Painting, according to Jean-Luc Marion, is a central topic of concern for philosophy, particularly phenomenology. For the question of painting is, at its heart, a question of visibility—of appearance. As such, the painting is a privileged case of the phenomenon; the painting becomes an index for investigating the conditions of appearance—or what Marion describes as "phenomenality" in general. In _The Crossing of the Visible_, Marion takes up just such a project. The natural outgrowth of his earlier reflections on icons, these (...) four studies carefully consider the history of painting—from classical to contemporary—as a fund for phenomenological reflection on the conditions of visibility. Ranging across artists from Raphael to Rothko, Caravaggio to Pollock, _The Crossing of the Visible_ offers both a critique of contemporary accounts of the visual and a constructive alternative. According to Marion, the proper response to the "nihilism" of postmodernity is not iconoclasm, but rather a radically iconic account of the visual and the arts that opens them to the invisible. (shrink)

A collection of essays spanning Smith's career that examines the prospects for a renewed continental philosophy of religion, while making a constructive case for Smith's own vision of the "Nicene option" and incarnational theology as conversation partner.

Following his successful Who's Afraid of Postmodernism? leading Christian philosopher James K. A. Smith introduces the philosophical sources behind postliberal theology. Offering a provocative analysis of relativism, Smith provides an introduction to the key voices of pragmatism: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Richard Rorty, and Robert Brandom. Many Christians view relativism as the antithesis of absolute truth and take it to be the antithesis of the gospel. Smith argues that this reaction is a symptom of a deeper theological problem: (...) an inability to honor the contingency and dependence of our creaturehood. Appreciating our created finitude as the condition under which we know (and were made to know) should compel us to appreciate the contingency of our knowledge without sliding into arbitrariness. Saying "It depends" is not the equivalent of saying "It's not true" or "I don't know." It is simply to recognize the conditions of our knowledge as finite, created, social beings. Pragmatism, says Smith, helps us recover a fundamental Christian appreciation of the contingency of creaturehood. This addition to an acclaimed series engages key thinkers in modern philosophy with a view to ministry and addresses the challenge of relativism in a creative, original way. (shrink)

How (Not) to Be Secular is what Jamie Smith calls "your hitchhiker's guide to the present" -- it is both a reading guide to Charles Taylor's monumental work A Secular Age and philosophical guidance on how we might learn to live in our times. Taylor's landmark book A Secular Age (2007) provides a monumental, incisive analysis of what it means to live in the post-Christian present -- a pluralist world of competing beliefs and growing unbelief. Jamie Smith's book (...) is a compact field guide to Taylor's insightful study of the secular, making that very significant but daunting work accessible to a wide array of readers. Even more, though, Smith's How (Not) to Be Secular is a practical philosophical guidebook, a kind of how-to manual on how to live in our secular age. It ultimately offers us an adventure in self-understanding and maps out a way to get our bearings in today's secular culture, no matter who "we" are -- whether believers or skeptics, devout or doubting, self-assured or puzzled and confused. This is a book for any thinking person to chew on. (shrink)

★ Publishers Weekly starred review One of the Top 100 Books and One of the 5 Best Books in Religion for 2019, Publishers Weekly Christianity Today 2020 Book Award Winner (Spiritual Formation) Outreach 2020 Resource of the Year (Spiritual Growth) Foreword INDIES 2019 Honorable Mention for Religion This is not a book about Saint Augustine. In a way, it's a book Augustine has written about each of us. Popular speaker and award-winning author James K. A. Smith has spent (...) time on the road with Augustine, and he invites us to take this journey too, for this ancient African thinker knows far more about us than we might expect. Following Smith's successful You Are What You Love, this book shows how Augustine can be a pilgrim guide to a spirituality that meets the complicated world we live in. Augustine, says Smith, is the patron saint of restless hearts--a guide who has been there, asked our questions, and knows our frustrations and failed pursuits. Augustine spent a lifetime searching for his heart's true home and he can help us find our way. "What makes Augustine a guide worth considering," says Smith, "is that he knows where home is, where rest can be found, what peace feels like, even if it is sometimes ephemeral and elusive along the way." Addressing believers and skeptics alike, this book shows how Augustine's timeless wisdom speaks to the worries and struggles of contemporary life, covering topics such as ambition, sex, friendship, freedom, parenthood, and death. As Smith vividly and colorfully brings Augustine to life for 21st-century readers, he also offers a fresh articulation of Christianity that speaks to our deepest hungers, fears, and hopes. (shrink)

The past several decades have seen a renaissance in Christian philosophy, led by the work of Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff, William Alston, Eleonore Stump, and others. In the spirit of Plantinga s famous manifesto, Advice to Christian Philosophers, James K. A. Smith here offers not only advice to Pentecostal philosophers but also some Pentecostal advice to Christian philosophers. In this inaugural Pentecostal Manifestos volume Smith begins from the conviction that implicit in Pentecostal and charismatic spirituality is a (...) tacit worldview or social imaginary. Thinking in Tongues unpacks and articulates the key elements of this Pentecostal worldview and then explores their implications for philosophical reflection on ontology, epistemology, aesthetics, language, science, and philosophy of religion. In each case, Smith demonstrates how the implicit wisdom of Pentecostal spirituality makes unique contributions to current conversations in Christian philosophy. (shrink)

2013 Word Guild Award (Academic) How does worship work? How exactly does liturgical formation shape us? What are the dynamics of such transformation? In the second of James K. A. Smith's three-volume theology of culture, the author expands and deepens the analysis of cultural liturgies and Christian worship he developed in his well-received Desiring the Kingdom. He helps us understand and appreciate the bodily basis of habit formation and how liturgical formation--both "secular" and Christian--affects our fundamental orientation to (...) the world. Worship "works" by leveraging our bodies to transform our imagination, and it does this through stories we understand on a register that is closer to body than mind. This has critical implications for how we think about Christian formation. Professors and students will welcome this work as will pastors, worship leaders, and Christian educators. The book includes analyses of popular films, novels, and other cultural phenomena, such as The King's Speech, Rise of the Planet of the Apes, David Foster Wallace's Infinite Jest, and Facebook. (shrink)

This important contribution to the ground-breaking Radical Orthodoxy series revisits the works of Husserl, Heidegger, Augustine and Derrida to reconsider the challenge of speaking of God through predication, silence, confession and praise. James K. A. Smith argues for God's own refusal to avoid speaking as well as for our urgent need of words to make Him visible to us. This leads to a radical new "incarnational phenomenology" in which God's love endows imperfect signs with the means to indicate (...) true states of infinitude, and in which we may ultimately discover a new theology of the arts. (shrink)

Given the enchanted worldview of pentecost-alism, what possibility is there for a uniquely pentecostal intervention in the science-theology dialogue? By asserting the centrality of the miraculous and the fantastic, and being fundamentally committed to a universe open to surprise, does not pentecostalism forfeit admission to the conversation? I argue for a distinctly pentecostal contribution to the dialogue that is critical of regnant naturalistic paradigms but also of a naive supernaturalism. I argue that implicit in the pentecostal social imaginary is a (...) distinct conception of nature that is amenable to science but in conflict with naturalism. (shrink)

This review essay assesses Michael Jackson’s ongoing project of staging an encounter between anthropology and philosophy in two books: Lifeworlds (2013) and As Wide as the World Is Wise (2016). Considering his philosophical enrichment of ethnographic theory and method, this essay addresses foundational questions about the prospects and practices of interdisciplinary engagement. It also suggests future avenues for continued dialogue between philosophy and anthropology.

William Abraham’s “canonical theism” calls into question standard strategies in philosophy of religion which (1) strain out the particularities of Christian faith, distilling a “mere theism” and (2) position Christian faith within a broader, “general” epistemology. I evaluate Abraham’s call for a philosophical approach that honors the thick particularity of Christian faith and makes room for the unique epistemological status of revelation. I conclude that Abraham’s promising project could be extended to more radically call into question the “intellectualism” that characterizes (...) contemporary philosophy of religion. (shrink)

In his early work, Martin Heidegger argues for a rigorous methodological atheism in philosophy, which is not opposed to religious faith but only to the impact of faith when one is philosophizing. For the young Heidegger, the philosopher, even though possibly a religious person, must be an atheist when doing philosophy. Christian philosophy, then, is a round square. In this essay, I unpack Heidegger’s methodological considerations and attempt to draw parallels with other traditions which argue for the possibility of a (...) Christian philosophy but at root concede Heidegger’s atheism. In conclusion, I propose that it is precisely Heidegger’s work which points to the inescapabiIity of and opens the door to religious philosophy. (shrink)

This essay considers the legacy of Kant’s philosophy of religion as appropriated by Jacques Derrida in his recent, “Foi et savoir: les deux sources de la ‘religion’ aux limites de la simple raison.” Derrida’s adoption of this Kantian framework raises the question of how one might describe this as a postmodern account of religion, which in turn raises the question of the relationship between modernity and postmodernity in general, and Derrida’s relationship to Kant in particular. Following an exposition of Derrida’s (...) notion of a formal “ethical” religion as a repetition of Kant’s critique in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, I offer a critique of Derrida’s (and Kant’s) “formalization” of religion and the relationship between faith and reason, arguing that a more persistent postmodernism requires a de-formalization of the modern concern for justice, appreciating its determinate prophetic origin. (shrink)

For Husserl, the natural attitude - and hence any further explication of it - is put out of play, bracketed by the phenomenological epoché, which, of course, is not to deny its existence, but only to turn our theoretical gaze elsewhere. As Husserl remarks, “the single facts, the facticity of the natural world taken universally, disappear from our theoretical regard” (Id 60/68). The project of the young Heidegger, I will argue, is precisely a concern with facticity, taking up this forgotten (...) project in phenomenology, and thus attempting an explication of the natural attitude, considered so “extraordinarily important” by Husserl. Heidegger thus effects something of a relocation of phenomenology, turning its analysis to a different site: pretheoretical experience. Further, Heidegger also seeks to honor the precognitive nature of this pretheoretical experience, or what he will call faktische Lebenserfahrung. As such, the young Heidegger is very concerned with Husserl’s “theoreticization” of factical life. To avoid the same in his ‘new’phenomenology, Heidegger must develop a new conceptuality: the “formal indication” (formale Anzeige).Selon Husserl, l’attitude naturelle - et toute explication de celle-ci - est mise hors d’usage, mise entre parenthèses par l’epoche, laquelle ne nie pas son existence, mais fait détourner notre regard théorique. Comme le remarque Husserl: «les faits singuliers, la facticité du monde naturel pris dans son universalité, disparaissent de notre regard théorique» (Id 60/68). Je soutiendrai que le projet du jeune Heidegger consiste précisément en une préoccupation de la facticité, reprenant ainsi un projet oublié de la phénoménologie, et tâchant ainsi d’expliquer l’attitude naturelle, si «extraordinairement importante» aux yeux de Husserl. Ainsi, Heidegger institue une sorte de redéfinition de la phénoménologie, fixant son analyse à un lieu différent: l’expérience préthéorique. De plus, Heidegger cherche é reconnaître la nature précognitive de cette experience préthéorique, ou ce qu’il appellera faktische Lebenserfahrung. Ainsi, Heidegger est hautement préoccupé par la «théorisation» husserlienne de la vie factuelle. Pour éviterune telle chose dans sa «nouvelle» phénoménologie, Heidegger doit développer une conceptualisation nouvelle: l’indication formelle (fonnale Anzeige). (shrink)

For Husserl, the natural attitude - and hence any further explication of it - is put out of play, bracketed by the phenomenological epoché, which, of course, is not to deny its existence, but only to turn our theoretical gaze elsewhere. As Husserl remarks, “the single facts, the facticity of the natural world taken universally, disappear from our theoretical regard” (Id 60/68). The project of the young Heidegger, I will argue, is precisely a concern with facticity, taking up this forgotten (...) project in phenomenology, and thus attempting an explication of the natural attitude, considered so “extraordinarily important” by Husserl. Heidegger thus effects something of a relocation of phenomenology, turning its analysis to a different site: pretheoretical experience. Further, Heidegger also seeks to honor the precognitive nature of this pretheoretical experience, or what he will call faktische Lebenserfahrung. As such, the young Heidegger is very concerned with Husserl’s “theoreticization” of factical life. To avoid the same in his ‘new’phenomenology, Heidegger must develop a new conceptuality: the “formal indication” (formale Anzeige).Selon Husserl, l’attitude naturelle - et toute explication de celle-ci - est mise hors d’usage, mise entre parenthèses par l’epoche, laquelle ne nie pas son existence, mais fait détourner notre regard théorique. Comme le remarque Husserl: «les faits singuliers, la facticité du monde naturel pris dans son universalité, disparaissent de notre regard théorique» (Id 60/68). Je soutiendrai que le projet du jeune Heidegger consiste précisément en une préoccupation de la facticité, reprenant ainsi un projet oublié de la phénoménologie, et tâchant ainsi d’expliquer l’attitude naturelle, si «extraordinairement importante» aux yeux de Husserl. Ainsi, Heidegger institue une sorte de redéfinition de la phénoménologie, fixant son analyse à un lieu différent: l’expérience préthéorique. De plus, Heidegger cherche é reconnaître la nature précognitive de cette experience préthéorique, ou ce qu’il appellera faktische Lebenserfahrung. Ainsi, Heidegger est hautement préoccupé par la «théorisation» husserlienne de la vie factuelle. Pour éviterune telle chose dans sa «nouvelle» phénoménologie, Heidegger doit développer une conceptualisation nouvelle: l’indication formelle (fonnale Anzeige). (shrink)

In reply to Benson’s response, I agree that we should be seeking the dissolution of all enclaves in philosophy of religion—whether continental or analytic. But I continue to suggest that continental philosophy of religion bears special burdens in this respect.

In reply to Benson’s response, I agree that we should be seeking the dissolution of all enclaves in philosophy of religion—whether continental or analytic. But I continue to suggest that continental philosophy of religion bears special burdens in this respect.

The author responds to critics of Awaiting the King, addressing especially questions about Augustinian liberalism and the church’s complicity in, and responsibility for, disordered liturgies, raising fundamental questions about the relationship between church and world.

Over the past decade there has been a burgeoning of work in philosophy of religion that has drawn upon and been oriented by “continental” sources in philosophy—associated with figures such as Martin Heidegger, Jacques Derrida, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Luc Marion, Gilles Deleuze, and others. This is a significant development and one that should be welcomed by the community of Christian philosophers. However, in this dialogue piece I take stock of the field of “continental philosophy of religion” and suggest that the field (...) is developing some un-healthy patterns and habits. The burden of the paper is to suggest a prescription for the future health of this important field by articulating six key practices that should characterize further scholarship in continental philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Throughout his corpus , Augustine grapples with the challenge of how to speak of that which exceeds and resists conceptualization. The one who would speak of God is confronted, it seems, by a double‐bind: either one reduces God's transcendence to the immanence of language and concepts, or one remains silent. Even to call God ‘inexpressible’, he remarks in De doctrina christiana, is to predicate something of God and thus make some claim to comprehension. ‘This battle of words’, he continues, ‘should (...) be avoided by keeping silent’ . Augustine thus seems to privilege and apophatic strategy. But this is not his last word on the matter. Indeed upon the heels of this passage he carefully notes: ‘And yet, while nothing really worthy of God can be said about him, he has accepted the homage of human voices, and has wished us to rejoice in praising [laude] him with our words.’ My goal in this essay is to consider Augustine's laudatory strategy of ‘praise’ as a non‐objectifying discourse concerning transcendence which navigates the straits between kataphatic theological positivism and apophatic silence. This will be taken up against the horizon of contemporary discussions of transcendence and phenomenology, particularly in the work of Jacques Derrida and Jean‐Luc Marion. (shrink)

Throughout his corpus, Augustine grapples with the challenge of how to speak of that which exceeds and resists conceptualization. The one who would speak of God is confronted, it seems, by a double‐bind: either one reduces God's transcendence to the immanence of language and concepts, or one remains silent. Even to call God ‘inexpressible’, he remarks in De doctrina christiana, is to predicate something of God and thus make some claim to comprehension. ‘This battle of words’, he continues, ‘should be (...) avoided by keeping silent’. Augustine thus seems to privilege and apophatic strategy. But this is not his last word on the matter. Indeed upon the heels of this passage he carefully notes: ‘And yet, while nothing really worthy of God can be said about him, he has accepted the homage of human voices, and has wished us to rejoice in praising [laude] him with our words.’ My goal in this essay is to consider Augustine's laudatory strategy of ‘praise’ as a non‐objectifying discourse concerning transcendence which navigates the straits between kataphatic theological positivism and apophatic silence. This will be taken up against the horizon of contemporary discussions of transcendence and phenomenology, particularly in the work of Jacques Derrida and Jean‐Luc Marion. (shrink)

Eric Gregory's Politics and the Order of Love takes up an audacious project: enlisting Saint Augustine in order to "help imagine a better liberalism." This article first provides a summary of Gregory's argument, focusing on his emphasis on love as a "motivation" for neighborly care, and hence democratic participation. This involves tracing the theme of motivation in the book, which is tied to his articulation of liberal perfectionism and an emphasis on civic virtue. In conclusion I raise the question of (...) whether his project has ignored a key aspect of Augustine's account of love, namely, the role of the Holy Spirit, thereby demarcating the limits of Gregory's "rational reconstruction" of Augustine. (shrink)

In this multi-faceted volume, Christian and other religiously committed theorists find themselves at an uneasy point in history—between premodernity, modernity, and postmodernity—where disciplines and methods, cultural and linguistic traditions, and religious commitments tangle and cross. Here, leading theorists explore the state of the art of the contemporary hermeneutical terrain. As they address the work of Gadamer, Ricoeur, and Derrida, the essays collected in this wide-ranging work engage key themes in philosophical hermeneutics, hermeneutics and religion, hermeneutics and the other arts, hermeneutics (...) and literature, and hermeneutics and ethics. Readers will find lively exchanges and reflections that meet the intellectual and philosophical challenges posed by hermeneutics at the crossroads. Contributors are Bruce Ellis Benson, Christina Bieber Lake, John D. Caputo, Eduardo J. Echeverria, Benne Faber, Norman Lillegard, Roger Lundin, Brian McCrea, James K. A. Smith, Michael VanderWeele, Kevin Vanhoozer, and Nicholas Wolterstorff. (shrink)