Hendrik Lorenz presents a comprehensive study of Plato's and Aristotle's conceptions of non-rational desire. They see this as something that humans share with animals, and which aims primarily at the pleasures of food, drink, and sex. Lorenz explores the cognitive resources that both philosophers make available for the explanation of such desires, and what they take rationality to add to the motivational structure of human beings. In doing so, he finds conceptions of the mind that are coherent (...) and deeply integrated with both philosophers' views about such topics as the relation between body and soul, or the nature of the virtues. (shrink)

Aristotle takes practical wisdom and arts or crafts to be forms of knowledge which, we argue, can usefully be thought of as ‘empiricist’. This empiricism has two key features: knowledge does not rest on grasping unobservable natures or essences; and knowledge does not rest on grasping logical relations that hold among propositions. Instead, knowledge rests on observation, memory, experience and everyday uses of reason. While Aristotle’s conception of theoretical knowledge does require grasping unobservable essences and logical relations that hold among (...) suitable propositions, his conception of practical and productive knowledge avoids such requirements and is consistent with empiricism. (shrink)

Ancient philosophical theories of soul are in many respects sensitive to ways of speaking and thinking about the soul psuchê] that are not specifically philosophical or theoretical. We therefore begin with what the word ‘soul’ meant to speakers of Classical Greek, and what it would have been natural to think about and associate with the soul. We then turn to various Presocratic thinkers, and to the philosophical theories that are our primary concern, those of Plato (first in the Phaedo, then (...) in the Republic), Aristotle (in the De Anima or On the Soul ), Epicurus, and the Stoics. These are by far the most carefully worked out theories of soul in ancient philosophy. Later theoretical developments — for instance, in the writings of Plotinus and other Platonists, as well as the Church Fathers — are best studied against the background of the classical theories, from which, in large part, they derive. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:I argue that there are, according to Aristotle, two importantly different kinds of goals or ends in the domain of human agency and that one of these two kinds has been frequently, though not universally, overlooked. Apart from psychological goals, goals that agents adopt as their purposes, there are also, I submit, goals that actions have by being the kinds of actions they are and, in some cases, by occurring in the circumstances in which they do. These latter goals belong (...) to suitable actions whether or not agents adopt them as purposes and whether or not agents are aware of them. There is evidence both in Aristotle's ethical writings and in his discussion of chance and luck in Physics II.4–6 that he recognizes goals of this latter kind. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: I II III IV V.

The Brute Within proceeds in three parts, the first two (amounting to half the book) on Plato and the third on Aristotle. Each part, as well as the book itself, has an Introduction in which Lorenz helpfully signals what he is up to; the author frequently (though sometimes repetitively) summarizes his argument as he goes along. There is no mistaking his central claims: that in both Plato and Aristotle there are three types of desires--reason, spirit and appetite--such that the (...) last two may motivate conduct without any participation in reason at all. In human beings, reason may itself motivate conduct and also may share information with appetite and spirit to modify behavior. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 122-123 [Access article in PDF] Andreas Kamp. Philosophiehistorie als Rezeptionsgeschichte. Die Reaktion auf Aristoteles' De Anima-Noetik. Der frühe Hellenismus. Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner, 2001. Pp. viii + 315. Cloth, $82.00. This book is the first installment of an extraordinarily ambitious project. The plan is to investigate the reception of Aristotle's conception of the intellect, set out in De Anima 3.4-5, in (...) the subsequent history of philosophy, from Theophrastus to the present.The current volume deals with the natural starting-point for this project, philosophy in the early Hellenistic period, centering on Theophrastus and his tenure as head of the Peripatos, the school that Aristotle founded.Kamp begins with an engaging, somewhat lengthy introduction, which remains curiously remote from what one might expect it to concentrate on, namely Aristotle's conception of the intellect. Apart from presenting an outline of the reception of Aristotle's philosophical work in general from Theophrastus to Sigmund Freud, the introduction includes only one short paragraph specifically on the topic of the intellect (12). This paragraph, which comes closest to revealing Kamp's reason for focusing, of all things, on Aristotle's discussion of the intellect in De Anima3.4-5, simply makes two unsubstantiated claims. First, Kamp claims that the conception of the intellect, as presented in those chapters, is at the center of the Aristotelian system; and secondly, that this is, of all Aristotelian and perhaps all philosophical theories, the one that received the highest level of attention in the subsequent history of philosophy. The reader might be content to wait and let the second claim be borne out, in the present volume and beyond; but the first claim—concerning the centrality of the intellect, and of De Anima3.4-5, to Aristotle's thought—should at least have received some specification and illustration.The central part of the book, and philosophically by far the most interesting, concerns Theophrastus. Kamp begins with an extensive discussion of the political, social, and economic circumstances of Theophrastus's biography and of the history of the Peripatos. He then offers a reconstruction of Theophrastus's remarks on the nature of the intellect in the fifth book of his Physics. This reconstructive effort is based on a number of fragments [End Page 122] preserved in Themistius's De Anima paraphrase (written at about 350ad) and in Priscianus Lydus's Metaphrasis in Theophrastum (about 530ad). Kamp's discussion of these fragments is well informed, judicious, and illuminating throughout.It may be in order, though, to indicate one misgiving. One of the problems that Theophrastus addresses is that it might appear as if thinking were a matter of the intellect being changed by intelligibles, much as perceiving is, or may appear to be, a matter of sense being changed by sensibles. (If so, the question arises as to what the principle of thought is, the intellect itself or the intelligibles.) Kamp reconstructs the train of thought as follows (124-5).(1) The intellect stands to intelligibles the way sense stands to sensibles (intellect-sense analogy).(2) Sense is changed by sensibles.Therefore, the intellect is changed by intelligibles.Kamp proceeds to suggest (126) that Theophrastus attempted to avoid the conclusion by denying the first premise. According to Kamp, Theophrastus rejected the intellect-sense analogy by drawing attention to significant differences between (the activity of) the intellect and sense perception, one of these being that the intellect (in thinking) is changed only in a special sense, namely inasmuch as it undergoes a transition to activity, energeia. Kamp is right that the notion of a special kind of change that consists in a transition to activity is Aristotelian; it is presented in considerable detail in De Anima2.5 (417b2-16). But it would surely be puzzling if Theophrastus thought that one significant difference between (the activity of) the intellect and sense perception was that the intellect (in thinking) was changed in a special sense (whereas sense perception, to complete the... (shrink)

Plato’s Utopia Recast is an exceptionally rich and ambitious book. Its central text is the Laws, and it inherits from that dialogue a focus on ethical and political theory. It also, however, operates on the assumption that the Laws is interconnected, more or less systematically, with other later dialogues. The Republic contains its own metaphysical, epistemological, and psychological theories, which provide support and philosophical context to its theory of justice. The Laws, by contrast, is devoted almost exclusively to ethics and (...) politics. It is Bobonich’s contention that other texts—especially the Phaedrus, the Philebus, the Statesman, the Theaetetus, and the Timaeus—supply philosophical underpinnings to the Laws’ ethical and political theory. Plato’s Utopia Recast thus includes not only careful and detailed discussions of various parts and aspects of the Laws, it also has a great deal to say about other later Platonic dialogues, and in particular about how they shed light on the commitments and peculiarities of the Laws. This synoptic program in itself would already make for a rather ambitious project. (shrink)

A review of Hendrik Lorenz, The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2006.

The revised edition contains a new chapter which provides an elegant description of the semantics. The various classes of lambda calculus models are described in a uniform manner. Some didactical improvements have been made to this edition. An example of a simple model is given and then the general theory (of categorical models) is developed. Indications are given of those parts of the book which can be used to form a coherent course.

In this paper, we first classify different types of second opinions and evaluate the ethical and epistemological implications of providing those in a clinical context. Second, we discuss the issue of how artificial intelligent could replace the human cognitive labour of providing such second opinion and find that several AI reach the levels of accuracy and efficiency needed to clarify their use an urgent ethical issue. Third, we outline the normative conditions of how AI may be used as second opinion (...) in clinical processes, weighing the benefits of its efficiency against concerns of responsibility attribution. Fourth, we provide a ‘rule of disagreement’ that fulfils these conditions while retaining some of the benefits of expanding the use of AI-based decision support systems in clinical contexts. This is because the rule of disagreement proposes to use AI as much as possible, but retain the ability to use human second opinions to resolve disagreements between AI and physician-in-charge. Fifth, we discuss some counterarguments. (shrink)

This paper explores the role and resolution of disagreements between physicians and their diagnostic AI-based decision support systems. With an ever-growing number of applications for these independently operating diagnostic tools, it becomes less and less clear what a physician ought to do in case their diagnosis is in faultless conflict with the results of the DSS. The consequences of such uncertainty can ultimately lead to effects detrimental to the intended purpose of such machines, e.g. by shifting the burden of proof (...) towards a physician. Thus, we require normative clarity for integrating these machines without affecting established, trusted, and relied upon workflows. In reconstructing different causes of conflicts between physicians and their AI-based tools—inspired by the approach of “meaningful human control” over autonomous systems and the challenges to resolve them—we will delineate normative conditions for “meaningful disagreements”. These incorporate the potential of DSS to take on more tasks and outline how the moral responsibility of a physician can be preserved in an increasingly automated clinical work environment. (shrink)

Die Arbeit widmet sich dem Person- und Freiheitsverstandnis des Freiburger Religionsphilosophen Bernhard Welte (1906-1983). Damit werden unter Berucksichtigung bisher unveroffentlichter Schriften anthropologische Voraussetzungen ethisch relevanter Grundphanomene menschlichen Daseins zuganglich gemacht.

Der Band befasst sich mit der in der politischen Philosophie geführten Diskussion um die (Nicht-) Vereinbarkeit von Vernunft und Herrschaft. Der bis auf Platon zurückreichende Versuch, Herrschaft (als) rational zu begründen, wird anhand seiner klassischen Varianten von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart auf seinen Vernunftanspruch hin kritisch analysiert. Mittels immanenter (Ideologie-)Kritik werden die Widersprüche in der begrifflichen Argumentation aufgedeckt und als Erscheinungen einer widersprüchlich verfassten gesellschaftlichen Ordnung dechiffriert, deren Herrschaftscharakter dem Vernunftvermögen des Menschen widerspricht.

Overzicht van het gedachtegoed van de Tsjechisch-Nederlandse geleerde (1592-1670), die streefde naar een synthese van wetenschap, waarden en wijsheid.

This article attempts to translate philosophical notions into biological terms in order to transform dualistic thinking into monistic thinking. What if ethics finds its cause in physical, molecular processes? In Ruling Passions Simon Blackburn acknowledges the biological fact that we are social animals and that we need to coordinate our efforts. Therein lies an opportunity for a fruitful discussion about the biological foundation of ethics. Although Blackburn thinks there cannot be a grand unifying theory or a single driving force that (...) underlies ethics, the spreading of our genes may well be the key. As cooperation is the means by which humans have been successfully spreading their genes, ethics in some sense can be regarded as a biological or even a physical force. Recognition of ethics as such a force can help overcome false dichotomies in contemporary ethics and law. Four natural laws of global ethics and law can be formulated on the basis of factual biological mechanisms - natural laws that have remarkable equivalents in religion and contemporary law. (shrink)

The centenary of E.F. Schumacher's birth (1911-1977) offered an urgent opportunity to revisit his work and life. Against the background of the crisis at the beginning of this century, reconsidering Schumacher's Small is Beautiful or frugality paradigm makes clear that advances in responsible economics continue to be a priority. This book contains the proceedings of the 2001 Annual Conference of the European SPES Forum on "Responsibility in Economics and Business: The Legacy of E.F. Schumacher", which was organised in September 2011 (...) by the Centre for Ethics of the University of Antwerp. (shrink)

With special attention being paid to recent developments in Artificial Intelligence and the Law, specifically related to evidentiary reasoning, this book ...