In Kidney for Sale by Owner: Human Organs, Transplantation, and the Market, I argued that the market is the most efficient and effective—and morally justified—means of procuring and allocating human organs for transplantation. This special issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy publishes several articles critical of this position and of my arguments mustered in its support. In this essay, I explore the core criticisms these authors raise against my conclusions. I argue that clinging to comfortable, but unfounded, notions (...) that human body parts are not commodities, that the physician-patient relationship transcends commercial practices, and that medicine rises above market-place morality (where “market-place morality” is presented rhetorically as a criticism) leads to a real failure adequately to appreciate the complex reality of modern medicine. Denying the illicit moral intuitions that commodification of body parts is immoral or that it necessarily violates human dignity would benefit donors and recipients alike, while also reinforcing virtuous transplantation practice and policy. Honestly acknowledging the medical marketplace would shed light on what is often a hazy and shrouded policy setting. At stake is not solely the efficiency of procuring human organs for transplantation but also the recognition of the moral authority of persons over themselves. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer a view beyond that which would narrowly reduce the role of parents in medical decision making to acting as custodians of the best interests of children and toward an account of family authority and family autonomy. As a fundamental social unit, the good of the family is usually appreciated, at least in part, in terms of its ability successfully to instantiate its core moral and cultural understandings as well as to pass on such commitments to (...) future generations. The putative rights of children to expression, information, freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and to freedom of association with others are, in this essay, assessed from the perspective of those conditions necessary for the family to function as a moral community. In so doing, I respond to the move to liberate children from parental authority and to effect the transformation of the family as implied by the United Nations’ "Convention on the Rights of the Child" and the pediatric bioethics it supports. (shrink)

In Roper v. Simmons (2005) the United States Supreme Court announced a paradigm shift in jurisprudence. Drawing specifically on mounting scientific evidence that adolescents are qualitatively different from adults in their decision-making capacities, the Supreme Court recognized that adolescents are not adults in all but age. The Court concluded that the overwhelming weight of the psychological and neurophysiological data regarding brain maturation supports the conclusion that adolescents are qualitatively different types of agents than adult persons. The Supreme Court further solidified (...) its position regarding adolescents as less than fully mature and responsible decisionmakers in Graham v. Florida (2010) and Miller v. Alabama (2012). In each case, the Court concluded that the scientific evidence does not support the conclusion that children under 18 years of age possess adult capacities for personal agency, rationality, and mature choice. This study explores the implications of the Supreme Court decisions in Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama for the “mature minor” standard for medical decision making. It argues that the Supreme Court’s holdings in Roper, Graham, and Miller require no less than a radical reassessment of how healthcare institutions, courts of law, and public policy are obliged to regard minors as medical decisionmakers. The “mature minor” standard for medical decision making must be abandoned. (shrink)

(No abstract is available for this citation).

The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization's (UNESCO) Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights announces a significant array of welfare entitlements—to personal health and health care, medicine, nutrition, water, improved living conditions, environmental protection, and so forth—as well as corresponding governmental duties to provide for such public health measures, though the simple expedient of announcing that such entitlements are “basic human rights.” The Universal Declaration provides no argument for the legitimacy of the sweeping governmental authority, taxation, and regulation (...) to create and impose such “rights.” As this paper explores that some action promotes a purported good, such as “health,” does not thereby make the action morally permissible. Just as there are moral limits on legitimate personal actions, there are also moral limits on legitimate governmental actions to promote purported goods, including health. A core question of any governmental regulation, therefore, is whether it is a legitimate application of moral political authority or an unauthorized act of state coercion. Pace UNESCO's wide-ranging assertions, this paper argues that promoting health only falls within the legitimate authority of governments in very narrowly defined circumstances. As the paper critically explores, at stake are foundational moral and political questions concerning the limits of governmental authority to intervene in the consensual interaction of persons. Imposing such duties on others, including citizens of a state through regulatory activity and taxation, must be justified, nonarbitrary, and demonstrably within the limits of moral political authority. UNESCO's assertions do not meet this burden of proof. (shrink)

A truly Christian bioethics challenges the nature, substance, and application of secular morality, dividing Christians from non-Christians, accenting central moral differences, and providing content-full forthrightly Christian guidance for action. Consequently, Christian bioethics must be framed within the metaphysical and theological commitments of Traditional Christianity so as to provide proper orientation toward God. In contrast, secular bioethicists routinely present themselves as providing a universal bioethics acceptable to all reasonable and rational persons. Yet, such secular bioethicists habitually insert their own biases and (...) prejudices into their moral conclusions, ethical consultations, and political aspirations, without any real justification. As this article explores, the ideologically driven anti-Christian commitments, including commitments to human rights and social justice, embodied within contemporary bioethics routinely illustrate the increasing gap between the traditionally Christian and the devoutly secular, further deepening the culture wars. (shrink)

To comprehend pain, disease, death and suffering as being meaningful - beyond the firing of synapses, the collapse of human abilities, and the mere end of life - requires a context in which to evaluate essential connotations, as well as to place and integrate understandings. If pain and suffering are to have enduring significance, they must be situated within a nest of ontological background assumptions, standards of inquiry, and epistemological foundations. Where secular bioethics fails to give deep meaning to suffering, (...) Christian bioethics succeeds. This essay analyzes the divergent meanings of suffering endorsed by the various Christian religions as conceptualized through the different metaphysical, epistemological, and sociological assumptions of each religion. (shrink)

This article raises three challenges to Richard McCormick's proportionalism. First, adequately to judge proportionate reason requires the specification of a particular background moral content and metaphysical context. Absent such specification, evaluation of proportionate reason is inherently and deeply ambiguous. Second, to resolve such ambiguity and yet remain Christian, proportionalism must adopt a forthrightly Christian moral content set within a straightforwardly Christian metaphysics. This move will, however, set Christian bioethics off as sectarian—a conclusion McCormick wishes to avoid. Third, even if proportionalism (...) were to adopt a Christian moral content and metaphysics to avoid such ambiguity, its methodology sets aside a key aspect of the Christian life: repentance. Proportionalism does not account for the core reality that repentance plays in one's personal encounter with and knowledge of God. As I will argue, the challenge in part is that moral action cannot be adequately conceptualized, nor can moral theology be properly understood, outside of the authentic practice of the religious life, and repentance is central to that Christian reality. (shrink)

Traditionally, people were recognized as being dead using cardio-respiratory criteria: individuals who had permanently stopped breathing and whose heart had permanently stopped beating were dead. Technological developments in the middle of the twentieth century and the advent of the intensive care unit made it possible to sustain cardio-respiratory and other functions in patients with severe brain injury who previously would have lost such functions permanently shortly after sustaining a brain injury. What could and should physicians caring for such patients do? (...) Significant advances in human organ transplantation also played direct and indirect roles in discussions regarding the care of such patients. Because successful transplantation requires that organs be removed from cadavers shortly after death to avoid organ damage due to loss of oxygen, there has been keen interest in knowing precisely when people are dead so that organs could be removed. Criteria for declaring death using neurological criteria developed, and today a whole brain definition of death is widely used and recognized by all 50 states in the United States as an acceptable way to determine death. We explore the ongoing debate over definitions of death, particularly over brain death or death determined using neurological criteria, and the relationship between definitions of death and organ transplantation. (shrink)

Despite the well-documented social, economic, and adaptive advantages for young children, adolescents, and adults, the traditional family in the West is in decline. A growing percentage of men and women choose not to be bound by the traditional moral and social expectations of marriage and family life. Adults are much more likely than in the past to live as sexually active singles, with a concomitant increase in forms of social isolation as well as in the number of children born outside (...) of marriage. These social shifts are also connected to public policies that provide incentives for individuals to exit the family, leaving behind its social, capital, and economic resources. The individualistic character of the social-democratic egalitarian ideology that underlies the current dominant approaches to health care financing in Western Europe and much of North America, for example, is associated with a decline in family stability. Welfare entitlements, including state-based health care, have made it easier to exit the family, undermining the centrality of the family’s core human relationships. This essay argues for the importance of recognizing the cardinal role and reality of the family and for the importance of family-based health care savings accounts for preserving family integrity, while also providing for sustainable long-term health care reform. (shrink)

In this paper, I assess Peter Dabrock's “Drawing distinctions responsibly and concretely: A European Protestant perspective on foundational theological bioethics.” I explore the ways in which Dabrock announces nontraditional Christian assumptions to guide Christian bioethics, engages the secular bioethical agenda on the very terms set by and congenial to the field of secular bioethics, and searches for insights from philosophy and science through which to recast Christian moral judgments. For example, he cites approvingly, as if they were expressive of Christian (...) moral concerns: human rights, democracy, and state-based social redistribution of resources to satisfy welfare entitlements. In this short essay, I argue that Dabrock has unduly limited the role of Traditional Christian theology to guide bioethics and, consequently, has also wrongly characterized the Christian moral life and Christian social/political obligations. (shrink)

Health care reform poses numerous challenges. A core challenge is to make health care more efficient and effective without causing more harm than benefit. Additionally, those fashioning health-care policy must encourage patients to exercise caution and restraint when expending scarce resources; restrict the ability of politicians to advance their careers by promising alluring but costly entitlements, many of which they will not be able to deliver; face the demographic challenges of an aging population; and avoid regulations that create significant inefficiencies (...) and restrict access to health care. Given such real-world challenges, how should health care be reformed in the United States or elsewhere? This number of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy examines many of the complex issues that must be considered in reforming a health-care system. (shrink)

This volume brings together a set of critical essays on the thought of Professor Doctor H. Tristram Engelhardt Jr., Co-Founding Editor of the Philosophy and Medicine book series. Amongst the founders of bioethics, Professor Engelhardt, looms large. Many of his books and articles have appeared in multiple languages, including Italian, Romanian, Portuguese, Spanish, and Chinese. The essays in this book focus critically on a wide swath of his work, in the process elucidating, critiquing, and/or commending the rigor and reach of (...) his thought. This volume compasses analyses of many different aspects of Engelhardt's work, including social and political philosophy, biopolitics, the philosophy of medicine, and bioethics. It brings together internationally known scholars to assess key elements of Engelhardt's work. (shrink)

This paper argues that professionals who make boundary-related decisions should be guided by relationship-based practice. In our roles as service users and professionals, drawing from our lived experiences of professional relationships, we argue we need to move away from distance-based practice. This includes understanding the boundary stories and narratives that exist for all of us – including the people we support, other professionals, as well as the organisations and systems within which we work. When we are dealing with professional boundary (...) issues, we should centre relationship-building skills that are central to many other aspects of our work. Skills that foster relationships at all levels – between professionals, service users, and services – need to be revalued. Our final recommendation is to create, develop, and foster safer spaces within and outside of organisations, as well as inter-professionally, for the discussion and exploration of boundary-related issues and practice. We are interested in hearing from those with experiences of being marginalised by boundaries so that they can inform a reshaping of our collective ideas around boundary related practices. To foster relationship-based practices in organisations, we have outlined several recommendations here; however, we recognize that these do not go far enough, and that collective action is needed to inform systemic change. (shrink)

This book provides an exploration of the ethics of cardiology practice. The chapters are divided by five broad areas of practice: beginning-of-life, end-of-life, transplantation and allocation of expensive or scarce resources, professionalism, and research.

There is a need for person-centred approaches and empowerment of staff within the residential care for older people; a movement called ‘culture change’. There is however no single path for achieving culture change. With the aim of increasing understandings about cultural change processes and the promotion of cultural values and norms associated with person-centred practices, this article presents an action research project set on a unit in the Netherlands providing care for older people with dementia. The project is presented as (...) a case study. This study examines what has contributed to the improvement of participation of older people with dementia in daily occupational and leisure activities according to practitioners. Data was collected by participant observation, interviews and focus groups. The results show that simultaneous to the improvement of the older people’s involvement in daily activities a cultural transformation took place and that the care became more person-centred. Spontaneous interactions and responses rather than planned interventions, analysis and reflection contributed to this. Furthermore, it proved to be beneficial that the process of change and the facilitation of that process reflected the same values as those underlying the cultural change. It is concluded that changes arise from dynamic, interactive and non-linear processes which are complex in nature and difficult to predict and to control. Nevertheless, managers and facilitators can facilitate such change by generating movement through the introduction of small focused projects that meet the stakeholders’ needs, by creating conditions for interaction and sense making, and by promoting the new desired cultural values. (shrink)

What can the actions of stockbreeders, as they select the best individuals for breeding, teach us about how new species of wild animals and plants come into being? Charles Darwin raised this question in his famous, even notorious, Origin of Species (1859). Darwin's answer - his argument by analogy from artificial to natural selection - is the subject of our book. We aim to clarify what kind of argument it is, how it works, and why Darwin gave it such prominence. (...) As we explain more fully in our Introduction, we believe that the argument becomes much more intelligible when set, contextually, in a story stretching from classical Greek mathematics to modern evolutionary genetics: a long story, and a broad one too, encompassing everything from Darwin's earliest notebook theorising on the births and deaths of species, to agrarian capitalism as a distinctive form of economic life, to shifting Western reflections on art-nature relations. (shrink)

Even strong, fearless, and badass Black girls and Black women need affirmations-- now more than ever. Fievre shares inspirational words of wisdom through fabulous Black female trailblazers who changed the world. You don't always have to be strong. Sometimes taking a break to focus on your mental health is bravery in itself. We find ourselves needing reminders that we are incredible and more than enough. Fievre shares strategies that will give you the dose of radical self-affirmation you deserve. -- adapted (...) from back cover. (shrink)

Liturgy and ritual -- Structure -- Curriculum.

This long-awaited book replaces Hughes and Cresswell's two classic studies of modal logic: _An Introduction to Modal Logic_ and _A Companion to Modal Logic_. _A New Introduction to Modal Logic_ is an entirely new work, completely re-written by the authors. They have incorporated all the new developments that have taken place since 1968 in both modal propositional logic and modal predicate logic, without sacrificing tha clarity of exposition and approachability that were essential features of their earlier works. The book takes (...) readers from the most basic systems of modal propositional logic right up to systems of modal predicate with identity. It covers both technical developments such as completeness and incompleteness, and finite and infinite models, and their philosophical applications, especially in the area of modal predicate logic. (shrink)

Global bioethics and the environment -- Biodiversity -- Health -- Disease -- Drugs -- Food -- Water -- Global bioethics in practice.

Expressions in a language, whether words, phrases, or sentences, have meanings. So it seems reasonable to suppose that there are meanings that expressions have. Of course, it is fashionable in some philosophical circles to deny this.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

In “Imposing Risks,” Judith Thomson gives a case in which, by turning on her stove, she accidentally causes her neighbor’s death. She claims that both the following are true: (1) she ought not to have caused her neighbor’s death; (2) it was permissible for her to turn her stove on. In this paper it is argued that it cannot be that both (1) and (2) are true, that (2) is true, and that therefore (1) is false. How this is so (...) is explained, and the implications of this position regarding the relation between rights and duties is explored. (shrink)