It is, I think, one of the outstanding characteristics of our age that during a short spell of thirty or forty years fundamental advances have been made in a large number of different sciences. These developments have altered almost every aspect of material life—they have certainly had great influence upon modern education, and upon modern ideas of politics, as well as upon a host of less important things. But chief of all we notice the effect of this Golden Age of (...) Science in the birth of new ideas. The revolution in ideas has only just started. Where it will end no one can see. (shrink)

The question I wish to discuss is this: Can the pleasure of several experiences together be expressed in all cases in terms of the pleasure of the experiences separately?

In this chapter I critically examine the hitherto neglected influence that Dorothy Wrinch had on her teacher, friend, and informal thesis adviser, Bertrand Russell, and the puzzling fact that Russell never cited Wrinch’s mathematical papers on Principia Mathematica. Wrinch never reshaped Russell’s general outlook; indeed, Wrinch adopted as her own many of Russell’s 1911–1919 views about logic, philosophy, science, and their relationships that are characteristic of logic-centered twentieth-century analytic philosophy. Still, the influence was not just (...) in one direction, from teacher to student, but also ran the other way. And while Wrinch’s own life and ideas have enjoyed far more attention in recent literature, most historians of philosophy have, for too long, largely overlooked how Wrinch influenced Russell. Here I critically discuss how Wrinch influenced Russell and tell a more well-rounded story of mutual influence and collaboration. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In her paper “On the Nature of Judgment”, published in 1919 in Mind, Dorothy Wrinch aimed at understanding how Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgement might be made to work. In this paper we will focus on Wrinch’s claim that on the theory it is impossible, as it should be, to judge nonsense. After having presented the prima facie objection to the theory created by nonsense and what we can take her solution to such a problem (...) to imply, we will show how Wrinch can resist the two main objections that have been moved to such a solution, whether as explicitly attributed to Wrinch or discussed without mentioning her. The conclusion will be, contrary to what one might be tempted to think, that even if there might be reasons to take the multiple relation theory as doomed, Wrinch was the first to show us that nonsense is not one of those reasons. (shrink)

In 1919, Dorothy Wrinch suggested how to extend Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment in order for the theory to be able to account also for molecular and quantified judgments. In this paper, some worries for her extension, which all stem from metaphysical considerations, will be presented and what Wrinch said and could have said about them will be discussed.

"This reviewer had to be restrained from stopping people in the street to urge them to read it: They would learn something of the way science is done,...

A Place for Beauty in the Therapeutic Encounter is written for all psychotherapists, counsellors, and psychologists who practise under the broad banner of psychoanalytic thinking. It is also for anyone who loves beauty and wants to think more about its place in the mind.

This book traces the career development and influence on American intellectual life of the first twenty women to earn a PhD in philosophy in the United States. Rogers explores the factors that led these women to pursue careers in academic philosophy, examines the ideas they developed, and evaluates the impact they had on the academic and social worlds they inhabited. This volume investigates not only the success stories of such women as Eliza Ritchie, Julia Gulliver, and Christine Ladd-Franklin, to name (...) a few, but also the policies and practices that made it difficult or impossible for others to succeed. (shrink)

There has been a long debate on whether demonstratives are directly referential as Kaplan originally argued, or indirectly referential like a definite description. I propose a new analysis of demonstratives that combines intuitions from both direct and indirect approaches. The demonstrative is analyzed as an indirectly referential expression with a binary maximality operator that takes two arguments, where the second argument can be a deictic pointing, an anaphoric index, or a relative clause. Direct reference is encoded not in the meaning (...) of the demonstrative but in the meaning contributed by the pointing gesture, thus capturing both direct and indirect uses. I further propose that some pronouns in English function as demonstratives, realizing the binary structure and competing with the demonstrative. The main advantages of this proposal include (a) deriving the distribution of pronominal and adnominal demonstratives systematically; (b) capturing the unique interaction that demonstratives have with a pointing gesture; and (c) locating English demonstratives against a larger, cross-linguistic picture. (shrink)

In a number of influential articles published since 1972, Dorothy Grover has developed the prosentential theory of truth. Brought together and published with a new introduction, these essays are even more impressive as a group than they were as single contributions to philosophy and linguistics. Denying that truth has an explanatory role, the prosentential theory does not address traditional truth issues like belief, meaning, and justification. Instead, it focuses on the grammatical role of the truth predicate and asserts that (...) “it is true” is a prosentence, functioning much as a pronoun does. Grover defends the theory by indicating how it can handle notorious paradoxes like the Liar, as well as by analyzing some English truth-usages. The introduction to the volume surveys traditional theories of truth, including correspondence, pragmatic, and coherence theories. It discusses the essays to come and, finally, considers the implications of the prosentential theory for other theories. Despite the fact that the prosentential theory dismisses the “nature of truth” as a red herring, Grover shows that there are important aspects of traditional truth theories that prosentential theorists have the option of endorsing. (shrink)