ABSTRACT This paper examines the logic and morality of the German Stem Cell Act of 2002. After a brief description of the law's scope and intent, its ethical dimensions are analysed in terms of symbolic threats, indirect consequences, and the encouragement of immorality. The conclusions are twofold. For those who want to accept the law, the arguments for its rationality and morality can be sound. For others, the emphasis on the uniqueness of the German experience, the combination of absolute and (...) qualified value judgments, and the lingering questions of indirect encouragement of immoral activities will probably be too much. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The authors analyse and assess the Universal Draft Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights published by UNESCO. They argue that the Draft has two main weaknesses. It unnecessarily confines the scope of bioethics to life sciences and their practical applications. And it fails to spell out the intended role of human dignity in international ethical regulation.

Within the latter half of the 30-year history of bioethics there has been an increasing pressure to address bioethical issues globally. Bioethics is not traditionally a theory-based enterprise, rather the focus has been problem related. With the introduction of the global perspective, theory has, however, become more important. One of the best known, probably the best known, theory of bioethics is the one presented by Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress in their PrinciplesofBiomedicalEthics in 1979. This theory is known (...) as the or the approach or It is the attempt to create a global framework for bioethics on the four principlesthat I will scrutinize in this paper. (shrink)

The growing interest in bioethics has given rise to a new group of experts: experts in bioethics. They come from different walks of life and their motives, claims, and qualifications for expertise are manifold. Various academic disciplines can be said to contribute to one's status as an expert in bioethics. Studies and research in, say, philosophy, law, anthropology, history, theology, and sociology with an emphasis on bioethical matters are often thought of as suitably qualifying a person as a bioethicist. In (...) addition to these academic qualifications there are two routes to becoming a bioethicist. I will call these the self-nomination and the through-work-experience routes. Self-nominated expertise is most common with medics who have strong religious or other ideological views about ethical matters. Another path to self-nominated expertise starts with strongly held ideological views with interest in bioethical matters. For this category of bioethical experts there does not have to be any institutional acknowledgment of their status; they are experts because they think they are. The other nonacademic type of expert in bioethics emerges through administrative channels. When the various ethics committees and regulatory bodies that now abound were first founded, there were no experts in bioethics to sit on these committees. People became experts by serving in these institutions for sufficiently long periods of time. This still happens with ethics committees in which just a few of the members are experts in ethics. People join the committees as experts of other fields, but are thought to have become experts through the fact that they have served on such committees. (shrink)

In discussions among nonphilosophers, the ethical argument from naturalness frequently comes up. “Of course, cloning should be banned—it is unnatural.” “Surely you cannot deny that homosexuality is unnatural.” “The immorality of gene technology is apparent because things like that do not happen in nature. Genes do not jump between species and crossbreeding produces infertile offspring.” Even those who come from a philosophical background can catch themselves thinking, “That is unnatural!” and finding grounds for suspicion from the thought. But what do (...) we mean when we talk about morality and naturalness? What interpretations can be given to the ideas of natural and unnatural in ethical discussions? What are the implications of these interpretations? Are there good grounds for assuming that naturalness is morally better than its opposite? a. (shrink)

Finland is a country in Northern Europe with a population of approximately 5.1 million people. It lies between Sweden and Russia and has a border with Norway too. It is part of the European Union and also belongs to the European Monetary Union. It is a welfare state in the sense that healthcare services, schools, universities, and social services are for the most part paid for by tax-based funding. In terms of basic healthcare, the state, through local municipalities, provides comprehensive (...) coverage to all residents, and this is utilized by both the wealthy and the poor. (shrink)

I think that utilitarianism is a good moral theory, and definitely better than its rivals, deontology and teleology. For practical purposes in multicultural contexts, at least, I think that no one should overlook a theory that is able to take into account a variety of ethical views and accommodate the ever-changing facts of the material world. But utilitarianism has a bad reputation in bioethics. It is often seen as the inhumane theory that allows the sacrifice of minorities, the killing of (...) the innocent, and simplistic calculations on the value of life. Hardly anyone cares to remember that most formulations of the theory do not allow these actions. The economic doctrine sometimes labeled as utilitarianism could be guilty as charged, but ethics and economy are not interchangeable words. Also as a theory that can actually propose answers to no-win situations, utilitarianism has been an easy target for criticism. (shrink)

In a contribution to The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy , Professor Rosamond Rhodes argues that individuals sometimes have an obligation to know about their genetic disorders, because this is required by their status as autonomous persons. Her analysis, which is based on Kant's concept of autonomy and Aristotle's notion of friendship, is extended here to consequentialist concerns. These are of paramount importance if, as we believe and Professor Rhodes herself implies, the Kantian and Aristotelian doctrines can be helpful only (...) in the sphere of private morality, not in the public realm. Better tools for assessing the right to genetic ignorance as an issue of public policy can, we contend, be found in Mill's ideas concerning liberty and the prevention of harm. Our own conclusion, based on the Millian way of thinking, is that individuals probably do have the right to remain in ignorance in the cases Professor Rhodes presents as examples of a duty to know. (shrink)

Sustainability, properly understood, is an existential moral ideal. The United Nations, however, defines it in terms of 17 indivisible sustainable development goals. This definition changes the core idea of the concept. It turns sustainability from a moral ideal into a set of economy-based political aspirations. The European Union’s bioeconomy strategy demonstrates the shift aptly and reveals its main problem. When economy is prioritized, social and ecological concerns become secondary. This has been the United Nations line since the Brundtland Commission’s report, (...) Our Common Future in 1987. Considerations of justice illustrate the inadequacy of the approach. Equality and justice require that all those affected by decisions are heard in making them. Under the current operationalization, decisions related to the natural environment and climate change are currently being made without hearing voices that advocate deeper social and ecological equality. After an explication of the problem and the state of the art as outlined above, a new notion of justainability is introduced and it is argued that assuming it would be a step in the right direction in taking also noneconomic values properly into account in international decision making. (shrink)

:This article examines the moralistic language and arguments used in relation to genetics. The focus is on three practices: the claims that there is a duty to know about one’s own genetic makeup, assertions that genetic information should be used to inform reproductive decisions, and the proposition that there are moral reasons to participate in biobank research. With these three, the author contends that there are equally good, if not better, arguments to challenge them from a Millian perspective. Furthermore, especially (...) in the current political climate, there is a need to respect people’s privacy concerns. (shrink)

Abstract:This paper explores how Finnish research ethics deals with matters of justice on the levels of practical regulation, political morality, and theoretical studies. The bioethical sets of principles introduced by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress in the United States and Jacob Dahl Rendtorff and Peter Kemp in Europe provide the conceptual background, together with a recently introduced conceptual map of theories of justice and their dimensions. The most striking finding is that the internationally recognized requirement of informed consent for research (...) on humans can be ideologically tricky in a Scandinavian welfare state setting. (shrink)

In debates on the ethics of artificial gametes, concepts of naturalness have been used in a number of different ways. Some have argued that the unnaturalness of artificial gametes means that it is unacceptable to use them in fertility treatments. Others have suggested that artificial gametes are no less natural than many other tissues or processes in common medical use. We suggest that establishing the naturalness or unnaturalness of artificial gametes is unlikely to provide easy answers as to the acceptability (...) of using them in fertility medicine. However, we also suggest that we should be cautious about repudiating any relationship between nature and moral evaluation. The property of being natural or man-made may not per se tell us anything about an entity’s moral status, but it has an important impact on the moral relationship between the creator and the created organism. (shrink)

The question concerning an individual''s rightto remain in ignorance regarding her owngenetic makeup is central to debates aboutgenetic information. Whatever is decided onthis matter has a weighty bearing on all of therelated third-party issues, such as whetherfamily members or employers should be toldabout an individual''s genetic makeup. Thosearguing that no right to genetic ignoranceexists tend to argue from a viewpoint I havecalled in this paper reasonablepaternalism. It is an appealing position whichrests on widely shared intuitions on reasonablechoices, but which, in (...) the end, smugglespaternalism back to medical practice. (shrink)

One of the much debated issues around the evolving human genetics is the question of the right to know versus the right not to know. The core question of this theme is whether an individual has the right to know about her own genetic constitution and further, does she also have the right to remain in ignorance. Within liberal traditions it is usually held that people, if they so wish, have the right to all the knowledge available about themselves. This (...) right is based on the value of autonomy or on the right of self‐determination, and it is sometimes partly justified as a countermeasure to the authorities' control over people. I do not wish to deny the right to genetic knowledge (about oneself). I think that its existence is self‐evident. The argument I want to put forth in this paper is that in liberal societies we should acknowledge people’s right to remain in ignorance as well. The only reason for not doing this would be that grave harm to others would follow if people were allowed to make these seemingly self‐regarding decisions. Arguments presented against the right to ignorance are twofold. First there are those arguing against the right to ignorance on the grounds of harm to others, that is, philosophers who do not deny people’s right to ignorance in self‐related matters but wish to state that genetic ignorance causes harm to others, and this is one of the most commonly accepted reason for restricting people’s freedom. The other line of argument flows from the Kantian view that not even merely self‐regarding foolishness (in the eyes of others) should be allowed. (shrink)

In her thorough and thoughtful contribution to the Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics titled “Medical Ethics: Common or Uncommon Morality” Rosamond Rhodes argues that contrary to American mainstream bioethics, medical ethics is not, and should not be, based on common morality, but rather, that the medical profession requires its own distinctive morality.1 She goes on to list sixteen duties that, according to her, form the core of medical ethics proper.

Neuroethics studies the ethical, social, and legal issues raised by actual or expected advances in neuroscience. The relevant fields in neuroscience include, but are not limited to, neuroimaging, cognitive neuroscience, neuropsychopharmacology, neurogenetics, and neuropsychiatry. For many, neuroethics is best understood as a subcategory of bioethics, and although not all agree, for the purposes of the present collection of articles, this definition is assumed. Although bioethics as a field of study started in the early 1970s as a normative enterprise, mainly practiced (...) by philosophers and theologians, it has since become truly inter- and multidisciplinary, comprising also law, sociology, psychology, gender studies, disability studies, anthropology, history, and many other approaches. What we particularly wanted to do in this issue, however, was to find the most pertinent questions of neuroethics from the viewpoint of philosophy, and the call for papers was drafted accordingly.Tuija Takala, Ph.D., is Academy Research Fellow at the Academy of Finland and Adjunct Professor of Social and Moral Philosophy at the University of Helsinki, Finland. She is president-elect of the European Society for Philosophy of Medicine and Health Care and holds a number of international editorial positions. Her current research interests lie in the conceptual, methodological, and theoretical aspects of philosophical bioethics.FootnotesThe editorial work for this special issue was supported by my project Neuroscience and Norms: Ethical and Legal Aspects of Norms in Neuroimaging / Ethical Concepts and Norms funded by the Academy of Finland. (shrink)

This paper examines the logic and morality of the German Stem Cell Act of 2002. After a brief description of the law’s scope and intent, its ethical dimensions are analysed in terms of symbolic threats, indirect consequences, and the encouragement of immorality. The conclusions are twofold. For those who want to accept the law, the arguments for its rationality and morality can be sound. For others, the emphasis on the uniqueness of the German experience, the combination of absolute and qualified (...) value judgments, and the lingering questions of indirect encouragement of immoral activities will probably be too much. (shrink)

Last year we reported that there are no professorships in medical ethics in Finland. This year we are happy to report that a chair in medical ethics has now been advertised at the University of Turku. We also gave details about the attempts to come up with a law on assisted reproduction. As predicted, there were problems, and eventually the proposal was withdrawn, leaving Finland still without a law on assisted reproduction. The talk on large-scale genetic databases has been surprisingly (...) quiet, and even the report published by the Parliament's working group on this matter, implying that a population database should be created, went virtually unnoticed. In this year's contribution, we address the issues of male circumcision, stem cell research, and, within the field of research ethics, the problem of defining medical research. (shrink)

This article provides an overview of the six other contributions in the Neuroethics and Animals special section. In addition, it discusses the methodological and theoretical problems of interdisciplinary fields. The article suggests that interdisciplinary approaches without established methodological and theoretical bases are difficult to assess scientifically. This might cause these fields to expand without actually advancing.

Among the many ethical problems brought about by the latest developments in medical sciences is the possibility of creating "designer" babies. In this paper I will look at one such a case from the viewpoint of the Kantian "humanity principle". The various aspects of treating people as a means that can be brought up in discussions about "designer" babies are scrutinised. These will obviously include treating the future child as a mere means, but the proper role of the mother and (...) others involved are also looked at. I will conclude by arguing that, contrary to the usual presuppositions, the humanity principle is of very limited use in discussions about designer babies, in this case and in others too. (shrink)

Part of the rationale behind public health measures is protecting the vulnerable. One of the groups most vulnerable to COVID-19 are the elderly and, consequently, many countries adopted public health measures that aimed to keep the elderly safe. The effectiveness and the consequences of those measures, however, leaves a lot to be desired. In my article, I will look at the steps that the Nordic countries took to protect their elderly and assess their success. I will further analyze those in (...) the light of standard ethical theories. Public health crises often call for choices between two evils. Selecting patients for intensive care is one such choice, and again, it seems that for the elderly, the outcome was less than favorable. Overall, from the point of view of ethics, many countries failed miserably when it came to the treatment of the elderly. I will end my paper by discussing the lessons we can learn from the COVID-19 pandemic and suggests measures we need to take to offer genuine respect for the rights of the elderly. (shrink)

Among the many ethical problems brought about by the latest developments in medical sciences is the possibility of creating "designer" babies. In this paper I will look at one such a case from the viewpoint of the Kantian "humanity principle". The various aspects of treating people as a means that can be brought up in discussions about "designer" babies are scrutinised. These will obviously include treating the future child as a mere means, but the proper role of the mother and (...) others involved are also looked at. I will conclude by arguing that, contrary to the usual presuppositions, the humanity principle is of very limited use in discussions about designer babies, in this case and in others too. (shrink)

This paper provides an overview of the development and the sociopolitical background of legislation pertaining to abortion in Finland from the nineteenth century to the current day. The first Abortion Act came to force in 1950. Before that, abortions were handled under criminal law. The 1950 law was restrictive and allowed abortions in very limited circumstances only. Its main aim was to reduce the number of abortions and especially illegal abortions. It was not very successful in reaching these goals, but, (...) significantly, it moved abortions from the realm of the criminal law to the hands of medical professionals. The birth of the welfare state and the prenatal attitudes of 1930s and 1940s Europe played their part in shaping the law. By late 1960s, with the rise of the women’s rights movement and other changes in society, there was pressure to change the outdated law. The new 1970 Abortion Act was broader and allowed abortions for limited social reasons too but left very limited, if any, room for a woman’s right to choose. After a citizen’s initiative in 2020, the year 2023 will see a significant amendment to the 1970 law; during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, an abortion can be performed on the woman’s request alone. However, there is still a long way to go in terms of women’s rights and abortion laws in Finland. (shrink)

This article describes and introduces a new innovative tool for bioethics education: a rock opera on the ethics of genetics written by two academics and a drummer legend. The origin of the idea, the characters and their development, and the themes and approaches as well as initial responses to the music and the show are described, and the various educational usages are explored.

In this paper I will study the theoretical foundations of autonomy and argue that many of the disputes around the principle follow from different understandings of what is "true freedom." My analysis will center on the two notions of liberty introduced by Isaiah Berlin in his "Two Concepts of Liberty" (originally published in 1959). The problem is that there is no unequivocal way to understand the division. In my paper, I will give one interpretation of Berlin's two concepts, and argue (...) that this reading both captures the essence of his essay and explains why there are so many ways of respecting autonomy. (shrink)

In this paper I will study the theoretical foundations of autonomy and argue that many of the disputes around the principle follow from different understandings of what is "true freedom." My analysis will center on the two notions of liberty introduced by Isaiah Berlin in his "Two Concepts of Liberty" (originally published in 1959). The problem is that there is no unequivocal way to understand the division. In my paper, I will give one interpretation of Berlin's two concepts, and argue (...) that this reading both captures the essence of his essay and explains why there are so many ways of respecting autonomy. (shrink)

Concepts that refer to trends like globalization and medicalization have, of late, become a hallmark of public debates. The logic of such concepts is that the same word can refer both to good and bad developments, partly depending on the chosen viewpoint. Hardly anyone opposes the global enforcement of human rights, but the global liberation of trade is sometimes viewed with suspicion. In a similar vein, advances in medicine are seldom seen as a bad thing, but medical solutions to social (...) issues can be seen as problematic. (shrink)

Rights, autonomy, privacy, and confidentialityare concepts commonly used in discussionsconcerning genetic information. When theseconcepts are thought of as denoting absolutenorms and values which cannot be overriden byother considerations, conflicts among themnaturally occur.In this paper, these and related notions areexamined in terms of the duties and obligationsmedical professionals and their clients canhave regarding genetic knowledge. It issuggested that while the prevailing idea ofautonomy is unhelpful in the analysis of theseduties, and the ensuing rights, an alternativereading of personal self-determination canprovide a firmer (...) basis for ethical guidelinesand policies in this field. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The authors analyse and assess the Universal Draft Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights published by UNESCO. They argue that the Draft has two main weaknesses. It unnecessarily confines the scope of bioethics to life sciences and their practical applications. And it fails to spell out the intended role of human dignity in international ethical regulation.

WHAT IS BIOETHICS ALL ABOUT? A START Matti Hayry and Tuija Takala. A Start What is bioethics all about? Is it only about medicine, nursing, and healthcare? ...

Many bioethical disputes are conceptual. This means that people quarrel about the use of words that they see as important. The underlying idea is that whoever wins the verbal argument will also be ethically right.

This book explores the many connections that bioethical thinking has with social reality. Bioethics, if it is to be effective, must engage with and address the actualities of modern life: policies, regulations, markets, opinions, and technological advances. In these original contributions fifteen notable scholars working in the North West of England take on this challenge. The series Values in Bioethics makes available original philosophical books in all areas of bioethics, including medical and nursing ethics, health care ethics, research ethics, environmental (...) ethics, and global bioethics. (shrink)

Rights can be founded in a variety of ethical systems—e.g., on natural law, on the duties postulated by deontological ethics, and on the consequences of our actions. The concept of risk we will outline supports a theory of rights which provides at least individual human beings with the entitlement not to be harmed by the environmental impacts of biotechnology. The analysis can, we believe, also be extended to the rights of animals as well as ecosystems, both of which can be (...) harmed by human actions. We argue that further examination of these harms and rights would be the best way to proceed from emotional moral objections to truly ethical analyses in the context of biotechnology and the environment. (shrink)

This book deals with the international assessment and regulation of biomedical research. In its chapters, some of the leading figures in today’s bioethics address questions centred on global development, scientific advances, and vulnerability. The series _Values In Bioethics_ makes available original philosophical books in all areas of bioethics, including medical and nursing ethics, health care ethics, research ethics, environmental ethics, and global bioethics.

This book explores the nature of values, and the status of value studies, at the turn of the millennium. The contributors, nineteen philosophers from fourteen countries, introduce and defend an enriching variety of views regarding the present state and future prospects of value inquiry.