Allegorical interpretation of the ancient Greek myths began not with the grammarians, but with the philosophers. As speculative thought developed, there grew up also the belief that in mystical and symbolic terms the ancient poets had expressed profound truths which were difficult to define in scientifically exact language. Assuming that the myth-makers were concerned to edify and to instruct, the philosophers found in apparent immoralities and impieties a warning that both in offensive and in inoffensive passages one must look beneath (...) the surface for the true significance of the tales. Thus allegory was originally positive, not negative, in its aim; its purpose was not so much to defend the poetic traditions against charges of immorality as to make fully explicit the wealth of doctrine which ex hypothesi the myths contained. Those who wrote to defend the poets could, if they chose, make some use of the results of the allegorical method; passages to which exception had been taken could be shown by allegorical treatment to be quite consistent with the view that the poets were wise and divinely inspired. But the first dim beginnings of allegory can be traced to another and a weightier motive—namely, the desire of speculative thinkers to appropriate for their own use some at least of the mythical traditions. Nor is there any reason to doubt that the same motive was the main driving force in the later history of allegorical interpretation. Objectionable passages were, indeed, regarded as among the richest in deeper meaning; but the leading allegorists applied their method to offensive and inoffensive passages alike. (shrink)

It has become a standing reproach upon Plato's treatment of poetry in the Republic that he forgets or misrepresents in the tenth book what he said in the third.According to the earlier discussion, poetry is required to perform important services in the ideal state; its subject-matter will make the young familiar with true doctrines ; its style will reflect the qualities proper to the character of guardian, and therefore—by the principle of imitation—induce and confirm such qualities in the souls of (...) young and old. Poetry, like all other forms of art, must train the young to love and resemble the beauty of truth, so that when reason develops, they will recognize it as an old friend. (shrink)

In C.Q., January, 1928, pp. 16 sqq., I examined afresh the two discussions of poetry as imitation which are found in Plato's Republic. I pointed out that Plato used the term ‘imitation’ in two senses, a good and a bad. The only kind of poetry which Plato excludes from his ideal state is that which is imitative in the bad sense of the term. He admits, and indeed welcomes, that kind of poetry which is imitative in the good sense , (...) and which he calls either imitative or non-imitative according as he is using the term ‘imitative’ in a good sense or a bad. The kind of poetry which is admitted into the ideal state is certainly imitative; and it is in fact called imitative by Plato himself —of course in the good sense of the word. Now the tenth book begins by stating that the result of the earlier discussion had been the decision to exclude ‘so much of poetry as is imitative.’ The implication is obviously that the remainder will not be excluded. But what are we to call that remainder, unless it be non-imitative in the sense in which the word is here used? (shrink)

The problem suggested by this passage cannot be properly appreciated unless it is shown first of all that the treatment of poetry and art in the Laws fundamentally agrees with, though of course in some respects it provides a welcome supplement to, the attitude set forth in the Republic and elsewhere by Plato. The demand that music and poetry should ‘imitate’ the good; and that this ‘imitation’ should have meaning and accuracy, and be free from mere emotionalism directly recalls the (...) doctrine of the Republic and other dialogues on the two kinds of imitation, which I have explained in the Classical Quarterly XXII p. 16, XXVI p. 161; the reason for the demand is the same—the imitation of evil has the same effect on character as the companionship of evil men. As for the effect of this ruling on comedy, the Republic is perhaps not over-clear. But the Laws explains that the comic art is to some extent valuable; its pictures of the ludicrous serve as a warning, and also help to make goodness more intelligible by setting it in relief; hence comedy may be performed for the edification of citizens by slaves or hired aliens under certain restrictions such as that a piece shall not have too long a run and that no ridicule of free men is to be permitted . On tragedy the two dialogues are in full agreement; it must become once more a hymn , using for a good purpose those forms of dramatic representation which are allowed to the poet in Rep. 396, and avoiding the mournful and complaining language of profane tragedy, which merely harrows the feelings and which cannot be used without blasphemy at a festival of the gods. (shrink)

I have shown in an earlier article that from the second half of the fifth century onwards the desire to defend Homer and Hesiod against accusations of immorality was certainly not the main motive which actuated the allegorical interpreters of the early poets. That desire, no doubt, existed; but the part which it played was wholly a subordinate one. In the present article I propose first to consider allegorism in its earlier stages, and to state my case for holding that (...) the practice of allegorical interpretation cannot have originated in this desire of Homeric partisans to exculpate the poet. My view is that the function of allegorism was originally not negative or defensive but rather positive or exegetical. (shrink)

In Plato's Euthyphro two suggestions are offered to account for the accusation of impiety brought against Socrates. The first comes from Euthyphro , who takes it that the accusation is directed primarily against Socrates' ‘divine sign.’ The second is made by Socrates himself , who puts forward the view that he is being brought to trial because he refuses to accept such tales about the gods as Hesiod told regarding the maltreatment of Uranus by Cronus and of Cronus by Zeus—tales (...) which Euthyphro not merely believes but regards as justifying his action in prosecuting his own father. Both these suggestions used to be taken at their face-value, as, for example, by Grote . But according to J. Burnet , followed by A. E. Taylor , neither is meant to be taken seriously. (shrink)

No modern writer, so far as I am aware, has called attention to the peculiar attitude adopted by Cornutus towards Homer and Hesiod. My object in this article is to state his attitude, and attempt some account of its significance for the history of Greek allegorical interpretation of poetry.

The modern admirers of Horace who take him seriously as a moralist are inclined to attribute an undue degree of originality to his views on the moral function of poetry. The conception of the poet as teacher was, of course, the traditional Greek view. But Professor A. Y. Campbell thinks—in spite of ‘passages from Strabo and Plutarch’ —that this conception ‘after the days of Plato and Aristophanes lapsed as completely as did the production of the sort of literature that had (...) justified it.’ Strabo and Plutarch, he asserts, merely provide evidence that the older Greek view revived; the forces inspiring this ‘revival’ were ‘not Greek, but Roman.’ ‘The Greeks got it from the Romans, Strabo from the spirit of the Augustan age.’. (shrink)

I begin with a paraphrase of Plato Laws X 887de, which has suggested the arguments to be developed in this brief article. ‘The Athenian’ speaks to the following effect: ‘How can one admonish in all patience those who deny the existence of gods ? For no sufficient reason they disbelieve the myths which, in infancy, they heard from nurses and mothers in sportive or in serious vein. They disbelieve also those myths which, at sacrifices, from boyhood onwards, they heard recounted (...) in prayers and saw represented in spectacles. They reject the testimony of their own parents, nay, of all Greeks and barbarians, who by continual prayer and worship show clearly their unanimous belief in the existence of gods. Despising all these things, they lay on us the burden of refuting by reasoned argument their perverse opinions.’. (shrink)