The chapter first provides a detailed exposition of Davidson's triangulation argument to the effect that only someone who has interacted simultaneously with another person and the world they share could have a language and thoughts. It then examines the core objections that have been made to the argument, namely, that triangulation is not needed either to fix the propositional contents of one's thoughts and utterances or to have the concept of objective truth; that one need not have the concept of (...) objective truth in order to be a thinker and speaker; and that the account the argument gives of what makes thought and language possible is circular. (shrink)

The chapter first provides a detailed exposition of Davidson's triangulation argument to the effect that only someone who has interacted simultaneously with another person and the world they share could have a language and thoughts. It then examines the core objections that have been made to the argument, namely, that triangulation is not needed either to fix the propositional contents of one's thoughts and utterances or to have the concept of objective truth; that one need not have the concept of (...) objective truth in order to be a thinker and speaker; and that the account the argument gives of what makes thought and language possible is circular. (shrink)

According to many commentators, Davidson’s earlier work on philosophy of action and truth-theoretic semantics is the basis for his reputation, and his later forays into broader metaphysical and epistemological issues, and eventually into what became known as the triangulation argument, are much less successful. This book by two of his former students aims to change that perception. In Part One, Verheggen begins by providing an explanation and defense of the triangulation argument, then explores its implications for questions concerning semantic (...) normativity and reductionism, the social character of language and thought, and skepticism about the external world. In Part Two, Myers considers what the argument can tell us about reasons for action, and whether it can overcome skeptical worries based on claims about the nature of motivation, the sources of normativity and the demands of morality. The book reveals Davidson’s later writings to be full of innovative and important ideas that deserve much more attention than they are currently receiving. (shrink)

Joining a vast Wittgensteinian anti-theoretical movement, John Canfield has argued that it is possible to read the claims that (1) “language is essentially communal” and (2) “it is conceptually possible that a Crusoe isolated from birth should speak or follow rules” in such a way that they are perfectly compatible, and, indeed, that Wittgenstein held them both at once. The key to doing this is to drain them of any theoretical content or implications that would put each claim at odds (...) with the other. I argue here, first of all, that it is not possible to detheorize both (1) and (2) and still hope to say anything illuminating about the nature of language. In fact, Canfield himself does not succeed in detheorizing both (1) and (2) but ends up trivializing (1) and leaving (2) with quite a bit of theoretical content. I further argue, however, that this is getting the matter the wrong way around. Contra Canfield et al., it is only when we recognize this that we can appreciate how radical and innovative Wittgenstein's claims about language really are. (shrink)

I distinguish among three senses in which meaning may be said to be normative, one trivial, the other two more robust. According to the trivial sense, meaningful expressions have conditions of correct application. According to the first robust sense, these conditions are determined by norms. According to the second robust sense, statements about these conditions have normative implications. Normativity in one or the other of the robust senses, but not in the trivial sense, is commonly thought to pose a threat (...) to naturalism. I argue that, given its trivial normativity, meaning cannot be normative in the first robust sense but it is normative in the sense that statements about the meaning of terms have hypothetical normative implications that are essential to meaning. I further argue that this normativity itself poses no threat to naturalism. Rather, this normativity follows from the fact that the trivial normativity of meaning precludes its naturalization. (shrink)

Hannah Ginsborg has recently offered a new account of normativity, according to which normative attitudes are essential to the meaningful use of language. The kind of normativity she has in mind –– not semantic but ‘primitive’ — is supposed to help us to avoid the pitfalls of both non-reductionist and reductive dispositionalist theories of meaning. For, according to her, it enables us both to account for meaning in non-semantic terms, which non-reductionism cannot do, and to make room for the normativity (...) of meaning, which reductive dispositionalism cannot do. I argue that the main problem with Ginsborg’s account is that it fails to say what makes it possible for expressions to be governed by conditions of correct application to begin with. I do believe, however, that normative attitudes are essential to meaning, but they have to be thought of as fully semantic. And I suggest that conditions of correct application can be present only when those attitudes are present. (shrink)

Wittgenstein and Davidson are two of the most influential and controversial figures of twentieth-century philosophy. However, whereas Wittgenstein is often regarded as a deflationary philosopher, Davidson is considered to be a theory builder and systematic philosopher par excellence. Consequently, little work has been devoted to comparing their philosophies with each other. In this volume of new essays, leading scholars show that in fact there is much that the two share. By focusing on the similarities between Wittgenstein and Davidson, their essays (...) present compelling defences of their views and develop more coherent and convincing approaches than either philosopher was able to propose on his own. They show how philosophically fruitful and constructive reflection on Wittgenstein and Davidson continues to be, and how relevant the writings of both philosophers are to current debates in philosophy of mind, language, and action. (shrink)

According to Davidson, 'triangulation' is necessary both to fix the meanings of one's thoughts and utterances and to have the concept of objectivity, both of which are necessary for thinking and talking at all. Against these claims, it has been objected that neither meaning-determination nor possession of the concept of objectivity requires triangulation; nor does the ability to think and talk require possession of the concept of objectivity. But this overlooks the important connection between the tasks that triangulation is meant (...) to perform. One cannot fix concepts or meanings, which one must do for there to be any concepts or meanings at all, without having the concept of objectivity. (shrink)

According to Donald Davidson, language is social in that only a person who has interacted linguistically with another could have a language. This paper is a discussion of Davidson’s argument in defence of that claim. I argue that he has not succeeded in establishing it, but that he has provided many of the materials out of which a successful argument could be built. Chief among these are the claims that some version of externalism about meaning is true, that possession of (...) a language requires possession of the concept of objectivity, and hence that the issue here concerns the identity of the external event that makes possible possession of the concept of objectivity. I end by presenting some reasons for thinking that only interpersonal linguistic interaction could play this role. (shrink)

According to the communitarian view, often attributed to the later Wittgenstein, language is social in the sense that having a (first) language essentially depends on meaning by one's words what members of some community mean by them. According to the interpersonal view, defended by Davidson, language is social only in the sense that having a (first) language essentially depends on having used (at least some of) one's words, whatever one means by them, to communicate with others. Even though these views (...) are importantly different, the arguments given for them--the interpretation argument in Wittgenstein's case, the triangulation argument in Davidson's--are interestingly similar. I see these arguments as complementary and argue that, contrary to what is widely thought, it is the interpersonal view, rather than the communitarian view, that they support. (shrink)

The papers collected in this issue were solicited to celebrate the hundredth anniversary of Donald Davidson’s birth. Four of them discuss the implications of Davidson’s views—in particular, his later views on triangulation—for questions that are still very much at the centre of current debates. These are, first, the question whether Saul Kripke’s doubts about meaning and rule-following can be answered without making concessions to the sceptic or to the quietist; second, the question whether a way can be found to answer (...) Davidson’s own doubts about the continuity of non-propositional thought and language; third, the question whether normative properties can be at once causal and prescriptive; fourth, the question whether folk psychological explanations can be at once illuminating and autonomous. The fifth paper reexamines Davidson’s take on the principle of compositionality, which always was at the centre of his theorizing about language. (shrink)

Two readings of Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox dominate the literature: either his arguments lead to skepticism, and thus to the view that only a deflated account of meaning is available, or they lead to quietism, and thus to the view that no philosophical account of meaning is called for. I argue, against both these positions, that a proper diagnosis of the paradox points the way towards a constructive, non-sceptical account of meaning.

Contra an expanding number of deflationary commentators onWittgenstein, I argue that philosophical questions about meaningare meaningful and that Wittgenstein gave us ample reason tobelieve so. Deflationists are right in claiming that Wittgensteinrejected the sceptical problem about meaning allegedly to befound in his later writings and also right in stressing Wittgenstein''s anti-reductionism. But they are wrong in taking these dismissals to entail the end of all constructive philosophizing about meaning. Rather, I argue, the rejection of the sceptical problem requires that we (...) abandon the questions that philosophers have traditionally addressed and that we replace them with more appropriate ones, to which constructive answers are forthcoming. However, though quietism is not the only alternative to reductionism, the rejection of reductionism does oblige us seriously to revise our sense of what constructive philosophy can achieve. (shrink)

According to Barry Stroud, Wittgenstein thought that language is social only in this minimal way: we cannot make sense of the idea of someone having a language unless we can describe her as using signs in conformity with the linguistic practices of some community. Since a solitary person could meet this condition, Stroud concludes that, for Wittgenstein, solitary languages are possible. I argue that Wittgenstein in fact thought that language is social in a much more robust way. Solitary languages are (...) not possible because we cannot make sense of the idea of someone having a language unless we can think of her as actively participating in the linguistic practices that fix the standards governing the applications of her words. (shrink)

Hannah Ginsborg has recently introduced a new kind of nor-mativity which is supposed to avoid the pitfalls of both non-reductionist and dispositionalist theories of meaning. Ginsborg calls her kind of normativity ‘primitive’, for, though it is not to be conceived of in purely naturalistic terms, it is nonetheless to be applied to states or facts that are not purely intentional or contentful in that they are ‘below the level’ of meaning facts. Primitive normativity provides an explanation of how we first (...) come to grasp the meaning of an expression. This explanation, according to Ginsborg, is missing in both non-reductionism, for which the state of meaning is sui generis, and dispositionalism, which does not explain how we go from mere discriminating to genuine understanding and meaning. I wish to defend non-reductionism, first, by showing that Ginsborg’s account does not yield the kind of explanation it aims at and, second, by suggesting that non-reductionism does not preclude a constructive account of the philosophical nature of meaning. (shrink)

Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is one of the most celebrated and important books in philosophy of language and mind of the past forty years. It generated an avalanche of responses from the moment it was published and has revolutionized the way in which we think about meaning, intentionality, and the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It introduced a series of questions that had never been raised before concerning, most prominently, the normativity of meaning and the prospects for (...) a reductionist account of meaning. This volume of new essays reassesses the continuing influence of Kripke's book and demonstrates that many of the issues first raised by Kripke, both exegetical and philosophical, remain as thought-provoking and as relevant as they were when he first introduced them. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉCet article est une réponse aux commentaires de Kirk Ludwig et d'Alexander Miller sur la première partie de Donald Davidson's Triangulation Argument: A Philosophical Inquiry. Il répond aux objections de Ludwig selon lesquelles l'argument de la triangulation ne réussit pas à établir le caractère social du langage et de la pensée. Il répond à l'invitation de Miller à comparer le non-réductionnisme de Davidson avec celui de Crispin Wright, ainsi que l'aspect social de la thèse de Davidson avec celui de la (...) thèse de Saul Kripke. Il répond enfin aux questions de Miller concernant mes affirmations sur la normativité de la signification. (shrink)

According to the sceptic Saul Kripke envisages in his celebrated book on Wittgenstein on rules and private language, there are no facts about an individual that determine what she means by any given expression. If there are no such facts, the question then is, what justifies the claim that she does use expressions meaningfully? Kripke’s answer, in a nutshell, is that she by and large uses her expressions in conformity with the linguistic standards of the community she belongs to. While (...) Kripke’s sceptical problem has gripped philosophers for over three decades, few, if any, have been satisfied by his proposed solution, and many have struggled to come up with one of their own. The purpose of this paper is to show that a more satisfactory answer to Kripke’s challenge can be developed on the basis of Donald Davidson’s writings on triangulation, the idea of two individuals interacting simultaneously with each other and the world they share. It follows from the triangulation argument that the facts that can be regarded as determining meaning are irreducible. Yet, contra Kripke, they are not mysterious, for the argument does spell out what is needed for an individual’s expressions to be meaningful. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper discusses Claudine Verheggen's account of what she takes to be Donald Davidson's response to the sceptical paradox about rule-following and meaning developed in Saul Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein's ‘rule-following considerations.’ It focusses on questions about the normativity of meaning, the social character of meaning, and the role of triangulation in Davidson's account of the determination of meaning, and invites Verheggen to compare the non-reductionism she finds in Davidson with that developed in Crispin Wright's judgement-dependent account (...) of meaning.RÉSUMÉCet article examine ce que Claudine Verheggen considère comme étant la réponse de Donald Davidson au paradoxe sceptique développé dans l'interprétation qu'offre Saul Kripke des remarques de Wittgenstein sur la possibilité de suivre une règle. Je me concentre en particulier sur des questions concernant la normativité de la signification, le caractère social de la signification et le rôle que la notion de triangulation joue dans la position de Davidson sur la détermination de la signification. J'invite aussi Verheggen à comparer le non-réductionnisme davidsonien avec celui défendu par Crispin Wright dans sa conception de la signification en tant que dépendante du jugement. (shrink)

Les enfants peuvent apprendre à penser et " conceptualiser"s'ils sont mis dès leur plus jeune âge en situation de réfléchir et discuter des questions philosophiques. Matthew Lipman a développé une méthodologie, la " philosophie pour enfants ", qui a fait ses preuves dans le monde entier. Cet ouvrage, qui s'ouvre par un texte de Matthew Lipman, a pour objectif de confronter le modèle lipmanien à d'autres points de vue pour en dégager les points forts, tout en l'enrichissant de la recherche (...) actuelle en pédagogie menée par des auteurs aussi différents que Marie-France Daniel, Jacques Lévine, Michel Tozzi et Britt-Mari Barth, etc. Cet ouvrage s'adresse aux enseignants et étudiants des IUFM et Hautes Ecoles. Il intéressera également les chercheurs et étudiants en Sciences de l'éducation, de même que les étudiants en Philosophie. Il est destiné, plus largement, à toute personne amenée à travailler avec des enfants et à expérimenter de nouvelles formes d'apprentissage et à stimuler l'esprit critique et la réflexion. (shrink)

Cet article présente les différentes étapes nécessaires à la construction d'un corpus visant l'étude des épenthèses consonantiques entre radicaux et suffixes en français, depuis le rassemblement des données brutes jusqu'au corpus final, débarrassé des termes dont la consonne candidate s'est avérée ne pas être épenthétique. Ce faisant, il montre les limites d'une extraction automatique des termes dérivés dans ce cadre morphophonologique. Enfin, il souligne le rôle d'un corpus raisonné dans la progression de l'analyse et la nécessaire interaction entre empirie et (...) théorie. (shrink)

À l'heure des fake news et des sciences alternatives, on pourrait facilement croire que tout est relatif. Cet essai voudrait pourtant suggérer le contraire. De nombreux malentendus circulent sur les concepts de vérité, de connaissance ou de réalité, déformés par l'idée-même de post-vérité. En nous proposant de nous méfier de nos préjugés métaphysiques les plus ancrés et d'œuvrer à une authentique connaissance métaphysique, cet essai de philosophie engagée nous invite à nous installer dans un espace académique et démocratique des raisons, (...) seul à même de garantir la liberté de conscience. Il démontre ainsi que les idéaux de vérité et de connaissance constituent moins un rempart ou un déni de la vie qu'ils ne sont les meilleurs alliés de nos idéaux de solidarité et de justice sociale"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

For most early pragmatists, including the founder C.S. Peirce and L. Wittgenstein, vagueness was a real and universal principle and not a mere defect of our knowledge or thought. This volume begins by exploring this pragmatist notion of vagueness and the way it was tied to their basic opposition to various kinds of reductionism and nominalism. It then develops towards an analysis of Peirce's original and wide views on vagueness, as seen through the angles of logic, semiotics, epistemology and metaphysics. (...) In the final part of this book, the reader is presented with a case for the contemporary relevance of such a realistic pragmaticism for the ongoing debate on semantic, epistemic and ontic vagueness. (shrink)

Focusing especially on case studies from the Old High German glosses to the Rule of Benedict, and especially on the lexeme disciplina, one of their central ascetic terms, this contribution examines different manifestations and methods of the glossators’ annotation system from a primarily linguistic viewpoint. The Old High German words interpolated between and to the side of the Latin lines are interpreted not only as linguistic primary material, but at the same time as means of deepening our cultural-historical understanding of (...) medieval forms of life and the spheres of knowledge inherent to them in which asceticism played a major role. (shrink)

Despite its intuitive appeal and the empirical evidence for it, the hypothesis of cognitive polyphasia (Moscovici, 1961/1976/2008) remains largely unexplored. This article attempts to clarify some of the ideas behind this concept by examining its operations at the level of individuals and by proposing a conceptual model that includes some elements of social cognition. Indeed, calls for a rapprochement between the theory of social representations and cognitive psychology have been made by Moscovici, in particular, in his 1984 paper on The (...) myth of the lonely paradigm and in his paper on La nouvelle pensée magique (1992) in which he argues that the theory of social representations provides an explanatory framework for the descriptions offered by cognitive psychology and that their combining could translate into a finer understanding of contemporary social phenomena.Building on the results of an empirical examination of the controversy that surrounded the MMR vaccination programme in the UK between 1998 and 2005, different ways of engaging into cognitive polyphasia are proposed, including what can be described as cognitive “monophasia”, that is, the exclusive use of one type of knowledge, at least at the level of the individual. A brief discussion about the implications of the proposed conceptual model for our understanding of cognitive polyphasia and of the different ways of making sense of the world around us concludes this article. (shrink)

Cette etude est une lecture, une interpretation feministe de trois romans des Lumieres - Les Illustres Francaises de Challe (la sixieme histoire) (1713), L'Histoire du chevalier des Grieux et de Manon Lescaut de Prevost (1731), et Le Diable amoureux de Cazotte (1772) - notamment du theme de la vertu feminine et de ses transgressions, sur le plan sexuel, a une epoque de transformation profonde dans le domaine de l'ethique et des moeurs. Pris au piege entre la tradition et les nouvelles (...) valeurs de la Philosophie, les trois auteurs - dans des recits narres a la premiere personne par des protagonistes masculins - presentent la femme obliquement. Leur approche frappe la lectrice par son essentielle ambiguite. Tout d'abord consideree comme coupable - accusee d'adultere et de perfidie, ou de seduction diabolique - la femme apparait progressivement innocente, et meme sainte, sur l'archetype de Marie-Madeleine, ou tout simplement chimerique, produit de l'imaginaire masculin. Son existence marginale, evoquee par le biais du souvenir, est symptomatique d'une absence effective en tant que sujet autonome.Simple objet, spectrale, a la fois exclue, en fin de compte, du bien et du mal, elle apparait dans l'incertitude, en quete d'une identite, d'un nouveau role et d'une place dans un monde en voie de transformation. (shrink)

Cet article remet en question une définition de la fiction parue en 1988, dans un ouvrage intitulé « Contribution à une étude du concept de fiction ». Etant fondée sur la théorie des actes de langage, cette définition présentait en effet l’inconvénient de ne pouvoir s’appliquer qu’aux fictions verbales. Une nouvelle définition est donc proposée dans cet article, faisant apparaître clairement la fiction comme un concept de nature pragmaticosémiotique : une fiction est une représentation, verbale ou non verbale, qu’un auteur (...) produit consciemment dans le but de la transmettre à un destinataire. En transmettant cette représentation, l’auteur de la fiction adopte une attitude spécifique, consistant à inviter le destinataire à imaginer un monde fictif dont les caractéristiques sont compatibles avec celles du monde décrit dans la représentation. Sur la base de cette définition, l’article recense des exemplifications de fictions aussi diverses que possible, selon la nature de leur support de représentation et selon leur fonction, puis il pose la question du rôle des fictions dans notre vie quotidienne et, en particulier, sur la manière dont elles nous apprennent quelque chose sur le monde réel. (shrink)

O presente artigo trata do fenômeno da judicialização da saúde no Brasil, a partir do significativo acúmulo de demandas judiciais promovidas pela cidadania ativa, como forma de concretização do direito social fundamental à saúde. Valendo-se de pesquisa bibliográfica e recurso a bancos de dados oficiais, apresenta o percurso doutrinário, a base constitucional e legal, bem como trata das decisões judiciais a essa demanda social como inseridas no contexto de uma política pública judiciária necessária a efetivação de tais direitos, como resposta (...) ao pungente drama existencial humano de acesso aos serviços de saúde. (shrink)

This paper discusses how Kierkegaard’s aesthete in Either/or’s “Diapsalmata” and “Rotation of Crops” attempts to apply Hegel’s principle of mediation to everyday decision-making. This paper has two main goals: First, it provides an in-depth analysis of exactly how the aesthete’s approach to decision-making follows the dialectical pattern of Hegelian mediation. Second, it argues that even though the aesthete meets with unfortunate results, the aesthete cannot be so easily dismissed. The aesthete’s Hegelian perspective is still relevant to daily life because it (...) provides an insightful view into how we ourselves sometimes approach decisions and cope with the difficulty of making decisions. (shrink)

This article analyzes the “Interlude” in Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments. In particular, it examines Johannes Climacus’s response to Hegel’s view that a past actuality is necessary. I provide an in-depth analysis of Hegel’s view of modality and of what he means when he says that a past actuality is necessary. In contrast to the standard scholarly interpretation, I argue that Climacus need not reject Hegel’s view because Hegel’s view of the necessity of the past is not so controversial or difficult to (...) accept. Finally, I show that Climacus’s main critique is that we cannot know the past as necessary in any meaningful way. He worries that we might get so preoccupied with the futile task of trying to know the Hegelian necessity of the past that we forget to personally appropriate the past in a way that can help us live in the present. (shrink)

Les approches pour lutter contre le fléau des maladies chroniques qui augmentent dans le monde entier se révèlent infructueuses et très coûteuses. Il est maintenant possible de corriger les chiffres alarmants et d’envisager une prévention efficace en adoptant le nouveau paradigme des Origines du Développement de la Santé et des Maladies (DOHaD), à condition d’intervenir très tôt en agissant sur le risque et non lorsque la maladie est déjà apparue. Ce concept est largement reconnu grâce à des études épidémiologiques et (...) des études animales. Les influences des facteurs environnementaux – nutrition, stress, psycho-affectifs, toxiques, bactériens et physiques – sur les processus épigénétiques représentent une révolution. En effet, les DMR modifications épigénétiques conservent la mémoire des impacts de facteurs environnementaux auxquels un individu est soumis tout au long de sa vie. Une période cruciale est le développement précoce, pré et postnatal, les 1000 jours ; cruciale parce que l’épigénome est particulièrement sensible aux effets de l’environnement, et aussi parce que l’individu construit son capital santé pour répondre plus ou moins bien aux aléas de la vie. En outre, l’existence de mécanismes non génétiques et non culturels capables de transférer la mémoire des expériences/expositions à des facteurs environnementaux parentaux et qui conditionnent la réactivité des générations suivantes à différents environnements au cours de leur vie suscite un intérêt grandissant. L’idée selon laquelle des marques épigénétiques non effacées lors des phases de reprogrammation est actuellement très en vogue, voire considérée à tort comme acquise malgré la rareté des exemples probants. Cependant, des questions fondamentales subsistent quant à la nature, aux rôles et à l’impact des marques et des mécanismes épigénétiques, des ARN non codants ou d’autres mécanismes et à leur persistance au cours des générations. Un modèle intégrant ces différents systèmes, leurs interactions avec l’environnement et les fenêtres de développement de la sensibilité selon le sexe du parent et de l’enfant reste à construire. Sur la base de la malléabilité des mécanismes épigénétiques sous-jacents, la réversibilité des marques environnementales ouvre de nouvelles perspectives. Cependant, comment les facteurs conférant une susceptibilité accrue ou une résilience vis-à-vis du développement des maladies agissent et influencent les mécanismes épigénétiques reste à élucider. Si la mémoire des expériences/expositions à des facteurs environnementaux est effectivement transmissible, le principal défi pour l’individu, et surtout pour les pouvoirs publics, est d’être en mesure d’éviter ceux qui posent des risques pour la descendance. Ces données peuvent déplacer le curseur des responsabilités en matière de soins de santé, de la sphère privée à la sphère socio-géographico-politique. (shrink)