Despite an expansive literature on communication in medicine, the role of language is dealt with mostly indirectly. Recently, narrative medicine has emerged as a strategy to improve doctor-patient communication and integrate patient perspectives. However, even in this field which is predicated on language use, scholars have not specifically reflected on how language functions in medicine. In this theoretical paper, the authors consider how different models of language use, which have been proposed in the philosophical literature, might be applied to communication (...) in medicine. In particular, the authors contrast the traditional, indexical thesis of language with new models that focus on interpretation instead of standardization. The authors demonstrate how paying close attention to the role of language in medicine provides a philosophical foundation for supporting recent changes in doctor-patient communication. In particular, interpretive models are at the foundation of new approaches such as narrative medicine, that emphasize listening to patient stories, rather than merely collecting information. Ultimately, debates regarding the role of language which have largely resided in non-medical literatures, have important implications for describing communication in medicine. In particular, interpretive models of language use provide an important rationale for facilitating a more robust dialogue between doctors and patients. (shrink)

Although scholars have thoroughly assessed American Evangelical Protestants’ beliefs about government intervention in addressing socioeconomic stratification and racial discrimination, they have paid considerably less attention to interpretations of health care reform. Especially important is that American Evangelicalism in recent years has incorporated personal accountability in such a way that makes this group distinctive when considering social responsibility toward others. Whereas earlier Evangelicals were instrumental in furthering the social gospel, American Evangelicals today prioritize matters of personal accountability ahead of social action. (...) The cultural toolkit available to Evangelicals includes a rationale for caring for others, but an emphasis on personal accountability shapes how they evaluate government health care interventions. This paper employs qualitative methods to understand how Evangelicals link such individualism with strategies for caring for others in the context of health care. The findings suggest that Evangelicals emphasize personal accountability, especially when evaluating government programs. However, personal accountability is accompanied by a conflicting ethical responsibility to provide care to others. The priority given to personal accountability or an ethic of care, however, varies according to the situational context or social location of white Evangelicals. These findings may be helpful in framing future health policies to draw Evangelical support. (shrink)

The move to patient-centered medical practice is important for providing relevant and sustainable health care. Narrative medicine, for example, suggests that patients should be involved significantly in diagnosis and treatment. In order to understand the meaning of symptoms and interventions, therefore, physicians must enter the life worlds of patients. But physicians face high patient loads and limited time for extended consultations. In current medical practice, then, is narrative medicine possible? We argue that engaging patient perspectives in the medical visit does (...) not necessarily require a lengthy interview. Instead, a new orientation to this process that emphasizes dialogue between practitioners and patients should be considered. In this new model, the purpose of the visit is to communicate successfully and develop a mutual understanding of illness and care. (shrink)

Social planners have begun to recognize that communities are an important resource for solving many problems. Understanding local norms and values is thought to provide insight into how issues are defined and what interventions might be considered practical. Communities in this framework are not just the physical locations at which programs are targeted, but are actively constructed spaces that must be properly understood. In many ways, the field of public health has been sensitive to this understanding and has elevated the (...) community in importance, thus emphasizing that significant features are variable and locally defined. Even in the new public health, however, empirical indicators are still often relied on, thereby leading to the increasing standardization of communities, rather than to openness to neighborhood particularities. For this reason, a community-based focus should guide future public health endeavors. Most important, this strategy underscores the importance of getting to know the communities in which symptoms, illness and care are defined, and allows for full participation by community members that make interventions both relevant and sustainable. (shrink)

Presents a concise and comprehensive analysis of George Berkeley’s thought and the impact of his intellectual contributions to philosophy In this latest addition to the Blackwell Great Minds series, noted scholar of early modern philosophy Margaret Atherton examines Berkeley’s most influential work and demonstrates the significant conceptual impact of his ideas in metaphysics and the philosophy of religion. A concise and rigorous primer on Berkeley’s essential writings and contributions to modern philosophy Written by a leading scholar of (...) early modern philosophy Offers insight into the foundations of modern metaphysical and religious philosophy Equips readers to find firm footing in Berkeley’s wider body of published work in the canon of Western philosophy. (shrink)

En este artículo expongo y analizo la propuesta berkeleyana del conocimiento nocional, que representa entre otras cosas el intento del irlandés por conocer a la mente o espíritu, esto es, a aquella cosa pensante y activa que por su propia actividad resulta irrepresentable como idea. Como el conocimiento nocional ya se menciona en los Comentarios Filosófi cos me remitiré a ellos para conocer los orígenes del mismo; sin embargo, como tal conocimiento aparece con mayor detalle en obras posteriores me serviré (...) sobre todo del Tratado para abordar la compleja doctrina nocional. // In this paper I expose and analyze the berkeleian proposal of notional knowledge. Among other things, this proposal represents Berkeley ́s attempt to know the mind or spirit, that is, the thinking and active thing that by its own activity results unrepresentable as idea. As such knowledge is already mentioned in the Philosophical Commentaries, I will refer to them in order to know the origins of that proposal. However, as notional knowledge appears in more detail in later works, I will make use especially of the Treatise to address the complex notional doctrine. (shrink)

Ever since its first publication critics of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason have been struck by certain strong formal resemblances between transcendental idealism and Berkeley's immaterialism. Both philosophers hold that the sensible world is mind-dependent, and that from this very mind-dependence we can draw a refutation of scepticism of the senses.

Ever since its first publication critics of Kant'sCritique of Pure Reasonhave been struck by certain strong formal resemblances between transcendental idealism and Berkeley's immaterialism. Both philosophers hold that the sensible world is mind-dependent, and that from this very mind-dependence we can draw a refutation of scepticism of the senses.

By focusing on the exchange between Descartes and Hobbes on how the self is related to its activities, Berkeley draws attention to how he and Hobbes explain the forensic constitution of human subjectivity and moral/political responsibility in terms of passive obedience and conscientious submission to the laws of the sovereign. Formulated as the language of nature or as pronouncements of the supreme political power, those laws identify moral obligations by locating political subjects within those networks of sensible signs. When (...) thus juxtaposed with Hobbes, Berkeley can be understood as endorsing a theologically inflected version of deontological ethics in which moral laws are linked directly to the constitution of the self. (shrink)

RésuméMoore attribuah l'idéalisme de Berkeley à sa négligence de la distinction entre l'acte d'appréhension et son objet. Bien que Berkeley ait justement tracé cette distinction dans le premier Dialogue, et l'ait rejetée, peu s'en sont aperçu, et ceux qui l'ont remarqué lui reprochent habituellement de confondre l'acte d'appréhension avec une action. La thèse ici développée est que Berkeley n'est pas coupable de cette confusion et qu'il rejette la distinction, en fait, pour de bonnes raisons à caractére empiriste, (...) qui ont à voir avec ce que l'on tient pour son argument principal. (shrink)

David Hume wrote that Berkeley's arguments `admit of no answer but produce no conviction'. This book aims at the kind of understanding of Berkeley's philosophy that comes from seeing how we ourselves might be brought to embrace it. Berkeley held that matter does not exist, and that the sensations we take to be caused by an indifferent and independent world are instead caused directly by God. Nature becomes a text, with no existence apart from the spirits who (...) transmit and receive it. Kenneth P. Winkler presents these conclusions as natural consequences of Berkeley's reflections on such topics as representation, abstraction, necessary truth, and cause and effect. In the closing chapters Proefssor Winkler offers new interpretations of Berkeley's view on unperceived objects, corpuscularian science, and our knowledge of God and other minds. (shrink)

Berkeley's Idealism both advances Berkeley scholarship and serves as a useful guide for teachers and students.

Berkeley is one of the most influential and yet most misunderstood of eighteenth-century philosophers. In this new, revised edition of his classic introduction, G.J. Warnock examines all Berkeley's major philosophical works and discusses his most original and interesting contributions to questions still debated by philosophers today. The aim of the book is to help the reader learn not so much about Berkeley, but rather, through Berkeley, something about philosophy itself.

The thoughts of three philosophers on three topics: meaning, causality, and objectivity, are the focus of this study.

This work traces the theory of Radical Dependence through its various forms in Berkeleys philosophical works. It shows that a desire to establish a theory of Radical Dependence underlies all of these works and that this theory unifies Berkeleys various phases of philosophical development. The work begins by establishing the meaning of Radical Dependence and examining the influence of Greek, Early Christian and Mediaeval philosophers and theologians on the development of the concept. Subsequently, the deism of the seventeenth-century philosophers is (...) examined; the influence of science and rationalism on the development of deism is traced, with particular attention being given to Berkeleys personal milieu. With a view to showing that Berkeley wishes to re-establish the waning Christian cosmology, his philosophical works are examined in chronological order, particular attention being paid to his final work Siris. It is shown that, although Berkeley moves from a philosophy based on the immaterialist hypothesis in his early works, to one based on the doctrine of participation in his last work, each phase is a variation of the doctrine of Radical Dependence. In the final chapter some of the shortcomings of Berkeleys various philosophical systems are discussed and alternatives are examined. The direction of his thought is found to be guided more by piety than by common-sense and reason: he suffers from a pious pragmatism which leads him to hold doctrines as true on the grounds that they corroborate Christian doctrines. His firm belief in the providence of God leads him to affirm an almost pantheistic worldview which he never fully manages to reconcile with traditional Christian theology, and the doctrine of creation ex nihilo in particular. (shrink)

This paper conducts an excavation of the epistemological foundations of Berkeley’s subjective idealism, arguing that his attempt to reconcile idealism with a common sense view of reality is purchased at the cost of theoretical inconsistency.

This original new work takes a sharply focused look at Berkeley's ontology and provides a fuller understanding of the relationship between, on the one hand, Berkeley's nominalism and antiabstractionism and, on the other, his principal arguments for idealism and his attempts to square his idealism with common sense. Drawing heavily on detailed textual analysis, historical context, and careful examination of the work of other scholars, Muehlmann challenges, modifies, rejects, and exploits some well-established interpretations of Berkeley's philosophy.

Berkeley’s appeal to a posteriori arguments for God’s existence supports belief only in a God who is finite. But by appealing to an a priori argument for God’s existence, Berkeley emphasizes God’s infinity. In this latter argument, God is not the efficient cause of particular finite things in the world, for such an explanation does not provide a justification or rationale for why the totality of finite things would exist in the first place. Instead, God is understood as (...) the creator of the total unity of all there is, the whole of creation. In this a priori argument, we should not focus on the specific objects that God creates, for that requires that we think that God knows each finite thing as distinct from every other. Rather, we should recognize how God creates all things in creating the complex, infinite totality of finite perceivings, each of which exists in virtue of the distinctions and relations it expresses. (shrink)

Berkeley argues that claims about divine predication (e.g., God is wise or exists) should be understood literally rather than analogically, because like all spirits (i.e., causes), God is intelligible only in terms of the extent of his effects. By focusing on the harmony and order of nature, Berkeley thus unites his view of God with his doctrines of mind, force, grace, and power, and avoids challenges to religious claims that are raised by appeals to analogy. The essay concludes (...) by showing how a letter, supposedly by Berkeley, to Peter Browne ("discovered" in 1969 by Berman and Pittion) is, in fact, by John Jackson (1686-1763), controversial theologian and friend of Samuel Clarke. (shrink)

Berkeley’s capacity to conceive of mind-independent bodies was corrupted by his theory of representation. He thought that representation of things outside the mind depended on resemblance. Since ideas can resemble nothing than ideas, and all ideas are mind dependent, he concluded that we couldn’t form ideas of mind-independent bodies. More generally, he thought that we had no inner resembling proxies for mind-independent bodies, and so we couldn’t even form a notion of such things. Because conception is a suggestible faculty, (...) Berkeley’s arguments actually made it the case that he himself couldn’t conceive of mind-independent bodies. (shrink)

Berkeley's immaterialism aims to undermine Descartes's skeptical arguments by denying that the connection between sensory perception and reality is contingent. However, this seems to undermine Berkeley's (alleged) defense of commonsense by failing to recognize the existence of objects not presently perceived by humans. I argue that this problem can be solved by means of two neglected Berkeleian doctrines: the status of the world as "a most coherent, instructive, and entertaining Discourse" which is 'spoken' by God (Siris, sect. 254) (...) and the nature of language as a public social practice. Together these doctrines entail that ordinary physical objects, including those that are not presently perceived, are a joint product of divine discursive activity and human interpretive activity. (shrink)

In the Introduction to the Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, Berkeley attacks the “received opinion that language has no other end but the communicating our ideas, and that every significant name stands for an idea” (PHK, Intro §19). How far does Berkeley go in rejecting this ‘received opinion’? Does he offer a general theory of language to replace it? If so, what is the nature of this theory? In this chapter, I consider three main interpretations of (...) Berkeley's view: the modified ideational theory, the speaker intentions theory, and the use theory. I argue that the use theory does, and its competitors do not, make sense of Berkeley's remarks on language in both the earlier and later works. (shrink)

Berkeley's main aim in his well-known early works was to identify and refute "the grounds of Scepticism, Atheism, and irreligion." This appears to place Berkeley within a well-established tradition of religious critics of Locke's epistemology, including, most famously, Stillingfleet. I argue that these appearances are deceiving. Berkeley is, in fact, in important respects an opponent of this tradition. According to Berkeley, Locke's earlier critics, including Stillingfleet, had misidentified the grounds of irreligion in Locke's philosophy while all (...) the while endorsing the true grounds of irreligion themselves. Locke's epistemology is innocent; matter and abstraction are to blame. (shrink)

In this first modern, critical assessment of the place of mathematics in Berkeley's philosophy and Berkeley's place in the history of mathematics, Douglas M. Jesseph provides a bold reinterpretation of Berkeley's work.

He assesses the validity of this self-description and considers why Berkeley might have chosen to align himself with a commonsense position.Pappas shows how ...

Berkeley doesn't use the Time-Gap Argument, as Leibniz does, to prove either that we immediately see only ideas or that we see physical objects mediately. It may be doubted whether he was even aware of the time-gap problem that gives rise to the argument. But certain passages in the Three Dialogues and elsewhere suggest that Berkeley would have had cogent answers to anyone who claimed that this argument, construed as being in aid of the conclusion that we only (...) perceive ideas, is unsound. Discussing points made by Bertil Belfrage, Len Carrier, John Foster, A. C. Grayling, Howard Robinson, A. D. Smith, Tom Stoneham, and Colin Turbayne, I try to show that the Time-Gap Argument can be expanded into a strong argument for Berkeleian Idealism. I also idnicate how the latter provides a solution to J. J. Valberg's "puzzle of experience" and disarms James Cornman's argument in Perception, Common Sense, and Science that Berkeley, too, faces a time-gap problem. (shrink)

Berkeley's doctrine of archetypes explains how God perceives and can have the same ideas as finite minds. His appeal of Christian neo-Platonism opens up a way to understand how the relation of mind, ideas, and their union is modeled on the Cappadocian church fathers' account of the persons of the trinity. This way of understanding Berkeley indicates why he, in contrast to Descartes or Locke, thinks that mind (spiritual substance) and ideas (the object of mind) cannot exist or (...) be thought of apart from one another. It also hints at why Gregory of Nyssa's immaterialism sounds so much like Berkeley's. (shrink)

The defense of common sense in Berkeley's Three Dialogues is, first and foremost, a defense of the gardener's claim to know this cherry tree, a claim threatened by both Cartesian and Lockean philosophy. Berkeley's defense of the gardener's knowledge depends on his claim that the being of a cherry tree consists in its being perceived. This is not something the gardener believes; rather, it is a philosophical analysis of the rules unreflectively followed by the gardener in his use (...) of the word 'exists'. It is by following these rules that the gardener gains knowledge of the cherry tree. Uncovering these deep connections between Berkeley's epistemology and his philosophy of language and placing them in the context of his critique of both Cartesian and Lockean philosophy will clarify Berkeley's strategy for bringing his reader back to common sense and practical engagement in the ordinary affairs of life. (shrink)

For Berkeley, minds are not Cartesian spiritual substances because they cannot be said to exist (even if only conceptually) abstracted from their activities. Similarly, Berkeley's notion of mind differs from Locke's in that, for Berkeley, minds are not abstract substrata in which ideas inhere. Instead, Berkeley redefines what it means for the mind to be a substance in a way consistent with the Stoic logic of 17th century Ramists on which Leibniz and Jonathan Edwards draw. This (...) view of mind, I conclude, is definitely not the bundle theory that some critics have portrayed it as being. (shrink)