A laboratory-testable, solid-state Maxwell demon is proposed that utilizes the electric field energy of an open-gap p-n junction. Numerical results from a commercial semiconductor device simulator (Silvaco International–Atlas) verify primary results from a 1-D analytic model. Present day fabrication techniques appear adequate for laboratory tests of principle.

In this dissertation, I defend a Russellian form of descriptivism. The main supporting argument invokes a relation between meaning and thought. I argue that the meanings of sentences are the thoughts people use them to express. This is part of a Gricean outlook on meaning according to which psychological intentionality is prior to, and determinative of, linguistic intentionality. The right approach to thought, I argue in Chapter 1, is a type of functionalism on which thoughts have narrow contents. On this (...) view, the attitude ascriptions of a regimented psychology capture what people really believe and desire. These attitude ascriptions have content clauses that are what David Lewis calls ‘modified Ramsey sentences.’ I then conclude that, since the meanings of sentences are the narrow contents of the thoughts speakers use them to express, the meanings of sentences can also be represented with such descriptive sentences. I extend the view so that it applies to individual words. The resulting view is a form of descriptivism. Referring, I claim in Chapter 2, is the expression of a de re attitude. I argue that the non-psychological, de re individuation of thoughts captures only contingent features of these thoughts. Furthermore, whether a thought counts as de re depends on the attributor’s context. These two characteristics carry over to reference. The referential properties of speech acts and expressions are merely contingent features. Furthermore, whether a speech act or expression counts as referring depends upon the attributor’s context. In Chapter 3, I apply this version of descriptivism to indexicals, demonstratives and names. Indexicals turn out to have non-descriptive, context-insensitive, semantically determined meanings. Demonstratives have descriptive, context-sensitive, pragmatically determined meanings. Names, finally, have descriptive, context-insensitive, semantically determined meanings. In the final chapter, I address Putnam's model-theoretic argument, the most formidable obstacle to the form descriptivism outlined here. I criticize Lewis's ‘magnetist’ solution that invokes primitive naturalness because it is committed to the existence of incorrigible error about the external world. I suggest an empiricist approach on which psychological intentionality, and so ultimately linguistic intentionality as well, is anchored in experience. (shrink)

In a series of interesting and influential papers on semantics, Hilary Putnam has developed what he calls a “post-verificationist” theory of meaning. As part of this work, and not I think the most important part, Putnam defends a limited version of the analytic-synthetic distinction. In this paper I will survey and evaluate Putnam’s defense of analyticity and explore its relationship to broader concerns in semantics. Putnam’s defense of analyticity ultimately fails, and I want to show here exactly why it fails. (...) However, I will also argue that this very failure helps open the prospect of a new optimism concerning the theory of meaning, a theory of meaning finally liberated from the dead weight of the notions of analyticity and necessary truth. Putnam’s work, in fact, makes valuable contributions to such a theory. (shrink)

Reconciliation of semantic holism with interpretation of individual expressions is advanced here by means of a relativization of sentence meaning to object language theories viewed as idealizations of belief-systems. Fodor's view of the autonomy of the special sciences is emphasized and this is combined with detailed replies to his recent criticisms of meaning holism. The argument is that the need for empirical evidence requires a holistic approach to meaning. Thus, semantic realism requires semantic holism. -/- .

This book provides a concise overview, with excellent historical and systematic coverage, of the problems of the philosophy of language in the analytic tradition. Howard Callaway explains and explores the relation of language to the philosophy of mind and culture, to the theory of knowledge, and to ontology. He places the question of linguistic meaning at the center of his investigations. The teachings of authors who have become classics in the field, including Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine, Davidson, and Putnam are (...) critically analyzed. I share completely his conviction that contemporary Anglo-American philosophy follows the spirit of the enlightenment in insisting on intellectual sincerity, clarity, and the willingness to meet scientific doubts or objections openly. --Professor Henri Lauener, Editor of Dialectica. (shrink)

This essay proposes a re-evaluation of Dewey's work with emphasis upon the ability of his philosophy to effect a realistic reformulation and development of America's tradition of humanistic liberalism. Dewey combines the tough-minded realism (or naturalism), congenial to the scientific orientation of American philosophy, with a firm conviction of the need of values and revaluation in community life. I draw on recent work of Hilary Putnam on Dewey and argue for the viability of Dewey's conception of value inquiry. The value (...) of Dewey's work to American liberalism extends beyond the version of liberalism, from the 1930's and the 1940's with which is name is most closely associated. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Hilary Putnam is a semi-fideist.

The article is a brief response to h putnam's brief response to my article, "empirical realism and other minds" ("philosophical investigations", Volume 2, 13-21, April 79). Putnam, In his response, Says that we might determine that an oddly behaving/talking person in an odd tribe was really in pain by discovering that he in fact has what (a further developed) science has determined he must have in order to be in pain. In my response I work out the imagined example with (...) a view to showing that logical difficulties associated with said working out, Strongly imply that "some" sort of logical relation between pain and behavior is unavoidable. (shrink)

In "Realism and Reason" Hilary Putnam has offered an apparently strong argument that the position of metaphysical realism provides an incoherent model of the relation of a correct scientific theory to the world. However, although Putnam's attack upon the notion of the "intended" interpretation of a scientific theory is sound, it is shown here that realism may be formulated in such a way that the realist need make no appeal to any "intended" interpretation of such a theory. Consequently, it can (...) be shown that realism is immune to Putnam's criticism and that attempts at reformulating this criticism are not likely to meet with success. (shrink)

Has the emergence of post-positivism in philosophy of science changed the terms of the “is/ought” dichotomy? If it has demonstrated convincingly that there are no “facts” apart from the theoretical frames and evaluative standards constructing them, can such a cordon sanitaire really be upheld between “facts” and values? The point I wish to stress is that philosophy of science has had a central role in constituting and imposing the fact/value dichotomy and a revolution in the philosophy of science should not (...) leave the dichotomy unaffected. The connection between post-positivism and naturalism will be my guiding thread in considering this “last dogma of positivism.” First this essay will specify the sense of naturalism that it will take to be essential to the post-positivist philosophy of science: the deflation of the notion of the “purity” of scientific knowledge. Then it will turn to the question of the implications that follow for the “autonomy” of ethics, including the danger posed by a new form of scientistic reductionism. (shrink)

While the influential analytical philosopher Hilary Putnam has made significant contributions to philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and philosophy of science, he isn't generally regarded as a philosopher of religion or a theologian. Nonetheless, I argue that his work should be of great interest to philosophers of religion and theologians. Focusing on the relationship between science and religion, this paper explores the importance of Putnam's attempt to reconcile his anti-metaphysical stance and his commitment to a religious form of life (...) for theology. I first demonstrate why an anti-metaphysical stance and a commitment to Judaism can be deemed contradictory, and then characterize Putnam's anti-metaphysical stance as a modus vivendi to avoid both of what I call analytic and scientistic metaphysics. In a third step I offer my interpretation of Putnam's way of relating science and religion without metaphysics in the qualified sense, and subsequently spell out some important consequences of the emerging picture for theology. In my conclusion I give an account of Putnam as a transitional thinker, and draw a parallel between some of his work and Kierkegaard's “leap of faith”. (shrink)

Putnam and others have argued that an examination of structures arising in quantum mechanics can lead to a non-classical propositional logic, quantum logic. In this paper it is argued that the procedure by which quantum logic is said to be discovered, a process called reading off, is fundamentally flawed. A parody fable shows that reading off leads to absurd consequences. The fable also leads one to cast doubt on the following claims central to the quantum logic program: (i) logic can (...) be reformed locally; (ii) classical logic is read off classical physics; and (iii) reading off is a justifiable process because quantum logic resolves quantum paradoxes. (shrink)

Within contemporary philosophy of mind, it is taken for granted that externalist accounts of meaning and mental content are, in principle, orthogonal to the matter of whether cognition itself is bound within the biological brain or whether it can constitutively include parts of the world. Accordingly, Clark and Chalmers (Analysis 58(1):7–19, 1998) distinguish these varieties of externalism as ‘passive’ and ‘active’ respectively. The aim here is to suggest that we should resist the received way of thinking about these dividing lines. (...) With reference to Brandom’s (1994, 2000, Inquiry 47:236–253, 2008) broad semantic inferentialism, we show that a theory of meaning can be at the same time a variety of active externalism. While we grant that supporters of other varieties of content externalism (e.g., Putnam 1975 and Burge (Philosophical Review 95:3–45, 1986) can deny active externalism, this is not an option for semantic inferentialists: On this latter view, the role of the environment (both in its social and natural form) is not ‘passive’ in the sense assumed by the alternative approaches to content externalism. (shrink)

SummaryEllis, Jardine and Putnam have argued that the would‐be scientific realist can only avoid being a metaphysical realist by becoming an “internal realist” . While metaphysical realism is unattractive, the approaches to truth offered by Ellis, Jardine and Putnam are quite unacceptable. However, the is no reason to think that one who wishes to be a scientific realist is limited to these two options.

This fifth volume in the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science is devoted primarily to the natural sciences, but like previous volumes in this series there is considerable variety in the topics discussed and the approaches taken by different contributors differ markedly. The first contribution is a 150 page essay by A. Grünbaum which is a reply to Hilary Putnam's critique of Grünbaum's philosophy of geometry. The essays by Peter Havas on causality and relativity and by Carl F. von (...) Weizäcker on the unity of physics are essays on the foundations of physical science by physicists who have distinguished themselves in this area. Helpful comments are added to the Havas' paper by John Stachel and to the von Weizäcker paper by Francis Zucker. Zucker provides a useful introduction to von Weizäcker's ambitious project of unifying physics for reader's unfamiliar with von Weizäcker's work. A symposium on theoretical entities and functional explanation in biology is included, with a paper by June Goodfield and comments by Ernst Mayr and Joseph Agassi. Historical essays include a discussion of hypotheses in Newton's philosophy and the development of the cognitive faculties in the theories of Ernst Mach. In addition, there are essays on logic in relation to physical science, measurement, models, symmetry, proof, truth, and the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory.--R. H. K. (shrink)

As Max Jammer has rightly said, contemporary discussion of the metrical properties of space have been dominated in recent years by the work of Adolf Grünbaum. One of Grünbaum's most important essays in this area, "Geometry, Chronometry and Empiricism" is reprinted in its entirety as the first chapter of this work. The third and final chapter is a lengthy reply to Hilary Putnam who published a critique of Grünbaum's original essay in 1963. Putnam's criticisms have not led Grünbaum to substantially (...) change his views but they have provided the means for some clarification and extension of those views, e.g., with respect to the notions of congruence and conventionality and in relation to Zeno's paradoxes, color attributes, and other topics. Between the original essay and the lengthy reply to Putnam there is a shorter chapter which deals with, among other things, the hypothesis that everything has doubled overnight, a related topic to which Grünbaum has given some attention in journal articles. It is safe to say that persons concerned with the problem of conventionalism and other philosophical problems about space will have to work their way through this important book.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Contemporary developments in American epistemology, by R. M. Chisholm.--Contemporary metaphysics in the United States, by D. F. Gustafson.--Philosophy of physics, by H. Putnam--The influence of continental philosophy on the contemporary American scene: a summons to autonomy, by G. A. Scharader, Jr.--The influence of the later Wittgenstein on American philosophy, by J. O. Nelson.--Philosophy of mind, by F. H. Donnell, Jr.--Some remarks on the philosophy of language, by J. A. Fodor.--Ethics in the United States today, by D. Kading.--Social philosophy; philosophy of (...) social science, by P. Diesing. (shrink)

"There are no paradoxes in mathematics," says Kurt Gödel. Moreover, Gödel seems to be right on this count. That is, there are no paradoxes, in the strict sense of the word, internal to the known and available body of mathematical knowledge. But while there are no paradoxes in mathematics, there certainly is an embarrassing bag of difficulties when we come to the application of mathematical concepts to the physical world. Of these, perhaps the most unruly offenders of all are the (...) problems proposed about 2500 years ago by Zeno and which, in modern idiom, have to do with the proper mathematical treatment of phenomena involving change and motion, and the physical meaning—if any—which may be assigned to convergent infinite series. At each stage in the growth of mathematical knowledge since their formulation Zeno's paradoxes have been the subject of some alleged resolution. Now Grünbaum contributes to this tradition, and it must be said that he makes a strong case. The weapons in the intellectual arsenal which Grünbaum brings to bear upon Zeno include such sophisticated devices as measure theory, but the weak link in the argument is in the first chapter where the author presents his somewhat psychologistic theory of temporal becoming. Grünbaum has a great many interesting things to say in later chapters about infinite processes, quantum mechanics, and Hilary Putnam. This is a first-rate contribution to the philosophy of physics.—H. P. K. (shrink)

A number of important legal theorists have recently argued for metaphysically realist approaches to legal determinacy grounded in particular semantic theories or theories of reference, in particular, views of meaning and reference based on the works of Putnam and Kripke. The basic position of these theorists is that questions of legal interpretation and legal determinacy should be approached through semantic meaning. However, the role of authority (in the form of lawmaker choice) in law in general, and democratic systems in particular, (...) require that these realist solutions to the problem of legal determinacy be rejected, or at least significantly revised. (shrink)

This paper traces the origins of two technological trajectories in the contemporary history of wind power technology: the American Smith-Putnam Wind Turbine and the Danish Gedser Wind Turbine. Describing the two wind turbine projects in terms of their technical design characteristics, the professional background of the individuals involved, the organizational features of the technological knowledge production, and the historical context, the paper builds on the notion of technological trajectories in the making as a means of identifying emerging selection mechanisms for (...) possible engineering problem solutions, scientific methods, material artifacts, and financial assessment techniques. Conceived during the Great Depression and World War II, respectively, both projects promoted the idea that wind power could make a cost-effective contribution to the existing electric utility system. The two projects resulted in distinctive wind turbine innovations that paved the way for two technological trajectories in the contemporary history of wind power. Studying the emergence of technological trajectories, it is argued, requires the historian of technology to attend to well-known features of technological design and its cultural context that in retrospect appear to be significant, but also to tackle the creation of novelty and the inevitability of technological uncertainties about which the logic of trajectories has little to say. (shrink)

This work is a contribution to analytic philosophy of sex. It deals with the scientific concept of the sexed human body by focusing in particular on the logical and the semantic implications of such a concept.

In this essay I argue that there is a sense in which phenomenological content determines the object of a conscious experience. "Phenomenological content" consists of the senses and sense-structures which become apparent when a subject engages in phenomenological reflection. An introduction to phenomenology is provided for those who are unfamiliar with its practice and literature. ;Various philosophers have argued that the sense of a verbal expression does not determine its reference. Ronald McIntyre has maintained that the arguments against the determination (...) of reference by sense can also be used to show that phenomenological content does not determine the object of a conscious experience. I argue that there is a sense of "determination" for which McIntyre is correct, but that there is another sense of "determination" according to which it would be correct to say that phenomenological content determines the object. ;If "determination" is used in a functional sense, in which A determines B if there is some function which yields B as output given A as input, then McIntyre is correct. The twin earth examples of Putnam and Burge clearly show that two subjects can have experiences with the same phenomenological content but different objects, so phenomenological content does not determine the object in this "functional" sense. But if "determination" means just "selection of one", then there is a determination of the object by phenomenological content from the perspective of, or with respect to, the experience itself. ;The object of a conscious experience is determined through being presented in that experience via a unity of sense . Such determination would not occur if a unity of sense could present anything other than a single, distinct, object. But every unity of sense in the phenomenological content of an experience presents something single and distinct. So there is a sense in which the object of a conscious experience is determined by phenomenological content through presentation. (shrink)

Purpose: Josef Mitterer's essays are considered to be important philosophical advancements of radical constructivism. The main purposes of this paper are, on the one hand, to structure the RC landscape and, on the other hand, to investigate the relations of Mitterer's work to radical constructivism in particular and to philosophy in general. Findings: In this short essay focusing on Mitterer's Das Jenseits der Philosophie, I would like to stress two major points. First, Mitterer's book should be considered as one of (...) several contemporary variants of a radical critique of the semantic turn in the philosophy of science that has taken place since the mid-thirties with the works of Rudolf Carnap, Carl G. Hempel, Hilary Putnam, Alfred Tarski and others. Second, it is by no means clear how to determine the relevance of the new semantic critique for the present and future cognitive status of radical constructivism. The degree of relevance depends crucially on the use of the term "radical constructivism." If radical constructivism, as I will argue, is seen as an umbrella term for a group of empirical research programs, then, by sheer necessity, the relevance can be marginal only. If, however, radical constructivism is viewed as a special form of philosophy of language and/or as a new epistemology, then the importance of Josef Mitterer's approach must be judged within the context of available functional alternatives. Implications: An immediate consequence of this article lies in a renewed emphasis on advancing an empirical research agenda for radical constructivism and in an effective downsizing of radical constructivism as a philosophical perspective. (shrink)

In apparent vogue, perhaps as a reaction against excesses on the part of certain Wittgensteinians, is the idea that the existence and nature of other people's mental lives are things known to us on broadly empirical grounds. A particularly unabashed version of this idea is to be found in Hilary Putnam's “Other Minds”1. Therein Putnam defines empirical realism as the “position that the existence of the external world is supported by experience in much the way that any scientific theory is (...) supported by observational data,”2 His concern in this article is to defend, after entering some criticism of detail, Paul Ziff's attempt to show that the same general sort of position is the proper one to adopt with regard to the traditional problem of other minds. I wish to argue here that the empirical realist's solution to the problem of other minds offered by Ziff and defended by Putnam is wrong. (shrink)

Some widely accepted arguments in the philosophy of mathematics are fallacious because they rest on results that are provable only by using assumptions that the con- clusions of these arguments seek to undercut. These results take the form of bicon- ditionals linking statements of logic with statements of mathematics. George Boolos has given an argument of this kind in support of the claim that certain facts about second-order logic support logicism, the view that mathematics—or at least part of it—reduces to (...) logic. Hilary Putnam has offered a similar argument for the view that it is indifferent whether we take mathematics to be about objects or about what follows from certain postulates. In this paper I present and rebut these arguments. (shrink)

As Max Jammer has rightly said, contemporary discussion of the metrical properties of space have been dominated in recent years by the work of Adolf Grünbaum. One of Grünbaum's most important essays in this area, "Geometry, Chronometry and Empiricism" is reprinted in its entirety as the first chapter of this work. The third and final chapter is a lengthy reply to Hilary Putnam who published a critique of Grünbaum's original essay in 1963. Putnam's criticisms have not led Grünbaum to substantially (...) change his views but they have provided the means for some clarification and extension of those views, e.g., with respect to the notions of congruence and conventionality and in relation to Zeno's paradoxes, color attributes, and other topics. Between the original essay and the lengthy reply to Putnam there is a shorter chapter which deals with, among other things, the hypothesis that everything has doubled overnight, a related topic to which Grünbaum has given some attention in journal articles. It is safe to say that persons concerned with the problem of conventionalism and other philosophical problems about space will have to work their way through this important book.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and (...) On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action. (shrink)