Patristic teaching about sin and disease allows supplementing well-acknowledged conditions for a Christian medicine with further personal challenges, widely disregarded in Western Christianities. A proper appreciation of man's vocation toward (not just achieving forgiveness but) deification reveals the need to cooperate with the Holy Spirit's offer of grace toward restoring man's prefallen nature. Ascetical exercises designed at re-establishing the spirit's mastery over the soul distance persons from (even supposedly harmless) passion. They thus inspire the struggle towards emulating Christ's (self-crucifying) kenotic (...) love, and to accept even secularly “undeserved” suffering as spiritually deserved in view of his (forever) lacking fervor in that struggle. Only in the spirit of that love can the evil Adam's sin brought into this world work its therapeutic impact, the eschatological purpose of which explains God's lovingly permitting that evil. This therapeutic impact is physically manifested already in this life through the transforming energies granted the saints of the church. (shrink)

Schmidt and Egler's critique of Christianity's exclusivist claim to truth rests on two suppositions: (a) that inter-religious pastoral care for dying patients requires a respect for their cultural backgrounds which necessitates accepting the equal validity of their respective (non-Christian) religions, and (b) that exclusivism is incompatible with the Christian love-of-neighbor commandment. In opposition to this critique, (a) the authors' own “pluralist” understanding of Christianity is refuted on two levels. First, it leads to inconsistencies in the authors' own (and very adequate) (...) understanding of pastoral care, especially with regard to their notion of intolerance, and second, it is irreconcilable with explicit New and Old Testament claims to absoluteness. In addition, (b) the authors' understanding of the way in which “exclusivism” justifies intolerance and missionary violence is shown to rest, first, on a secularized reduction of Christianity, i.e., of Christians' own “religious identity” as well as of the Christian way of “helping those in need,” and second, on a merely theoretical (rather than also practical) view of Christians' commitment to God. As a corollary to that refutation, a reconsideration of the truly Christian sources of obedience and charity is recommended. (shrink)

Corinna Delkeskamp-Hayes; Christian Credentials for Roman Catholic Health Care: Medicine versus the Healing Mission of the Church, Christian bioethics: Non-Ecum.

Corinna Delkeskamp-Hayes; Sin and Disease: An Introduction, Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical Morality, Volume 12, Issue 2, 1 January 2006.

One of the lamentable characteristics of our contemporary age is the way in which abortion has been adopted as a natural part of the culture. This essay describes this adoption as a symptom of that culture’s profound de-Christianization. As that culture sheds its once Christian commitments, persons change the way in which they relate to their body in its sexually differentiated physiology, its physical drives and impulses. They refashion their sense of human flourishing, their vision of women’s social role, the (...) value they place on education, career, and economic well-being, and their understanding of reproductive responsibility. This de-Christianization is not sufficiently appreciated in a nominally still “Christian culture.” Such blindness reflects an inability to distinguish Christian commitments from moral commitments, which, although framed in terms that are compatible with Christian meanings, are equally open to meanings affirming the idolatry informing secular humanism. De-Christianization is not the same as de-moralization. This essay explores the way in which the new moral norms about sexuality, about education and career opportunities for women, authority within marriage, the role of this-worldly well-being and human suffering all contribute to our culture’s complacency in view of abortion. The underlying concern is to illustrate how a morality (even a morality of human sympathy and solidarity) that is not anchored in a genuine Tradition-affirming Christian conduct of life leads away from Christ, and how only a return to that conduct can heal our “culture of death.”. (shrink)

Belgium's policy of not permitting Catholic hospitals to refuse euthanasia services rests on ethical presuppositions concerning the secular justification of political power which reveal the paradoxical character of European liberalism: In endorsing freedom as a value (rather than as a side constraint), liberalism prioritizes first-order intentions, thus discouraging lasting moral commitments and the authority of moral communities in supporting such commitments. The state itself is thus transformed into a moral community of its own. Alternative policies (such as an explicit moral (...) diversification of public healthcare or the greater tolerance for Christian institutions in the Netherlands) are shown to be incompatible with Europe's liberal concern with securing social and material freedom resources, as well as the concern with equality of opportunity, as embodied in the European Union's anti-discrimination labor law. The essay's argument for the preferability of a libertarian solution closes with the challenge that only if the provision of public healthcare can be shown to be rationally indispensable for a morally justified polity, could the exposed incoherence of modern European liberalism be generously discounted. (shrink)

Corinna Delkeskamp-Hayes; Bioethics for Thresholders: A Brief Introduction, Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical Morality, Volume 8, Issue 3.

Corinna Delkeskamp-Hayes; Sin and Disease in a Post-Christian Culture: An Introduction, Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical Morality, Volume.

Corinna Delkeskamp-Hayes; The Spiritual Claim of a Dying Mother – A Complement to Paul's Report, Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical Morality.

The intimate connection, within Christianity, of theology and ethics is invoked, and the ethical differences between Christian denominations are exposed, as they present themselves inMellon's case studies, in order to call attention to the unsolvable dilemma in which hospital chaplains find themselves, if they understand their role in a merely conciliatory fashion as that of a “comforter, mediator, educator, ethicist, and counselor”. As witnessed by the Calvinist and Anabaptist traditions Mellon introduces, concepts such as “the patient's good” can mean radically (...) different things in these theological contexts. Attempting to merely mediate between such positions in a spirit of merely generic prayer and on the basis of a merely psychological notion of well-being poses a risk to chaplains' spiritual integrity and faithfulness to their mission. (shrink)

(2005). Between Morality and Repentance: Recapturing “Sin” for Bioethics. Christian Bioethics: Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 93-132.

Hospital chaplaincy, in its exposure to clients, colleagues, and care-takers from different faith backgrounds, can be understood in either generic or catholic terms. The first understanding, often merely implicit in denominationalist approaches, assumes that some “Absolute” can be prayerfully invoked through the medium of diverse rituals, confessions, and symbols. This position combines the advantage of unprejudiced acceptance of other creeds and traditions with the disadvantage of lacking resources for discriminating among the spiritualities that may be operative within those other creeds (...) and traditions. Catholicism, in linking true spirituality with the one true church as the mystical body of the Tri-une God, secures such a criterion but fails to satisfy the tolerance-of-acknowledgement in the secular sense, which is canonical in contemporary ecumenism. The Orthodox understanding of Catholicism is portrayed as imposing a non-judgemental humility and repentance which provides a solution to that spiritual-human dilemma of inter-faith cooperation in the hospital. (shrink)

Sin-talk, though politically incorrect, is indispensable. Placing human life under the ‘hermeneutic of sin’ means acknowledging that one ought to aim flawlessly at God, and that one can fail in this endeavor. None of this can be appreciated within the contemporary post-Christian, mindset, which has attempted to reduce religion to morality and culture. In such a secular context, the guilt-feelings connected with the recognition of sin are considered to be harmful; the eternal benefit of a repentance is disregarded. Nevertheless, spirituality (...) appears to have therapeutic benefits. Therefore attempts are made to re-locate within healthcare a religion shorn of its transcendent claims, so as then to harvest the benefits of a spirituality ‘saved from sin’. This reduction of religiosity to its therapeutic function is nourished by a post-modern constructivist construal of religion. This article critically examines the dis-ingenuity marring such recasting, as well as the incoherence of related attempts to reduce transcendence to solidarity, and to re-shape the significance of religious rituals. (shrink)

The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine confuses respect for a person's right to self-determination with concern about protecting human beings generally. In a legal document, this mixture of deontological with utilitarian considerations undermines what it should preserve: respect for human dignity as the foundation of modern rights-based democracies. Falling prey to the ambiguity of freedom, the Convention blurs the dividing line between morality and the law. The document should be remedied through distinguishing fundamental rights from social 'rights', persons as (...) entitled to the right to self-determination from born humans as entitled to the right to life and from members of the human species as entitled to the morally respo-nsible care of voting majorities. For the cultivating of the required responsibility, the conditions for an adequate public debate should be secured. (shrink)

This essay focuses on the challenge European states have imposed on themselves, namely, to provide state-of-the-art health care equally to all and for less than market price. Continued endorsement of that challenge in these states hinges on their character as media democracies: the public is moved by a supposed morally warranted expectation that all should receive adequate health care at no significant personal cost. The structural and economic constraints that hamper such forms of healthcare delivery result in systems that are (...) financially inefficient and fail to provide the quality of treatment patients are led to expect. This essay examines the tension between secular moral claims to social solidarity and the actual limits of accessibility to healthcare services. Its critical focus addresses both the difficulties that result from politicians invoking high moral ideals while framing their decisions around short-term political advantage, and the transformation of the Enlightenment’s secular aspirations into a political ideology that distorts such moral ideals. This essay concludes that the commitments to very particular notions of equality and human dignity, which frame contemporary Europe’s provision of publicly subsidized health care, have given rise to a governance that is morally incoherent and unsustainable. This failure of public health care in Europe can thus be read as one more belated manifestation of the epistemological and moral failure of the Enlightenment’s secularizing project, a failure which should invite contemporary Europeans to honestly face the moral challenge of postmodernity. (shrink)

This introduction explores the relationship between Europe and its Christianities. It analyses different diagnostic and evaluative approaches to Europe's Christian or post-Christian identity. These are grouped around the concepts of diverse traditional, and, on the other hand, post-Enlightenment Christianities. While the first revolves around a liturgical and mystical account of the church, a Christ-centred humanism, an emphasis on man's future life, noetic theology and a foundationalist claim to universal truth, the second endorses a moralization of the “Christian message,” political implementation (...) of “Christian goals,” rationalism, a this-worldly humanism, and tolerance for religious diversity. Since even the concepts of “traditional” and “post-Enlightenment” Christianity turn out to be deeply ambiguous, the essay concludes with exploring the different ways in which the Christianity of the Apostolic Church, the Enlightenment (along with the “Western” Christianities it shaped), and contemporary liberalism each conceive of their respective endorsements of human freedom as either normative, that is obligatory, value-laden, or contingent, and arbitrary. In each case, a different notion of “tradition” (as well as familial and church authority) is placed either in harmony or in opposition to such freedom. As a result of this conceptual analysis, the deeply fractured identity of Europe, as exemplified by the diverse bioethical positions adopted by the authors in this issue, becomes visible. (shrink)

Paternal authority is recommended as a valid Christian resource for conflict resolution in biomedical (and other inner-familial) decision making. Its bases are explored in view of the two-fold creation account in Genesis, interpreted in the light of the Pauline theology. In addition, a theological account is proposed that portrays the taxis between husband and wife as a condition under which humans can seek to emulate the inner-Trinitarian love. The relationship between that love (as portrayed in St. Basil’s On the Holy (...) Spirit), the love between God and man, and the love between the sexes (as further extended to the children in a family that constitutes a “small church”), is described in terms of an interplay between the Divine offer of grace and the human response of obedience. In framing their marital love according to the model of Christ and His Church, couples can also profit from the ascetical therapy predicted for their fallen nature in the “curse” that drove our forefathers from Paradise. (shrink)

This introduction to Christian Bioethics 15/2 focuses on the challenges which secular moral reconstruction and secular political implementation presents for Christian diakonia. It summarises the various Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox ways in which Christians’ loving service to the world have been integrated either into the secular state's provision of social welfare or into the Church's liturgical life by the authors of this issue. This summary centres on questions concerning the political nature of Christian charity, its role within the church, (...) the implication of public funding for the integrity of the Christian service, the relationship between love and justice, and the impact of different kinds of feminism on Christian diaconic work. (shrink)

This essay questions the way in which continental Western Christians welcome political implementation (i.e., integration into the publicly funded welfare network and collaboration with heterodox Christians, members of other religions, or irreligious humanitarians) when offering their diaconic services. Among the theological assumptions underlying such reliance from outside the Church, this essay takes special issue with the idea that Christianity's “ethical” commitment to charity can be separated from its spiritual (e.g., liturgical, ascetical, missionary) concerns. Such separation suggests prioritizing charity recipients’ needs (...) over against the framing character of charity providers’ Christian love. On the philosophical level, this same separation refashions Christian philanthropy in terms of a secularly construed “human dignity.” This dignity, even though nominally endorsed by the welfare bureaucracy, is however shown to get repudiated by the objectifying and depersonalizing implications of publicly funded social services. On the theological level, the potentially anti-Christian implications of secularly implemented “diakonia” are pointed out. The scriptural bases usually invoked for the prioritizing of needs are exposed as unfit to offer the hoped-for justification. As a result, only, and at most, a very limited, reserved, and watchful material cooperation with the secular state and with those outside the Church is recommended for Christian “diakonia.”. (shrink)

Can proposing a policy of equal access to health care be justified on Christian grounds? The notion of a “Christian justification” with regard to Christians' political activity is explored in relation to the New Testament texts. The less demanding policy of granting “rights to (basic) health care,” the meaning of Jesus' healing activities, early Christian welfare schemes, and Christian grounds for the ascription of “rights” are each discussed. As a result, with some stretching of the neighbor-love and missionary imperatives it (...) is proposed that a basic health care policy can be legitimized. With regard to equal access to health care, however, all attempts to derive an equalizing imperative from the spiritual “equality among humans” or by way of the “love your neighbor as yourself” imperative are shown to fail. Particular attention is given to whether “attending to the least of my brothers' needs” obliges Christians to satisfy those needs optimally, as well as to the personal involvement aspect of the love-commandment in its simultaneously spiritual and temporal orientations. (shrink)

This introduction supplies further bearing points for the conceptual map, which the introduction to the previous issue on European bioethics (2008/1) had provided for sorting out the various dimension in which the essays collected in these issues resemble and differ from each other. Special attention is devoted to communication, as diverse Christianities attend to different purposes, problems, and opportunities for normatively engaging (persuading, influencing, ruling, opposing, and converting) their surrounding secularized cultures. These differences reflect incompatible ways of conceiving Christ's acts (...) of healing, as these provide a model for His disciples' bioethics. These differences also reflect diversely rationalist and noetic epistemologies. The subtext concerns the haunting question about the enduring sustainability of a specifically Christian bioethics in Europe. As Schotsmans opts for a Roman Catholicism that is not recognized as such by his Magisterium, as Muller transforms Protestantism into a religiously nonhostile laicity, as Messer and Silva da Barbosa hope for the prophetic impact of communal “cities on the hill,” and as the Orthodox pursue the conversion of Western Europe in Greek, Russian, and Rumanian, ongoing Divine miracles present the most realistic hope. (shrink)

This essay takes a Traditional Christian, that is, Orthodox look at the integration of psychotherapy into pastoral counseling, as endorsed by many Western mainline Christianities. It examines how the Christian pastor can guide his sheep through the bioethical problems they encounter in their pursuit of salvation. The first part explores whether the turn to psychology and psychotherapy can be welcomed as a return to the Traditional therapeutic understanding of theology and of the Church as a spiritual hospital for fallen souls. (...) The second part examines two typical ways in which non-Orthodox Christianities embrace psychotherapy in pastoral counseling, as directed to unburdening parishioners from their doubts about bioethical decision making in the context of a Christian life. This part highlights the theological assumptions (about the pastor, his care, and the notion of God informing both) framing that embrace and shows them to be incompatible with the Traditional commitment to man's Divine vocation. The turn to psychotherapy here, rather than inaugurating a return to the therapeutic spirit of Traditional theology, offers a secularized substitute. The third part investigates the possibility of a Traditional Christian way of practicing psychotherapy along with its significance for Orthodox pastoral care in bioethical counseling. Here it becomes clear that, even beyond incompatible theological assumptions, already psychotherapy's endorsement of a predominantly discursive approach to healing is alien to Traditional pastoral care. (shrink)

This introduction discusses the various respects in which the turn to psychotherapy and psychology in pastoral counseling touches on issues of bioethics (as the content of such counseling) and medical morality (insofar as the spiritual dimension addressed in pastoral care impacts the medical condition of those cared for, and the various kinds of psychotherapy relate to the therapy offered by medicine). A short characterization of each essay contained in this issue of Christian Bioethics highlights the major subjects on which these (...) essays agree and disagree. These subjects concern the significance of psychotherapy and psychology for (1) reaching out to parishioners who are estranged from the church, (2) criticizing religion as a whole, and (3) remedying certain distortions for which pastoral care and counseling have been criticized in some Christianities. Problems that arise from the incompatibilities between different sorts of theological and psychological accounts of human flourishing and their suggested solutions are considered. The introduction, then, concludes by briefly discussing the different understandings of tradition and church that inform the various post- and extra-Enlightenment positions adopted by the authors. (shrink)

Unlike (especially) the various Protestantisms, Orthodox Christianity recognizes no fundamentally different problems in the development and (future) application of human germ line genetic engineering (HGGE) than those raised by more traditional medicine. The particular challenges which frame the life of a traditional Christian arise not only in view of “groundbreaking” technological progress and its attendant increase in human power over nature, but permeate already his most simple daily routines. The diverse post-traditional Christianities have ceased confronting such liturgical–ascetical challenges. The quite (...) appropriately pious desire, among those committed to such Christianities, for some restraint in the face of such increase of power therefore gets refocused onto substitute concerns. The new challenge then arises to establish the universal validity of the moral norms underlying such concerns in order to ground the desired prohibition. The discussions of several such norms offered in this issue of Christian Bioethics illustrate the embarrassment presented by the unavailability of either theological or rational foundations needed for such a project. The attempt to prove that there is something in principle morally wrong about HGGE is thus not only unnecessary for the Christian conduct of life (and presents a distraction), but also doomed to fail. (shrink)

Does a non-ecumenical journal on Christian bioethics make sense? Taking issue with Stanley Hauerwas' critique of Ramsey, the author argues (l) interdenominational exchange should not be construed as contest, and (2) the attempt on the part of Christians to address secular issues in secular terms should not be mistrusted or viewed as a contamination hazard. Instead (I) an awareness of human limits should render adherents of different traditions willing to learn from each other and (2) one should see in the (...) love-of-neighbor principle an obligation to serve the world. Addressing the communication problem, the author recommends different language levels for intra-group and ever more encompassing inter-group exchanges. (shrink)

SummaryDavid Hartley's Observations provides an example from the history of medicine of the bearing of theories of the relationship between body and mind on the problem of morality and free will. Further, Hartley's solution requires a distinction between two understandings of what it means for morality to be rationally grounded. The kind of ethics which can be established for moral agents on the basis of medical knowledge alone (and for which Hartley's “Rule of Life” presents but one historical example) has (...) been termed ‘therapeutic’ It leads to a viewpoint in which it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between the kinds of reasons for supporting morals and the kinds of reasons for supporting good teeth. The kind of ethics which requires additional grounds entering into the motivation of the agent himself has been termed “rational.” This distinction between therapeutic and rational ethics rests on the more basic distinction between general and particular grounds on which to establish a rational system of ethics. As a result, the initial problem of how any account of the body-mind relation might allow for the possibility of ethics leads to the more interesting problem of how a therapeutic interpretation of ethics, which is possible on the grounds of medical knowledge, might be reconciled with a fully rational interpretation of ethics which we require on philosophical grounds. “Medical ethics” has traditionally been viewed as the application of concepts from philosophical ethics to the specific problems presented in medical practice. In consequence of the second problem exposed here, it would be useful to extend the domain of medical ethics from the level of concepts and cases to the level of interpreting the rational grounds for those concepts. Otherwise one may fail to distinguish a medical view of ethics from an ethical view of medicine. (shrink)

Collective dilemmas have attracted widespread interest in several social sciences and the humanities including economics, sociology and philosophy. Since Hardin’s intuitive example of the Tragedy of the Commons, many real-world public goods dilemmas have been analysed with a wide ranging set of possible and actual solutions. The plethora of solutions to these dilemmas suggests that people make different kinds of decision in different situations. Rather than trying to find a unifying kind of reasoning to capture all situations, as the paradigm (...) of rationality has done, this article develops a framework of agent decision-making for social simulation, that takes seriously both different kinds of decision making as well as different interpretations of situations. The Contextual Action Framework for Computational Agents allows for the modelling of complex social phenomena, like dilemma situations, with relatively simple agents by shifting complexity from an agent’s cognition to an agent’s context. (shrink)

Als kulturgeschichtlich bedeutsame Phänomene entstammen Masken der Ritual- und Theaterpraxis und traten schon in der Antike als Metapher in den Sprachgebrauch über. Kaum ein Philosoph hat den Masken so viel Raum gegeben wie Friedrich Nietzsche: Sie sind ihm Hilfsmittel der Erkenntnis und conditio humana, sie ermöglichen Höflichkeit und Selbstschutz, fungieren aber auch als Darstellungsform. Corinna Schubert führt zentrale Themen seines Denkens unter einem neuen Gesichtspunkt zusammen und erschließt sie als Philosophie der Masken. Dabei geht es nicht nur darum, was (...) Nietzsche über Masken denkt, sondern auch, wie er mit und in Masken denkt. (shrink)

Moral, die erstens von inhaltlich überzogenen Moralvorstellungen, zweitens von der Missachtung des Eigenrechts von Handlungssphären und drittens von überzogenen Arten des Geltendmachens moralisch legitimer Forderungen herrühren kann. Wir charakterisieren diese Quellen des Moralismus näher, unterscheiden verschiedene Spielarten oder Subtypen und besprechen schließlich Phänomene aus dem Umkreis des Moralismus.

In response to the coronavirus disease 2019 schools around the world have been closed to protect against the spread of coronavirus. In several countries, homeschooling has been introduced to replace classroom schooling. With a focus on individual differences, the present study examined 138 schoolers regarding their self-control and boredom proneness. The results showed that both traits were important in predicting adherence to homeschooling. Schoolers with higher levels of self-control perceived homeschooling as less difficult, which in turn increased homeschooling adherence. In (...) contrast, schoolers with higher levels of boredom proneness perceived homeschooling as more difficult, which in turn reduced homeschooling adherence. These results partially hold when it comes to studying in the classroom. However, boredom threatened adherence only in the homeschooling context. Our results indicate that boredom proneness is a critical construct to consider when educational systems switch to homeschooling during a pandemic. (shrink)

: In recent literature supporting a hybrid view between metaethical cognitivism and noncognitivist expressivism, much has been made of an analogy between moral terms and pejoratives. The analogy is based on the plausible idea that pejorative slurs are used to express both a descriptive belief and a negative attitude. The analogy looks promising insofar as it encourages the kinds of features we should want from a hybrid expressivist view for moral language. But the analogy between moral terms and pejorative slurs (...) is also problematic. In this paper, I argue for two main ways in which we should distinguish between two different types of pejorative terms: slurs, on the one hand, and what I call general pejorative terms, on the other. I examine the problems with the analogy between slurs and moral terms and conclude that general pejorative terms like ‘jerk’ are a better candidate on which to model the potential dual-use behavior of moral terms. So if hybrid theorists are looking for a dual-use model for moral language, they should be careful to base their analogies on general pejoratives, rather than slurs. (shrink)

Flow is a gratifying state of deep involvement and absorption that individuals report when facing a challenging activity and they perceive adequate abilities to cope with it. The flow concept was introduced by Csikszentmihalyi in 1975, and interest in flow research is growing. However, to our best knowledge, no scoping review exists that takes a systematic look at studies on flow which were published between the years 2000 and 2016. Overall, 252 studies have been included in this review. Our review (...) provides a framework to cluster flow research, gives a systematic overview about existing studies and their findings, and provides an overview about implications for future research. The provided framework consists of three levels of flow research. In the first “Individual” level are the categories for personality, motivation, physiology, emotion, cognition, and behavior. The second “Contextual” level contains the categories for contextual and interindividual factors and the third “Cultural” level contains cultural factors that relate to flow. Using our framework, we systematically present the findings for each category. While flow research has made progress in understanding flow, in the future, more experimental and longitudinal studies are needed to gain deeper insights into the causal structure of flow and its antecedents and consequences. (shrink)