In his latest work on the social consequences of religious commitment, Jay Newman reveals in clear and concise fashion the extent to which competitiveness is an essential feature of religious life. His assessment charts various classical strategies that have been proposed for either eliminating such competitiveness or directing it into appropriate channels. After a detailed philosophical analysis of the nature and value of competition, the author examines competition between denominations and within denominations, and considers religious competition in some of (...) its less obvious forms. In the process of evaluating the methods for curbing religious competition advocated by such thinkers as Spinoza and Lessing, as well as by modern ecumenists, the author points the way to a general approach to religious competition that minimizes destructive religious conflicts without ignoring the positive value of religious competition. (shrink)

Once upon a time, when there was no psychoanalysis or cultural anthro-pology or meta-ethics, most philosophers believed that there was objective truth in such statements as, ‘Murder is wrong’, ‘One should not steal’, and ‘Heliogabalus was an evil man’. Many philosophers still believe that there is, and though their view is not wholly respectable in most English-speaking philosophical circles, it probably has the important merit of being true. There are serious reasons for worrying about the traditional view: it is not (...) clear how an ‘ought’ can be derived from an ‘is’; there are problems s e in trying to translate evaluative terms into descriptive ones; reflective men disagree profoundly on ethical issues; ethical judgments appear to have an emotive component; etc. Still, there are also very good reasons for believing that murder is wrong and that Heliogabalus was an evil man. I shall not defend the objectivity of statements of the form, ‘ X is good ’, for I am not at all worried about such statements passing out of the language of rational men. Even behaviourists and relativists and emotivists still make reasonably intelligent statements of this form. But I am worried about the future of a related class of statements, those of the form, ‘ X is civilized ’. These statements have been gradually disappearing from our discourse; perhaps they have been casualties of recent revolutions in social science and philosophy. And this state of affairs is a tragic one indeed, for not only is there a need for statements of this form, but of all ethical statements, these are the ones whose descriptive content is most incontrovertible. Non-cognitivistic moral philosophers generally dismiss statements about the ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarous’ along with statements about the ‘good’, ‘evil’, ‘right’, and ‘wrong’. But social scientists have made statements about the ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarous’ special objects of attack. They have even suggested that people who make such statements are narrow-minded, naive, and ‘ethnocentric’. ‘Ethnocentrism’, an eminent social scientist tells us, ‘is the technical name for this view of things in which one's own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it.’ Ethnocentrism is innocent enough up to a point, but reflective men should be careful not to allow it to blind their moral sense. The noted anthropologist, Herskovits, has given us the following warning: Cultures are sometimes evaluated by the use of the designations ‘civilized’ and ‘primitive’. These terms have a deceptive simplicity, and attempts to document the differences implied in them have proved to be of unexpected difficulty. (shrink)

While one of John Henry Newman's principal aims in the Grammar of Assent is to explain how men can give a ‘real assent’ to the existence of God, the major part of the actual phenomenology of religious belief in the work is concentrated in the fifth of its ten chapters. Unfortunately, this section of the essay has been overshadowed by the preliminary distinction between real and notional apprehension and by the later invocation of the illative sense; but perhaps the (...) time is now ripe for a closer examination of this central part of Newman's philosophy of religion, which is in many ways the key to the successes and failures of Newman's new method in philosophical theology. (shrink)

A provocative study of the complex relations between philosophy and journalism.

SummaryIn considering the main weaknesses of epistemologies like Chisholm's, this paper introduces a concept which is foreign to such systems, Cardinal Newman's notion of illative judgment. The method of concrete inference involves the cumulation of probabilities, and principles of epistemic logic can never accommodate all relevant circumstances. Epistemic principles like Chisholm's, perhaps best rephrased as principles of inductive logic, will not, when applied, elicit assent by themselves. Systems like Chisholm's do not ring true phenomenologically because they overemphasize inference at (...) the expense of judgment.RésuméPour remédier aux faiblesses majeures des épistémologies telles que celle de Chisholm, cet article introduit un conceptétranger à de tels systémes: la notion de‘ jugment illatif’ du Cardinal Newman. La méthode ?on;inférence concréte suppose la cumulation de probabilityés et les principes ?on;une logique épistémique ne peuvent jamais tenir compte de toutes les circonstances qui inter‐viennent. Des principes épistémiques tels que ceux de Chisholm, qu'on pourrait peut‐être qualifier de principes de logique inductive, ne vont pas, lorsqu'ils sont appliqués, entraîner par eux‐mêmes ľassentiment. De tels systémes ne sonnent pas phénoménologiquement juste parce qu'ils surestiment ľinférence aux dépens du jugement.ZusammenfassungIndem er die Hauptschwächen von Erkenntnistheorien wie die von Chisholm hervorhebt, fuhrt der Verfasser einen Begriff ein, der solchen Systemen fremd ist, nämlich der Begriff des illativen Urteils von Kardinal Newman. Die Methode des konkreten Folgerns involviert die Kumulation von Warscheinlichkeiten, und die Prinzipien der epistemischen Logik können nie alle relevanten Umstände erfassen. Epistemische Prinzipien wie diejenigen von Chisholm, die man vielleicht am besten als Prinzipien der induktiven Logik reformuliert, werden, wenn sie angewen‐det werden, nicht von selbst Zustimmung erwecken. Systeme wie das von Chisholm scheinen phänomenologisch inadäquat, weil sie Folgerungen auf Kosten von Ürteilen uberbewerten. (shrink)

Religious criticisms of technology are addressed by Newman, who concludes that religion and technology are largely compatible, mutually supportive, and very much alike.

Despite the pervasive feeling that much of the culture of Western democracies has increasingly become inauthentic or phoney, contemporary cultural critics and observers have paid little attention to the traditional philosophical criticism of inauthentic c.