Kateb asserts that the defense of universal human rights requires two indispensable components: morality and human dignity. For Kateb, morality and justice have sound theoretical underpinnings; human dignity, by virtue of its “existential” quality, lacks its own theoretical framework. This he proceeds to establish with a critique of the writings of canonical Western political philosophers and contemporary thinkers like Peter Singer and Thomas Nagel. The author argues that while morality compels just governments to prevent, reduce, or eliminate human (...) suffering inasmuch as it is possible, people possess and are entitled to dignity by mere virtue of their “status” as human beings. Homo sapiens, he maintains, have a “stature,” manifest in the species's “great achievements,” that exceeds that of other creatures, even in the secular cosmos. (shrink)

Studie over het werk van de Amerikaanse politicologe Hannah Arendt (1906-1975).

Emerson was a great moral philosopher. One of his principle contributions is the theory of self-reliance, a view of democratic individuality. 'Nietzsche was Emerson's best reader,' and George Kateb provides an accessible reading of Emerson that is friendly to the interests of Nietzsche and to later Nietzscheans such as Weber, Heidegger, Arendt, and Foucault.

It is only through the duality of the `masculine' and the `feminine' that the `human' finds full realization.Pope John Paul IISee the power of national emblems. Some stars, lilies, leopards, a crescent, a lion, an eagle, or other figure, which came into credit, God knows how, on an old rag of bunting, blowing in the wind, on a fort, at the ends of the earth, shall make the blood tingle under the rudest or the most conventional exterior. The people fancy (...) they hate poetry, and they are all poets and mystics! Ralph Waldo Emerson. (shrink)

(2006). Is John Gray a Nihilist? Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy: Vol. 9, The Political Theory of John Gray, pp. 305-322.

The paper tries to show the importance of the writings of John Locke in preparing the way for secularism. He provides a theory for disentangling religion and the state for several main reasons, including the avoidance of religious persecution of minorties; the avoidance of civil strife; and the need to leave it to individuals to work out their own salvation by exercising their conscience free of state interference. Locke is a creative theorist; his creativity shows itself in the new arguments (...) he formulates and publishes on behalf of the freedom of religion from the state and the freedom of the state from religion. The influence of his Letter on Toleration and the Second Treatise in Two Treatises of Government has proved worldwide and lasting. The paper also takes up a later work by Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, where Locke retreats to some extent from the religious individualism, but not the religious toleration, of his most famous works. But even that retreat gives only a little comfort to those who deplore secularism. (shrink)

This paper deals with the recently published work by Hannah Arendt, "Some Questions of Moral Philosophy" , which is her most extensive discussion of moral issues. What emerges from this work is a fuller account of what genuine morality is. Writings that she published had prepared her readers for the idea that genuine morality is Socratic morality, which holds that it is better for the person to suffer wrong than to do wrong. That means, in the contexts of resistance to (...) totalitarianism and to tyranny and despotism, that it is better to suffer wrong than to be an accomplice or passive bystander of wrong done to others when one could be safe if one did not resist. On the other hand, Arendt makes it clear that spurious morality in the form of what she calls "the morality of mores" makes people accomplices or passive bystanders. For them, morality is merely conformity to the prevailing norms, and their conformity is underlain by self-love. Thus, morality in one conventional sense sustains political evil, while morality in the real sense impels the individual's effort to resist evil. But this paper also tries to indicate that for Arendt the evil of totalitarianism is not simply the infliction of atrocious suffering and premature death on millions of people. Rather, the worst part of the evil is that atrocious suffering dehumanizes its victims. The loss of humanity is an existential loss: a deprivation of the human status. Correspondingly, the most noteworthy aspect of resistance to evil is to give testimony to the human stature: the unique human capacity to engage in free audacious activity. Status and stature constitute human dignity; and for Arendt human dignity is essentially existential in importance and only secondarily moral. (shrink)

This paper deals with the recently published work by Hannah Arendt, "Some Questions of Moral Philosophy", which is her most extensive discussion of moral issues. What emerges from this work is a fuller account of what genuine morality is. Writings that she published had prepared her readers for the idea that genuine morality is Socratic morality, which holds that it is better for the person to suffer wrong than to do wrong. That means, in the contexts of resistance to totalitarianism (...) and to tyranny and despotism, that it is better to suffer wrong than to be an accomplice or passive bystander of wrong done to others when one could be safe if one did not resist. On the other hand, Arendt makes it clear that spurious morality in the form of what she calls "the morality of mores" makes people accomplices or passive bystanders. For them, morality is merely conformity to the prevailing norms, and their conformity is underlain by self-love. Thus, morality in one conventional sense sustains political evil, while morality in the real sense impels the individual's effort to resist evil. But this paper also tries to indicate that for Arendt the evil of totalitarianism is not simply the infliction of atrocious suffering and premature death on millions of people. Rather, the worst part of the evil is that atrocious suffering dehumanizes its victims. The loss of humanity is an existential loss: a deprivation of the human status. Correspondingly, the most noteworthy aspect of resistance to evil is to give testimony to the human stature: the unique human capacity to engage in free audacious activity. Status and stature constitute human dignity; and for Arendt human dignity is essentially existential in importance and only secondarily moral. (shrink)

At the center of Lincoln’s political thought and career is an intense passion for equality that runs so deep in the speeches, messages, and letters that it has the force of religious conviction for Lincoln. George Kateb examines these writings to reveal that this passion explains Lincoln’s reverence for both the Constitution and the Union.

This chapter brings together some of Arendt's key ideas on thinking and judging. With the exception of system building, they all play a part in constituting the attention that grows out of and focuses political worry; and some play a part in perfecting the will to resist. Her implication is that political theorists and historians as well as poets, novelists, and moral essayists should and often do aim to perfect these operations of remedial intellect. But it is precisely the scarcity (...) of these mental traits in the population at large that produces the bulk of events in life; and these events are the stuff that necessitates and often joyously entangles thinkers and scholars in the project of understanding. (shrink)

This paper follows Jeremy Bentham in holding that because punishment, even when not corporal, is pain, the state administration of punishment is inherently evil. Too many defenders of punishment see the deliberate infliction of pain as not evil at all, but rather as the justice due the criminal. The paper proposes that punishment is the lesser and necessary evil, and not justice, which is a positive good free of evil. The US Constitution teaches the proper democratic attitude towards punishment, which (...) is that punishment should be done reluctantly and leniently. All the provisions of the criminal law in the document go in the direction of reluctance and leniency. One principal enemy of this spirit is the doctrine of retribution, as defended by Leviticus, Kant, and JS Mill. A critique is offered of this doctrine; deterrence is left as the basic justification for punishment, especially in a constitutional democracy. (shrink)

The main purpose of the paper is to examine the question as to whether self-sacrifice is intrinsic to moral action. The conclusion is that though some moral deeds can be free of appreciable self-sacrifice, most of the time some degree of self-sacrifice is called for. The necessity is not conceptual but built into the lives of most people. The paper is especially interested in a person's refusal to go along with or actively cooperate with wrongdoing, even when there is some (...) risk; and positively giving assistance to those who are oppressed or persecuted, and again when there is some risk. Abstaining from violating the rights and entitlements of others is not enough to be moral, indispensable as it is. An important issue is what degree of self-sacrifice is called for, which, when not risked or endured, allows us to think that immorality has been committed. I follow the standard practice of distinguishing between moral heroism and moral obligation. Moral heroism is exemplified by Socrates who at risk to his life refused to cooperate with the unjust command of the Thirty to seize an innocent man and hand him over for execution. The paper holds that one's basic rights set the limits to the extent of self-sacrifice that one can be obliged to risk or endure. The first part of the paper is devoted to Socrates and to the way in which his moral heroism is not a model for the moral person's action, but rather an inspiration to think hard about what self-sacrifice is demanded, short of his. I locate in the golden rule, the precept that urges us "always to treat others as you would like them to treat you" , the best single moral precept. The second part of the paper is on the golden rule. But the precept must be revised somewhat in accordance with the limits on self-sacrifice set by the preservation of one's basic rights. The consequences of the golden rule for political involvement is also discussed. The paper also looks at self-denial, especially as it is taught by Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount. Self-denial in its most extreme form counsels martyrdom or passive non-resistance and even cooperation with one's oppression. Thus, extreme self-denial is perhaps not a moral phenomenon at all, though in its less extreme forms, it is one of the best aspects of civilized life. There are undeniable affinities between self-sacrifice and self-denial. (shrink)

The main purpose of the paper is to examine the question as to whether self-sacrifice is intrinsic to moral action. The conclusion is that though some moral deeds can be free of appreciable self-sacrifice, most of the time some degree of self-sacrifice is called for. The necessity is not conceptual but built into the lives of most people. The paper is especially interested in a person's refusal to go along with or actively cooperate with wrongdoing, even when there is some (...) risk; and positively giving assistance to those who are oppressed or persecuted, and again when there is some risk. Abstaining from violating the rights and entitlements of others is not enough to be moral, indispensable as it is. An important issue is what degree of self-sacrifice is called for, which, when not risked or endured, allows us to think that immorality has been committed. I follow the standard practice of distinguishing between moral heroism and moral obligation. Moral heroism is exemplified by Socrates who at risk to his life refused to cooperate with the unjust command of the Thirty to seize an innocent man and hand him over for execution. The paper holds that one's basic rights set the limits to the extent of self-sacrifice that one can be obliged to risk or endure. The first part of the paper is devoted to Socrates and to the way in which his moral heroism is not a model for the moral person's action, but rather an inspiration to think hard about what self-sacrifice is demanded, short of his. I locate in the golden rule, the precept that urges us "always to treat others as you would like them to treat you", the best single moral precept. The second part of the paper is on the golden rule. But the precept must be revised somewhat in accordance with the limits on self-sacrifice set by the preservation of one's basic rights. The consequences of the golden rule for political involvement is also discussed. The paper also looks at self-denial, especially as it is taught by Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount. Self-denial in its most extreme form counsels martyrdom or passive non-resistance and even cooperation with one's oppression. Thus, extreme self-denial is perhaps not a moral phenomenon at all, though in its less extreme forms, it is one of the best aspects of civilized life. There are undeniable affinities between self-sacrifice and self-denial. (shrink)

This paper follows Jeremy Bentham in holding that because punishment, even when not corporal, is pain, the state administration of punishment is inherently evil. Too many defenders of punishment see the deliberate infliction of pain as not evil at all, but rather as the justice due the criminal. The paper proposes that punishment is the lesser and necessary evil, and not justice, which is a positive good free of evil. The US Constitution teaches the proper democratic attitude towards punishment, which (...) is that punishment should be done reluctantly and leniently. All the provisions of the criminal law in the document go in the direction of reluctance and leniency. One principal enemy of this spirit is the doctrine of retribution, as defended by Leviticus, Kant, and JS Mill. A critique is offered of this doctrine; deterrence is left as the basic justification for punishment, especially in a constitutional democracy. (shrink)