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Según Martin Heidegger, la filosofía se consuma en la época actual en el pleno desarrollo de las ciencias particulares. Estas se ocupan del ente. Pero ya desde su inicio pensó la filosofía al ente en tanto ente, ya como fundamento del todo; ya como ente supremo, relegando al Ser. Filosofía y poesía, pensar y poetizar, son modos paradigmáticos del decir, dialogan, se co-responden. En la consumación de la filosofía, finaliza un modo del decir y del pensar, hasta ahora excluyente: el (...) del ente en cuanto tal. En la consumación de éste, acontece la falta de fundamento, percibida como angustia y silencio. Esto leemos en Samuel Beckett. Una temporada en el infierno de Rimbaud dice la historia de Occidente desde el punto de vista del fundamento en tanto ente supremo: esto es, Dios. En el decir de Rimbaud se patentiza el ser religioso cristiano de Occidente. El callar del poeta se corresponde con el ocultamiento del fundamento poéticamente pensado como ente supremo. En Persona de Bergman se representa el drama del silencio como vacío de las palabras, a la vez que como abismo en el sentido de la ausencia del ente supremo en tanto fundamento, experimentado desde la inmanencia de la conciencia, con lo que se suma la problemática del sujeto de la Modernidad, ahora desfondado por la ausencia. Otra raíz tiene en primera instancia el poetizar de Paul Celan: arranca del pensamiento de Martin Buber y tiende deliberadamente al silencio como modo privilegiado de la relación con un Tú que es Otro absoluto. Sin embargo, su pertenencia a la poesía en lengua alemana implica un cuño metafísico y lo lleva a la órbita de la poesía europea finalizante como silencio. El decir debería entonces detenerse en este destino de la poesía occidental: dejar callar al silencio. Oír y escuchar su voz sin palabras. Acaso diga de otro modo que las irrestaurables palabras vacías. (shrink)

The thinkers presented in these lectures by Bergman represent a radical departure from objectivism and subjectivism.

En ocasión del fallecimiento de Arturo Andrés Roig queremos sumarnos a la larga serie de homenajes que ha recibido. Para ello, reproducimos aquí tres memoriales dedicados al maestro por filósofos americanos.

Un aspecto poco estudiado del argumento de Michael Sandel en contra del carácter neutral de la justicia como equidad, es el modo en que funda sus conclusiones en el entendimiento que tiene de otros tres aspectos de la concepción rawlsiana de justicia: su carácter deontológico, el equilibrio reflexivo, y la posición original. Nuestro objetivo es mostrar que Sandel no ha cometido cuatro errores independientes, sino que poseer un entendimiento equivocado del carácter deontológico de la teoría lo ha llevado a caracterizar (...) mal en qué consiste el equilibrio reflexivo y esto -finalmente- lo ha conducido a una errónea interpretación de lo que se encuentra modelado en la posición original y -en última instancia- a sostener la falta de neutralidad de la concepción de justicia. Concentrarnos en este asunto nos permitirá apreciar cómo se articulan y complementan las distintas réplicas que Brian Barry, Samuel Freeman y el mismo John Rawls han dirigido contra Sandel. One aspect of Michael Sandel´s argument against the neutral character of justice as fairness on which little research has been done is the way in which he founds his conclusions on the basis of the understanding he has about three other aspects of the Rawlsian conception of justice: its deontological character, the reflective equilibrium and the original position. It is my aim to prove that Sandel has not made four independent mistakes but, on the contrary, to have a wrong understanding of the deontological character of the theory has driven him to a wrong characterization of what the reflective equilibrium consists of and this, in turn, has taken him to a wrong interpretation of what is modelled in the original position and, at large, to hold the idea that justice as fairness lacks neutrality. Focusing on this issue will allow us to appreciate how the different responses made by Brian Barry, Samuel Freeman and John Rawls himself against Sandel are articulated and complement one another. (shrink)

A troca epistolar de Espinosa com Hugo Boxel ocorreu de setembro de 1674 a meados de outubro ou novembro do mesmo ano. Foram escritas, até onde se sabe, seis cartas, três de cada um, todas elas em holandês. Há disponível, todavia, apenas a cópia do original de uma única delas, a _epístola LIII_, restando como fontes únicas as _versiones_ latinas apresentadas nas _Opera Posthuma_. Toda a sequência argumentativa rende um interessantíssimo documento, frutífero no que atina a questões como fé (...) e superstição. Aqui, todavia, não temos a pretensão de entrar no debate teórico. O que ora propomos é somente uma tradução integral da correspondência entre Espinosa e Boxel, entregando ao leitor uma versão em língua portuguesa que seja a mais justa e acurada possível, e que reproduza fielmente a terminologia técnica usada. (shrink)

Approximationism — science approximates the truth as an ideal — is the view of science implicit in all of Einstein's major works, heralded by Hugo Bergman in Hebrew in 1940 and expressed by Karl Popper in 1954 and 1956. Yet Bergman was not sufficiently clear about it, and even Popper is not - as shown by their not giving up certain remnants of the older views which approximationism replaces, even when these remnants are inconsistent with approximationism. Norare (...) the approximationist theories of these authors satisfactory solutions to all the problems which traditional epistemologies purported to solve. Approxiamtionism still is a program rather than a fully blown theory. (shrink)

Approximationism — science approximates the truth as an ideal — is the view of science implicit in all of Einstein's major works, heralded by Hugo Bergman in Hebrew in 1940 and expressed by Karl Popper in 1954 and 1956. Yet Bergman was not sufficiently clear about it, and even Popper is not - as shown by their not giving up certain remnants of the older views which approximationism replaces, even when these remnants are inconsistent with approximationism. Norare (...) the approximationist theories of these authors satisfactory solutions to all the problems which traditional epistemologies purported to solve. Approxiamtionism still is a program rather than a fully blown theory. (shrink)

Approximationism — science approximates the truth as an ideal — is the view of science implicit in all of Einstein's major works, heralded by Hugo Bergman in Hebrew in 1940 and expressed by Karl Popper in 1954 and 1956. Yet Bergman was not sufficiently clear about it, and even Popper is not - as shown by their not giving up certain remnants of the older views which approximationism replaces, even when these remnants are inconsistent with approximationism. Norare (...) the approximationist theories of these authors satisfactory solutions to all the problems which traditional epistemologies purported to solve. Approxiamtionism still is a program rather than a fully blown theory. (shrink)

The paper attempts to give an outline of the main doctrines of the Brentano-School and to mark the place of Bergman's contributions to descriptive Psychology. The idea of an immanent object is rejected by Marty and Bergman and was critized by Bergman in the framework of the 'concept-intuition'-distinction. It is shown that Bergman's critic leads to an interesting defense of the thesis of the privacy of mental contents.