Classic studies of explanation, such as those of Hempel and Bromberger, took it for granted that an explanation-seeking question of the form "Why P?" should be understood as asking about the proposition P. This view has been recently challenged by Bas van Fraassen and Alan Garfinkel. They acknowledge that some questions have the surface form "Why P?", but they hold that a correct reading for why-questions should take the form "Why P (rather than Q)?", where Q is a contrasting alternative. (...) This contrast theory is discussed here. It is argued that, properly understood, the contrast theory and the propositional approach can and should give equivalent readings to why-questions. (shrink)

William Lane Craig has defended a modern First Cause argument based on 1) a principle of universal causality and 2) the claim that the universe must have had a beginning. But 1) is susceptible to counter examples from quantum theory. Moreover, Craig’s defense of 2) is open to serious question. He claims that an actual infinity (of time) is impossible; he also claims that 2) is in fact supported by big bang theory. I argue that both of these claims are (...) mistaken, and that in consequence we have no particular reason to suppose that 2) is true. I conclude that the First Cause argument fails, but I suggest that a weaker inductive argument might be worth a try. (shrink)

SummaryIt is argued, contrary to Nelson Goodman, that confirmability is not a semantical property possessed by some hypotheses. Instead, hypotheses are confirmed or disconfirmed on the basis of all relevant information, not just postivie or negative instances.

Summary“There are some types of reasoning which are acceptable in a given situation but not justifiable according to the rules of formal logic. This sort of reasoning seems to depend on a judgment about what the speaker knows along with an Assumption of Maximum Information, that if the speaker is serious he is making the logically strongest statement he knows to be true. Because such reasoning can be informally correct, formal logic should be understood as establishing rules not for all (...) acts of inference but only for those which do not depend on contingent judgments about the context of an assertion.”RésuméIl y a des types de raisonnement qui sont acceptables dans une situation donnée, mais qui ne sont pas justifiables selon les règles de la logique formelle. Cette sorte de raisonnement semble dépendre d'un jugement sur ce que sait celui qui parle, ainsi que d'un Postulat d'Information Maximale selon lequel, si le locuteur est sérieux, il choisit l'énoncé le plus fort logiquement parmi ceux qu'il sait être vrais. Un tel raisonnement étant informellement correct, la logique formelle devrait être conçue comme édictant des règles non pas pour tous les actes d'inférence, mais seulement pour ceux qui ne dépendent pas de jugements contingents quant au contexte d'une assertion.Zusammenfassung〈Es gibt Argumentationsweisen, die in einer bestimmten Situation annehmbar sind, obschon sie sich auf Grund der Regeln der formalen Logik nicht rechtfertigen lassen. Sie hängen ab von einem Urteil über das, was der Redende weiss, wie auch von der Annahme maximaler Information, die besagt, dass er, wenn er im Ernst spricht, auch die starkste Aussage macht, von der er weiss, dass sie wahr ist. Weil es korrekte informelle Folgerungen dieser Art gibt, kann man sagen, dass die formate Logik nicht Regeln fiir aile Schlussfolgerungen liefert, sondern nur für solche, die nicht von kontingenten Urteilen über den Aeusserungskontext abhängen.〉. (shrink)

Gutoku Shinran 愚禿親鸞 maintains his status today as one of the most consequential religious thinkers in Japanese history. The tradition stemming from his thought and teaching activity, Shin Buddhism, has been a significant force in Japanese society since the fifteenth century and remains one of the largest Buddhist movements in the world at present, with over twenty thousand temples in Japan and a century-old institutional presence in North America. His writings have been studied in a commentarial tradition going back to (...) his early descendants in the fourteenth century, burgeoning during the Edo period, and continuing in recent times with prominent nonsectarian philosophers such as NISHIDA Kitarō西田幾多郎, SUZUKI Daisetsu 鈴木大拙, TANABE Hajime 田辺元, MIKI Kiyoshi 三木清, and NISHITANI Keiji 西谷啓治. Shinran’s concern in his writings is less to impart doctrinally validated teachings or methods of proper conduct than to articulate and enable a fundamental transformation of awareness. This is because it is precisely such an “overturning” of ordinary awareness and entry into a transformed mode of existence that signals the authentic encounter with enlightening activity that lies at the core of his Buddhist thought. His focal issues are, therefore, the nature of a person’s interaction with the Pure Land path and the distinction between provisional and genuine modes of engagement. He recognizes that it is usual for persons initially encountering Pure Land teachings to seek a coherent intellectual understanding of the doctrines from the perspective of the conventional self and to pursue means to assimilate the advantages of the path into their ongoing lives. Shinran, however, views such efforts as a continued assertion of the false discrimination and self-attachment that propel ordinary human life in anxious and painful existence. Thus, he seeks in his writings to precipitate a shift in apprehension that leads to authentic engagement with, and indeed itself arises from, the working of the Pure Land path. In other words, Shinran views the distinctive accessibility and effectiveness of Pure Land Buddhism as rooted in its transformative functioning within the realm of mundane, illusive thought and language. In this essay, I focus on aspects of reading Shinran, first taking up the overarching issues of Mahāyāna and Pure Land Buddhist thought that contextualize the basic problems in doctrinal understanding he feels compelled to address in his own writings. I then go on to consider the character of his methods of composition in formulating and communicating his own religious awareness. I close by highlighting several of the major philosophically relevant themes and issues in his thought. (shrink)

This book represents a considerable revision and expansion of Public Choice II. Six new chapters have been added, and several chapters from the previous edition have been extensively revised. The discussion of empirical work in public choice has been greatly expanded. As in the previous editions, all of the major topics of public choice are covered. These include: why the state exists, voting rules, federalism, the theory of clubs, two-party and multiparty electoral systems, rent seeking, bureaucracy, interest groups, dictatorship, the (...) size of government, voter participation, and political business cycles. Normative issues in public choice are also examined including a normative analysis of the simple majority rule, Bergson–Samuelson social welfare functions, the Arrow and Sen impossibility theorems, Rawls's social contract theory and the constitutional political economy of Buchanan and Tullock. (shrink)

I discuss the relationship between different versions of the equivalence principle in general relativity, among them Einstein's equivalence principle, the weak equivalence principle, and the strong equivalence principle. I show that Einstein's version of the equivalence principle is intimately linked to his idea that in GR gravity and inertia are unified to a single field, quite like the electric and magnetic field had been unified in special relativistic electrodynamics. At the same time, what is now often called the strong equivalence (...) principle, related to the local validity of special relativity, can also be found in Einstein's writings, albeit by a different name and clearly separated from what he calls the equivalence principle. I discuss both the development of Einstein's thoughts on the different versions of the equivalence principle, their relationship to the relativity principle, as well as later reflections and variants proposed. (shrink)

Does a flourishing life involve pursuing passionate attachments? Can we choose what these passionate attachments will be? This book offers an original theory of how we can actively cultivate our passionate attachments. The author argues that not only do we have reason to view passionate attachments as susceptible to growth, change, and improvement, but we should view these entities as amenable to self-cultivation. He uses Pierre Hadot's and Michel Foucault's accounts of Hellenistic self-cultivation as vital conceptual tools to formulate a (...) theory of cultivating our passionate attachments. First, their accounts offer the conceptual resources for a philosophical theory of how we can cultivate our passionate attachments. Second, the exercises of self-cultivation they focus on allow us to outline a practical method though which we can cultivate our passionate character. Doing this brings out a significantly new dimension to the role of the passionate attachments in the flourishing life and offers theoretical and practical accounts of how we can cultivate them based on the Hellenistic conception of self-directed character change. Cultivating Our Passionate Attachments will be of interest to advanced students and scholars working in virtue ethics, moral philosophy, and ancient philosophy. (shrink)

This contributed volume is the result of a July 2010 workshop at the University of Wuppertal Interdisciplinary Centre for Science and Technology Studies which brought together world-wide experts from physics, philosophy and history, in order to address a set of questions first posed in the 1950s: How do we compare spacetime theories? How do we judge, objectively, which is the “best” theory? Is there even a unique answer to this question? -/- The goal of the workshop, and of this book, (...) is to contribute to the development of a meta-theory of spacetime theories. Such a meta-theory would reveal insights about specific spacetime theories by distilling their essential similarities and differences, deliver a framework for a class of theories that could be helpful as a blueprint to build other meta-theories, and provide a higher-level viewpoint for judging which theory most accurately describes nature. But rather than drawing a map in broad strokes, the focus is on particularly rich regions in the “space of spacetime theories.” -/- This work will be of interest to physicists, as well as philosophers and historians of science working with or interested in General Relativity and/or Space, Time and Gravitation more generally. (shrink)

I have been trying to understand the moral aspect of human nature for several decades. Several years ago, after publishing The Origins of Morality, an editor from Oxford Press suggested that I write up the theory and research I reviewed in this academic book in a manner that would be accessible to people with relatively little background knowledge in the area. A few years later, I launched this project, which ended up in this book. In it, I trace the grown (...) of my understanding of morality. (shrink)

Stimulating and thought-provoking, this important new text looks at the welfare problems and philosophical and ethical issues that are caused by changes made to an animal's telos, behaviour and physiology, both positive and negative, to make them more productive or adapted for human uses. These changes may involve selective breeding for production, appearance traits, or competitive advantage in sport, transgenic animals or the use of pharmaceuticals or hormones to enhance production or performance. Changes may impose duties to care for these (...) animals further and more intensely, or they may make the animal more robust. The book considers a wide range of animals, including farm animals, companion animals and laboratory animals. It reviews the ethics and welfare issues of animals that have been adapted for sport, as companions, in work, as ornaments, food sources, guarding and a whole host of other human functions. This important new book sparks debate and is essential reading for all those involved in animal welfare and ethics, including veterinarians, animal scientists, animal welfare scientists and ethologists. (shrink)

The position that I seek to defend in this article is that the epistemological hegemony that is presently one of the defining characters of the relationship between Africa and the global North is a form of injustice which makes the talk of ‘global justice’ illusory. In arguing thus, I submit that denying the indigenous people of Africa an epistemology that is comparable to epistemologies from other geopolitical centres translates to questioning their humanity which is a form of injustice. I thus (...) proceed to argue that, as a precondition to an authentic discourse on the possibility of ‘global justice’; epistemic injustice must first be challenged and rejected. In so doing, I am defending the position that the acceptance and respect for the diversity of the peoples of this world and their epistemologies is imperative if genuine justice at global level is to be realised. (shrink)

The surprising aspects of quantum information are due to two distinctly non-classical features of the quantum world: first, different quantum states need not be orthogonal and, second, quantum states may be entangled. Non-orthogonality leads to the blurring of classical distinctions. On the other hand, entanglement leads via non-locality to teleportation and other ``entanglement-assisted'' forms of communication that go beyond what is classically possible. In this article we attempt to understand these new possibilities via an analysis of the significance of entanglement (...) for the basic physical concepts of a ``particle'' and a ``localized physical system''. Classical particles can be individuated on the basis of qualitative differences in their sets of properties. But in entangled states the ``particle labels'' of the quantum formalism usually do not pick out such sets of individuating particle properties. It is sometimes nevertheless possible to think in terms of individual particles, which may be localized; but we argue that in general the structure of quantum mechanics is at odds with such a particle interpretation. This finally leads us to the conclusion that quantum mechanics is best seen as not belonging to the category of space-time theories, in which physical quantities are functions on space-time points. The resulting picture of the quantum world is relevant for our understanding of the way in which quantum theory is non-local, and it sheds light on the novel aspects of quantum information. (shrink)

This paper extends several themes from recent work on norms of assertion. It does as much by applying those themes to the speech act of asking. In particular, it argues for the view that there is a species of asking which is governed by a certain norm, a norm to the effect that one should ask a question only if one doesn’t know its answer.

A fascinating recent turn in epistemology focuses on inquiring attitudes like wondering and being curious. Many have argued that these attitudes are governed by norms similar to those that govern our doxastic attitudes. Yet, to date, this work has only considered norms that might *prohibit* having certain inquiring attitudes (``norms of restriction''), while ignoring those that might *require* having them (``norms of expansion''). We aim to address that omission by offering a framework that generates norms of expansion for inquiring attitudes. (...) The framework draws on inferential erotetic logic, which we explain and augment with some theorems. We explore several of the norms that it yields - some sympathetically, others unsympathetically. (shrink)

This book discusses that imagination is as important to thinking and reasoning as it is to making and acting. By reexamining our philosophical and psychological heritage, it traces a framework, a conceptual topology, that underlies the most disparate theories: a framework that presents imagination as founded in the placement of appearances. It shows how this framework was progressively developed by thinkers like Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant, and how it is reflected in more recent developments in theorists as different as (...) Peirce, Saussure, Wittgenstein, Benjamin, and Bachelard. The conceptual topology of imagination incorporates logic, mathematics, and science as well as production, play, and art. Recognizing this topology can move us past the confusions to a unifying view of imagination for the future. (shrink)

This paper explores the nature of curiosity from an epistemological point of view. First it motivates this exploration by explaining why epistemologists do and should care about what curiosity is. Then it surveys the relevant literature and develops a particular approach.

A hallmark of Western culture is a massive moral confusion, rendering the very idea of virtue "exotic and incomprehensible." McInerny here drags the conversation back to the beginning, establishing the terms and the tools of what it means to think and to do what is moral. As he asserts, the virtuous life and the moral life are one and the same. To be moral is to be good, and the goodness of one's acts reflects the fundamentals of thought placed in (...) the service of a pursuit of a virtuous life. Why is the concept of a virtuous life so foreign to many? We do not know the basics of a moral life. As McInerny states, "To be good we have to know what that means." The two biggest judgments one will make during life pertain to knowing what is good, what is bad, and the difference between the two. This bleeds into a study of morality and ethics when it pertains to concrete acts, but in reality all aspects of our lives bear on these judgments. "Being ethical is not simply a state of mind, it is a state of being, a way of living one's life that reflects the fundamental principles of ethics [...] [it is one] who lives in a certain way." Nevertheless, the subject of this book focuses on ethics--namely, the goodness or badness of human acts. McInerny's great reason for writing this work is to teach the reader that he or she cannot properly tackle ethical questions (even if they are not identified as such) if one is not himself or herself actually ethical (living virtuously). Writing very much as a teacher of teachers, McInerny relies on the foundations of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, as well as his late brother, Ralph McInerny, to reiterate the principles of ethics that inform both thought and act. To speak of ethics, then, is to admit a commitment to virtue and how the theoretical distinction of good and bad is necessarily practical. Acting well will lead to thinking better, but McInerny notes that culture has lost sight of the former and thereby the coherency to address ethical questions. Being Ethical aims to correct this disconnect in forty-eight cogent lessons. Being Ethical is fundamentally intended to serve as a sequel to D. Q. McInerny's Being Logical (Random House, 2004), which has remained in print and has been translated into six languages. Its style lends itself to being used as a textbook in liberal studies. More generally, it is a refreshing presentation of this topic and timely and timeless exhortation to readers of the necessity of a love of virtue for ethical thought. For friends and students of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and Ralph McInerny, this book bears a style and manner that is both familiar and much loved. (shrink)

Facing Heidegger s critique of modern technology, the author analyses the question of technology and ethical responsibility and the call for reflexivity towards technology. He examines Heidegger s thoughts about how science and technology conceal the enigmatic and distinctive presencing of Being and exhibits how modern technology has brought unintended consequences and risks. The author extends the deliberation among diverse epistemologies, interested parties and laypersons, a component of reflexive modernization. Such epistemic community opens the way for a new reflexive democratization (...) of technology, in which different actors should be involved in decision making about technology as it affects the society, the environment and individuals.". (shrink)

On Dwelling explores the meaning of dwelling in places where we humans live and work—from our homes to the very planet we co-inhabit. Crossing boundaries and disciplines, it lays the groundwork for addressing place-based issues like migration, ethnic division, resource use, and human-caused peril to the earth itself.

The central task of this dissertation is to develop a new interpretation of Leibniz's famous claim that there are no purely extrinsic denominations . Though Leibniz regarded NPE as one of his most important doctrines, he nowhere offers an explicit statement as to what he meant by it. One interpretation of NPE, which enjoys a modest consensus among interpreters, is that all extrinsic denominations reduce to intrinsic denominations. According to the reductionist view, things only have intrinsic denominations as properties; extrinsic (...) denominations are not genuine properties of things. Critics of reductionism have argued that the textual case for it is inconclusive at best, and I share this assessment with them. However, in my opinion, a satisfactory non-reductionist understanding of NPE has not been offered. The goal of my dissertation is to provide such a non-reductionist account. I contend that NPE, far from being a claim of the reducibility of extrinsic denominations, is actually an assertion that extrinsic denominations are genuine properties of the things they denominate. ;To establish my reading of NPE, I examine a line of textual evidence to which interpreters have paid little attention: the way Leibniz argues for NPE. In some passages Leibniz derives NPE from his predicate-in-subject principle of truth. In others, he employs his doctrine of the interconnection of all things to reach NPE. Elsewhere, he bases NPE on the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Though, as mentioned, Leibniz never explicitly defines NPE, he does have much to say by way of explicit definition of each of these three principles. A consideration of what version of NPE could plausibly be drawn from them is thus a revealing way to proceed. In the case of each argument, I show that my interpretation of NPE is the conclusion naturally suggested by the given principle, while the reductionist version of NPE forms only an awkward, textually implausible fit with it. The result of the examination is an original and serious critique of the reductionist reading of NPE, as well as the development of a far more plausible understanding of that claim. (shrink)

Einst galt die Erkenntnistheorie als Königsdisziplin der Philosophie. Heute ist sie gegenüber der Ontologie und Sprachphilosophie in den Hintergrund getreten. Wenn wir aber das Programm der Aufklärung fortführen und in einer rationalen Gesellschaft leben wollen, müssen wir die Epistemologie wiederbeleben. In diesem Buch werden zwei Kernfragen der Disziplin beleuchtet. Alle Wissenschaften setzen auf Schlüsse vom Speziellen auf das Allgemeine, von der Vergangenheit auf die Zukunft. Der erste Teil des Buches beschäftigt sich damit, wie solche Induktionsschlüsse gerechtfertigt werden können. Im zweiten (...) Teil geht um das Problem der empirischen Basis. Viele PhilosophInnen glauben, dass selbst die grundlegendsten empirischen Beobachtungen durch unsere theoretischen Hintergrundannahmen geprägt sind. Sind Wissenschaft und Erkenntnis also zirkuläre Unterfangen? (shrink)

This paper considers the implications for nursing practice of what the continental philosopher Emmanuel Levinas described as the ‘non‐intentional’. The place of the non‐intentional emerges from a critique of Buber’s conception of the ‘I‐Thou’ and the ‘I‐It’ relations, and is revealed to a person in the moments prior to the grasping of conscious understanding. A specific incident that took place between a nurse and a person diagnosed with dementia is described and then used to illustrate an exploration of the ‘I‐Thou’ (...) relation and then the non‐intentional. The nurse practitioner’s pre‐understandings of the term dementia are shown to have hindered the emergence of an ‘I‐Thou’ relation and the possibility of a non‐intentional glimpse of the otherness of the other. It is suggested here that the plausible associations that become synonymous with a diagnosis like dementia detract from attentiveness to another ‘person’. The more tangible an understanding of another person becomes, the less likely it is that a person can really experience the other as separate to their perception of them. The implications for practitioner education and learning in relation to the non‐intentional are considered, in particular the need to reflect on the immediacy of the feelings experienced in a relationship. The non‐intentional highlights how ‘I’, as a nurse practitioner, can exclude the other by imposing an understanding on what is seen and experienced in relation to another person. The ‘I’ prioritizes intentional understanding and so obscures the importance of the spontaneous response to the tear in the eye of the other, which is the basis for Levinas’s conception of the non‐intentional. The spontaneity of the non‐intentional is what Levinas believed confirmed the separateness and autonomy of the other and consequently should be the basis for a therapeutic nursing relationship with a patient. (shrink)

Amartya Sen has demonstrated a possible inconsistency between a (liberal) right and Pareto optimality. Neither Sen nor the subsequent literature have discussed the origin of the rights that lead to the liberal paradox. In this article I examine one possible origin of rights definitions-a constitutional contract agreed to by all members of the community. Constitutional rights are show to be vulnerable to a similar paradox as with liberal rights, but if the writers of the constitution were correct in their choice (...) of actions to protect, such paradoxes will be unlikely and involve small welfare losses when they do occur. The article demonstrates that both the origin of rights and their potential role in advancing the interests of citizens can be explained using a utilitarian/welfarist methodology. (shrink)

This new textbook provides a clear, informative and rigorous guide for students taking Religious Studies GCSE with all the major exam boards. It covers the philosophy and ethics content of the key GCSE specifications and examines these themes from the perspectives of Christianity, Roman Catholicism and Islam. Throughout the book, emphasis is placed on the scriptural basis of each religious view and on other sources of authority in each religious tradition. The development of core ethical and doctrinal questions is explored, (...) and key thinkers and theologians are introduced to give a sound understanding of complex issues. Chapter by chapter, the book covers such topics as religious texts and sources of authority; the existence and nature of God; revelation and religious experience; the problem of evil; science and religion; death and life after death; human nature and personal relationships; human rights, conflict and crime; and global issues. There is also a dedicated chapter on study skills and exam techniques, and each chapter includes student-friendly features such as revision summaries, questions and activities. While the book has been designed with the new GCSE specifications and reforms in mind, it encourages students to see the full significance of these issues by going beyond the narrow confines of their own specification. As such, Religious Studies for GCSE will be the ideal companion for investigating this rich and fascinating area of human life. (shrink)

Kann "Gott" Thema einer vernunftigen, undogmatischen Philosophie sein? Wenn ja, in welcher Weise? Uber eine systematische Rekonstruktion des philosophischen Werkes von Simon L. Frank (1877-1950) werden diese Fragen erortert. Der erkenntnismetaphysische Grundansatz Franks vereinigt Transzendentalphilosophie und Phanomenologie. Er fuhrt zu einer "Fundamentalontologie", die durch ihre immanente Verbindung zur Anthropologie wesentlich personale Ontologie ist. Der Uberschritt zur philosophischen Theologie wird anhand des Begriffes "religioser Erfahrung" herausgearbeitet. Wissenschaftlichkeit sowie philosophische und religiose Adaquatheit dieses Unterfangens werden uberpruft. Dabei wird sowohl dem Verdacht auf (...) "Ontotheologie" als auch dem Vorwurf des "Pantheismus" kritisch nachgegangen. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article analyzes the action of centripetal and centrifugal forces in utterances from the religious sphere, which reveal worldviews of the evangelical Christian segment regarding disability. For that, we selected a video available on YouTube, containing utterances by the hosts Tito Rocha and Leandro Quadros regarding disabilities, as well as the response of an internet user about the positioning of these individuals. The theoretical and methodological reflection is based on the dialogical orientation of language, considering dialogic relations, voices, and (...) centripetal and centrifugal forces. Additionally, we drew upon studies on worldviews, the inclusion of people with disabilities, religious discourse, and Christian theology. The results reveal that the discourses of the hosts reflect and refract a Christian worldview that unifies the understanding of disability due to divine punishment caused by sin. While the internet user’s comment presents movements of centralization and dispersion of this Christian perspective. (shrink)

RESUMO Este artigo analisa a atuação das forças centrípetas e centrífugas em enunciados da esfera religiosa que evidenciam cosmovisões do segmento cristão evangélico acerca da deficiência. Para tanto, selecionamos um vídeo disponível na plataforma YouTube contendo enunciados dos apresentadores Tito Rocha e Leandro Quadros relativos à temática da deficiência, bem como a resposta de uma internauta acerca do posicionamento desses sujeitos. A reflexão teórico-metodológica fundamenta-se na orientação dialógica da linguagem, sobretudo nas considerações acerca das relações dialógicas, vozes e forças centrípetas (...) e centrífugas. Também recorremos a estudos sobre cosmovisão, inclusão da pessoa com deficiência, discurso religioso e teologia cristã. Os resultados indicam que os discursos dos apresentadores refletem e refratam uma cosmovisão cristã que unifica o entendimento da deficiência como resultado da condenação divina ocasionada pelo pecado. O comentário da internauta, por sua vez, apresenta movimentos de centralização e dispersão dessa perspectiva cristã. (shrink)

Recent decades have seen a revived interest in super-substantivalism, the idea that spacetime is the only fundamental substance and matter some kind of aspect, property or consequence of spacetime structure. However, the metaphysical debate so far has misidentified a particular variant of super-substantivalism with the position per se. I distinguish between a super-substantival core commitment and different ways of fleshing it out. I then investigate how general relativity and alternative spacetime theories square with the different variants of super-substantivalism.