Context: To speak of constructivism -- and in particular of radical constructivism -- in education is to place oneself on a field which, like any other academic field, is the scene of tensions, debates, and indeed battles. While such controversies are, predictably enough, fought out between the partisans of constructivism and those defending other theses, they are also fought out between the constructivists themselves, as a number of group works have brought out (e.g., Steffe & Gale 1995; SRED 2001). In (...) other words, constructivists do not express their views in unison whenever there is a question on the development of knowledge (an individual or collective matter?), the underpinnings of knowledge (be they of a psychological, sociological or other type) or, as humorously noted by Quale (2007), that "sin" which is said to consist in the relativist mode of questioning or critique authorized by constructivism. Purpose: In this paper, we would like to contribute to this discussion and to this plurality of ways of embedding oneself in constructivism, in particular by bringing out (as was so acutely shown by Ernst von Glasersfeld 1987a, 1995, 2007) that while constructivism offers a basis on which to revisit the question of knowledge, its contributions nevertheless extend well beyond this single preoccupation. By reincorporating "the properties of the observer" into his or her discourse as well as the conditions, stakes and issues surrounding the utterance in question, in short, by reincorporating the question of power into the utterance-making, constructivism also provides a basis for revisiting the "Great Divides" -- that is, the (unequal) relationships between the various forms of knowledge as well as the (unequal) modes of evidence and authority that accompany these relations. Method: Through an examination of three topics, that is the "racism" of intelligence, the Semmelweis affair, and the question of endogenous knowledge, we will attempt to explicate various insights afforded by constructivism. Conclusion: So doing, we will show that radical constructivism, in its recognition of the plurality of possible modes of description and explanation, contributes to a form of epistemological democracy. (shrink)

Between 1648 and 1652, Cyrano de Bergerac wrote a small satirical work entitled The Other World, a fictional account of his imaginary epic voyage to the Moon.* The story not only describes “The States and Empires of the Moon,” (its subtitle in the original edition), it provides a critical view of his own civilization as well. The narrator's position in his depiction of the radically different, “other” entity allows him to maintain opinions which, however whimsical, still include elements of social (...) and philosophical examination. In the early stages of world migration, Europe was beginning to see the Other as a place for the expression, if not the transposition, of its ancient dreams; Cyrano, however, takes a different approach. He looks at ways the Other might be used to gain perspective on the Self. Looking down at Earth from above, he proclaims: “People, I declare that this moon is not a moon, but a world, and that world over there is not a world, but a moon.”. (shrink)

This is a welcome reprint of a book that continues to grow in importance.

Les deux premiers chapitres expliquent la position épistémologique contemporaine. Dans le troisième, les auteurs présentent "une analyse des discours de 25 adolescents et adolescentes recueillis lors d'entrevues semi-structurées qui exploraient leur point de vue sur la connaissance scientifique.".

This international and interdisciplinary collection presents and discusses the many issues and educational practices that are touched on by constructivism. Drawing on perspectives from a range of different fields, this book invites us to reposition ourselves in relation to the major currents that have influenced education in this century, namely pragmatism, genetic epistemology, and social interactionism. The essays call for new reflection on the questions that are central to the project of education and that, in particular, involve the validity of (...) knowledge and types of knowledge, the compartmentalization of school subjects, the mediating role of teachers, and, above all, the ends of education. In so doing, this book relaunches the discussion on constructivism's potential for the social empowerment of groups and individuals. (shrink)

Yves Larochelle | : Charles De Koninck, qui chercha à réconcilier la lecture thomiste d’Aristote avec la science contemporaine, et Michel Henry, qui voulut rénover la phénoménologie husserlienne et heideggérienne en restituant la place de l’affectivité dans le champ philosophique, ont connu des trajectoires intellectuelles très différentes. Pourtant, leurs parcours respectifs aboutissent ultimement aux deux mêmes conclusions déterminantes : le réductionnisme scientifique ambiant menace l’intégrité spirituelle de l’humanité et seul le constat d’une finalité d’ordre divin à la vie humaine (...) peut restituer un sain équilibre. | : Charles De Koninck, who tried to reconcile the thomistic reading of Aristotle with contemporary science, and Michel Henry, who wanted to renovate Husserlian and Heideggerrian phenomenology by placing affectivity at the center of philosophy, had very different intellectual trajectories. Nonetheless, they both come to two similar conclusions : contemporary scientific reductionism is menacing the spiritual integrity of mankind, and only the recognition of a divine finality to human life can restore a healthy balance. (shrink)

Dominic LaRochelle | : Les religions ne constituent pas des monolithes immuables et inchangés dans le temps. Elles évoluent au fil de l’histoire humaine, changent au gré des transformations culturelles et sociales des communautés dans lesquelles elles s’implantent, négocient avec les instances séculières et religieuses leur pertinence et leur droit d’exister ; bref, elles innovent constamment pour s’assurer une place dans un monde lui aussi en constant changement. Cet article propose deux outils pour analyser les innovations au sein des (...) traditions religieuses : les théories de la réception, inspirées des travaux de Hans Robert Jauss, et l’invention des traditions, inspirée du célèbre ouvrage d’Eric J. Hobsbawm et Terence O. Ranger. L’intérêt de l’utilisation de ces outils en histoire est qu’ils permettent, entre autres choses, de dépasser les oppositions classiques tradition/modernité et authenticité/innovation en analysant les religions du point de vue des ruptures et des transformations à l’intérieur de celles-ci. Ces outils seront appliqués à un cas particulier, celui de la réception et de la réinvention du taoïsme dans les sociétés occidentales au XXe siècle. Cette tradition religieuse chinoise vieille de plusieurs siècles a en effet été réinventée en Occident et transformée en une tradition spirituelle universelle répondant aux attentes des Occidentaux en matière de spiritualité contemporaine. | : Religions are not immutable monoliths that remain unchanged over time. They evolve over the course of human history ; changing according to the cultural and social transformations of the communities in which they are established and negotiating with secular and religious authorities for their relevance and right to exist. In short, they continually innovate to secure a place in a constantly changing world. This article proposes two tools to analyze innovations within religious traditions : reception theories, inspired by the works of Hans Robert Jauss, and the invention of tradition, inspired by the celebrated work of Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence O. Ranger. The interest of using these tools in a historical approach is that they allow us, among other things, to overcome the traditional oppositions of tradition vs. modernity and authenticity vs. innovation by analyzing religions from a rupture and transformation point of view. These tools will be applied to a particular case, namely the reception and reinvention of Taoism in Western societies in the twentieth Century. This centuries-old Chinese religious tradition has been reinvented in the West and transformed into a universal spiritual tradition that meets the expectations of Westerners for contemporary spirituality. (shrink)

Purpose: According to the constructivist perspective tirelessly promoted by Ernst von Glasersfeld for more than 40 years now, the world we see is of a piece with our way of understanding and locating ourselves within it; ultimately, whenever we claim to describe the world-in-itself, we in fact are describing the product of the mapping process that has enabled us to make our way in this world and to actualize our projects within it. Obviously, this kind of perspective has consequences for (...) the way both educational action and research on this theme are conceived of and accomplished. That, at least, is what we shall attempt to show in this article. Implications: In keeping with the claim that knowledges are constituted not in reference to reality "itself" but to practices and activities, constructivism advocates examining cognition in action -- that is, in terms of how the latter is enacted in the field. Accordingly, constructivism also seeks to prompt teachers to: (1) scrutinize the processes and distinctions by which students chart out the world; (2) and to personally devise, on the basis of this experience, a model -- or models, rather -- of their students' future relationship to the universes of knowledge intended for learning. Likewise, constructivism also aims to prompt researchers to perform some very careful detective work into the ways in which this charting process is played out and thus to opt for a comprehensive rather than an experimentalist approach. Conclusion: To adopt the constructivist perspective also means to "de-siloize" knowledge production and to recognize that this production occurs in all spheres of society. From this point of view, constructivism can thus be viewed as a way of challenging the claims of a certain scientific establishment to alone possess the requisite standing for interpreting the world. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Ethics: A Radical-constructivist Approach” by Andreas Quale. Upshot: This comment deals primarily with Quale’s attempt to distinguish between cognitive knowledge and non-cognitive knowledge. Considering that he uses this distinction as a basis for discussing ethical issues, I thought it important to assess the validity of this position and its potential usefulness for radical constructivism. In the following section, I sketch out my understanding of von Glasersfeld’s conception of cognition; so doing, I set the stage (...) for throwing into question, in the second section, a suspension that Quale proposes regarding both cognition and communication. (shrink)

Applying ethical values in scientific research is conditional to the determination of a metaphysical position on human beings as such. The contemporary context of science and technoscience is essentially based on technological fallouts and a modern dogma of efficiency, relegating ethics to a second place at best. This carries possibly dangerous consequences for humanity. The objective of natural sciences worthy or their name is a return to a form of investigation closer to its origin, but also more conscious of the (...) implications of modern technology. Hence, ethics must be at the heart of scientific education and research, not in its margins. (shrink)

Cette édition numérique a été réalisée à partir d'un support physique, parfois ancien, conservé au sein du dépôt légal de la Bibliothèque nationale de France, conformément à la loi n° 2012-287 du 1er mars 2012 relative à l'exploitation des Livres indisponibles du XXe siècle. Pages de début Remerciements L'échéance d'une fin I. Subjectivité II. Modernité III. Historicité IV. Heuristicité V. ScepticismeAntifondamentalisme et utopie Bibliographie Pages de fin.

La déconstruction des représentations modernes se réclame aujourd’hui de plus en plus de la suspension des critères du jugement non pas à l’instar des règles de la morale chrétienne (“qui es-tu pour juger?”), mais plutôt par une destitution des finalités de tout arrière-monde. Dans cette optique de reconfiguration des catégories, parler du préjugé revient, d’entrée de jeu, à s’exposer dans le cadre d’une métaphysique de la modernité et à évoquer un report possible à l’objectivité. Or, les basculements contemporains dans l’ère (...) du soupçon appellent malgré tout une interrogation: Où est donc passé le préjugé? De quelle histoire restet-il la trace? Cet exposé montre que, loin d’être nié ou confiné à un champ de représentations archaïques, il est plutôt en voie d’être réhabilité, pourvu d’une nouvelle dignité sans le nom, d’ailleurs péjoratif, voire transformé en catégorie épistémique au nom du relativisme et de l’incommensurabilité des univers de sens. Il semble passer de nos jours par un accueil acritique de la contingence ou par l’abandon à une compréhension préréflexive du monde comme possibilité maximale de toute entreprise cognitive. Le propos tente de dégager les difficultés théoriques que pose le projet de la suspension du jugement dans l’épistémologie poststructuraliste. (shrink)

La déconstruction des représentations modernes se réclame aujourd’hui de plus en plus de la suspension des critères du jugement non pas à l’instar des règles de la morale chrétienne (“qui es-tu pour juger?”), mais plutôt par une destitution des finalités de tout arrière-monde. Dans cette optique de reconfiguration des catégories, parler du préjugé revient, d’entrée de jeu, à s’exposer dans le cadre d’une métaphysique de la modernité et à évoquer un report possible à l’objectivité. Or, les basculements contemporains dans l’ère (...) du soupçon appellent malgré tout une interrogation: Où est donc passé le préjugé? De quelle histoire restet-il la trace? Cet exposé montre que, loin d’être nié ou confiné à un champ de représentations archaïques, il est plutôt en voie d’être réhabilité, pourvu d’une nouvelle dignité sans le nom, d’ailleurs péjoratif, voire transformé en catégorie épistémique au nom du relativisme et de l’incommensurabilité des univers de sens. Il semble passer de nos jours par un accueil acritique de la contingence ou par l’abandon à une compréhension préréflexive du monde comme possibilité maximale de toute entreprise cognitive. Le propos tente de dégager les difficultés théoriques que pose le projet de la suspension du jugement dans l’épistémologie poststructuraliste. (shrink)

Context: Ernst von Glasersfeld’s constructivist epistemology has been a source of intellectual inspiration for several Quebec researchers, particularly in the field of science and mathematics education. Problem: However, what is less well known is the influence that his work had on the direction taken by educational reform in Quebec in the early 2000s as well as the criticisms that his work has given rise to – some of which present a family resemblance to the science wars that swept over the (...) US and France during the 1990s. Results: We begin by outlining the constructivist orientation of Quebec’s educational reform. We then draw a parallel between the above-mentioned science wars and the critics who denounced the constructivist foundations of the reform. In both cases, the bone of contention concerns the usual interpretation of relativism, with the criticisms that we refer to tending to oppose relativism with realism or rationalism. Now, by definition, relativism stands in opposition to absolutism and not to realism, unless the latter manifests itself in an absolutist form (which is the case of some of the critiques). Implications: The fear generated by relativism is by no means new. However, it seems that more than an epistemological controversy is at stake in the current depreciation of positions that, like that of radical constructivism, question the possibility of a “view from nowhere” – that is, aperspectival objectivity – and the resultant knowledge. In the sphere of education, at least in Quebec, there may well be an ideological issue of control over education that is involved. (shrink)

This book presents G. A. Cohen's Gifford Lectures, delivered at the University of Edinburgh in 1996. Focusing on Marxism and Rawlsian liberalism, Cohen draws a connection between these thought systems and the choices that shape a person's life. In the case of Marxism, the relevant life is his own: a communist upbringing in the 1940s in Montreal, which induced a belief in a strongly socialist egalitarian doctrine. The narrative of Cohen's reckoning with that inheritance develops through a series of sophisticated (...) engagements with the central questions of social and political philosophy. In the case of Rawlsian doctrine, Cohen looks to people's lives in general. He argues that egalitarian justice is not only, as Rawlsian liberalism teaches, a matter of rules that define the structure of society, but also a matter of personal attitude and choice. Personal attitude and choice are, moreover, the stuff of which social structure itself is made. Those truths have not informed political philosophy as much as they should, and Cohen's focus on them brings political philosophy closer to moral philosophy, and to the Judeo-Christian ethical tradition, than it has recently been. (shrink)

A highly original reading of Immanuel Kant that demonstrates his interest in the social realm of human interaction.

Containing selected papers on the fundamentals and applications of Complexity Science, this multi-disciplinary book presents new approaches for resolving complex issues that cannot be resolved using conventional mathematical or software models. Complex Systems problems can occur in a variety of areas such as physical sciences and engineering, the economy, the environment, humanities and social and political sciences. Complexity Science problems, the science of open systems consisting of large numbers of diverse components engaged in rich interaction, can occur in a variety (...) of areas such as physical sciences and engineering, the economy, the environment, humanities and social and political sciences. The global behaviour of these systems emerges from the interaction of constituent components and is unpredictable but not random. The key attribute of Complex Systems is the ability to self-organise and adapt to unpredictable changes in their environment. (shrink)

A leading figure in neuroaesthetics makes the case that aesthetic experience can be meaningfully measured by the tools of neuroscience.

Fichte assigns ‘intellectual intuition’ a new meaning after Kant. But in 1799, his doctrine of intellectual intuition is publicly deemed indefensible by Kant and nihilistic by Jacobi. I propose to defend Fichte’s doctrine against these charges, leaving aside whether it captures what he calls the ‘spirit’ of transcendental idealism. I do so by articulating three problems that motivate Fichte’s redirection of intellectual intuition from being to acting: (1) the regress problem, which states that reflecting on empirical facts of consciousness leads (...) only to further facts and so cannot yield a first principle; (2) the rhapsody problem, which states that the categories form a haphazard set and so lack necessity unless they derive from a first principle; and (3) the nihilism problem, which states that a first principle cannot lie outside our cognition of it, lest it be the cause of our cognition and, being first, the cause of all our actions, reducing us to machines. Crucially, Fichte’s three motivating problems are in fact aspects of a single problem. Leaving any aspect unsolved spoils putative solutions to the other two. Consequently, Fichte requires a single unified solution to all three, which his doctrine of intellectual intuition provides. (shrink)

G.E. Moore, more than either Bertrand Russell or Ludwig Wittgenstein, was chiefly responsible for the rise of the analytic method in twentieth-century philosophy. This selection of his writings shows Moore at his very best. The classic essays are crucial to major philosophical debates that still resonate today. Amongst those included are: * A Defense of Common Sense * Certainty * Sense-Data * External and Internal Relations * Hume's Theory Explained * Is Existence a Predicate? * Proof of an External World (...) In addition, this collection also contains the key early papers in which Moore signals his break with idealism, and three important previously unpublished papers from his later work which illustrate his relationship with Wittgenstein. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII Coda Appendix Acknowledgements.

A model for the ideal state includes discussions of the nature and application of justice, the role of the philosopher in society, the goals of education, and the effects of art upon character.

This essay challenges the widely accepted principle that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. The author considers situations in which there are sufficient conditions for a certain choice or action to be performed by someone, So that it is impossible for the person to choose or to do otherwise, But in which these conditions do not in any way bring it about that the person chooses or acts as he (...) does. In such situations the person may well be morally responsible for what he chooses or does despite his inability to choose or to do otherwise. Finally the author considers certain suggestions for revising the principle he rejects or for replacing it with a principle of an altogether different kind. (shrink)