I defend a naturalist theory of moral justification, "Confirmation Theory", from an objection raised by David Copp and Geoffrey Sayre-McCord. Confirmation Theory holds that some moral theory is justified because it is needed in the best empirical explanation of the world. The objection is that moral explanations are "incidental", that even if a moral theory is indispensable, this doesn't establish that any moral standard is justified. I show that the naturalist can concede that moral explanations are incidental and still maintain (...) the attractive elements of Confirmation Theory. (shrink)

This is a book grounded in the real ethical challenges of modern business practice, with a world-religious perspective so necessary in an era of globalization.

At metaphase in mitotic cells, pulling forces at the kinetochore‐microtubule interface create tension by stretching the centromeric chromatin between oppositely oriented sister kinetochores. This tension is important for stabilizing the end‐on kinetochore microtubule attachment required for proper bi‐orientation of sister chromosomes as well as for satisfaction of the Spindle Assembly Checkpoint and entry into anaphase. How force is coupled by proteins to kinetochore microtubules and resisted by centromere stretch is becoming better understood as many of the proteins involved have been (...) identified. Recent application of genetically encoded fluorescent tension sensors within the mechanical linkage between the centromere and kinetochore microtubules are beginning to reveal – from live cell assays – protein specific contributions that are functionally important. (shrink)

The observation that humans are often irrational has become commonplace. This observation has received empirical support from various experiments performed by cognitive scientists that are supposed to show that humans systematically violate principles of probability, rules of logic, and other norms of reasoning. In response to these experiments, philosophers have made creative and appealing arguments that these experiments must be mistaken or misinterpreted because humans must be rational. I examine these arguments for human rationality and show that they fail; cognitive (...) science does play a role in assessing human rationality. ;In Chapter One, I examine three cognitive science experiments in detail and discuss what is at issue in the debate about human rationality. At issue is whether the mistakes humans make are mere mistakes or indicative of systematic divergences from norms of reasoning. Defenders of human rationality say these mistakes are not characteristic of underlying reasoning abilities but are performance errors. Because humans make performance errors, human reasoning ability cannot be read off of behavior, but rather is to be studied by exploring cognitive competence, the underlying ability to reason. ;In Chapter Two, I develop and discuss the notion of cognitive competence. I then consider and reject two arguments that human cognitive competence must match the norms of reasoning. The first argument appeals to simplicity considerations, the second to the supposed common origin of our cognitive competence and our normative standards. In Chapter Three, I turn to a related argument for a view that humans are rational that says cognitive competence is discovered in the same way norms of reasoning are justified: both projects involve reflective equilibrium using as data people's judgments about what counts as good reasoning. ;In Chapter Four, I consider an argument for human rationality that draws on the principle of charity: when translating utterances of a speaker, one should try to interpret her utterances as rational and true. ;In Chapter Five, I consider an argument for human rationality that appeals to evolution. This argument claims that natural selection will select for cognitive mechanisms that produce true beliefs, and that such "truth-tropic" mechanisms are sufficient for being rational. ;My overall conclusion is that while cognitive science does not determine what the normative principles of reasoning are, it is relevant to whether or not human cognitive competence matches these principles; whether or not humans are irrational is, thus, an empirical question. (shrink)

The function and method of philosophy.--The nature of religious experience.--Religion and philosophy: naturalism.--Religion and philosophical idealism.--The structure of the universe and the objectivity of values.--The christian conception of god.--The doctrine of the person of christ.--The doctrine of the trinity.