This unique bibliography offers a scholarly listing of Schiller materials, with mention in the preface of special works. An introductory essay discusses Schiller's pragmatic humanism and features a list of biographical references.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:110 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY History of Aesthetics, Vol. I. Ancient Aesthetics. By Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz. Ed. J. Harrell. Trans. Adam and Ann Czerniawski. (The Hague-Paris: Mouton and Warszawa: PWN-Polish Scientific Publishers, 1970. Pp. vii-352.) History of Aesthetics, Vol. II. Medieval Aesthetics. By WladySlaw Tatarkiewicz. Ed. C. Barrett. Trans. R. M. Montgomery. (The Hague-Paris: Mouton and Warszawa: PWN-Polish Scientific Publishers, 1970. Pp. vii-315.) These two volumes of Tatarkiewicz' monumental history of (...) aesthetics, the third volume (to 1700) of which is now being prepared for press, have been reviewed already in the major aesthetic journals in Europe and America following their publication in Polish. Since Polish is not one of my languages, I can say nothing about the adequacy of the (rather obscured) translators and their work. The editors of both volumes have done their difficult work thoroughly, though the usual inconsistencies of spelling and such creep in. British spellings of judgement, centre, and colour, for example, appear in one part of a volume, while center, color, and judgment appear in another part. These are rare and not at all irksome details. On p. 220 of volume I, Aristotle has become a Stagiryte (sic). If the editors and translators actually re-checked all of those Greek, Polish and English texts--to say nothing of the Latin--they have earned a very large debt indeed. Again, my selective ignorance eliminates me from assessment. Tatarkiewicz' historical writing is surgical and Lacon-like. His major achievement lies in refraining from philosophical animadversions and for sticking strictly to his topic, no matter how tempting the theoretic distractions. Actually one expects a history of aesthetics to find the locus of aesthetic theory in the usual systematic frameworks of outstanding philosophers, but again Tatarkiewicz knows better than to try to provide these settings. His device is to stay exactly with the texts of authors, and to provide as much evidence for his statements as a printed work will allow. His scholarship is truly prodigious, and the work will live as reference for a long time to come. But it is more than a reference. There are some remarkable novelties included that bear mention. First of all, Tatarkiewicz' opening analysis of what must be included in a history of aesthetics is penetrating and convincing. In addition to the major "dualities" of aesthetics (beauty-art, subjective-objective aesthetics, psychological-sociological aesthetics, descriptive-prescriptive aesthetics, etc.) he simply accepts the necessity to find evidence of aesthetic history among statements by artists, among the inexplicit and inarticulate art works, in the vox populi and cultural actions of people. Thus the "evidence" he adduces will often displease the theoretical purist. Next, one is impressed by the great antiquity of some key issues that are being avidly pursued today. What is impressive is not that they are being repeated now, but that modern writers so rarely recognize (or acknowledge) their historical sources---or seem to care to. A careful study of this history might do much to reduce the growing volume in aesthetics----or at least to change the direction of emphasis significantly. One is surprised to note which figures emerge as of first rate importance in the history of aesthetics, important for different reasons. These figures stand out: Democritus, Plotinus, Aristotle, Vitruvius, the Pseudo-Dionysius, Johannes Scotus Erigena, to select only a few. The first Polish philosopher, Vitelo, anticipates much modern psychologizing in advancing the work of Alhazen. Ockham, not so surprising, contributes major advances, as do Augustine and Aquinas. BOOK REVIEWS 111 One fascinating item is the author's extensive account of the most violent and extended controversy in the history of aesthetics---the veneration of images and the disputes between the Iconoclasts and the Iconophiles. This sometimes physical battle raged for over 100 years! The Byzantine society, obviously, took art seriously. Tatarkiewicz' great labor is an object lesson in historiography and bibliographic technique. At one and the same time it demonstrates how much of value remains to be discovered by careful adherence to the detail of scholarship, while it also displays how much fruitful scholarship depends upon a brilliant and profoundly informed mind. Such a work, in short, could only have descended from a fully mature... (shrink)

Since Erich Lindemann's seminal work on 'the symptomatology and management of acute grief' from 1944, it has been common to define grief through its particular emotional structure and dynamics. According to this perspective, grief announces itself in socalled 'pangs of grief' in which the bereaved is occasionally flooded by waves of emotions. This picture has become so ingrained in our understanding of grief that it has defined both public discourse on grief and contemporary clinical constructs. In this paper, I propose (...) that underneath grief's fluctuating emotivity, there is a deeper feeling of grief. This deeper feeling reflects an altered mode of being in the world in which the bereaved experiences herself as 'at a distance' from the worldly. I will refer to this state as world-distancing and emphasize it as a protective affective state that shields the bereaved from a limit situation in which the world has become overwhelming in the absence of the deceased. It is experienced as being in a bubble or as if enclosed in a kind of membrane that shields the bereaved from the intrusiveness and penetrating character of the world. Worlddistancing, however, comes with significant perils if the bereaved are unable to reattach to the world. I outline this danger as a state of existential loneliness that follows from what Eugené Minkowski termed a felt lack of vital contact with the world. (shrink)

There is, I shall assume, such a thing as moral evil (more on which below). My question is whether is also such a thing as non-moral evil, and in particular whether there are such things as aesthetic evil and epistemic evil. More exactly, my question is whether there is such a thing as moral evil but not such a thing as non-moral evil, in some sense that reveals something special about the moral, as opposed to such would-be non-moral domains as (...) the aesthetic and the epistemic. The philosophical issue at stake here is that of the nature of these different normative domains, and the nature and extent of their difference. (shrink)

Can understanding be transmitted by testimony, in the same sense that propositional knowledge can be transmitted by testimony? Some contemporary philosophers – call them testimonial understanding pessimists – say No, and others – call them testimonial understanding optimists – say Yes. In this chapter I will articulate testimonial understanding pessimism (§1) and consider some arguments for it (§2).

More has been said about the Hart-Fuller debate than can be considered healthy or productive even within the precious world of jurisprudential scholarship – too much philosophising about how law has revelled in its own abstractness and narrowness. But the mission of this book is distinctly and determinedly different – it is not to rework these already-rehashed ideas, but to reject them entirely. Rather than add to the massive jurisprudential literature that has been generated by all and sundry, the book (...) criticises and abandons the project that Hart and Fuller set in motion. It contends that the turn that was taken in 1957 has led down a series of cul-de-sacs, blind alleys, and dead-ends to nowhere useful or illuminating. It is more than past time to leave their debate behind and strike out in an entirely new and more promising direction. The book insists that not only law, but also all theorising about law, is political in all its derivations, dimensions, and directions. (shrink)

Early emotional attachment, the development of the right brain, and the relational origins of the unconscious mind -- Modern attachment theory -- Early interpersonal neurobiological assessment of attachment and autistic spectrum disorders -- All our sons: the developmental neurobiology and neuroendocrinology of boys at risk -- Early right brain regulation and the relational origins of emotional wellbeing -- The development of the right brain across the life span: what's love got to do with it? -- Playing on the right side (...) of the brain. an interview with allan n. schore in the American journal of play -- Index. (shrink)

Social work ethics provide practitioners with guidance on how to promote social work values such as respect, social justice, human relationships, service, competence, and integrity. Students entering the profession need to develop a real-world understanding of how to apply these values in practice while also managing the dilemmas that arise when social workers, clients, and others encounter conflicting values and ethical obligations. Ethics and Values in Social Work offers a comprehensive set of teaching and learning materials to help students develop (...) the knowledge, self-awareness, and critical thinking skills required to handle values and ethical issues in all levels of practice--individual, family, group, organization, community, and social policy. BSW and MSW students will particularly appreciate how complex ethical obligations and theories have been translated into plain language. Additionally, the comprehensive set of case examples and exercises provides realistic scenarios to develop critical thinking and problem solving skills across a range of practice situations. (shrink)

This book provides the reader with a detailed and captivating account of the story where, for the first time, physicists ventured into proposing a new force of nature beyond the four known ones - the electromagnetic, weak and strong forces, and gravitation - based entirely on the reanalysis of existing experimental data. Back in 1986, Ephraim Fischbach, Sam Aronson, Carrick Talmadge and their collaborators proposed a modification of Newton's Law of universal gravitation. Underlying this proposal were three tantalizing pieces of (...) evidence: 1) an energy dependence of the CP (particle-antiparticle and reflection symmetry) parameters, 2) differences between the measurements of G, the universal gravitational constant, in laboratories and in mineshafts, and 3) a reanalysis of the Eötvos experiment, which had previously been used to show that the gravitational mass of an object and its inertia mass were equal to approximately one part in a billion. The reanalysis revealed that, contrary to Galileo's position, the force of gravity was in fact very slightly different for different substances. The resulting Fifth Force hypothesis included this composition dependence and also added a small distance dependence to the inverse-square gravitational force. Over the next four years numerous experiments were performed to test the hypothesis. By 1990 there was overwhelming evidence that the Fifth Force, as initially proposed, did not exist. This book discusses how the Fifth Force hypothesis came to be proposed and how it went on to become a showcase of discovery, pursuit and justification in modern physics, prior to its demise. In this new and significantly expanded edition, the material from the first edition is complemented by two essays, one containing Fischbach's personal reminiscences of the proposal, and a second on the ongoing history and impact of the Fifth Force hypothesis from 1990 to the present. <. (shrink)

Jörn Rüsen is the preeminent German practitioner of "historics," or theory of historiography. Unlike his closest American counterpart, Hayden White, Rüsen places particular emphasis on the historical discipline. The emphasis is embodied in Rüsen's notion of the "disciplinary matrix" of historiography, which embraces five "factors": the cognitive interest of human beings in having an orientation in time; theories or "leading views" concerning the experiences of the past; empirical research methods; forms of representation; and the function of offering orientation to society. (...) Rüsen's account of the disciplinary matrix will remind some readers of the "hermeneutic circle." But Rüsen is far closer to Jürgen Habermas than to Martin Heidegger or Hans-Georg Gadamer, for, like Habermas, he emphasizes the authoritative role of universal rational science.The essay argues that Rüsen's notion of the disciplinary matrix is an important contribution to the understanding of historiography. Combined with his parallel conception of differing "paradigms" of historiography, it helps us to make sense of the history of historiography, and is useful for analyzing and commenting on present-day historiography. The essay also argues for a greater degree of pluralism than seems assumed in Rüsen's view. It suggests that in an age of diversity the rhetorical conception of "topic"--which provides questions to be asked rather than answers--is of special use, and it reinterprets Rüsen's disciplinary matrix in a topical direction. Rüsen rightly suggests that historics has a unifying function. The essay suggests that, given social diversity, only such reflective theory can unite the varied body of historiography. This is one of the reasons why historiographical theory is important now. (shrink)

As far back as we know, there have been individuals incapacitated by memories that have filled them with sadness and remorse, fright and horror, or a sense of irreparable loss. Only recently, however, have people tormented with such recollections been diagnosed as suffering from "post-traumatic stress disorder." Here Allan Young traces this malady, particularly as it is suffered by Vietnam veterans, to its beginnings in the emergence of ideas about the unconscious mind and to earlier manifestations of traumatic memory (...) like shell shock or traumatic hysteria. In Young's view, PTSD is not a timeless or universal phenomenon newly discovered. Rather, it is a "harmony of illusions," a cultural product gradually put together by the practices, technologies, and narratives with which it is diagnosed, studied, and treated and by the various interests, institutions, and moral arguments mobilizing these efforts. This book is part history and part ethnography, and it includes a detailed account of everyday life in the treatment of Vietnam veterans with PTSD. To illustrate his points, Young presents a number of fascinating transcripts of the group therapy and diagnostic sessions that he observed firsthand over a period of two years. Through his comments and the transcripts themselves, the reader becomes familiar with the individual hospital personnel and clients and their struggle to make sense of life after a tragic war. One observes that everyone on the unit is heavily invested in the PTSD diagnosis: boundaries between therapist and patient are as unclear as were the distinctions between victim and victimizer in the jungles of Southeast Asia. (shrink)

What is your authentic self—is it something that you design and create, or something to be discovered within yourself? The philosophical literature remains somewhat divided on this question, and this lack of consensus is also reflected in the popular sphere; in fact, ordinary appeals to the notion of an ‘authentic self’ often involve diverse, if not contradictory, views on selfhood. Interestingly, the self-help psychology of Canadian author and professor Jordan Peterson offers a particularly fitting example of this conflict. The argument (...) that Peterson makes for the importance of personal authenticity in his 2018 book, 12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos, highlights some of the metaphysical and moral challenges surrounding the concept. In particular, his portrayal of the authentic self demonstrates the degree to which conflicting views of selfhood can coincide: at the same time as his belief in biological essentialism supports a view of the self as genetically fixed, his appeal to social autonomy characterises the self as free and self-determined. Nonetheless, conceiving of the self as constrained in some aspects yet autonomous in others is not an inherently contradictory position. This chapter considers the extent to which these two visions of the self can be reconciled in Peterson’s work and, firmly situated as Peterson is within contemporary discourse, what his ideas on authenticity can tell us about the wider cultural debate. (shrink)

Chapter 1: Introduction to Social Work Values and Ethics -- Chapter 2: Managing Ethical Issues -- Chapter 3: Social Justice -- Chapter 4: Client Autonomy, Self-Determination, and Informed Consent -- Chapter 5: Privacy, Confidentiality, and Exceptions -- Chapter 6: Professional Competence, Incompetence, and Impairment -- Chapter 7: Cultural Competence, Humility, Awareness, and Responsiveness -- Chapter 8: Professional Boundaries, Dual Relationships, and Conflicts of Interest -- Chapter 9: Responsibilities in Practice Settings -- Chapter 10: Access to Services -- Chapter 11: Honesty (...) and Integrity -- Chapter 12: Social Work Accountability and Regulation -- Chapter 13: Risk-Benefit Management -- Chapter 14: Conclusion. (shrink)