This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

If one consults a somewhat older philosophical dictionary, one is likely to find that the word ‘metaphysics’ designates that branch of philosophy which deals with objects transcending the objects of the world of senses. The word itself, so the dictionary will tell us, is indicative of it. ‘Metaphysics’ means ‘what comes after physics’. Physics, of course, deals with that which is sensible; meta in this context means ‘after’ in the sense of ‘higher than’. Metaphysics, then, is the theory of the (...) supra-sensible, as indicated by its very name. (shrink)

If one consults a somewhat older philosophical dictionary, one is likely to find that the word ‘metaphysics’ designates that branch of philosophy which deals with objects transcending the objects of the world of senses. The word itself, so the dictionary will tell us, is indicative of it. ‘Metaphysics’ means ‘what comes after physics’. Physics, of course, deals with that which is sensible; meta in this context means ‘after’ in the sense of ‘higher than’. Metaphysics, then, is the theory of the (...) supra-sensible, as indicated by its very name. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 95 direction, it opens a field of pure philosophy, unencumbered by surds such as finite man. Only if the Phenomenology is taken as a monographic work on man can there be difficulty. Let us hasten to add that, on the very premises of his book, Loewenberg's criticism of Hegel is tentative rather than apodictic; its harshness is relieved through the dialogue form. And perhaps, the interlocutors will, (...) as one of them suggests, "resume (their) conversations with fresh minds at a later date" (p. 371). They might find that they have to go beyond the limits of exoteric discussion. Or, conversely, they might find that exoteric treatment can yield no more than an anthropological reading and is, in fact, bound up with it. If Loewenberg 's extant commentary did no more than demonstrate this negative point, however implicitly,it would be of great merit. But there is of course much more: there is the substance of Loewenberg's commentary, largely unaffected by the above counter-representations. Theoretical problems aside, the supreme value of the book lies in its clarity and perceptiveness, in the "sense" it makes of the Phenomenology. Of a kind all its own, it will henceforth serve as the preferred entrance to Hegel. KLAUS HARTMANN Bonn, W. Germany Arthur Hfibscher, editor. XXXVIlI. Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch ]~r das Jahr 1957. (Frankfurt/ Main: Waldemar Kramer, 1967.Pp. v + 244.) Schopenhauer: Philosophe de l'Absurde. By Clement Brosset. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967.Pp. ix [i] -b 107.Paper, F. 7.--) Manches in dem Jahrbuch ist rein anekdotisch; manches bio- oder bibliographisch. Einiges h~ngt nur sehr lose mit Schopenhauer zusammen; so der liingste Beitrag (K. Engisch, "Todesstrafe--ja oder nein?,") mit nfitzlicher historischer und systematiseher Ubersieht, die zum Ergebnis kommt, dass die Argumente gegen die Todesstrafe iiberwiegen. Von gesetzgeberischen Interessen getragen ist such G. Zoebe, "Sind die Tiere rechtlos?" Der zweitliingste Beitrag (H. Voigt, 'r0ber Schopenhauers Erkenntnistheorie,') enth~ilt eine Art von Variationen sum Thema des Zusammenhanges zwischen Charakter und Schicksah Man freut sich, dass ein Inder (Kanti Chandra Pandey) sich fiber Schopenhauers Kenntnis des Hinduismus und Buddismus eehr anerkennendausspricht. Das Bild der Sehopenhauerschen Philosophie, wie es uns im Jahrbuch begeguet ist das uns vertraute: Pessimismus, ErlSsung durch Kunst, Mitleid, Verneinung des Willens. Aber nach Brosset erfassen diese Kategorien nur die sekund~ren Charaktere der Schopenhauerschen Philosophie. In ihrem wirklich wertvollen Kern sei diese Philosophie erstens Vorl~uferin der yon Brosset so genannten genealogischen Philosophie eines Marx, Nietzsche und Freud; allerdings letzten Endes ein Versager, da sie auf das eigentliche Anliegen der genealogischen Philosophie, n~mlich die Ableitung konkreter und spezifischer Ideen (bei Schopenhauer: der Intelligenz) aus der Umformung unbewusster Tatbestiinde (bei Schopenhauer: des Willens), nicht eingehe, sondern sich mit der Feststellung begniigt, dass die Wurzel der (bewussten) InteUigenz der (unbewusste) Wille ist. Zweitens sei Schopenhauer der erste, der seine Philosophie auf der Urerfahrung der Grundlosigkeit (Brosset zieht den Ausdruck Absurdit~t vor), daher Unausdenkbarkeit oder Unergrfindlichkeit des Seins im ganzen, aufbaut. Auf diese Erfahrung (die Frage, 'Warum nicht Nichts?' ist unbeantwortbar) reagiere der Menseh mit Angst. Die Notwendigkeit und die Zweckm~issigkeit, die die Welt im ganzen charskterisieren, seien selbst kontingent und zwecklos. Manchmal scheint mir Brosset die Originalitiit seiner Interpretationen zu iiberseh~tzen; insbesondere seine Erkl~rung der Blindheit des Willens (S. 26f.) rennt wohl offene Tfiren ein. PHILIP MERLAN ~cripps College, Claremont, California... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Eschatology, Sacred and Profane* PHILIP MERLAN LET ME BEGINthis paper with a double motto. The first is from a German poet, C. F. Meyer. It reads in my own translation: "We hosts of the dead ones--more numerous are we--than you who tread the earth and you who sail the sea." The second is a piece of statistical information for the correctness of which, however, I cannot vouchsafe. (...) It reads: "From the time when man first appeared, 77 billion people have been born. Thus, today's population of about 3 billion represents only 4 per cent of all men ever born" (Universitas 6 [1964], p. 423). With these two mottoes in mind let me proceed. Kant is one of the great representatives of the belief both in a goal to history and in progress. As he sees it, this goal is one world-wide society living under one law, which law coincides with the demands of morality, or as we could also say, in which legality and morality at least do not conflict. Kant is convinced that nature will by-and-by compel man to establish this world-wide society characterized, among other things, by eternal peace. Thus, Kant is an optimist with regard to the future. Yet, he is profoundly pessimistic with regard to the past. For him, history is one long chain of sufferings inflicted on man by man; and on the whole he has a very dim view of man's nature. The synthesis of his pessimism with his optimism is contained in a remarkable sentence which we find in one of his last writings--1793, when Kant was 69. The title is On the Adage--This May be Right in Theory, But Is Inapplicable to Practical Purposes, and here he says: When one contemplates the evil which in the course of history man has inflicted on man, one would be inclined to give up in despair. But there is one thought on the thinking of which our mind will cheer up. It is the thought: things will improve in the future. This kind of cheer will be entirely benevolent and unselfish, for this improvement will take place after we * I am indebted for the posthumous edition of this paper of my late husband Philip Merlan to Professor Frederick Sontag of Pomona College. My husband prepared this paper for, and read it to, various philosophical groups. In the course of these readings, he made numerous pencil additions. Thus, what Professor Sontag has done, is to change the tone to suit a printed presentation and to work the additions into the text as the logic of the arguments and notes seemed to dictate. Franciszka Merlan. [193] 194 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY have been buried for a long, long time. We ourselves will not be able to harvest what we ourselves have helped to plant. (WW8, 273-13) In whose name did Kant speak? Who are the altruists who feel cheered up by the prospect of a goal which they themselves will not live to reach? No easy answer can be found in Kant's writings. However it would not be surprising if Kant, a Rousseauian in so many respects, retained some of Rousseau's belief in the innate goodness of man (in spite of his pietistic heritage which encourages him to see man as thoroughly corrupt). Thus, he expects everybody to be capable of this altruistic attitude. We all do then cheer up when we think of the prospects for mankind. This means that our altruism permits us in some way to participate in mankind's bright future, to reach the goal, if I may say so, in hope and expectation, though not physically. For Kant the problem of history was never in the center of his own interest, nor would he have admitted that it is of central importance for man. Hegel's attitude is quite different. Man's participation in history is Hegel's main topic. At this point let me remind you briefly of Hegel's fundamental ideas. The enlightenment and romanticism produced two highly characteristic interpretations of religion. According to the former, the kernel of every religion is morality. According to the latter, the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Minor Socratics* PHILIP MERLAN OF MEN MORE OR LESS DECISIVELY influenced by Socrates, three--Antisthenes (c. 455-360), Aristippus of Cyrene (c. 435-356), and Eucleides of Megara (c. 450380 )--became founders of schools (or sects) often referred to as "minor Socratic schools." These schools are the Cynic, the Cyrenaic, and the Megaric, respectively. The names of the last two are self-explanatory. That of the first sounds somewhat like "dog (...) (kytn)-like." By some it is assumed to have been derived from the meeting place of Antisthenes with his followers, the gymnasium of Kynosarges; x others believe it to be contemptuously indicative of the dog-like life of the members of the sect (shamelessness, begging, barking, biting). 2 In this sense it was proudly and defiantly accepted by the members themselves, a What we know of the ethical teachings of the Megaric school amounts to hardly more than one sentence, in which the Good seems to have been identified with the One. 4 All we can say of this formula is that it, in some way, links the * Size (very limited), scope (ethical doctrines only), manner of presentation (for the general reader and rather dogmatic), etc., of this article were determined by the character of the Encyclopedia of Morals, in which it originally appeared. The present footnotes try to make up for some of the shortcomings unavoidable in this kind of article. [The Journal is grateful to Philosophical Library, Inc. for permission to reprint this article. The footnotes were subsequently added by Professor Merlan and appear here for the first time.] As the only collection of fragments of Cynics (Antisthenes, Diogenes, Crates, Monimus, Demonax, Oenomaus, Teles, Bion) is that contained in F. W. A. Mullach, Fragmenta philosophorum graecorum (Paris: 1865), vol. II, pp. 274-429, which is hard to obtain (the collection of fragments by A. W. Winekelmann, Antisthenis fragmenta [1842] even harder), I shall quote them directly from the sources. There was no need to do so with the Cyrenaics, as we have two recent collections of their fragments: G. Giannantoni, 1 Cirenaici (Florence, n.d.: [1958])--they will be quoted as G--and E. Mannebach, Aristippi et Cyrenaicorum fragmenta (K~51n-Leiden: 1961), which will be quoted as Ma. A generous selection of fragments of Megarians, Cynics and Cyrenaics in German translation with introduction and notes is contained in W. Nestle, Die Sokratiker (Jena: 1922), pp. 79-177. Our knowledge of Antisthenes would considerably be enriched if we could follow H. Kesters, who, in a number of publications (one of them: Plaidoyer d'un Socratique... [Louvain: 1959]) ascribes Themistius, Or. XXVI to Antisthenes. However, the ascription is doubtful. i I.e., Whitehound: D.L. VI 13. Elias, In Cat. (CAG XVIII/I, Berlin: 1908), p. Ill, 2-29. Busse has a fourfold explanation of the name, all connected with the word Kt~v. Cf. K. v. Fritz, Quellenuntersuchungen zu Leben und Philosophie des Diogenes von Sinope (Leipzig: 1926), pp. 47-49. D.L. VI 60. 55; Stob. vol. III, p. 462, 16 W.-H. Quotations from Stobaeus refer to: K. Wachsmuth, O. Hense, loannis Stobaei Anthologium, 5 vol. (Berlin: 1884-1902); they are by volume, page, and line of this edition. 4 Eus. PE XIV 17, 1; D.L. II 106 (~v x6 dtTu06v). [143] 144 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Megarians to the Eleatic school 5 but also to some aspects of Plato's Philebus and his Laws, and also to the Epinomis, and, above all, to his lecture or course of lectures "The Good," the conclusion of which was that it is the One which is the Good. 6 And though we know that many Megarians were engaged in political activities,7 we do not know in what way, if any, that highly abstract ethical doctrine was linked to practice. It is entirely different with the other two schools, in which ethical theory is immediately applied to life and theoretical aspects of philosophy are often neglected or even absent. However, there is some doubt as to whether Antisthenes can actually be considered the fountainhead of Cynicism. He seems to have undergone the influence of Socrates late in his life, when he had already been active as a... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Religion and Philosophy from Plato's Phaedo to the Chaldaean Oracles PHILIP MERLAN A FEW YEARSAGO another of the so-called Orphic tablets was found? Like the previously known ones~it is an instruction for the deceased--it tells him what he will find in the beyond and how he is to act to secure for himself a blessed afterlife. As a rule the tablets differ somewhat in their wording and (...) the newly found is particularly remarkable in that the deceased, when asked by the guards of the Spring of Memory what his business here is, is instructed to answer, "I am a child of the Earth and o~octvo~5~aveOo~v~og ~ and my name is Asterios. ''~ Now, it is generally recognized that the tablets are the product of some mystery religion? The new tablet suggests that part of its initiation ceremony might have been the experience of a mock death and a mock rebirth, the latter symbolized by the assuming of a new name? XN. M. Verdelis, "XaXr~ 7eCp6~oxos raX~rls ~x r 'ApxaLoXoy~K ~ 'Er 1950-1951 (Athens, 1951), pp. 80-105, esp. pp. 99-105. 2 Their text can be found in any edition of Diels-Kranz, VS. New finds: N. M. Verdelis, '0pr162 ~,&rt*ara ~ Kpr "Ap~ca~oXo*t~x~"E~tzep~ 1953-54, Second Part (Athens, 1958), pp. 56-60. On their character (Orphic? Pythagorean?), see F. Cumont, Lex perpetua (Paris, 1944), p. 406. Which mystery religion professed these two as obviously the highest deities? One is tempted to think of the mysteries of Samothrace, as in them these two deities played a conspicuous role according to Varro, De lingua lat. V 58 (cf. B. Cardauns, Varros 'Logistoricus' iiber die G6tterverehrung [Wiirzburg, 1960], pp. 60-67). 4 dar (~po4pro~)seems to me an evident conjecture by Verdelis. See, e.g., M. P. Nilsson, Geschichte der griechischen Religion, Vol. 2 (Miinchen, 1950), pp. 223-227. 0This is the assumption of Verdelis, XaXxr ~'e,~0~oxo~ with which I agree. On baptismal names see, e.g., A Oepke, "AM~IOAAEIY~ im griechischen und hellenistischen Kult," Archiv fiir Religionswissenschaft 31 (1934), pp. 42-56, esp. 52, note 5 (den Anstoss---scil. to bestowing of a new name on the initiate--gaben wohl primitive Wiedergeburtsgedanken). It seems to me that the Pindaric lines praising him who descends to the netherworld if he had been initiated, because he ot~e ~p fllov.reXew'gu,/olSeJ,~b.&6a~orol,tlpx~p (fr. 137a Sch) are to be explained by assuming that Pindar is here alluding to the experience of mock death (~-~,ev~-~) and mock rebirth (apX~), though it remains unclear whether the initiate experienced them in his own person or was only shown something (e.g. the burial of a seed followed by its shooting into an ear) symbolizing such events. [163] 164 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY And it is only natural to suppose that the initiation ceremony was preceded by some kind of ritual purification. In one more respect the new tablet is remarkable. It is the oldest we know. It belongs to the mid-fourth century. And this means that perhaps only a few years separate it from the date of the publication of Plato's Phaedo.' Now, as everybody knows, the Phaedo has something to say on mystery religions. Socrates first explains to his friends why he is not only not afraid of death but even looking forward to it. All his life long, he says, he was a philosopher and philosophy, as he sees it, is nothing else but ~X~-c~l0ctvd,ov. And as he explains in what way philosophy is a preparation for death, he time and again uses for the description of the philosopher's way of life the word 'pure' and its cognates (Phaedo 67d-e; 69a6-e5 [~d~}aqot~,•, ~xa0a0~vog], so that in the end the philosopher's way of life can by Socrates be described as purification-obviously purification not in its ritual sense of the word but, as Socrates sees it, in its true sense. And now Socrates clinches his argument and says: And it seems indeed that the men to whom we are indebted for the institution of... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Zur Zahlenlehre im Platonismus (Neuplatonismus) und " lm Yezzra PHILIP MERLAN VOR MEHRERENJahrzehnten hat Baeck die These aufgestellt, dass die Philosophie yon Proclus die Quelle yon Sefer Yezira ist. 1 Diese These ist yon Hebr~iisten abgelehnt worden~(eigentlich ohne Angabe yon Grfinden), yon Griizisten unbeachtet geblieben. Der vorliegende Aufsatz unternimmt es, dieselbe yon gr~zistischer Seite zu stfitzen. Doch geschieht dies in strikter Beschr~nkung auf die Zahlenlehre des 1. (...) Kapitels yon Sefer Yezira, d.h. des :Kapitels, worin die Lehre yon der allumgreifenden Wirkung der ersten zehn Ziffern8 vorgetragen wird. Von den Themen von Plotins Enn. VI 6 sind einige yon besonderem Interesse fiir unser Problem. Vor allem beweist Plotin, dass Zahlen nicht etwa das Produkt unseres Abstrahierens yon gez~ihlten Dingen oder das des z~ihlenden Subjekts sind, dass sie vielmehr vor den geziihlten Dingen und unabhiingig yon ihrem Gedachtwerden existieren~--genau so wie die iibrigen Intelligibilien, gleich Ideen. ~ Auch diese existieren ~a~,, nicht ~,vol~. Zweitens beweist Plotin, dass der 'Ort' an dem diese Zahlen existieren, im Bereich des Intelligiblen liegt. Dabei spaltet aber Plotin diesen Bereich dreifach. Sonst ist ibm der Bereich des Intelligiblen einfach gleichbedeutend mit dem der Intelligenz; in anderen Worten, sonst ist ihm der Bereieh des Intelligiblen einfach gleiehbedeutend mit der zweiten Hypostase. Und sonst bleibt ihm diese zweite Hypostase ungespalten. Hier unterscheidet aber Plotin drei Unterbereiche des Intelligiblen. Der oberste ist das Seiende; der mittlere ist Intelligenz; der unterste ist Lebewesen. 6 1Leo Baeck, "Zum Sepher Jezira," Monatsschrift fiir Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums 70 ~TN. F. 34 (1926),S. 371-376;78 = N. F. 42 (1934), S. 448-455. So von G. ~ajda, Introduction a la pens$ejuive du Moyen Age (Paris, 1947), S. 17, Anm. 1; G. Scholem, Ursprung und Anfdnge der Kabbala (Berlin, 1962),S. 24, Anm. 42. Immerhin gibt Scholem zu, dass Sefer Yezira yon grieehischen Quellen beeinflusst ist. So iibersetze ich sephiroth, um an die MSgliehkeit zu erinnern, dasses sich um dasselbe Wort handeln mag, dessen arabische Form (sift, sefr) in so viele Sprachen als Ziffer eingegangen ist. 4Zun~chst wehrt Plotin eine Plato-Interpretation ab, die aus ihm (offenbar aus Epinomis 978C-D) herauslesen wfirde, dass er die Zahl nur als Produkt des Z~ihlensyon ala~r& angesehen hat (4, 11-20). Er rut es, indem er Plato unterschiebt, er habe vom aX,10Lvb~~m0~6~gesprochen, der realiter existiert und an den die Seele sich erinnert, wean sie a'LaO~r&wahrnimmt (20-24). 5 6, 5-19. Cf. 9, 5-6. e el ~ rSO~V7rp~rov ~e~ ~afle~v ~rp~vov 5v, civetvo~z~, e~ra v5 ~ov... (8, 17-18; of. 1-2; 15, 2-3). Diese Triade ist offenbar aus Platos Sophistes 248 E-249 B und Timaeus 39 E abgeleitet. [167] 168 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Was wir vor uns haben ist natiirlich die Triade Sein-Intelligieren-Leben, die im sp~iteren Neuplatonismus immer wieder, bei Plotin aber, wenn auch unmissverst ~indlich, doch nur gelegentlich auftaucht. Und die Zahl hat ikren Oft im obersten dieser drei Bereiche, dem des Seienden/ Die Zahl schw~ngert nun sozusagen das Seiende und ist so Ursache yon dessen Geburtswehen, unter denen das Seiende die Vielheit der seienden 'Dinge' zur Welt bringt, d.h. sich in seiende 'Dinge' vervielf~ltigt.8 So geht also die Zahl der 'Ents~ehung '9 der seienden 'Dinge' voran. Und die seienden 'Dinge' (gleich Ideen; siehe unten) habe Plato deswegen als Henaden und Zahlen bezeichnet.1~ Daher bezeichnet Plotin die Zahlen als Fundament, Quelle, Wurzel, Prinzip der seienden Dinge. n Dutch die Zahlen oder durch das zur Zahl gewordene Seiende sind die seienden 'Dinge' mit dem Seienden verknfipft.~2 Die Zahlen, yon denen bisher gesprochen wurde, sind natfirlich nicht Zahlen im gewShnlichen Wortsinn. Vielmehr unterscheidet sie Plotin als erste, wahrhafte, wesentliche Zahlen yon monadischen Zahlen?3 In diesem Zusammenhang aber bezeichnet 'monadisch' Zahlen, die aus Einheiten zusammengesetzt sind. Im Unterschied yon ihnen sind die wesentlichen (ersten, wahrhaften) Zahlen nicht aus Einheiten zusammengesetzt. Es scheint demnach, dass Plotin den ZaMen weder Priorit~tt noch Posterioritiit dem Seienden gegenfiber zuschreibt (er bezeichnet gelegentlieh das Seiende einfach Ms ZaM).14Sowie das Seiende aus dem Ureinen (so wird hier Plotins oberstes Prinzip bezeichnet werden) entspringt und zu sich kommt... (shrink)

Reviewer surveys barnard's work, approves of main theses, but corrects minor points. he then reflects upon several problems raised by barnard. he relates some of herder's assertions to german proto-romanticism. points discussed are: herder's turning away from cosmopolitanism and his turning toward english literature as an expression of his francophobia, the "superiority" of the gothic style, the concepts of "kunstpoesie" and "naturpoesie", the emphasis on primitivism and the socio-political theories, the theory of language. merlan also comments on the "volk" (...) concept and its significance for historiography, and the debate between herder and kant. he concludes with a statement about the concept of "volk" and the problem of an individual's participation in history. the work reviewed is "herder's social and political thought. from enlightenment to nationalism." by f.m. barnard. oxford: clarendon press 1965. pp. xv, 189. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 119 Der Verf. bedient sieh in Verfolgung seines Ziels der fibliehen historischen Methode, die er mit Meistersehaft handhabt. Doch ist er keineswegs ein typischer Vertreter des modernen Historismus. Als Philosoph ist er gefesselt von den Problemen, die sich in der dreifachen Thematik seiner Untersuehung verbergen. Er begibt sich in die Gesehichte, aber doch nur, um yon Zeit zu Zeit aus ihr herauszutreten und i)berlegungen nachzugehen, die er (...) selbst, anlfifilieh einer methodologisehen Bemerkung in der Einleitung, als eine "Typologie yon LSsungen" (3) bezeiehnet. Aber das ist ein understatement, keine exakte Besehreibung. Die unbefangene und nfiehterne Kfihnheit dieser seiner trans-historisehen Reflexionen durehweht als ein frischer Luftzug die Welt der Gelehrsamkeit und Vielbelesenheit, die sich in diesen Seiten aufbaut. Freilieh, wo der Verf. selbst steht, gibt er uns nur gelegentlieh zu verstehen, so z.B. wenn er mit Entsehiedenheit die averroistisehe Depotenzierung des Einzelnen gegenfiber der Mensehheir zurfickweist. Aber, wiederum im Zusammenhang mit Averroes, legt er Gedanken zu der berfihmten oder auch berfiehtigten Lebre yon der doppelten Wahrheit vor, die uns in Zweifel darfiber lassen, ob und wie weit sich der Verf. hier verbirgt oder d~couvriert. M. gesellt sich nicht zu denen, die Averroes entlasten woUen, indem sie die fatale Lehre als eine spatere Zutat erkl~ren. Vielmehr mSchte er das Anathema dadurch fortnehmen, daB er die grobe und beleidigende Darstellung der Lehre dutch eine subtile Deutung ersetzt, die sie als konsequent, als vernfinftig und schlie61ich als wahr erscheinen l~Bt (107 ft.). Der Mensch, so argumentiert er, drfickt sich in einer Mehrheit yon "Sprachen" (universes of discourse) aus, die sich nieht ineinander fibersetzen lassen--der Sprache der Kunst, der Dichtung, der Philosophie, der Religion usw. So kann ein und derselbe Menseh ohne Selbstwidersprueh oder Unredliehkeit als Philosoph sagen: die individuelleSeele ist sterblich, als Gl~ubigerhingegen: sie ist unsterblich. Denn sowohl "Seele" wie "Individuum" wie aueh "Unsterblichkeit" meinen etwas anderes je nach dem universe of discourse, dem philosophischen oder religiSsen, in welchem sie gebraueht werden. Freilich, man kann den Versueh maehen, in langagestart in einer der vielen langues zu reden, und die Theologie kann nicht umhin, eben dies zu wagen. Ffir die Theologie aber~ so bekennt der Verf., ist kein Raum in seinem "scheme of things" (109). Das ist ein erschreckendes Wort, und nieht blofi ffir den, der die Theologie erhalten mSchte. Denn es besteht begrfindete Sorge, dab der Ruin der zwisehen den versehiedenen langues zerriebenen Theologie auch die Philosophiepulverisiert. Die verschiedenen"Spraehen" miissen doch wohl in der einen mensehlichen Person sinnvoll zusammengeordnet sein. Welche Wissenschaft aber wenn nicht die Philosophie darf sich diese Zusammenordnung zum Gegenstand ihres Forschens und Sagens machen? Wir schliefien also unseren Bericht fiber ein bedeutendes Buch mit einer Frage, nicht aber der Kritik oder gar des Besser-wissen-wollenswegen, sondern um auszudrficken, dab der Autor uns nicht nur als gelehrter Kenner unterrichtet, sondern als Philosoph zum Denken zwingt. Mi~nchen, Germany HELMUT KUHN Diogenis Laertii Vitae Philosophorum. Recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit H. S. Long. 1 vol. in2. (Oxford: 1964.Pp. xx ~ xiv W 597. $11.20.) Der Hg erinnert uns, dass seit der Cobetsehen (1850), leider apparatlosen, keine kritische Ausgabe des Diogenes im ganzen ersehlenen ist. Immerhin gibt es abet die Ubersetzung yon M. Gigante (DiogeneLaerzio, Vite dei filosofi, Bari 1962), die so annotiert ist, dass sie vielfach anstatt einer Edition gebraucht werden kann. Man bedauert, dass der Hg sie offenbar noch nicht benutzen konnte (sein Buch ist wohl 1964erschienen, doch ist die Vorrede 1961datiert). Der Hg schliesst sich der Meinung an, dass nut 3 der existierenden Diogenes-Hss den Wert unabh~ngiger Zeugen besitzen. Vorsichtiger beurteilt den Sachverhalt z.B.H. Erbse in: Geschichte der Text~berlieferung, I. Band (1961), S. 306f., doch wollen wir die These des Hg akzeptieren. Wie allgemein zugestanden, gehen diese drei auf eine gemeinsame Vorlage zur~iek. Unter diesen Ums~nden ist es die Pflicht des Hg, uns verl~sslich und eindeutig fiber den Text dieser drei (BFP aus dem 12.u. 13.Jh.) zu informieren, eine Entscheidung zu treffen, wo diese 120 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY nicht tibereinstimmen, darfiber hinaus Textverderbnisse anzuzeigen und womSglich zu emendieren, entweder dureh eigene Vermutungen (in Buch VI und IX, e. 19% des Ganzen, habe ich nur zwei gefunden, beide einleuehtend... (shrink)