhood favorites). 1 But this (...) is to be a romantic in an uncapitalized manner, and has nothing to do with the literary movement of Romanticism, a movement from which, as is well-known, Nietzsche distanced himself loudly and vigorously. Nietzsche famously follows Goethe in his verdict that Romanticism is a form of sickness and classicism a form of strength, and commentators, for the most part, have accepted this self-description. 2 That is, they do not blithely identify Nietzsche with that nineteenth-century artistic movement, whose proponents include Victor Hugo, Eugene Delacroix, and Richard Wagner. 3But Romanticism is a plural phenomenon. When Goethe made his famously dismissive remark, he was clearly not talking about Hugo and Wagner; he meant Romanticism in an earlier incarnation. Commentators have been less reticent about finding all sorts of affinities between Nietzsche and some of these earlier movements. In particular Nietzsche is frequently and positively compared to Jena Romanticism (also known as early Romanticism), a movement whose principal figures included August and Friedrich Schlegel, Novalis, Tieck, Schleiermacher, and Schelling, and the writings they published in the 1790s, principally in the journal, Athenaeum. It is this romantic movement that will be the focus of my paper. Jena romantics, while Grecophile, had nothing to do with Rousseauean primitivism (they were well aware that their image of the [End Page 501] Greeks reflected contemporary fantasies more than historical reality), they had no cult of the genius, and they did not valorize emotion above reason. 4 What was central to their movement was profound skepticism about the viability of traditional attitudes towards truth, an intellectually rigorous theory of art that gave particular weight to playfulness, fragmented writing, the notion of literary irony, a sense that the philosopher ought to be or become more of an artist (though not a genius)—and, correlatively, that philosophy is or ought to become more artistic. All of which sounds decidedly Nietzschean. Romanticizing Nietzsche While Nietzsche himself never makes the connection, he never explicitly distances himself from the authors of Jena romanticism in the way he does from later romantic figures. 5 Indeed, he barely mentions the Jena romantics by name and probably never read Friedrich Schlegel, the figure most closely associated with this romantic movement. 6 As such, there is certainly space for commentators to argue for a close if tacit intellectual connection between Nietzsche and Jena romanticism; indeed, one commentator speaks of a fundamental affinity, 7 another calls Nietzsche the last romanticist, and yet another claims that "[Nietzsche's] story makes sense only when read in the larger context of his Romantic predecessors' history." 8It is undeniable that Nietzsche came out of a philological tradition inaugurated by the Schlegels (and developed by Schelling) which juxtaposed the Dionysian and the Apollinian in Greek tragedy. According to Lacoue-Labarthe, "an entire tradition of academic philosophy (which, on his own initiative, Nietzsche had joined) revolved around precisely this opposition." 9 At least in [End Page 502] his earlier works Nietzsche's view of the Greeks was influenced by (if not predicated on) the scholarly research and interpretative theories of figures associated with Jena romanticism. How profound and enduring this influence might have been is an interesting question, but not one I will explore at present. I will not discuss the influence of the Jena romantics in their scholarly capacity as classical philologists, but rather focus on any impact they may have had as philosophically minded literary critics during the 1790s. Similarly, I will not look at The Birth of Tragedy but rather focus on claims made concerning the romantic tendencies of Nietzsche's later work. A body of scholarship has been building which claims that the critical theories of Jena... (shrink)

The so-called Menschenpark-debate on genetic engineering—originating in 1999—turned out to be one of the most controversial and contentious debates in German philosophy. It is also regarded as the first manifestation of the struggle between Sloterdijk and Habermas. While Sloterdijk’s ideas had a significant impact on Habermas’s theory, Sloterdijk’s philosophy has been consistently ignored and dismissed until today due to two reasons. First, he was accused of advocating for fascist ideology. Second, philosophers from the same academic circles claimed that his method (...) does not meet academic standards. The debate therefore signifies a larger problem that concerns the methodological difference between analytic-Continental philosophies that work on a formal level and Continental philosophies that work with a tropological account experimenting with different non-formal philosophical expressions. I will carve out this distinction with respect to the Menschenpark-debate to argue that Sloterdijk is an integral part of our philosophical historical moment. (shrink)

The Metaphysics of Theism presents an explanation and evaluation of Aquinas's natural theology, the paradigm of which is the first book of the Summa contra gentiles. Natural theology provides the traditional and still central means of integrating philosophy with (some of) theology. What makes this enterprise natural theology is its forgoing of appeals to revelation as evidence for the truth of propositions. What makes it natural theology is its agenda to investigate, by means of analysis and argument, not only the (...) existence and nature of God but also the relation of everything else—especially human nature and behaviour—to God, considered as reality's first principle. Natural theology still offers the best route by which philosophers can, as philosophers, approach theological propositions. The one presented in this book undertakes to show that there must be a necessary being that constitutes the ultimate explanation of the universe. (shrink)

ABSTRACT I present the case for pacifism by formulating what I take to be the most plausible version of the idea of respect for human life. This generates a very strong, though not necessarily absolute, moral presumption against killing, in war or any other situation. I then show how difficult it is for this presumption to be overridden, either by the considerations invoked in ‘just war’theory, or by consequentialist claims about what can be achieved through war. Despite the strength of (...) the moral case against war, people sometimes say that they have no choice but to fight. In the concluding section of the paper I attempt to identify the relevant sense in which this could be said, and I discuss briefly how this affects the case for pacifism. (shrink)

In this article I use Kantian moral philosophy to develop a concept of meaningful work. Specifically, a Kantian would argue that work is meaningful if (1) it is freely entered into, (2) it allows the worker to exercise her autonomy and independence, (3) it enables the worker to develop her rational capacities, (4) it provides a wage sufficient for physical welfare, (5) it supports the moral development of employees and (6) it is not paternalistic. I then provide examples of contemporary (...) management practices that provide meaningful work in this sense. (shrink)

Ackn o wledgments I owe special gratitude to Professors Hugo Adam Bedau and John Rawls for many helpful discussions of the general idea and scope, ...

Descartes' proof that his essence is thinking.--Thoughtless brutes.--Descartes' proof that he is essentially a non-material thing.--Behaviorism as a philosophy of psychology.--The privacy of experience.--Wittgenstein on the nature of mind.--The myth of cognitive processes and structures.--Moore and Wittgenstein on the sense of "I know."--The groundlessness of belief.

Not all of the responses to fascism in the English speaking world were hostile. With the aim of providing a representative sample, Routledge here re-issues Norman Hillson’s _I Speak of Germany_. First published in 1937, this is an account of the author’s travels in Germany, and is largely sympathetic to the changes wrought by the regime. Like others adopting a similar position, the author believes that the terms of the Versailles treatment put Germany in an impossible position, and that (...) the Nazis had inspired a recovery. Racial politics, whilst not ignored, are not seen as being at the heart of the programme – ‘obsession of race purity maybe a little absurd and quite impractical of realization’. (shrink)

Film theorists talk enthusiastically these days in terms of semiotics, sutures, and systems of meaning. I think we can usefully frame these theories by some evidence as to how some actual readers make actual theories from an actual film. To that end, I would like to explore here what three people, Agnes, Norm, and Ted, said about The Story of O. It seems to me that if any film should demonstrate the fixity of semiotic and other codes, surely a pornographic (...) film should.You might call this essay, then, the story of this I storying three other I’s storying The Story of O.1 “Storying” is Audrey Grant’s verb, and by it she intends the representing of an event in your own mind and telling somebody about it.2In this essay, then, I propose to tell you how I represent in my mind how these three individuals represented in their minds The Story of O.Sometimes we felt or thought about the film more or less alike, and sometimes we squarely contradicted one another. I want to ask two questions of these responses. First, how can we relate their variety to the singleness of the film? Second, how can we relate their variety to the generality of any codes that govern the seeing of films? Norman N. Holland is Milbauer Eminent Scholar at the University of Florida. His most recent book, The I , develops a widely useful model for thinking about humans’ perceiving, interpreting, reading, and generally I-ing. His most recent contribution to Critical Inquiry is “Interactive Fiction” in the September 1984 issue. (shrink)

The definitive study of the natural theology of Thomas Aquinas, the greatest medieval philosopher, written by one of the world's most eminent scholars of medieval thought.

Ideal for courses in ancient philosophy or ancient and medieval philosophy, The Great Conversation: A Historical Introduction to Philosophy, Volume I: Pre-Socratics through Descartes covers the same material as the first half (chapters 1-13) of author Norman Melchert's longer volume, The Great Conversation. Tracing the exchange of ideas among history's key philosophers, the book demonstrates that while constructing an argument or making a claim, one philosopher almost always has others in mind. The sixth edition features coverage of Taoism; key (...) terms, boldfaced throughout and listed at chapter ends; brief and provocative quotations that stimulate thought and provoke questions; a new section on how to read philosophy; and a new appendix--Writing a Philosophy Paper. (shrink)

Ideal for courses in ancient philosophy or ancient and medieval philosophy, The Great Conversation: A Historical Introduction to Philosophy, Volume I: Pre-Socratics through Descartes, Seventh Edition, covers the same material as the first half (chapters 1-13) of author Norman Melchert's longervolume, The Great Conversation. Tracing the exchange of ideas between history's key philosophers, it demonstrates that while constructing an argument or making a claim, one philosopher almost alwayshas others in mind. It addresses the fundamental questions of human life: Who (...) are we? What can weknow? How should we live? and What sort of reality do we inhabit? Author Norman Melchert provides a generous selection of excerpts from major philosophical works and makes them more easily understandable to students with his lucid and engaging explanations. Extensive cross-referencing shows students how philosophers respond appreciatively or critically to thethoughts of other philosophers. The text is enhanced by two types of exercises - "Basic Questions" and "For Further Thought" - and numerous illustrations. Also available to suit your course needs: The Great Conversation: A Historical Introduction to Philosophy, Seventh Edition (combined volume covering the Pre-Socratics through Derrida, Quine, and Dennett) and The Great Conversation: Volume II: Descartes through Derrida and Quine (includes chapters12-26 of the combined volume). (shrink)

Something is not working in ethics consultation: in certain situations, relationships within families and with careproviders and surrogates have become so emotionally charged and destabilized that attention is dominated by conflict and misunderstanding, foreshadowing a loss of dignity and hope. In a compelling, urgent article, informed by events in the Schiavo case, with examples from the literature on theory, practice, and outcomes, Caplan and Bergman address this situation: redirecting our attention to what they see as “a lack of effective mechanisms” (...) for dealing with a “painful class of disputes in which families disagree with one another, or with doctors, about the care of those who cannot communicate.”1 It is no small matter that many of these cases are situated in the immediate, intense environment of end-of-life decision making. -/- How might we understand these encounters, and their limits? What can we hope? Following the tack of Caplan and Bergman, I will extend the discussion of the complex relationships between patients, families, surrogates, and physicians, and “hope for consensual resolution,” offering a somewhat different account of what is lacking. While Caplan and Bergman foreground an apparent irreconcilability of appeals to competing biomedical principles as what is lacking, I will suggest that a “salient characteristic” among participants, what Caplan and Bergman identify as a common concern for the patient’s best interests, may be far less stable and more complex, and thereby less directive, than first imagined. When Caplan and Bergman sketch their expectations for mediation and for mediators, they are right in noting that abstract principles “articulated as dispositive by designated ‘experts’ fail to capture, and arguably respect, the unique and complex nature of each such individual decision-making process,” and that “patients and families are at the extreme end of a power imbalance.” It is less clear that their descriptions — or their hope for mediation — capture this enormous challenge. (shrink)

The central thesis of this article posits that Dilthey’s theory of worldviews initially leans towards historical relativism but ultimately reverts to an unsuccessful ahistorical solution involving the classification of universal types of worldviews. To substantiate this thesis, I will elucidate how Dilthey’s position emerged amidst the intellectual conflicts of materialism, Neo-Kantianism, and its relationship to historicism. Focusing on Dilthey’s seminal work, ‘The Types of Worldview’ (1911), I will explore how, in response to the constraints of his era and a prevailing (...) fear of relativism, Dilthey ultimately adopts an ahistoricist approach, as exemplified in his brief exchange with Husserl. In conclusion, this article contends that Dilthey’s hermeneutics represents a partial foray into a genuinely historicist philosophy but falls short of fully justifying historical, objective knowledge. (shrink)

The policy changes governing the relations between the pharmaceutical, medical device and service industries and academic clinical research physicians, recommended by the Institute of Medicine,1 the American Academy of Medical Colleges,2 and much discussed in the media and on our campuses, aim to create some protective ethical firewalls. However, some potentially critical consequences of these steps are missed if we do not acknowledge what else is on the table, and who is sitting at it. By only reacting defensively to the (...) juggernaut of righteous indignation over the loss of purity in a faculty physician's approach to medical problem solving, we are allowing the process to blind us to the difficulties in establishing fair and equitable management of all of the potential conflicts of commitment and conflicts of interest we incur, not only as faculty members, but also as departments and academic medical centres . Critically, this involves all sources of revenue—private, commercial and public—that support our professional and institutional commitments as well as our personal finances.i To counter the present crackdown on inappropriate financial relationships effectively, we will need to reframe the questions, and convince all stakeholders to the process that there is more to this crisis than can be resolved through our public confessions of commercial largesse obliged. The Phrma Code guidelines3 have resulted in what is believed to be a defensible, if as yet legally untested, compartmentalisation of the commercial sector's marketing, medical education and research sponsorship activities. We at the AMC are a long way from understanding how those same missions, as they emanate from our multifarious commitments, can be isolated and individually managed. Defining the parameters for establishing institutional conflicts of interest and commitment are beyond our essay's scope, but with the very public emphasis on capitalist subversion of …. (shrink)

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls defines a hypothetical contract situation and argues rational people will agree on reflection it is fair to contractors. He solves the rational choice problem it poses by deriving two lexically-ordered principles of justice and suggests the derivation justifies the principles. Its soundness aside, just what justificatory force does such a derivation have?On one view, there is no justificatory force because the contract is rigged specifically to yield principles which match our pre-contract moral judgments. (...) Rawls provides ammunition for this claim: “By going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the contractual circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgments [about what is just] and conforming them to principle, I assume that eventually we shall find a description of the initial situation that both expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted.”. (shrink)

Most economists are committed to some version of egoism. After distinguishing among the various sorts of egoistic claims, l cite the empirical literature against psychological egoism and show that attempts to account for this data make these economists' previous empirical claims tautological. Moreover, the assumption of egoism has undesirable consequences, especially for students; if people believe that others behave egoistically, they are more likely to behave egoistically themselves. As an alternative to egoism I recommend the commitment model of Robert Frank. (...) The equivalent of egoism at the organizational level is that business firms seek (should seek) to maximize profits. I present arguments to show that a conscious attempt by managers to maximize profits is likely to fail. A committed altruism is more likely to raise profits. I suggest that a firm should take as its primary purpose providing meaningful work for employees. (shrink)