This essay distinguishes three types of appeals to experience in ethics, identifies problems with appealing to experience, and argues that appeals to experience must be open to critical assessment, if experientially-based arguments are to be useful. Unless competing and potentially irreconcilable experiences can be assessed and adjudicated, experientially-based arguments will be problematic. The paper recommends thinking of the appeal to experience as a kind of storytelling to be evaluated as other stories are.

Although images are pervasive in public policy debates in bioethics, few who work in the field attend carefully to the way that images function rhetorically. If the use of images is discussed at all, it is usually to dismiss appeals to images as a form of manipulation. Yet it is possible to speak meaningfully of visual arguments. Examining the appeal to images of the embryo and fetus in debates about abortion and stem cell research, I suggest that bioethicists would be (...) well served by attending much more carefully to how images function in public policy debates. (shrink)

Philosophers have sometimes drawn a distinction between supererogation and duty. This paper considers the possibility that a religious understanding of hu- man life and history may require what would otherwise be considered praise worthy but not obligatory. The specific example here is forgiveness. The paper sketches a view of forgiveness and suggests that forgiveness is not, at least in contemporary Western thought, considered to be a moral obligation. Several reasons why this might be the case are considered as well as (...) how par- ticular Christian beliefs about God's justice and mercy may transform this situa- tion. The paper concludes that given certain religious beliefs, forgiveness may be both moral prerogative and religious duty. (shrink)

: Successful stem cell therapies might change the natural contours of human life. If that happened, it would unsettle our ethical commitments and encourage us to see the entire natural world merely as material to be manipulated.

This paper claims that recent attempts to draw on the maternal experiences of women in order to articulate an ethic of care and compassion is a new romanticism. Like earlier romantic views, it is both attractive and potentially dangerous. The paper examines the basic claims of this new romanticism in order to identify both its strengths and weaknesses. I conclude that there are at least two versions of this new romanticism, one that relies primarily on the experiences of child-bearing in (...) grounding an ethic of care and compassion, and a second that relies primarily on child-rearing. I suggest that the former version of the new romanticism is deeply flawed because such a view ought to be unacceptable to women and will be inaccessible to men. (shrink)

Its critics to the contrary, the “gift of life” metaphor is not to be blamed for the indebtedness and guilt that organ recipients often experience. It is certainly misused, however, both by post‐transplant caregivers, who exploit it to manipulate recipients' behavior, and by the organ procurement system, which has failed to understand that the decision to give the gift of life must be approached communally.

Current reproductive technology challenges us to think seriously about social values surrounding childbearing. Thoughtful discussion must combine careful attention to the experience of pursuing parenthood by technological means with principled reflection on the morality of this pursuit.

This paper claims that recent attempts to draw on the maternal experiences of women in order to articulate an ethic of care and compassion is a new romanticism. Like earlier romantic views, it is both attractive and potentially dangerous. The paper examines the basic claims of this new romanticism in order to identify both its strengths and weaknesses. I conclude that there are at least two versions of this new romanticism, one that relies primarily on the experiences of child-bearing in (...) grounding an ethic of care and compassion, and a second that relies primarily on child-rearing. I suggest that the former version of the new romanticism is deeply flawed because such a view ought to be unacceptable to women and will be inaccessible to men. (shrink)

The move in moral theory toward listening to and accommodating “experience” requires that we hear its diversity, take a closer look at its nature, and ask how it should function in moral deliberation.

Hailed as revolutionary, the prospect of human cloning is actually the next logical step in a series of developments in reproductive technology that began with the first test-tube baby in 1978. This book addresses the debates over cloning in the context of new reproductive technology and human embryo research. It examines the status of preimplantation embryos, the ethical issues related to cloning and embryo research, and the formulation of public policy.

Given the dichotomy traditionally posited between reason and emotion, ethicists have generally downplayed or ignored the role of emotions in the moral life. In this paper I argue that the traditional dichotomy between reason and emotion should be abandoned, and that developing an account of emotions that attends to their cognitive structure can pave the way for a reassessment of the role emotions play in our efforts to live morally. I suggest that this reassessment is of particular interest to religious (...) ethicists because adopting a "constructivist" theory of emotions can help explain how a religious vision of human life and history may bring about significant moral changes in the life of the believer. I try to illustrate this point by showing how a religious conception of the nature of moral relations may have an effect on the emotion of anger. (shrink)

In “Reason and the Republic of Opinion,” Leon Wieseltier bemoaned an age that reduces reason to utilitarian calculation and requires almost ritual genuflection before the altar of numbers. The spirit of this age is at work in the field of bioethics where, as Debra Mathews and colleagues point out in “A Conceptual Model for the Translation of Bioethics Research and Scholarship,” researchers and scholars are increasingly “being asked to demonstrate and also forecast the value and impact of their work.” Despite (...) the reductionism that typically accompanies the movements imbued with this spirit, the concern for accountability that stands behind the call for measuring success is legitimate. The bioethics community is thus fortunate to have such a distinguished group of scholars wrestling with these matters. Indeed, the effort of Mathews et al. to articulate a framework for determining success in bioethics research and scholarship is especially admirable precisely because they resist the temptation to reduce success to quantitative measures alone. That said, it is also important to say that it is nearly impossible to engage with the task these scholars have set for themselves and not succumb to a kind of data fetishism. It is well and good to talk about the complexity of bioethics as a field, but the language of “metrics,” “outputs,” “feedback loops,” “stakeholders,” and the like is not the language of the disciplines of history, literature, philosophy, or religious studies—all fields that Mathews et al. rightly credit with making important contributions to bioethics research and scholarship. (shrink)

In one of his most important books, Children, Ethics, and Modern Medicine, Richard B. Miller argues that medical ethicists have too frequently focused on abstract moral and legal principles in wrestling with the issues raised by contemporary medical practice. Drawing on the anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, Miller suggests that ethicists must attend to both the “experience-near” realities that patients and their families confront and the “experience-distant” work of connecting those realities to the theoretical principles that might help illuminate the existential and (...) ethical problems faced by patients and families. In a useful analogy, Miller argues that the best strategy is to tack back and forth between the near and the distant such that one artfully occupies the intermediate space between personal and impersonal perspectives. In this chapter, I follow Miller’s advice to seek out the intermediate space between the lived reality of the bedside and the reflective domain of the scholar’s office. For most bioethicists that space is found in one of three ways. One encounters patients and their families as a clinician or as an observer of the clinical encounter. One attends carefully to illness narratives as a source of experience-near material. Or one reflects on one’s own experience as a patient or family member encountering medical practice. This chapter suggests that it is possible to combine these approaches. Specifically, I draw on the experience of accompanying my wife through her illness and death from ovarian cancer, as well as on grief memoirs to illuminate a neglected area of health humanities scholarship. Drawing on Arthur Frank’s classic study of illness narratives in The Wounded Storyteller, this chapter delineates similarities and between grief narratives and illness narratives. A comparison of these two genres suggests why the grief of patients and families is so often overlooked in accounts of the clinical encounter. (shrink)

Gilbert Meilaender has been an important contributor to the field of bioethics for decades. His insistence that there is a natural teleology of the body that should constrain ambitions of the will in bioethics deserves careful attention. This article examines the idea of a natural teleology of the body as it applies to human oocytes. It argues that approaching human eggs in terms of their telos rather than their moral status is useful. The article examines how Meilaender deploys the idea (...) of a natural teleology to reject John Robertson’s work on assisted reproduction, particularly his preoccupation with procreative liberty. Finally, the article raises questions about the sharp contrast Meilaender draws between teleology and intentionality. (shrink)

SUMNER TWISS HAS ARGUED THAT HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION NEEDS TO be expanded to include work that traditionally is beyond the horizon of human rights literature. Specifically, human rights education could benefit from inclusion of humanistic genres such as novels, poetry, film, drama, and music, which engage our critical and emotional capacities. Examination of humanistic literature in relation to human rights atrocities might provide important and new insights into the causes of human rights abuses. In this essay I suggest that although (...) Twiss identifies an important area for further reflection, there are some reasons to worry about the possibility of blurring genres that his proposal entails. I also suggest that we need to develop criteria for evaluating the kinds of experiential arguments that are frequently embedded in the literature Twiss highlights. (shrink)

If you will be teaching a course in bioethics in the near future, you might want to assign the books here under review, even if you haven't yet read them. All three authors will be familiar to those working in the field of bioethics: Howard Brody (author of The Future of Bioethics) and Daniel Callahan (In Search of the Good: A Life in Bioethics) as long‐time, significant contributors to the profession, and John Evans (The History and Future of Bioethics: A (...) Sociological View) as a sociologist outsider with a keen eye for the cultural and political currents that helped shape the field. What distinguishes these works is that all three take stock of the history of the field of bioethics and all three imagine or advocate for a particular future. (shrink)

Although images are pervasive in public policy debates in bioethics, few who work in the field attend carefully to the way that images function rhetorically. If the use of images is discussed at all, it is usually to dismiss appeals to images as a form of manipulation. Yet it is possible to speak meaningfully of visual arguments. Examining the appeal to images of the embryo and fetus in debates about abortion and stem cell research, I suggest that bioethicists would be (...) well served by attending much more carefully to how images function in public policy debates. (shrink)

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, policy makers and others have debated the question of whether or not the United States should torture in an effort to prevent terrorist attacks. In a series of controversial essays, the legal theorist Alan Dershowitz argues that, if a democratic society is going to torture, it should at least be done under the cover of law. To that end, he recommends establishing a legal mechanism by which a judge could issue torture warrants—much as (...) they do now for search warrants. In this essay, I examine Dershowitz's proposal in light of Michael Walzer's classic essay on dirty hands. Just as Walzer uses political theater as a lens for viewing the issue of political assassination, I similarly draw upon a dramatic response to Dershowitz's proposal to think through the issue of torture warrants. (shrink)

In this essay, Paul Lauritzen examines Richard B. Miller's liberal account of pediatric ethics by asking if the duty to promote a child's basic interests is substantial enough to secure the well-being of children. This question is raised in light of two case studies: daytime TV talk shows that broadcast interviews with sexually active children, and a medical study conducted to test the effect of growth hormone treatment on adult height in peripubertal children. In both cases, Lauritzen (...) argues, children are subjected to potential harms that are not easily explained, and therefore not easily prevented, by appeals to basic interests. (shrink)

Views of the self may be plotted on a set of coordinates. On the axis that runs from fragmentation to unity, Rorty and Rorty's Freud champion the decentered self while Wallwork, Taylor, and Ricoeur argue for a sovereign, unified self. On the other axis, which runs from the disengaged, inward-turning self to the engaged and "sedimented" self, Wallwork, would be positioned near Rorty, defending self-creation against the narrative identity affirmed by Taylor and Ricoeur. Despite his skepticism concerning the communitarian agenda (...) of the narrativists, Flanagan grants that the self is social and relational--a position further explored by Oliver, Stendahl, Deutsch, and Mack in "Selves, People, and Persons". (shrink)

Sumner B. (Barney) Twiss, who died in 2023, was for ten years a General Editor of the Journal of Religious Ethics (JRE). He was a frequent contributor of articles, a member of the JRE Editorial Board, and a member of the journal's Board of Trustees. In this article, colleagues and students reflect on some of his many contributions, not only to the JRE but to the broader discursive fields of comparative religious ethics and human rights.

Although the use of new health technologies in healthcare and medicine is generally seen as beneficial, there has been little analysis of the impact of such technologies on people's lives and understandings of health and illness. This book explores how new technologies not only provide hope for cure and well-being, but also introduce new ethical dilemmas and raise questions about the "natural" body. Focusing on the ways new health technologies intervene into our lives and affect our ideas about normalcy, the (...) body and identity, New Health Technologies explores: how new health technologies are understood by lay people and patients how the outcomes of these technologies are communicated in various clinical settings how these technologies can alter our notions of health and illness and create "new illness." Written by authors with differing backgrounds in phenomenology, social psychology, social anthropology, communication studies and the nursing sciences, this book is essential reading for students andacademics of medical sociology, health and allied studies, and anyone with an interest in new health technologies. (shrink)

"This volume brings together articles by sixteen leading scholars on a cross-section of Platonists authors-Christian and non-Christian-from early through late Byzantium philosophy, including the Capaddocians, Cyril, Proclus, Damascius, Dionysius, George of Pisidia, Nicetas Stethatos, Nikephoros Choumenos, Psellos, and George Palamas. The reception of Byzantine thought in the Latin tradition is also considered. The articles collectively show development in the Greek East on ontological issues such as the doctrine of the soul, as well as theological concepts of the One/God and Trinity (...) within a hierarchical universe. The volume considers exegetical questions relating to the use of Plato and the Platonists by Byzantine Christian authors"--. (shrink)

Questions: Between Identity and Difference is in many ways a curious book. It is a scholarly book, but tests the boundaries of traditional academic methods. It is a philosophical book, but bases its arguments on observational studies in classrooms where Danish, Russian, Spanish, and Chinese schoolchildren are taught in their native languages. It is a demanding book, one that assumes its readers think for themselves. Yes it is also a generous book, which draws on the author's own experience in researching (...) and exploring what it means to be human across a variety of thoughts and behavioural patterns. (shrink)

In some previous work, I tried to give a concept-based account of the nature of our entitlement to certain very basic inferences (see the papers in Part III of Boghossian 2008b). In this previous work, I took it for granted, along with many other philosophers, that we understood well enough what it is for a person to infer. In this paper, I turn to thinking about the nature of inference itself. This topic is of great interest in its own right (...) and surprisingly understudied by philosophers. A correct understanding of inference promises to shed light on a number of important topics. In particular, it threatens to undermine the sort of concept-based story about entitlement to which I had previously been attracted. (shrink)

Eliminative materialism is the thesis that our common-sense conception of psychological phenomena constitutes a radically false theory, a theory so fundamentally defective that both the principles and the ontology of that theory will eventually be displaced, rather than smoothly reduced, by completed neuroscience. Our mutual understanding and even our introspection may then be reconstituted within the conceptual framework of completed neuroscience, a theory we may expect to be more powerful by far than the common-sense psychology it displaces, and more substantially (...) integrated within physical science generally. My purpose in this paper is to explore these projections, especially as they bear on (1) the principal elements of common-sense psychology: the propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires, etc.), and (2) the conception of rationality in which these elements figure. (shrink)

"First published in this translation 1955; second edition (revised) 1974; reprinted with additional revisions 1987; reissued with new Further Reading 2003; reissued with new introduction 2007"--T.p. verso.

This is an essay based on a story with observations, about present and sparkling moments from everyday life coexisting with a mother living with dementia. The story is used to begin philosophical underpinnings reflecting on ‘how it could be otherwise’. Dementia deploys brutal existential experiences such as cognitive deterioration, decline in mental functioning and often hurtful social judgements. The person living with dementia goes through transformation and changes of self. Cognitive decline progressively disrupts the foundations upon which social connectedness is (...) built, often creating a profound sense of insecurity. The challenge for carers and healthcare professionals is therefore to find ways of clarifying a concept of agency. It will be worthwhile developing the ability of attuning into ‘what is there’ arising from every corner of the care situation. Understanding and practicing this can strengthen existence and the experience of connectedness and meaning, empowering the person with dementia. It is important to find ways, relational moves, in which carers and healthcare professionals can embed the creativity appearing in mundane everyday situations filled with surplus of meaning, sharing mental landscapes (and embodied relational understanding) with the person living with dementia – seizing and sharing aesthetic moments (verbal and nonverbal) being present together. We argue that carers and healthcare professionals may find this understanding of care useful. This implies looking into a phenomenological‐hermeneutic perspective developing competences as well as practical wisdom understanding and being aware of the creative and innovative possibilities (often preverbal and unnoticed small things) in everyday life of what we, inspired by psychoanalyst Daniel Stern, call sparkling moments of meeting, creating experience with the other that is personally undergone and lived through in the present. (shrink)