After introducing Millianism and touching on two problems raised by genuinely empty names for Millianism (section I), I provide a brief exposition of the Gappy Proposition View (GPV) and of how different versions of this view can reply to the problems in question (section II). In the following sections I develop my reasons against the GPV. First, I will try to argue that apparently promising arguments for the claim that gappy propositions are propositions are not successful (section III). Then, I (...) will develop two arguments against GPs via demonstrating two odd consequences of the GPV: (a) that there can be an atomic proposition which contains other propositions that are not the semantic contents of any part of the .. (shrink)

Avicenna introduces the primary propositions as the most fundamental principles of knowledge. However, as far as we are aware, Avicenna’s primaries have not yet been independently studied. Nor do Avicenna scholars agree on how to characterize them in the language of contemporary philosophy. It is well-known that the primaries are indemonstrable; nonetheless, it is not clear what the genealogy of the primaries is, how, epistemologically speaking, they can be distinguished from other principles, what their phenomenology is, what the cause of (...) the assent to them is, how to explain the relationship between the ‘innate [nature] of the intellect’ and the primaries and, finally, back to their indemonstrability, in what sense they are ‘indemonstrable’. We will try to fill this gap. As a corollary, we will explain why Gutas’s view [Gutas, Dimitri.... (shrink)

According to Millianism, the semantic content of a proper name is its semantic referent. Many names, however, lack semantic referent; hence, so-called ‘empty’ names. Empty names raise various problems for Millianism. T.C. Ryckman, Fred Adams, Garry Fuller, Robert Stecker, Kenneth Taylor, and Nicole Wyatt, among others, have defended Millianism against these problems by appeal to pragmatics . I introduce Millianism and the problems raised by empty names for the view, then examine Pragmatic Millianism , its strength, its varieties, and why (...) the previous arguments against PM do not succeed. I then provide my argument against PM: the view oversimplifies the complex phenomenon of association between names and descriptions. I discuss an objection to my argument and rebut that. Finally, I try to draw an outline of a positive view. (shrink)

Neo-Russellianism, which incorporates both Millianism (with regard to proper names) and the thesis of singular Russellian propositions, has widely been defended after the publication of Kripke's Naming and Necessity. The view, however, encounters various problems regarding empty names, names that do not have semantic referents. Nathan Salmon and Scott Soames have defended neo-Russellianism against such problems in a novel way; to account for various intuitions of competent and rational speakers regarding utterances of sentences containing empty names, Salmon and Soames appeal (...) neither to entities similar to Fregean senses, e.g. propositional guises or modes of presentation, nor to Gricean implicatures. In this paper, however, I argue that their view slips into neo-Meinongianism; it is committed to nonexistent objects, assigns various properties to them, and allows quantifiers range over such entities. This, I conclude, makes Salmon and Soames' view less appealing, if not implausible. (shrink)

Here I shall focus on Suhrawardi’s use and conception of ‘fiṭrī’, translated as ‘innate’ by Hossein Ziai (1990), Hossein Ziai and John Walbridge (Suhrawardi 1999), and Mehdi Aminrazavi (1997, 2003),1 and will try to make some points in passing regarding Cartesian innate ideas in relation to Suhrawardi’s fiṭrīāt. I will try to explain my understanding of Suhrawardi’s i‛tibārāt ‛aqliyya (beings of reason) and their relationship to fiṭrīāt. As a relevant issue, I will touch on Suhrawardi’s distinction between objective and intellectual (...) attributes. Considering Platonic forms as the godparents of Suhrawardi’s ‘innate’ ideas, I will end by justifying this question: Is Suhrawardi a Platonist?Let’s begin with Descartes. .. (shrink)

According to the common wisdom, among both contemporary scholars and classic interpreters, Avicenna is committed to ‘Co-origination’: The human soul is temporally originated with the human body. Against the common wisdom, we will argue that Co-origination is ambiguous and vague and thus its attribution to Avicenna is in need of clarification and precisification. The problem is broken down into two sub-problems: First, the problem of the origination of different souls/powers, namely the vegetative, animal and rational, in humans, and second, the (...) problem of the relationship between these souls/powers. Based on our solutions to these two sub-problems, we will offer our own reading of Co-origination according to which Avicenna is not committed to the view that the human soul is originated with the ‘human body’ in its ordinary sense. (shrink)

RésuméLa « Lettre sur l’âme » est intéressante et significative ; elle tente de résoudre des problèmes fondamentaux qui relèvent des frontières de la psychologie, de l’épistémologie, de la métaphysique, de la philosophie de l’esprit et de la logique. Le consensus parmi les spécialistes d’Avicenne est que la « Lettre » est de sa plume. Dans cet article, je vais contester ce consensus. J’examinerai le contenu philosophique et logique de la « Lettre », ainsi que la vision d’Avicenne sur les (...) formes impossibles dans ses œuvres authentiques, et je construirai un argument basé sur le contenu contre l’authenticité de la « Lettre ». J’espère que cette étude éclairera la vision d’Avicenne sur les impossibilia, ce qu’ils sont et comment ils peuvent être appréhendés. (shrink)

Millianism is the view that the semantic content of a proper name is its semantic referent. Empty names, names with no semantic referents, raise various problems for Millianism. To solve these problems, many have appealed to pragmatics, thus ‘Pragmatic Millianism’. Pragmatic Millianism employs the relation of association between names and descriptions as well as some pragmatic processes to substitute empty names with descriptions associated with. The resultant content should account for the intuitions raised by utterances of sentences containing empty names. (...) Here, I will try to argue against this picture: Names are associated with descriptions of different kinds in a number of ways. The complex nature of this relation is overlooked by Pragmatic Millianism. Neither the relation of association nor the pragmatic processes responsible for substituting a description or a cluster of descriptions for an empty name guarantee the fullness of what is pragmatically imparted. The moral is this: Regarding empty names, Pragmatic Millianism should be avoided. (shrink)

In a past issue of Philosophy East and West (Aminrazavi 2003), Mehdi Aminrazavi, developing his ideas expressed earlier in Suhrawardi and the School of Illumination (Aminrazavi 1997), attempted to argue “that Ibn Sīnā’s peripatetic orientation and Suhrawardī’s ishrāqī perspective have both maintained and adhered to the same epistemological framework while the philosophical language in which their respective epistemologies are discussed is different” (Aminrazavi 2003, p. 203). I disagree; however, this is not the point I am going to address in this (...) short note. As part of his argument, Aminrazavi tries to show that “both philosophers seem to realize the need for a pre-cognitive ability that is based on a priori .. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Recently, in a series of papers, Joshua Spencer has introduced, defended, and developed a modified version of Neo-Russellianism, namely Plenitudinous Russellianism, according to which there are structurally identical but numerically distinct singular Russellian propositions. PR claims to provide novel semantic solutions to all the major problems that NR faces with no radical revision in NR. In this paper, I introduce a semantic puzzle for PR: the view leads to the violation of the principle of substitutivity of co-referential proper names (...) within simple ‘that’-clauses. I consider different responses to my argument, and show that none of them is fully satisfactory for the Russellian. I conclude that PR needs to depart from NR more radically. RÉSUMÉ Récemment, Joshua Spencer a publié une série d'articles où il expose, défend et développe une version modifiée du Néo-Russellianisme, appelée Russellianisme de plénitude, selon laquelle il y a des propositions Russelliennes singulières structurellement identiques mais numériquement distinctes. Ce Russellianisme de plénitude prétend apporter de nouvelles solutions sémantiques à tous les problèmes majeurs auxquels le NR se confronte, sans pour autant procéder à une révision radicale du NR. Dans cet article, je mettrai le PR face à un casse-tête : cette vision mène à la violation du principe de substitution des noms propres co-référentiels au sein des subordonnées complétives simples. Je tâcherai de considérer différentes réponses à mon argument et de montrer qu'aucune d'entre elles n'est pleinement satisfaisante pour un Russellien. Je vais conclure que le PR devrait s’écarter plus radicalement du NR. (shrink)

Concept originalism, recently introduced and defended by Sainsbury and Tye, Tye, and Sainsbury, holds that “atomic concepts are to be individuated by their historical origins, as opposed to their semantic or epistemic properties”. The view is immune to Gareth Evans’s “Madagascar” objection to the Causal Theory of Reference since it allows a concept to change its reference over time without losing its identity. The possibility of reference-shift, however, raises the problem of misleading belief reports. S&T try to tackle the problem (...) by strengthening the sufficient condition for a truthful belief report. We will argue that, first, their solution fails, second, and more importantly, their diagnosis of the root of the problem is misguided, third, two initially appealing ways out of the problem fail, and fourth, the prospect of finding a solution to the problem within CO is dim. The view opens the Pandora’s box of reference-shift, in a wide range of cases, without providing the necessary semantic means to take care of them. (shrink)

I will focus on the following question: “Is Avicenna[aut]Avicenna an empiricist?”. I will introduce Avicenna’sAvicenna language of “signification”, “understood content”, “mentalMental impression” and “conception”. Then, following Kenneth P. Winkler[aut]Winkler, K. ~ P., I will distinguish between origin-empiricism and content-empiricism Empiricism and reinterpret the distinction in Avicenna’sAvicenna language as OEA and CEA. I will show that Avicenna’sAvicenna analysis of the relationship between knowledge, on the one hand, and sensation and imagination, on the other hand, includes three empiricist themes. I use these (...) themes to argue that that Avicenna is committed to OEA. Then, I will consider three “possible” limitations to Avicenna’sAvicenna origin-empiricism. I will show that a common empiricist solution, that relies on the compositionality of the “understood contentContent”, quia demonstration and relative conceptions, has significant limitations. I will argue that a careful examination of these limitations, and the epistemology of the primary conceptions, show that Avicenna is not committed to CEA. I will conclude that “Is Avicenna[aut]Avicenna an empiricist?” has no simple yes-or-no answer. This raises a parallel open question: “Is Avicenna a rationalist?”, in some sense. After briefly commenting on this question, I will consider a related, but generally dissociated, question on the reality of abstraction, namely “Is Avicenna an abstractionist?” I will explain how the common replies to both questions rely on different incompatibility principles, according to which emanation from the active intellect is incompatible with apprehension by or abstraction from sense-perception. I will end by outlining the elements of a reading of Avicenna that assumes neither of these incompatibility principles. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 31 How hard is it to answer an ontological question? Ontological trivialism,, inspired by Carnap’s internal-external distinction among “questions of existence”, replies “very easy.” According to, almost every ontologically disputed entity _trivially_ exists. has been defended by many, including Schiffer and Schaffer. In this paper, I will take issue with. After introducing the view in the context of Carnap-Quine dispute and presenting two arguments for it, I will discuss Hofweber’s argument against and explain why it fails. (...) Next, I will introduce a modified version of ontological trivialism, i.e. negative ontological trivialism,, defended by Hofweber, according to which some ontologically disputed entities, e.g. properties, trivially do _not_ exist. I will show that fails too. Then I will outline a Meinongian answer to the original question, namely, ‘How hard is it to answer an ontological question?’ The Carnapian intuition of the triviality of internal questions can be saved by the Meinongian proposal that quantification and reference are not ontologically committing and the Quinean intuition of the legitimacy of interesting ontological questions can be respected by the Meinongian distinction between being and so-being. (shrink)

How hard is it to answer an ontological question? Ontological trivialism,, inspired by Carnap’s internal-external distinction among “questions of existence”, replies “very easy.” According to, almost every ontologically disputed entity trivially exists. has been defended by many, including Schiffer and Schaffer. In this paper, I will take issue with. After introducing the view in the context of Carnap-Quine dispute and presenting two arguments for it, I will discuss Hofweber’s argument against and explain why it fails. Next, I will introduce a (...) modified version of ontological trivialism, i.e. negative ontological trivialism,, defended by Hofweber, according to which some ontologically disputed entities, e.g. properties, trivially do not exist. I will show that fails too. Then I will outline a Meinongian answer to the original question, namely, ‘How hard is it to answer an ontological question?’ The Carnapian intuition of the triviality of internal questions can be saved by the Meinongian proposal that quantification and reference are not ontologically committing and the Quinean intuition of the legitimacy of interesting ontological questions can be respected by the Meinongian distinction between being and so-being. (shrink)

This volume is a collection of essays on a special theme in Aristotelian philosophy of mind: the internal senses. The first part of the volume is devoted to the central question of whether or not any internal senses exist in Aristotle’s philosophy of mind and, if so, how many and how they are individuated. The provocative claim of chapter one is that Aristotle recognizes no such internal sense. His medieval Latin interpreters, on the other hand, very much thought that Aristotle (...) did introduce a number of internal senses as shown in the second chapter. The second part of the volume contains a number of case studies demonstrating the philosophical background of some of the most influential topics covered by the internal senses in the Aristotelian tradition and in contemporary philosophy of mind. The focus of the case studies is on memory, imagination and estimation. Chapters introduce the underlying mechanisms of memory and recollection taking its cue from Aristotle but reaching into early modern philosophy as well as studying composite imagination in Avicenna’s philosophy of mind. Further topics include the Latin reception of Avicenna’s estimative faculty and the development of the internal senses as well as offering an account of the logic of objects of imagination. (shrink)

I should, I suppose, begin by taking some personal responsibility for this controversy. When my late friend Hossein Ziai and I published our edition and translation of Suhrawardī’s Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq (hereafter Philosophy of Illumination), we chose “innate” as our rendering of fiṭrī. I don’t remember discussing the rendering, and we did not bother to mention it in the glossary. Hossein had used this rendering in his first book, Knowledge and Illumination, stating that “innate ideas serve as the grounds for knowledge.”1 (...) Others, however, have rendered the term and its source, fiṭra, as “nature,” “natural spirit,”2 or “innate disposition.”3So what does fiṭra mean? Al-Tahānawī, in his dictionary of Islamic technical .. (shrink)

n this paper, a non-classical axiomatic system was introduced to classify all moods of Aristotelian syllogisms, in addition to the axiom "Every a is an a" and the bilateral rules of obversion of E and O propositions. This system consists of only 2 definitions, 2 axioms, 1 rule of a premise, and moods of Barbara and Datisi. By adding first-degree propositional negation to this system, we prove that the square of opposition holds without using many of the other rules of (...) classical logic (including double negation elimination). We then show that the Propositional Substructural Logic SLe is the best logic to study Aristotelian Syllogisms. Also, based on the IFLe square of opposition, the rules of conversation and the rules of negation are completely proved in Muzaffar's logic. For this purpose, we used the monadic first-order logic with the same standard deductive apparatus of quantifiers in classical logic, plus the axioms of "some a is an a" and "some not-a is a not-a". Finally, to show that there is no existential commitment to general terms in categorical logic, the Strong Four-Valued Relevant-classical Logic KR4 was used. With the same existential interpretation of the quantifiers and the standard translation of the quarter quantified. (shrink)

A quantified universe is a set M equipped with a Riesz space equation image of real functions on Mn, for each n, and a second order operation equation image. Metric structures 4, graded probability structures 9 and many other structures in analysis are examples of such universes. We define ultraproduct of quantified universes and study properties preserved by this construction. We then discuss logics defined on the basis of classes of quantified universes which are closed under this construction.

Open Shop Scheduling Problem is one of the most important scheduling problems in the field of engineering and industry. This kind of problem includes m machines and n jobs, each job contains a certain number of operations, and each operation has a predetermined processing time on its corresponding machine. The order of processing of these operations affects the completion times of all jobs. Therefore, the purpose of OSSP is to achieve a proper order of processing of jobs using specified machines, (...) so that the completion time of all jobs is minimized. In this paper, the strengths and limitations of three methods are evaluated by comparing the results of solving the OSSP in large-scale and small-scale benchmarks. In this case, the minimized completion time and total tardiness are considered the objective functions of the adapted methods. To solve small-scale problems, we adapt a mathematical model called Multiobjective Mixed Linear Programming. To solve large-scale problems, two metaheuristic algorithms including Multiobjective Parallel Genetic Algorithm and Multiobjective Parallel Simulated Annealing are adapted. In experimental results, we randomly generated small-scale problems to compare MOMILP with the Genetic Algorithm and Simulate Annealing. To compare MOPSA and MOPGA with the state of the art and show their strengths and limitations, we use a standard large-scale benchmark. The simulation results of the proposed algorithms show that although the MOPSA algorithm is faster, the MOPGA algorithm is more efficient in achieving optimal solutions for large-scale problems compared with other methods. (shrink)

The academic literature has viewed drivers of corruption in isolation and, consequently, failed to examine their synergistic effect. Such an isolated view provides incomplete information, leads to a misleading conclusion, and causes great difficulty in curbing corruption. This paper conducts a systematic literature review to identify the drivers of corruption in the construction industry. Subsequently, it develops a system dynamics (SD) model by conceptualizing corruption as a complex system of interacting drivers. Building on stakeholder and open systems theories, the proposed (...) SD model shows how the complex reinforcing relationship between authoritative, organizational, cultural, and financial drivers of corruption further increases corrupt practices. The new model also provides lessons that can be helpful in the development of policy frameworks to control corruption in the construction industry. To achieve success in the fight against corruption, the findings of this research suggest that (1) corruption must be understood at both the organizational and state levels, (2) anticorruption practices must be informed by ethically grounded stakeholder management strategies, and (3) anticorruption reforms must go hand-in-hand with strategies to tackle the economic downturn. (shrink)

Dans ces "bulles" de pensées, traversées par un fourmillement de références à l'histoire culturelle et à la philosophie classique, Pascale Seys porte un regard "dézoomé", tantôt grave, tantôt léger, sur nos façons d'agir et de penser. -- Provided by publisher.

Dans ces "bulles" de pensées, traversées par un fourmillement de références à l'histoire culturelle et à la philosophie classique, Pascale Seys porte un regard "dézoomé", tantôt grave, tantôt léger, sur nos façons d'agir et de penser. Prenant le pouls d'un monde pressé, elle nous invite à réfléchir au temps qui passe, à l'ambiguïté du bonheur et aux affres du désir, à la splendeur du cosmos, aux vertus du retard, des voyages et de la poésie, autant de mythologies de notre quotidien (...) qui nécessitent, pour être considérées pour ce qu'elles sont, de "déplacer l'éléphant".0. (shrink)

Davidson, özellikle semantik metafor kuramlarına karşı eleştirel bir yaklaşım geliştirir. Ona göre metafor, bu kuramların aksine, tek anlamlı olarak kabul edilmelidir. Bunun için ifadeleri, anlamla ve kullanımla ilgili olarak ikiye ayırır. Metafor tek anlamlı ve açıkça yanlış bir ifadedir. Fakat birisi, çoğunlukla, doğru olduğuna inandığı ifadeler dile getirme eğilimindedir. Bu nedenle, bilerek yanlış bir ifade dile getirmek anlamla değil; kullanımla ilgili olmalıdır. Metaforlar yanışlıklarından dolayı kullanımla ilgilidir ve muhatapta dürtmeye benzer bir etki ortaya çıkarırlar. Bu etkinin bir neticesi bazı karşılaştırmalar (...) yapmak ve bazı benzerlikler bulmak olabilir. Ancak bunlar, anlamadan sonra gerçekleşen şeyler olduğu için anlamsal olmayacaktır. Dolayısıyla Davidson, metafor ifadelerin bilişsel, anlamsal ve önermesel olmadıklarını düşünür. Ayrıca metaforları eksiltilmiş benzetme olarak gören kuramların görüşlerini kabul etmez. Metaforla ilgili, sınırlı olumlu tanımlarından birisi ise Wittgenstein’ın tavşanördek görseline (T-Ö kafası) dayanır. Buna göre, metaforlar bir şeyi görmeyi değil ama bir şeyi, başka bir şey olarak-görmeyi sağlar. Dolayısıyla olarak-görme metaforu açıklamak için iyi bir yoldur. Bu çalışmada, Davidson’ın metafor kuramının ana hatlarını verdikten sonra, onun üç önemli özelliği bağlamında bir inceleme yapacağım. İlki, metaforla benzetme/benzerlik ilişkileri ve bunlarla ilgili sorunlardır. Diğeri metaforu olarak-görme ile açıklamanın sorunlarıdır. Sonuncusu ise metaforun tek anlamlı olduğu savıyla ilgilidir. Bu savın sorunlu yanlarına rağmen, semantik ve pragmatik metafor kuramları kadar iyi çalışan bir özellikte olduğunu göstermeye çalışacağım. Bununla birlikte, çoğunlukla, Davidson’ın kendi anlam kuramıyla ve başka metafor kuramlarıyla ilişkileri de göstermeyi deneyeceğim. (shrink)

A. EInleitung B. CArl Schmitt und die Hinterfragung der Politikwissenschaft Die Frage nach der modernen Politikwissenschaft - Der Begriff des Politischen - Pluralismus- und Liberalismuskritik C. POlitische Theologie und der Prozess der Sakularisierung Politische Theologie - Monotheismus und Reichstheologie - Sakularisierungsprozess der Neuzeit D. DIe aus dem politischen Willen hervorgehende Jurisprudenz Der moderne Staat - Legalitat und Legitimitat - Verfassungslehre - Menschheitsdemokratie vs. MAssendemokratie E. DAs Gleichgewicht der Machte als Aufhalter der Globalitat Nomos vs. UNiversalismus - GroSSraum als Alternative der (...) globalen Welt - Feindlichkeit und Menschenrechte - Das Problem des Burgerkriegs F. GLobalisierungskritik in den Kategorien von Carl Schmitts Gedankengut Die Entmachtigung des Nationalstaats - Die Verrechtlichung der zwischenstaatlichen BeziehungenFazit Literaturverzeichnis, Personen- und Sachregister. (shrink)

The issue of existence - quiddity difference is one of the important issues that were put forward for the first time in Islamic philosophy without having any background in Greek philosophy. Aristotle's metaphysics which is the main source of the first philosophy contains only synonymous and verbal meaning ofexistence. The issue of existence - quiddity difference has no room in Aristotle's works. This issue was proposed first by Farabi and then was completed by Ibn sina. In Islamic philosophy when it (...) is proved that existence in the mind is neither identical with quiddity nor a part of it but differs with it and is excess of it, that is, when it is proved that existence occurs on quiddity, this question arises that how is their relation in the outside? Whether existence occurs on quiddity or existence and quiddity are identical in the external world? To this question the Islamic philosophers answer that existence and quiddity are identical in the outside and it isimpossible that they differ from each other in the external world. The importance of this issue is that it finally led to the origination of the doctrine of the principality of existence which is known as the culmination of Islamic philosophy. The main goal of this article is study this issue and its impact upon the origination of the doctrine of the principiality of existence. (shrink)

We argue that the debate about the normativity of belief thesis has been hampered by the slogan, ‘belief aims at truth’. We show that the slogan provides no content to the normativity of belief. The slogan encourages formulations of the norm as a prescriptive norm. There are well-known problems with such formulations. We provide a new formulation of the thesis as a prohibitive norm. This captures the key intuition most normativists about belief want to endorse.

In social systems or spaces, distance between the centre and the periphery breeds epistemic injustice. There are growing accounts of epistemic injustice in health-related fields, as in the article by Pratt and de Vries.1 The title of the article asks: ‘Where is knowledge from the global South?’ Like me, you may answer by saying: ‘Knowledge from the global South is in the global South’. That answer says a lot about how we right epistemic injustice done to actors in the global (...) South or the periphery, including in health ethics. Pratt and de Vries identified four sets of actors (individuals, institutions, journals and funders) responsible for righting epistemic injustice. For three of the four sets of actors, they recognised the need for—or the possibility of—symmetry between global North and global South. Except journals. They did not seriously consider that journals are either present in or could belong to the global South; to the periphery. Platforms for knowledge exchange, circulation, cultivation and curation—such as journals, conferences, publishers, blogs, archives, seminars, books and the media, social or traditional—are neither physically nor epistemically neutral. They are situated. The BBC cannot do for Nigeria or Australia what it does for Britain; neither can the BMJ. Many of us take our position at the centre or periphery as neutral, natural, necessary or permanent. But the African American writer Toni Morrison proved the opposite with her career: ‘I stood at the border, stood at the edge and claimed it as central. l claimed it as central, and let the rest of the world move over to where I was.’2 Although physically in the USA, Toni Morrison was writing …. (shrink)

A generic analysis of research article abstracts can cover issues of different types; among them are linguistic features. An integral part of linguistic features of research article abstracts is interactive metadiscourse usage that can assist to make the text persuasive and unfolding to a discourse community. The main principle behind applying interactive metadiscourse is the view of writing as socially engaging; specifically, it indicates the ways writers project themselves into their arguments to declare their attitudes and commitments to the readers. (...) This study aimed to explore how interactive metadiscourse markers are deployed by research article abstract writers belonging to different disciplinary communities within the soft sciences, while trying to reach the audience by creating a well-organized discourse. Hyland’s interpersonal model of metadiscourse was adopted to analyze 60 research article abstracts written in Applied Linguistics and Economics. Based on the results, there were marked variations found across the two disciplines in terms of interactive metadiscourse markers. (shrink)

The current study aims to explain the fundamentals of religious pluralism in Wittgenstein later philosophy and Gadamer philosophical hermeneutics, specifically regarding culture. It, then, proposes the approach more suitable for the Islamic context. Having fulfilled such an objective, pluralism, concerning religious rituals, becomes accepted and cultural and religious interaction is realized without any relativism conclusion. Wittgenstein’s pluralism results in pure relativism. That is to say, in order to understand the rules of the language game and life style he mentions, one (...) needs to be placed inside. However, it is a dialectical model that Gadamer philosophical hermeneutics leads to. Dialogue gives opportunity to cultural interaction and convergence, developing the religious culture. The latter is of more proximity to Islamic resources such as the Quran, proposing a religious culture transcending cultural, historical, and social limitations. All in all, the two significant features of Gadamer’s which Wittgenstein ignores are first, the interaction of religious pluralism encouraging the development of religious culture and second, reciprocal relation between culture and religion based on hermeneutics circle. (shrink)

I study definability and types in the linear fragment of continuous logic. Linear variants of several definability theorems such as Beth, Svenonus and Herbrand are proved. At the end, a partial study of the theories of probability algebras, probability algebras with an aperiodic automorphism and AL-spaces is given.

According to many philosophers, the notion of belief is constitutively normative ; Shah ; Shah and Velleman (); Gibbard (); Wedgwood ). In a series of widely discussed papers, Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have developed an ingenious ‘Moral Twin Earth’ argument against ‘Cornell Realist’ metaethical views which hold that moral terms have synthetic natural definitions in the manner of natural kind terms. In this paper we shall suggest that an adaptation of the Moral Twin Earth argument to the doxastic (...) case – Doxastic Twin Earth – provides new evidence for the normativity of belief. (shrink)

The ultraproduct construction is generalized to p‐ultramean constructions () by replacing ultrafilters with finitely additive measures. These constructions correspond to the linear fragments of continuous logic and are very close to the constructions in real analysis. A powermean variant of the Keisler‐Shelah isomorphism theorem is proved for. It is then proved that ‐sentences (and their approximations) are exactly those sentences of continuous logic which are preserved by such constructions. Some other applications are also given.

We develop a model theoretic framework for studying algebraic structures equipped with a measure. The real line is used as a value space and its usual arithmetical operations as connectives. Integration is used as a quantifier. We extend some basic results of pure model theory to this context and characterize measurable sets in terms of zero-sets of formulas.

Linear continuous logic is the fragment of continuous logic obtained by restricting connectives to addition and scalar multiplications. Most results in the full continuous logic have a counterpart in this fragment. In particular a linear form of the compactness theorem holds. We prove this variant and use it to deduce some basic preservation theorems.

We study the relations of being substructure and elementary substructure between Kripke models of intuitionistic predicate logic with the same arbitrary frame. We prove analogues of Tarski's test and Löwenheim-Skolem's theorems as determined by our definitions. The relations between corresponding worlds of two Kripke models [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL K] ⪯ [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL K]′ are studied.

I focus on an overlooked aspect of the challenge of irrelevant influences. The challenge is often framed in terms of whether recognizing the presence of irrelevant factors in the pedigree of a belief provides a defeater. I argue that the epistemic significance of irrelevant factors goes beyond their status as defeaters. I focus on what I call gray cases, where learning about such factors causes epistemic worry without justifying giving up the belief. I argue that in gray cases, the subject (...) finds a commendatory epistemic practical reason to engage in an activity intended to assuage that epistemic worry. (shrink)