In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 81-96 [Access article in PDF] Pragmatism:The Unformulated Method of Bishop Berkeley Lesley Friedman 1. Introduction THOUGH WELL KNOWN AS A SCIENTIST, logician, and metaphysician, Charles Sanders Peirce is perhaps best remembered as the founder of Pragmatism. Surprisingly, Peirce attributes this way of thinking—often taken as a uniquely American contribution—to Bishop George Berkeley. According to Pierce, Berkeley should be regarded (...) as the author of that method of modern pragmatism (RFB, 96): 1 Pragmaticism is... a method of thinking.... Of those who have used this way of thinking Berkeley is the clearest example.... (CP, 8.206, c.1905) Berkeley on the whole has more right to be considered the introducer of pragmatism into philosophy than any other one man.... (1903 letter to William James)In a metaphysical Club, I used to preach this principle as a sort of logical gospel, representing the unformulated method followed by Berkeley, and in conversation about it I called it 'Pragmatism.' (CP, 6.482, 1908) [End Page 81]While it is acknowledged that Peirce believed Berkeley to be "a very distinguished master of the pragmatist mode of thinking," just why Peirce makes this claim is not altogether clear. In significant ways Berkeley blundered metaphysically, according to Peirce (MS, 322, c.1907). 2 He overlooked the reality of possibility (and thus realism about generals), misunderstood the nature of existence and the ordinary notion of matter, and had an inadequate view of perception. 3 In his early work, Peirce goes so far as to criticize what looks to be Berkeley's attempt at the pragmatic method: "A better rule [than Berkeley's] for avoiding the deceits of language is this: Do things fulfil the same function practically? Then let them be signified by the same word. Do they not? Then let them be distinguished" (CP, 8.33, 1871). Moreover, while Peirce cites the Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision as using the "medium of pragmatism," others have criticized Berkeley in this very work for drawing conclusions without any experimentation. 4 Since it is precisely the pivotal role of experience and experiment that distinguish the method of pragmatism, it is puzzling that Berkeley is chosen as worthy of the title that Peirce bestows on him. My hope in this paper is to shed some light on this question. I beginwith an explication of Peirce's pragmatism and then move on to offer an account ofhow Berkeley uses this method, though never formulates it. Next, I discuss the positions Peirce understood to be consequences of the view, including critical common-sensism, fallibilism, and scholastic realism. I suggest that, although he erred on several corollary positions, Berkeley foresaw the aims, purpose, and essential points of the methodological, though not the "metaphysical side" of pragmatism. 5 2. Peircean Pragmatism Pragmatism 6 is not a metaphysical doctrine: it does not aim to ascertain the truth of things; it does not attempt to throw any "positive light on any problem" (CP, 5.464, 1907). Rather, it offers a means of distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate [End Page 82] hypotheses, so that verbal disputes—those that so often arise simply because the disputants do not understand meanings in the same way—can be resolved. It is thus "only a method of thinking"(CP, 8.206, c.1905, emphasis added).... pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, if sound, must render needless any further rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as hypotheses, that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful suggestions; and furthermore, this is all that the [logical] maxim of pragmatism really pretends to do.... (CP, 5.195, 1903) Seeking to lay "the dust of pseudoproblems," pragmatism allows "us to discern what pertinent facts the phenomena may present. But this is a good half of the task of philosophy" (CP, 8.186, 1903). It is worth pausing to mention that philosophy, as Peirce understands it, does not stand apart from science in the way it does today, but rather is the second of the three sciences of discovery, all of which... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reply to Flage Lesley Friedman "The chiefexercise of the memory," Hume tells us, "is not to preserve the simple ideas, but their order and position."1 On Daniel Flage's interpretation ofHume, however, it is the only exercise ofthe memory (1985a, 1985b, 1990). Flage's account can accommodate onlymemories of complex ideas; he disallows the possibility of 'preserving* a simple idea in its simplicity. Yet there is an example of (...) a purely simple impression in the Treatise; and since for every impression there is in principle a corresponding idea which we can later recall, this example establishes the existence of a purely simple memory-idea. In what follows I will provide support for this claim, Flage's counterarguments (this volume) notwithstanding. Flage argues that given any perceived object, say a coloured dot, there is a visual field in which we perceive it. This field and the impression we receive from it, "must be a complex impression, that is, an impression that is composed of indefinitely many colour points. In this respect it is analogous to a pointillist painting or, to use a more contemporary example, a computer array composed of pixels" (1993, 190). Flage is probably right about this; from our point of view, it is implausible to suggest that there is any purely simple background, or worse, that there is no impression ofa background at all. Nonetheless, my concern is with what Hume thought and not with what is plausible orimplausible; and Hume does give an example ofa "background" that is notcomplex, namely, the scenarioinwhichwe perceive points oflight in darkness. We may observe, that when two bodies present themselves, where there wasformerly an entire darkness, the onlychange, that is discoverable, is in the appearance ofthese two objects, and that all the rest continues to be as before, a perfect negation oflight, and of every colour'd or visible object. This is not only true of what may be said to be remote from these bodies, but also of the very distance; which is interpos'd betwixt them; that being nothing but darkness, or the negation of light; without parts, without composition, invariable and indivisible. (T 57, bold italics added) I originally considered the ink spot experiment and theidea ofred in the dark as examples ofpurely simple impressions. Let me try this Volume XLX Number 1 199 LESLEYFRIEDMAN again, elaborating a bit more on the latter (what I take to be Hume's example of a version of the ink spot experiment). Early on in the Treatise Hume speaks of"that idea ofred which we form in the dark" (T 3). Let us then consider a red spot in complete darkness. Flage and I agree that this spot is qualitatively simple. Our disagreement is rooted in the nature ofthe "background," in this case the darkness. Flage claims that "the sighted-person sitting in the dark has an impression or impressions, namely, an impression of darkness" (1993, 190); and therefore the impression we have of the spot of red in darkness is not purely simple. In support of this claim he cites the followingevidence: Hume's remarks that (1) "the sighted-person sitting in the dark "receives no other perception... than what is common to him with one born blind' " (ibid., 189; T 55-56), and (2) "the idea of utter darkness can never be the same with that of vacuum" (T 56). Let me take each ofthese in turn. Presumably, the first quote is cited in order to estabUsh that the blind person does indeed have a perception (impression) of darkness. This cannot be right; ifsuch a person had an impression ofdarkness, he would also have an idea of darkness, and if we look to the part of the sentence which Flage leaves out of his quotation, we find the following: "and 'tis certain such-a-one [that is, a blind person] has no idea either of light or darkness" (T 56). Hume's point is simple: the reason that the blind person has no idea ofdarkness is because he has no impression of darkness; and we are in the same position as him when we are sitting in the dark. Nor does the second quote provide evidence for the... (shrink)

Peirce's Reality and Berkeley's Blunders LESLEY FRIEDMAN IN A NUMBER OF HIS LATE REMARKS, Peirce makes it clear that he holds Bishop Berkeley in the highest esteem. Hailed as the "father of all modern philoso- phy," Peirce argues that Berkeley, not Kant, "first produced an Erkenntnis- theorie, or 'principles of human knowledge', which was for the most part cor- rect in its positive assertions" ? This is not at all to say that Berkeley escapes rebuke; in spite of (...) several laudatory remarks, ~ Peirce takes him to task for two errors: his view of reality as actual perception, and his neglect of real possibility. Additionally, in some passages we find Berkeley both credited for some insight and admonished for some oversight. In one such occurrence, ' The following abbreviations are used throughout this paper: RFB "Review of Fraser's Berkeley," Nation 73 : 95-96. LSB Robert G. Meyers and Richard H. Popkin, eds., "Early Influences on Peirce: A Letter to Samuel Barnett,"Journal of the History of Philosophy 31 : 6o7-21. This letter is dated December 2o, 19o 9. CP Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, eds. C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss . and A. Burks . Cited by volume and paragraph number. MS Peirce's manuscripts from microfilm rolls a-3 o, following the Robin listing: Annotated Catalogue of the Papers of Charles S. Peirce (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press,.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Another Look at Flage's Hume Lesley Friedman In recent articles, Daniel Flage (1985a, 1985b) offers an interpretation of Humean memory-ideas as relative ideas: ideas of memory are analogous to definite descriptionsinsofar as they single outexactly one entity.1 Consequently, Flage argues that Hume has provided an adequate distinction between ideas generated by memory and ideas generated by imagination. It is my contention that Flage's reading is neither consonant (...) with Hume's remarks in the Treatise nor successful in reducing the number ofdifficulties with Hume's theory ofmemory. I shall argue that (1) it is not clear that all memory-ideas are complex (an assumption necessary for Flage's interpretation); (2) Flage construes all memory as episodic, but he overlooks semantic memory; and (3) there isa distinction between mis-remembering and imagining which Flage's account cannot accommodate. It is worth noting that Flage contends that he is giving an interpretation ofHume's account ofmemory; he is not simply attempting to find out the truth ofthe matter. That is, Flage's position is that there is good reason to think that Hume construed memory-ideas as relative ideas. Accordingly, Flage must provide evidence, preferably textual, for the claim that Hume held such a view. My position is thatit is unlikely that Hume held such a view, and even if he did, it is inadequate for grounding an external distinction between memory-ideas and imagination-ideas. In short, claiming that Hume was interested in a decisive distinction between ideas ofmemory and ideas ofimagination is to involve Hume in problems with which he was not concerned. Not only are Flage's remarks in conflict with Hume's, but ifwe readhim as Flage suggests, Hume's theory ofmemory becomes considerably more riddled with problems than it is if we do not so read him. Flage and Hume In section 1 of Treatise 1.1, Hume draws his celebrated distinction between ideas and impressions. In the second section he considers impressions in some detail and he does the same for ideas in section three. Following every impression, Hume claims, there is a corresponding idea, either produced by the faculty of memory or the faculty of imagination. He takes it as no less than obvious that memory-ideas are more "lively and strong" than imagination-ideas: Volume XDi Number 1 177 LESLEY FRIEDMAN Tis evident at first sight, that the ideas of the memory are much more lively and strong than those of the imagination, and that the former faculty paints its objects in more distinct colours, than any which are emplo/d by the latter.2 That memory-ideas are more lively than their counterparts in imagination Hume construes as asensible difference between the two. Accordingly, I shall refer to this difference as the internal difference. Thereis,however,another difference betweenthesekinds ofideas, namely, that memory-ideas preserve the order and form of their corresponding simple ideas, while imagination-ideas need not: Tis evident, that the memory preserves the original form, in which its objects were presented, and that where-ever we depart from it in recollecting any thing, it proceeds from some defect or imperfection in that faculty.... The chiefexercise of the memoryis not to preserve the simpleideas, but their order and position.... The same evidence follows us in our second principle, of the Uberty ofthe imagination to transpose andchange its ideas. (T 9-10) I shall refer to the above as the external difference between memory-ideas andimagination-ideas.3 During his discussion ofcausation, Hume elaborates on the above differences. The external difference, he claims, "is not sufficient to... make us know the one from the other; it being impossible to recai the pastimpressions, in order to compare them with our present ideas, and see whether theirarrangementbe exactlysimilar" (T85). He concludes that the difference between memory and imagination is simply that memory-ideas are more forceful and vivacious than imagination-ideas. In short, since the external difference is non-phenomenal, it is inadequate for distinguishing, in practice, between ideas that are the product ofmemory and ideas that are the product of the imagination. Before concluding his discussion of the above differences Hume voices anote ofscepticismconcerningthe internal difference. He argues that theinternal... (shrink)

My focus in this work is on giving an analysis of Peirce's post-1895 remarks about realism and the realism/nominalism debate. I argue that there is a consistent position to be found in these writings, yet in order to understand his position we must look not only at Peirce's remarks on realism, but also to the various themes connected with his realism, viz. to his discussion of the categories, pragmatism, and opposing views. ;From Peirce's direct remarks on realism we learn that (...) there are two kinds of universals, viz., laws and possibilities , both of which are independent of mind. Peirce's claim that Firsts are real as possibilities, and Thirds are real as that to which Seconds conform, constitutes his universal-realism . Thirds, however, are laws, that which science seeks to discover. The subjunctive conditionals which express scientific theories are either true or false, and the entities to which they refer are real or figments. In this consists Peirce's scientific realism, or "scholastic realism". ;From Peirce's discussions of the categories and of nominalism, we learn that there are two kinds of qualities: embodied and unembodied. The latter are uninstantiated universals, the former are dispositions. Peirce's doctrine of pragmaticism is an analysis of embodied qualities, i.e., what it means to say that "an object possesses a character." I suggest that Peirce insists that uninstantiables as necessary for realism about laws because they ground the counterfactuals which law-statements support. ;Because Peirce has both uninstantiated universals, and because he also believes that there is a sense in which universals really are "in" things as parts, he is neither Transcendental nor Immanent Realist exclusively. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:On Friedman's Look Daniel E. Flage In a pair of articles and a book (Flage 1985a, 1985b, 1990), I argued that Hume's ideas of memory are relative ideas. In "Another Look at Flage's Hume" (this volume), Lesley Friedman challenges my account on four points. She argues (1) that it is possible to remember simple ideas in their simplicity; (2) that I have misrepresented Humean impressions ofreflection; (...) (3) that I have overlooked the importance of force and vivacity in Hume's account ofmemory; and (4) that there is no textual evidence for claiming that Humean ideas of memory are relative ideas. In addition, she contends that my interpretation cannot account for mis-remembering. In this paper I show that some of the problems Friedman finds with myinterpretation arise from myreading of Lockean distinctions into the Treatise while others stem from my conflation of distinctions drawn in the first Enquiry with comparable distinctions in the Treatise. 1. Remembering simple ideas My argument that Humean ideas ofmemory are relative ideas is based primarily on Hume's remarks in three passages. In Treatise 1.1.3, one finds this: "the imagination is not restrain'd to the same order and form with the original impressions; while the memory is in a manner tytt down in that respect, without any power of variation."1 Later in the same passage one finds this: Tis evident, that the memory preserves the original form, in which its objects were presented, and that where-ever we depart from it in recollecting any thing, it proceeds from some defect or imperfection in that faculty.... The chiefexercise of memory is not to preserve the simple ideas, but their order and position. (T 9) And in Treatise 1.3.5, one finds this: These faculties [memory and imagination] are as little distinguish'd from each other by the arrangement of their complexideas. For tho'itbe apeculiar propertyofthe memory to preserve the original order and position of its ideas, while the imagination transposes and changes them, as it pleases; yet this difference is not sufficient to distinguish them in their Volume XLX Number 1 187 DANIEL E. FLAGE operation, or make us know the one from the other; it being impossible to recai the past impressions, in order to compare them with our present ideas, and see whether their arrangement be exactly similar. (T 85) This is only one characteristic ofideas ofmemory, the other being the greater degree of"force andvivacity" in an idea ofthe memory vis-à-vis an idea ofthe imagination (T 9, 85). I call this characteristic the formal criterion (Flage 1985a, 171); Friedman calls it the external difference (p. 178). These passages show that ideas of the memory represent earlier impressions, or ideas, or "events," or things known.2 How do they do so? Given the remarks on the preservation of"order and form" and "order and position," and given that resemblance alone is not sufficient to distinguish nonmnemonic ideas from mnemonic ideas (see T 9), I argued that there is an implicit causal thesis: an idea ofmemory singles out the impression that was its original cause. It is a relative idea corresponding to a definite description ofthe form, "the impression that is the (original) cause of and exactly (or closely) resembles m," where 'm' denotes a particular positive idea. (Flage 1985a, 172)3 If my account of memory is correct, there is a positive idea ("mental image") that provides the basis for every relative idea of memory. Further, this positive idea must be complex. Friedman objects (pp. 180-81) that insofar as my account requires that there be a complex positive idea that provides the basis for one's relative idea of memory, this conflicts with several passages in the Treatise. She cites the ink spot experiment (T 42) as showing that one can have a simple impression of colour. She remarks, "Since we can have such a simple impression, we can also remember it" (p. 180), adding, "It seems clear that Hume thinks that in the [ink spot] experiment, all that is present in one's visual field is the spot of ink" (ibid.). Since I had argued that "Hume's example ofseeing a minimum... (shrink)

Call the norms of inquiry zetetic norms. How are zetetic norms related to epistemic norms? At first glance, they seem quite closely connected. Aren't epistemic norms norms that bind inquirers qua inquirers? And isn't epistemology the place to look for a normative theory of inquiry? While much of this thought seems right, this paper argues that the relationship between the epistemic and the zetetic is not as harmonious as one might have thought and liked. In particular, this paper argues that (...) some familiar contemporary epistemic norms are in tension with, and even in conflict with, central zetetic norms. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.

In this paper I look at belief and degrees of belief through the lens of inquiry. I argue that belief and degrees of belief play different roles in inquiry. In particular I argue that belief is a “settling” attitude in a way that degrees of belief are not. Along the way I say more about what inquiring amounts to, argue for a central norm of inquiry connecting inquiry and belief and say more about just what it means to have an (...) inquiry or question settled. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that there is a class of attitudes that have questions (rather than propositions or something else) as contents.

What I call the dynamics of reason is a post-Kuhnian approach to the history and philosophy of science articulating a relativized and historicized version of the Kantian conception of the rationality and objectivity of the modern physical sciences. I here discuss two extensions of this approach. I argue that, although the relativized standards of rationality in question change over time, the particular way in which they do this still preserves the trans-historical rationality of the entire process. I also make a (...) beginning in extending my historical narrative from purely intellectual history (both philosophical and scientific) to the wider cultural context. (shrink)

This book explores Iris Murdoch as a philosopher who, through her distinctive methodology, exploits the advantages of having a mind on the borders of literature and politics in her early career writings (pre-The Sovereignty of Good). By focusing on a single decade of Murdoch’s early career, Jamieson tracks connections between her views on the state of literature and politics in postwar Britain and her approach to the philosophy of mind and moral philosophy. Furthermore, this close study reveals that, far from (...) a stylistic quirk, Murdoch’s use of metaphors, analogies, and other literary devices is internal to her methodology. Finally, rather than asking what Murdoch’s views are, this work will ask “what is Murdoch trying to achieve with her writings and public lectures, and how does she go about this?” By answering the latter question, we will have a new strategy for interpreting her writings more generally. The book contributes to the growing body of scholarship focusing on Iris Murdoch’s philosophical writings, and on women in the history of analytic philosophy. (shrink)

Managing Complexity in Healthcare introduces the ComEntEth (Complex Entropic Ethical) model as an integrated bio-medical and philosophical approach to understanding how people get things done in healthcare. Drawing on the complexity sciences, studies of entropy in living organisms, and the ethics of Emmanuel Levinas, healthcare is theorised as energetic relational exchanges between people as entropic and ethical entities that unfold around a central attractor: Reduction in elevated entropy or suffering in patients. Living entities are engaged in a continuous struggle against (...) the tendency to produce entropy. From the cellular to the collective of human endeavours, the tendency of complex systems is to disorder and decay. Yet in the micro-activity of healthcare enterprise, people resist this tendency by expending energy to create order and sustain life. Making sense of how this miraculous work is made possible is the foundation of this book. Through practical examples - from analysis of practitioner burnout, rural and remote healthcare, the functioning of emergency departments, to government, social and institutional responses to the COVID-19 pandemic -this new integral philosophy provides practitioners, managers, policy designers, and scholars an effective way to understand the dynamics of daily processes and practices that link the micro of everyday interactions with the macro-trends of healthcare. (shrink)

Scientific disagreements are an important catalyst for scientific progress. But what happens when scientists disagree amidst times of crisis, when we need quick yet reliable policy guidance? In this paper we provide a normative account for how scientists facing disagreement in the context of ‘fast science’ should respond, and how policy makers should evaluate such disagreement. Starting from an argumentative, pragma-dialectic account of scientific controversies, we argue for the importance of ‘higher-order evidence’ (HOE) and we specify desiderata for scientifically relevant (...) HOE. We use our account to analyze the controversy about the aerosol transmission of COVID-19. (shrink)

Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue , the first study in any language to provide a complete overview of Buber's thought, remains the definitive guide to the full range of his work and the starting point for all modern Buber scholarship. As well as summarizing Buber's early intellectual development and attitudes - his mysticism, his youthful existentialism, his philosophy of Judaism and religious socialism - it focuses on the two crucial issues of his mature thought: his dialogic or I-Thou philosophy, (...) and his probing of the nature and redemption of evil. As a sensitive, intuitive and perennially fascinating account of one of the twentieth century's great spiritual teachers, and as an influential classic in its own right, Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue reveals the implications of Buber's thought for theory of knowledge, education, philosophy, myth, history and Judaic and Christian belief. This fully revised and expanded 4th edition includes a new preface from the author, an expanded bibliography incorporating new Buber scholarship, and two new appendices in the form of essays on Buber's influence on Emmanuel Levinas and Mikhail Bakhtin. (shrink)

Liberalism sanctifies the values chosen by the sovereign individual. This tends to rule out criticisms of an individual's “preference” for one value over another by, ironically, establishing a deterministic view of the self that protects the self's desires from scrutiny. Similarly, rational choice approaches to social theory begin with previously determined individual preferences and focus on the means by which they are pursued, concentrating on the results rather than the sources of people's values.A striking new attempt to go behind the (...) liberal and rational‐choice starting point in order to understand political preferences is found in Aaron Wildavsky's Cultural Theory. Yet Cultural Theory does not facilitate the criticism of preferences, because its understanding of them is fundamentally liberal. Even while rejecting methodological individualism, Cultural Theory's monocausally social theory of preference formation retains in a new guise the liberal preservation of preferences from criticism by reestablishing a deterministic view of the formation of values, leading it to share with liberalism an a historical view of their origins. (shrink)

[1] The early years, 1878-1923 -- [2] The middle years, 1923-1945 -- [3] The later years, 1945-1965.

The postwar welfare state provides social insurance against economic, health, and related risks in an uncertain world. Because everyone can envision themselves to be among the unfortunate, social insurance fuses self-interest and solidarism in a normative principle Friedman (2020) calls probabilistic justice. But there is a competing principle of status defense, where the aim is to erect boundaries between socioeconomic strata and discourage cross-class mobility. We argue that this principle dominates when inequality is high and uncertainty low. The current (...) moment is one of high inequality and high uncertainty, which results in intense status anxiety, yet does not rule out solidaristic solutions. Our contributions are to diagnose the causes of our current malaise, and to theorize the normative bases for the political choice facing contemporary western democracies. (shrink)

In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle examines the nature of happiness, which he defines as a specially good kind of life. He considers the nature of practical reasoning, friendship, and the role and importance of the moral virtues in the best life. This new edition features a revised translation and valuable new introduction and notes.

The comparison made by Ada Lovelace in 1843 between the Analytical Engine and the Jacquard loom is one of the well-known analogies between looms and computation machines. Given the fact that weaving – and textile production in general – is one of the oldest cultural techniques in human history, the question arises whether this was the first time that such a parallel was drawn. As this paper will show, centuries before Lovelace’s analogy, such a comparison was made by Gottfried Wilhelm (...) Leibniz. During the 17th century, Leibniz compared his calculating machines with another textile machine, the stocking frame, a machine which mechanized knitting and which was invented in 1589. During the following centuries, this machine was considered as a technological wonder and as a creation of God, and, during the last decades of the 17th century, Leibniz emphasized the need to consider it and other textile machines mathematically. What, then, were the reasons for the parallel drawn between this machine and Leibniz’s automatic computation machines? And what were the consequences of this analogy concerning the artisanal knowledge embedded in manual textile practices? (shrink)

It has been 140 years since a full biography of William of Auvergne (1180?-1249), which may come as a surprise, given that William was an important gateway of Greek and Arabic thought and philosophy to western Europe in the thirteenth century, and one of the earliest writers in the medieval Latin west on demonology. Lesley Smith's aims in this book are two-fold: first, to take a closer look at William, the human being, how he saw the world and his (...) place in it; and to uncover William's interactions with his Parisian congregation through the nearly 600 sermons he left after his death. Smith has mined these writings, unremarked in previous scholarship, to give us a different perspective on the schoolmaster, bishop of Paris, and strict theologian we have come to know: a preacher who spoke and ministered not just to the powerful and elite, but also to commoners, to the poor, and to the less fortunate. Through a study of the sermons, Smith creates a broader landscape of William's thought and life, highlighting his attention to the importance--and limits--of language, and his attempts to find a way to address the concerns of the larger populace. In his preaching, we get a sense of the balance William achieved, in the way he communicated religious teachings, in his understanding of the concerns of ordinary Parisians, and in his awareness of the ebb and flow of daily life in a medieval city. The book will interest scholars of intellectual history and philosophy, religion, and literary studies more broadly for Smith's innovative method of excavating the sermons in pursuit of William the person, and his humanity. An altogether "new" William for the twenty-first century. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: I Equality of Resources II Justice in Health Care III Why Universal Access Requires In‐kind Transfers IV Conclusion Acknowledgement.

Honeybees show lateral asymmetry in both learning about odours associated with reward and recalling memory of these associations. We have extended this research to show that bees exhibit lateral biases in their initial response to odours: viz., turning towards the source of an odour presented on their right side and turning away from it when presented on their left side. The odours we presented were the main component of the alarm pheromone, iso-amyl acetate (IAA), and four floral scents. The significant (...) bias to turn towards IAA odour on the right and away from it on the left is, we argue, a lateralization of the fight-flight response elicited by this pheromone. It contrasts to an absence of any asymmetry in the turning response to an odour of the flowers on which the bees had been feeding prior to testing: to this odour they turned towards when it was presented on either the left or right side. Lemon and orange odours were responded to differently on the left and right sides (towards on the right, away on the left) but no asymmetry was found in responses to rose odour. Our results show that side biases are present even in the initial, orienting response of bees to certain odours. (shrink)

Beautifully packaged reissue of the vividly lyrical biography of Nietzsche that John Banville called 'a major intellectual event' In 1888, philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche moved to Turin. This would be the year in which he wrote three of his greatest works: Twilight of the Idols, The Antichrist, and Ecce Homo; it would also be his last year of writing. He suffered a debilitating nervous breakdown in the first days of the following year. In this probing, elegant biography of that pivotal year, (...) Lesley Chamberlain undoes popular clichés and misconceptions about Nietzsche by offering a deeply complex approach to his character and work. Focusing as much on Nietzsche's daily habits, anxieties and insecurities as on the development of his philosophy, Nietzsche in Turin offers a uniquely lively portrait of the great thinker, and of the furiously productive days that preceded his decline. (shrink)

Advancements in artificial intelligence and (social) robotics raise pertinent questions as to how these technologies may help shape the society of the future. The main aim of the chapter is to consider the social and conceptual disruptions that might be associated with social robots, and humanoid social robots in particular. This chapter starts by comparing the concepts of robots and artificial intelligence and briefly explores the origins of these expressions. It then explains the definition of a social robot, as well (...) as the definition of humanoid robots. A key notion in this context is the idea of anthropomorphism: the human tendency to attribute human qualities, not only to our fellow human beings, but also to parts of nature and to technologies. This tendency to anthropomorphize technologies by responding to and interacting with them as if they have human qualities is one of the reasons why social robots (in particular social robots designed to look and behave like human beings) can be socially disruptive. As is explained in the chapter, while some ethics researchers believe that anthropomorphization is a mistake that can lead to various forms of deception, others — including both ethics researchers and social roboticists — believe it can be useful or fitting to treat robots in anthropomorphizing ways. The chapter explores that disagreement by, among other things, considering recent philosophical debates about whether social robots can be moral patients, that is, whether it can make sense to treat them with moral consideration. Where one stands on this issue will depend either on one’s views about whether social robots can have, imitate, or represent morally relevant properties, or on how people relate to social robots in their interactions with them. Lastly, the chapter urges that the ethics of social robots should explore intercultural perspectives, and highlights some recent research on Ubuntu ethics and social robots. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the way that cultures change and how cultural diversity is created, maintained and lost. Human culture is the inevitable result of the way our species acquires its behavior. We are extremely social animals and an overwhelming proportion of our behavior is socially learned. The behavior of other animals is largely a product of innate evolved determinants of behavior combined with individual learning. They make quite modest use of social learning while we acquire a massive cultural repertoire (...) from the people we associate with (Richerson & Boyd, 2005: Chapter 2). Expertise in exploiting our environment, values about what matters in life and even feelings about whom to trust and whom to hate are mostly “absorbed” from those around us. (shrink)

This volume is a tribute by his peers, and by younger scholars of the next generation, to Harvey M. Friedman, perhaps the most profound foundationalist since Kurt Godel. Friedman's researches, beginning precociously in his mid-teens, have fundamentally shaped our contemporary understanding of set theory, recursion theory, model theory, proof theory and metamathematics. His achievements in concept formation and theory formulation have also renewed the standard set by Godel and Alfred Tarski for the general intellectual interest and importance of (...) technical work in foundations. Friedman pioneered the now well-established and flourishing field of Reverse Mathematics, whose aim is to calibrate the intrinsic logico-mathematical consistency-strength of all the important theorems of mathematics. He has relentlessly pursued the full extent of the incompleteness phenomena into which Godel provided the first revealing glimpse. The Godel--Friedman program, as it is now deservingly called, seeks to find simple, natural and elegant mathematical statements of a combinatorial nature, that can be proved to be independent of set theory even when extended by powerful large-cardinal existence axioms. (shrink)

This practical guide explores professional values in nursing, helping you to develop safe, compassionate, person-centred and evidence-based practice. The fundamental values of equality, anti-discriminatory practice and caring are discussed throughout. Chapters explore person-centred and holistic nursing care. They discuss working in partnership with people and families and working in partnership within the interprofessional team. The book explores vulnerability and safeguarding, challenging poor practice and promoting best practice. Chapters are mapped to NMC Standards for Pre-registration Nursing Education. Strong evidence base to (...) ensure best practice. Accessible style with features including learning outcomes, key points, summary boxes, case studies, reflection points and questions. Relevant to all fields of nursing, with case studies representing patients across the lifespan and with different healthcare needs. Free online resources include PowerPoints, additional scenarios and questions. Professional Values in Nursing is a valuable resource for all nursing students, helping to embed professional values in your everyday practice. (shrink)

The first study in any language to provide a complete overview of Buber's thought, remains the definitive guide to the full range of his work and the starting point for all modern Buber scholarship. As well as summarizing Buber's early intellectual development and attitudes - his mysticism, his youthful existentialism, his philosophy of Judaism and religious socialism - it focuses on the two crucial issues of his mature thought: his dialogic or I-Thou philosophy, and his probing of the nature and (...) redemption of evil. As a sensitive, intuitive and perennially fascinating account of one of the twentieth century's great spiritual teachers, and as an influential classic in its own right, Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue reveals the implications of Buber's thought for theory of knowledge, education, philosophy, myth, history and Judaic and Christian belief. (shrink)

In the previous paper I resituated Peter Singer's Animal Liberation within the larger context of the historical development of the animal activist movement. This paper directly follows on from the previous one, but here I take a closer at the book itself, focusing on 'Tools for Research', the second chapter in which Singer discusses animal experimentation particularly. My aim is to draw attention to the tactics adopted by Singer, which given the historical development of the movement, as detailed previously, are (...) indeed activist, and offer some account of why they are morally persuasive. (shrink)

In this paper and the next I discuss Peter Singer’s approach to answering the question of how one ought to live with nonhuman animals. In the first paper I situate Singer’s work within the larger historical context of moral concern for animals, looking at previous public consensus on the issue, its breakdown and its re-emergence with Singer in the 1970s. In the second paper, I take a closer look at Singer’s highly influential book, Animal Liberation , and argue that as (...) activist literature, his chapter on animal experimentation for example can be seen as morally persuasive in ways other than simply as an example of of speciesism. How I do this is to place Singer’s work side by side that of 19th century activist Francis Power Cobbe’s, in particular her pamphlet Light in Dark Places , and examine their work against the criticisms from scientists defending the practice of animal experimentation. (shrink)