Contemporary pain literature increasingly acknowledges the need of a multidimensional approach to pain, which accounts for its complex biological, psychological and social components. This is reflected in the recently revised definition of the International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP) and some contemporary philosophical positions. This paper addresses the need to offer a theoretical approach that integrates the biopsychosocial and qualitative multidimensionality of pain by developing the “social grounding view of pain”. My focus is on seeking a multidimensional philosophical (...) approach that accounts not only for its complex biological and psychological aspects but also and specifically does justice to its social dimension. I draw from some of the most recent multidimensional theoretical and methodological approaches that attempt to account for the social component of pain, including enactivism and interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA), to propose the advancement of the social grounding view, which has a particular focus on socially shared linguistic concepts in relation to the meaning and modulation of pain. More specifically, the social grounding view is based on the argument that the meaning of the experience of pain is determined in part by socially shareable linguistic concepts habitually associated with pain. I test this view against empirical cases drawn from pain neuroscience education (PNE) and try to demonstrate how the modification of the linguistic concepts of pain could be used effectively to modulate its experience. (shrink)

The first edited collection to offer a systematic introduction to African phenomenology.

Recently there has been a strong movement towards reflections about the “geography of reason,” especially among philosophers who deal with postcolonial thinking. There is also a renewed interest among different schools of thought, both analytical and continental, in the ways our “life world,” or “embodiment,” or “situated cognition,” shape our minds and eventually the philosophy we do. As a result, we have seen some recent publications on the nature and import of the concept of “place” by authors such as Edward (...) Casey, Jeff Malpas, and Bruce Janz. In Philosophy in an African place, Bruce Janz introduces the concept of “philosophy-in-place” with the question as to what it is to do philosophy in a particular context of lived experience or, more specifically, what it is to do philosophy in an African place. This paper expands on Janz's “philosophy-in-place” by developing what will be called a “philosophy through place.” It starts with Janz's discussion of the problem of placing philosophy and a philosophy-in-place. Then it attempts to develop an argument for a “philosophy through place” and its implications for considering the place of philosophy in Africa and the challenge it poses to philosophy. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to give a critical discussion of Sartre’s concept of sexual desire and its relation to self-identity and freedom. Why Sartre? Sartre is one of very few philosophers who offers a systematic account of sexual desire. He has influenced eminent philosophical concepts of sexual desire held by, for instance, de Beauvoir, Lacan, Foucault, Levinas, Irigaray and Butler, but not much is written about his own notion of sexual desire. This alone is reason to explore Sartre’s (...) view. What makes his view of sexual desire particularly interesting is that it is framed by his theory of freedom. Sartre offers the original, radical notion that freedom is absolute. Because consciousness is never self-identical, he argues, human identity is not fixed. Instead, we are consequently nothing else but what we keep desiring to make of ourselves. He concludes that we are always free to choose our drives and desires, even what seem to be our most enslaving, natural sexual instincts. The question raised in this article, however, concerns what the nature of sexual desire is and how free we really are to choose our sexual desires. I first contextualise Sartre’s view of sexual desire within his notion of desire in general and its relation to instinct, drive, consciousness, freedom and identity. Then, I give a detailed discussion of his analysis of sexual desire, its relation to freedom, and, what Sartre calls its failures. Finally, I discuss a critique of, and alternative to, Sartre’s theory of sexual desire from the perspective of my own notion of heteronomous and autonomous desire and freedom. (shrink)

This paper addresses two issues. The first part deals with the classic question of human nature by focussing on the problem of human consciousness, in particular, the relationship between subjective and intentional consciousness. I argue for an essential link between subjectivity and intentionality by suggesting a phenomenological conception of the human condition. On this basis, the second part deals with what I call ‘humane’ ethics. This part shows that my conception of the human condition contains a humane approach to morality.

How far can one ascribe a spatial meaning to pain? When I have a pain, for instance, in my leg, how should one understand the “in” in the “pain in my leg”? I argue (contrary to Noordhof) that pain does have a spatial meaning, but (contrary to Tye) that the spatiality of pain is not to be understood in the standard sense of spatial enclosure. Instead, spatiality has a special meaning with regard to pain. By defining pain in phenomenological terms (...) as a disturbed form of bodily perception, I contend that the “in” in “pain in my body” has a dual spatial meaning: firstly, it signifies my internal perceptual relation to a disturbing part of my body; secondly, it denotes the external perceptual relation to my environment that the disturbance forces me to take. Once the spatiality of pain is understood in terms of such a perceptual relation, it is not restricted to localisable hurts, but pertains to all forms of pain, such as affliction and agony. South African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 25 (4) 2006: pp. 336-349. (shrink)

In African Philosophy and Enactivist Cognition: The Space of Thought (2023), Bruce B. Janz introduces what he calls an enactivist African philosophy. The book makes a significant contribution to African philosophy as no other work has yet made the connection between African philosophy and enactivism. This article’s aim is to give a critical response to the book. It starts with some background by connecting Enactivist Cognition with Janz’s earlier Philosophy in an African Place (2009). This is followed by a brief (...) discussion of his introduction to enactivist African philosophy and its connection to texts in African philosophy. The article closes with a discussion of some issues that Enactivist Cognition raises. (shrink)

Phenomenology is an emerging field within the broader domain of African and Africana philosophy. The phenomenological method, with its various approaches to studying the meaning of lived experience, is at the core of the thought of African philosophers such as Paulin Hountondji, Dismas A. Masolo, Achille Mbembe, Mabogo More, Tsenay Serequeberhan, Noel Chabani Manganyi, and proponents of Africana Philosophy such as WEB Du Bois, Frantz Fanon, Lucius Outlaw, Lewis Gordon, George Yancy, and Linda Martin Alcoff. Technically, the term “African phenomenology” (...) is not used as widely, or introduced as systematically, as Africana phenomenology. The aim of this chapter is to introduce some of the central issues and theorists of the field of African phenomenology. As the subtitle of this chapter indicates, its scope is limited to what one may call introductory perspectives in African phenomenology. The idea is to outline for further investigation some thematically related contributions to African phenomenology with specific reference to the grounding work of Paulin Hountondji as related to works of Kwasi Wiredu and Dismas A. Masolo. Hountondji’s critical adoption of Husserl’s classic phenomenological approach offers a broad, foundational scope, which makes it particularly suitable for a basic introduction to African phenomenology. (shrink)

This chapter aims to contribute to the endeavour of investigating nonhuman animals as experiencing subjects in their own right with their own species-specific histories. Our focus is on the examination of pain experience in animals. We argue that there is need for more research in which pain experience in animals is accounted for in species-specific terms. Making use of empirical studies in the fields of neurobiology, evolutionary-developmental biology, comparative psychology, and cognitive ethology, we try to offer a phenomenological analysis of (...) indications and expressions of pain experience in animals. We attempt to show how different animals are capable of indicating and expressing specific and unique experiences of pain in terms of their particular species, evolution, and places of living in human and natural contexts. (shrink)

In Why pains are not mental objects Guy Douglasrightly argues that pains are modes rather than objects ofperceptions or sensations. In this paper I try to go a stepfurther and argue that there are circumstances when pains canbecome objects even while they remain modes of experience.By analysing cases of extreme pain as presented by Scarry,Sartre, Wiesel, Grahek and Wall, I attempt to show thatintense physical pain may evolve into a force that, likeimagination, can make our most intense state of experiencebecome (...) a mental object. I shall finally argue that, thoughextreme pains cannot serve as paradigm cases, they do showthe general importance of taking pain states to be objects. (shrink)

Most contemporary discussions about pain take place within the frame work of materialistic theories. Their general point of departure is an attempt to explain mental pain in terms of physical pain. In this article I address two major problems, which materialistic theories deal with, from within a phenomenological perspective. The first problem is to find a physiological explanation of pain that leaves space for mental pain experience. The second problem, which I focus on, consists in the attempt to offer a (...) description of the physiological basis of mental pain, which does not reduce the mental to the physical. I thereby present the thesis that pain can be understood either as the body's revolt against the mind or the mind's revolt against the body. With this thesis I want to show that pain means a rupture which in a paradoxical way mediates to us an understanding of the unity of body and mind. The purpose is to explain the meaning of pain, as a key to our understanding of our bodily existence.‘Der Schmerz selbst hat das Wort.'– Martin Heidegger. (shrink)

In times in which we ask ourselves how political cruelty and torments can be forgotten, Nietzsche's pleadoyer for pain to serve the purpose of education, surprises. What might sound like a mere provocation, rather lies at the heart of the Nietzschean philosophy. As is pointed out, Nietzsche's contention that pain is the most powerful aid to mnemonics, originates from his philosophy of pain as the main condition of all forms of creation. The title “educating (bilden) pain” expresses Nietsche's advocacy of (...) an education towards pain as the dynamo of creation. In this paper I explore how Nietzsche's notion of pain is linked to two concepts of Bildung. In the first part I investigate the relation between pain and “Bildung” in the sense of “creation”, and in the second part I link this to the relation between pain and “Bildung” in the sense of “education”. By these means, I try to answer the question: how far can pain, which is seen as the condition of creation, be linked to conditions of education. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.21(2) 2002: 122-132. (shrink)

In this paper Nietzsche's physiology of pain is critically related to recent theories of neurology of pain. Nietzsche offers no encompassing notion of a neurology of pain like the well-known theories of, for instance, Melzack and Wall do. But, as will be shown, Nietzsche's notion of physiology offers a productive connection with contemporary neurology, particularly with Wall's newest notion of the neurology of pain. Thus I shall not discuss Nietzsche's view on science in general, but the possible application of his (...) philosophy to a particular science. (shrink)

This paper explores links between Heidegger's notion of language and views in African philosophy. My contention is that Heidegger's daring phenomenology of language is also found and even radicalised within the framework of African philosophy, particularly the philosophy of myth. I argue that the exploration of the relation between these views of language offers the possibility not only to expand on the conventional conception of language but also to challenge the common notion of philosophical language and philosophy as such. South (...) African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 27 2008: pp. 310-324. (shrink)

ABSTRACTMost recently, debates on decolonization, transformation, and Africanization raise, again, critical questions about the continuous dominance of the Western practice of philosophy in an African place. Such debates bear particular reference to colonization; however, they are relevant to any place where displacement is an issue and transformation demanded. Yet, the concept of displacement receives surprisingly little attention in these debates or in literature on place. I argue that place and displacement are inherently related, and explore some implications of this relation (...) with regard to the practice of philosophy. My contention is that while displacement is an issue that raises specific challenges to the practice of Western philosophy in an African context, it is in fact a defining feature of philosophy as such in search of its place in the world. In conclusion, I propose what I call a distopological approach towards a philosophical practice that takes seriously its place and inherent relation to... (shrink)

Until recently, few philosophers worked on laughter, and it was typically viewed negatively. However, the last four decades have witnessed a significant increase in philosophical writings about and positive views of laughter. This introductory paper attempts to show that, in line with this development, contributions to this special issue explore various fresh theoretical, thematic, historical, and critical aspects of laughter and its relation to philosophy. These contributions can be divided roughly into two intersecting groups, with one group focused on the (...) theoretical, thematic, and historical exploration of laughter, and the other on critical social and moral issues of laughter. They demonstrate how laughter matters to philosophers as a serious philosophical subject, and they take care to distinguish objectionable types of laughter from its constructive uses as social and moral critique and facilitator. (shrink)

Volume 24, Issue 2, April 2019, Page 1-1.

Volume 24, Issue 2, April 2019, Page 2-9.

In his latest book, entitled “Sweet dreams”, Daniel Dennett confirms and expands on his argument for a natural science of human consciousness. He dubs his view heterophenomenology: a third-person, scientific form of phenomenological description that can account for the most private and ineffable subjective experiences. A central part of his book consists of a reinvention of Jackson's thought experiment about color blind scientist, Mary, who tries to figure out what color experience is like. I explore another variation of this thought (...) experiment asking whether an informed but inexperienced Mary can really know what it is like to have sex. My contention is that while Dennett's third-person approach to consciousness is valid on an epistemic level, it fails ontologically. Mary does miss something if she knows all about but does not have experience of the real thing. The opposite goes for Merleau-Ponty whose first-person ontology does not account for third-person epistemology. The question is ultimately how far a science of consciousness is really possible. This paper enquires about the possibility of an approach that allows a scientific account of consciousness, specifically qualia, without dissolving the ontology of subjective experience. I suggest a possible direction that new work on the hard problem of consciousness might take. (shrink)

How far can one ascribe a spatial meaning to pain? When I have a pain, for instance, in my leg, how should one understand the “in” in the “pain in my leg”? I argue (contrary to Noordhof) that pain does have a spatial meaning, but (contrary to Tye) that the spatiality of pain is not to be understood in the standard sense of spatial enclosure. Instead, spatiality has a special meaning with regard to pain. By defining pain in phenomenological terms (...) as a disturbed form of bodily perception, I contend that the “in” in “pain in my body” has a dual spatial meaning: firstly, it signifies my internal perceptual relation to a disturbing part of my body; secondly, it denotes the external perceptual relation to my environment that the disturbance forces me to take. Once the spatiality of pain is understood in terms of such a perceptual relation, it is not restricted to localisable hurts, but pertains to all forms of pain, such as affliction and agony. (shrink)

Published in Niort in 1714 by Doctor Abraham Gaultier, the Réponse en forme de dissertation ŕ un théologien, shows, in the form of an explication of the Sceptics' doctrine, a sort of materialism inspired by the doctrines of vitalism. In spite of claimed forms of allegiance to religious orthodoxy, the Réponse puts men and animals on the same level of materiality and mortality.

A short, provocative book about why "useless" science often leads to humanity's greatest technological breakthroughs A forty-year tightening of funding for scientific research has meant that resources are increasingly directed toward applied or practical outcomes, with the intent of creating products of immediate value. In such a scenario, it makes sense to focus on the most identifiable and urgent problems, right? Actually, it doesn't. In his classic essay "The Usefulness of Useless Knowledge," Abraham Flexner, the founding director of the (...) Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton and the man who helped bring Albert Einstein to the United States, describes a great paradox of scientific research. The search for answers to deep questions, motivated solely by curiosity and without concern for applications, often leads not only to the greatest scientific discoveries but also to the most revolutionary technological breakthroughs. In short, no quantum mechanics, no computer chips. This brief book includes Flexner's timeless 1939 essay alongside a new companion essay by Robbert Dijkgraaf, the Institute's current director, in which he shows that Flexner's defense of the value of "the unobstructed pursuit of useless knowledge" may be even more relevant today than it was in the early twentieth century. Dijkgraaf describes how basic research has led to major transformations in the past century and explains why it is an essential precondition of innovation and the first step in social and cultural change. He makes the case that society can achieve deeper understanding and practical progress today and tomorrow only by truly valuing and substantially funding the curiosity-driven "pursuit of useless knowledge" in both the sciences and the humanities. (shrink)

Can one refute Berkeleyan phenomenalism by arguing that sensory objects seem mind-independent, and that, according to Berkeley, experience is to be taken at face value? Relying on Mackie’s recent discussion of the issue, I argue, first, that phenomenalism cannot be straightforwardly refuted by relying on perceptual or bodily experience of mind-independence together with the truthfulness of experience. However, I maintain, second that phenomenalism can be indirectly refuted by appealing to the bodily experience of resistance. Such experience presents us with the (...) causal activity of the resisting physical object. If experience is truthful, as the phenomenalist has it, physical objects are causally active. But then their effects no longer depend on our perceiving them, on pain of overdetermination. (shrink)

Reporting and investigating research misconduct can lead to disciplinary proceedings being initiated, and ultimately to disciplinary sanctions being imposed on convicted scientists. The conversion of research misconduct findings into disciplinary sanctions is poorly understood. This article analyses all the disciplinary decisions handed down on appeal by the Conseil national de l'enseignement supérieur et de la recherche (CNESER) between 1991 and 2023, concerning breaches of research integrity by academics and doctoral students ( n = 333). Three findings are highlighted. Firstly, the (...) article describes how the CNESER sanctioned research misconduct even before the notion of research integrity became part of French law, by monitoring scientists’ compliance with “deontological rules”. Secondly, we show that assessing disciplinary fault involves evaluating a much broader set of circumstances than the mere existence of research misconduct, which can explain why the latter do not result in disciplinary sanctions or lighter sanctions. Thirdly, the research highlights situations where research misconduct is intertwined with other allegations, blurring the relative importance of these motives in the awarding of disciplinary sanctions. The article concludes with a call for greater accessibility to the disciplinary decisions handed down by universities in the first instance, as a key next step in gaining a better understanding of the disciplinary response to research misconduct. (shrink)

Why should we decolonise knowledge? One popular rationale is that colonialism has set up a single perspective as epistemically authoritative over many equally legitimate ones, and this is a form of...

Abraham Fraunce’s The Shepherds’ Logic (c. 1585) is one of the first English adaptations of Petrus Ramus’s Dialecticae libri duo (1556). Preserved in a manuscript also containing two shorter essays on Ramist dialectic, the work was later modified and enlarged for publication as The Lawyers’ Logic (1588). But Fraunce’s substantial and almost exclusive use of Edmund Spenser’s The Shepherds’ Calendar (1579) as the source for practical examples makes the manuscript treatise a unique document revealing the influence of the Ramist (...) reform of the arts of discourse on the new literary elite led by Philip Sidney and Gabriel Harvey. This is the first published critical edition of Fraunce’s early treatise and the two companion essays. It presents the texts in modernized spelling, traces their sources and contexts, and draws out their literary and philosophical implications. It also includes relevant excerpts from The Lawyers’ Logic, such as Fraunce’s quantitative-verse translation of Virgil’s Second Eclogue and its Ramist analysis, and a full catalogue of the quotations from Spenser’s Calendar. As a whole, this edition sees Fraunce’s pastoral logic as a first-hand testimony showing how scholarly training in the Renaissance arts of discourse enlightened the composition and interpretation of poetic texts. (shrink)

Tout au long des années 80, Derrida a exploré le thème de l’invention et étudié en particulier sa conception cartésienne. Derrida récuse avec force cette dernière pour montrer qu’elle dissimule une conception théologico-politique du sujet, accomplissant sur le plan politique la thèse métaphysique du logocentrisme. Mais, à partir de Psychè. Inventions de l’autre, cette vision est infléchie pour développer la signification positive de ce qu’il finit par appeler « l’invention du même » qui constitue l’un des courants majeurs de l’invention (...) techno-scientifique au sens moderne. Solidaire d’une certaine « politique de la recherche », Descartes voit l’une de ses inventions, la « langue universelle », être pour la première fois « contresignée » par Derrida. Cette reconnaissance ne doit pas toutefois cacher un désaccord où se révèle l’originalité de la pensée derridienne de l’invention : résolument anticartésienne, elle propose une inventio qui, en tant qu’elle confond avec le jeu même de la « différance », s’exclut de la cogitatio. Événement immanent à la res extensa qui, pour cette raison, ne saurait être entièrement rationalisé et qui, c’est significatif, en même temps qu’il s’ouvre à la chance, renvoie à une autre conception de l’être-ensemble. L’invention porte dans son excès, selon Derrida, l’annonce d’un temps nouveau. (shrink)

An exploration of the theories, histories, practices, and contradictions of liberalism today. What does it mean to be a liberal in neoliberal times? This collection of short essays attempts to show how liberals and the wider concept of liberalism remain relevant in what many perceive to be a highly illiberal age. Liberalism in the broader sense revolves around tolerance, progress, humanitarianism, objectivity, reason, democracy, and human rights. Liberalism's emphasis on individual rights opened a theoretical pathway to neoliberalism, through private property, (...) a classically minimal liberal state, and the efficiency of “free markets.” In practice, neoliberalism is associated less with the economic deregulation championed by its advocates than the re-regulation of the economy to protect financial capital. Liberalism in Neoliberal Times engages with the theories, histories, practices, and contradictions of liberalism, viewing it in relation to four central areas of public life: human rights, ethnicity and gender, education, and the media. The contributors explore the transformations in as well as the transformative aspects of liberalism and highlight both its liberating and limiting capacities. The book contends that liberalism—in all its forms—continues to underpin specific institutions such as the university, the free press, the courts, and, of course, parliamentary democracy. Liberal ideas are regularly mobilized in areas such as counterterrorism, minority rights, privacy, and the pursuit of knowledge. This book contends that while we may not agree on much, we can certainly agree that an understanding of liberalism and its emancipatory capacity is simply too important to be left to the liberals Contributors Alejandro Abraham-Hamanoiel, Patrick Ainley, Abdullahi An-Na'im, Michael Bailey, Haim Bresheeth, Başak Çalı, David Chandler, William Davies, Costas Douzinas, Natalie Fenton, Des Freedman, Roberto Gargarella, Priyamvada Gopal, Jonathan Hardy, John Holmwood, Ratna Kapur, Gholam Khiabany, Ray Kiely, Monika Krause, Deepa Kumar, Arun Kundnani, Colin Leys, Howard Littler, Kathleen Lynch, Robert W. McChesney, Nivedita Menon, Toby Miller, Kate Nash, Joan Pedro-Carañana, Julian Petley, Anne Phillips, Jonathan Rosenhead, Annabelle Sreberny, John Steel, Michael Wayne, Milly Williamson. (shrink)

Dans cette these publiee en 1989, Olivier Chedin propose une lecture originale de la troisieme Critique de Kant, qui retrace la genese transcendantale des facultes theoriques dans le jugement esthetique. Il s'agit avant tout d'eclaircir le rapport d'un pouvoir theorique de representation avec une faculte esthetique de juger: d'exhiber, dans l'exercice du jugement de gout, l'inauguration d'un pouvoir de connaitre. On comprendra alors comment le sentiment esthetique surgit d'une harmonie originaire des facultes. Mais la Critique du jugement, qui opere (...) d'abord une critique du sentiment, propose aussi une critique de la liberte pure: du beau, je suis en effet seul juge, sans loi ni imperatif, en face d'une promesse de bonheur qui fait, en moi-meme, acte de liberte. Sensible a l'apparition d'une presence ou s'inaugure l'exercice d'un pouvoir de representation, l'auteur applique enfin la these kantienne a l'elucidation des oeuvres d'art - tant celles de l'art classique que celles de l'art non-figuratif le plus contemporain -, suggerant que l'esthetique de Kant n'aurait peut-etre pas trouve en son temps l'art qu'elle meritait? (shrink)

This paper defends hedonic intentionalism, the view that all pleasures, including bodily pleasures, are directed towards objects distinct from themselves. Brentano is the leading proponent of this view. My goal here is to disentangle his significant proposals from the more disputable ones so as to arrive at a hopefully promising version of hedonic intentionalism. I mainly focus on bodily pleasures, which constitute the main troublemakers for hedonic intentionalism. Section 1 introduces the problem raised by bodily pleasures for hedonic intentionalism and (...) some of the main reactions to it. Sections 2 and 3 rebut two main approaches equating bodily pleasures with non- intentional episodes. More precisely, section 2 argues that bodily pleasures cannot be purely non-intentional self-conscious feelings, by relying on Brentano’s objection to Hamilton’s theory of pleasure. Section 3 argues that bodily pleasures cannot be non-intentional sensory qualities by relying on Brentano’s objections to Stumpf’s theory of pleasure. Section 4 develops a brentanian view of the intentionality of bodily pleasures by claiming bodily pleasures are directed at a sui generis class of sensory qualities. Section 5 presents an objection to Brentano’s later theory of pleasure according to which all sensory pleasures are directed at sensing acts. (shrink)