Part 1. Foundations -- Reasoning about ethics -- Ethical theories and perspectives -- Three core concepts in medical ethics : best interests, autonomy and rights -- An introduction to law -- Doctors and patients : relationships and responsiblities -- Part 2. Core topics -- Consent -- Capacity -- Mental health -- Confidentiality -- Resource allocation -- Children and young people -- Disability and disease -- Reproductive medicine -- End of life -- Organ transplantation -- Research -- Part 3. Extensions -- (...) Neuroethics -- Genethics -- Information ethics -- Public health ethics. (shrink)

This book provides a clear, concise description of medical law; but it does more than that. It also provides an introduction to the ethical principles that can be used to challenge or support the law. It also provides a range of perspectives from which to analyse the law: feminist, religious and sociological perspectives are all used.

Under the current Mental Health Act of England and Wales, it is lawful to perform deep brain stimulation in the absence of consent and independent approval. We argue against the Care Quality Commission's preferred strategy of addressing this problematic issue, and offer recommendations for deep brain stimulation-specific provisions in a revised Mental Health Act.

This is the first book to unpack the legal and ethical issues surrounding unauthorised intimate examinations during labour. The book uses feminist, socio-legal and philosophical tools to explore the issues of power, vulnerability and autonomy. The collection challenges the perception that the law adequately addresses different manifestations of unauthorised medical touch through the lens of women's experiences of unauthorised vaginal examinations during labour. The book unearths several broader themes that are of huge significance to lawyers and healthcare professionals such as (...) the legal status of women and their bodies. The book raises questions about women's experiences during childbirth in hospital settings. It explores the status of women's bodies during labour and childbirth where too easily they become objectified, and it raises important issues around consent. The book highlights links to the law on sexual offences and women's loss of power under the medical gaze. The book includes contributions from leading feminist philosophers, medical professionals, and academics in medicine and law, and offers pioneering analysis relevant to lawyers and healthcare professionals with an interest in medical law and ethics; feminist theory; criminal law; tort law; and human rights law. (shrink)

Dementia is a topic of enormous human, medical, economic, legal and ethical importance. Its importance grows as more of us live longer. The legal and ethical problems it raises are complex, intertwined and under-discussed. This book brings together contributions from clinicians, lawyers and ethicists – all of them world leaders in the field of dementia – and is a comprehensive, scholarly yet accessible library of all the main (and many of the fringe) perspectives. It begins with the medical facts: what (...) is dementia? Who gets it? What are the current and future therapeutic and palliative options? What are the main challenges for medical and nursing care? The story is then taken up by the ethicists, who grapple with questions such as: is it legitimate to lie to dementia patients if that is a kind thing to do? Who is the person whose memory, preferences and personality have all been transformed by their disease? Should any constraints be placed on the sexual activity of patients? Are GPS tracking devices an unpardonable interference with the patient's freedom? These issues, and many more, are then examined through legal lenses. The book closes with accounts from dementia sufferers and their carers. It is the first and only book of its kind, and the authoritative text. (shrink)

This article explores the current parenting culture, particularly the promotion of competitive and excessive parenting, as an important background issue against which the debates around pre-natal testing take place. It offers an alternative vision of parenting, relying on care ethics, which sees parenting as a relationship, rather than a job. A relationship that should change a parent’s understanding of what is valuable in life. Parenting should not be about moulding the ‘perfect child’ but being open to being profoundly changed. The (...) parent–child with a disability relationship offers particular opportunities to find new meanings and values in life. This analysis is offered as another dimension to the debates over pre-natal testing. It is not intended as an argument against such testing, but rather raises concerns about some of the broader attitudes around it. (shrink)

This paper will explore the relevance of vulnerability to children’s rights. Broadly speaking legal debates over children can be broken down into two camps. First, those who emphasise the vulnerability of children. For them rights designed to protect children from abuse and promote their welfare are the most significant. Second, those who claim that children are far less vulnerable than is assumed and should be given many of the freedoms of adults. For them rights of autonomy and freedom should be (...) emphasised. This paper will argue that both camps make the error of starting with the norm of adulthood being a time of invulnerability and independence from which children are either distinguished or are closer to than is normally appreciated. Once it is recognised that adults share in children’s vulnerability, we can see that childhood vulnerability is not something which children should be enabled to escape from, nor is it something that is unique to children. Vulnerability and interdependence should form the basis of rights for both children and adults. There is, therefore, no reason why children and adults should not have the same rights. (shrink)

In the original publication of the article, the title of the article was incorrectly published. It has been updated in this correction.

This article argues against the case for regarding bodies and parts of bodies to be property. It claims that doing so assumes an individualistic conception of the body. It fails to acknowledge that our bodies are made up of non-human material; are unbounded; constantly changing and deeply interconnected with other bodies. It also argues that holding that our bodies are property does not recognise the fact that we have different attitudes towards different parts of our removed bodies and the contexts (...) of their removal. The appropriate legal reform should, therefore, be to produce a statute which can provide a balance between the competing personal, social and interpersonal interests in different body parts. (shrink)

This article explores the current parenting culture, particularly the promotion of competitive and excessive parenting, as an important background issue against which the debates around pre-natal testing take place. It offers an alternative vision of parenting, relying on care ethics, which sees parenting as a relationship, rather than a job. A relationship that should change a parent’s understanding of what is valuable in life. Parenting should not be about moulding the ‘perfect child’ but being open to being profoundly changed. The (...) parent–child with a disability relationship offers particular opportunities to find new meanings and values in life. This analysis is offered as another dimension to the debates over pre-natal testing. It is not intended as an argument against such testing, but rather raises concerns about some of the broader attitudes around it. (shrink)

This article is an examination of the doctor–woman patient encounter through a vulnerability lens. This relationship has been traditionally been critiqued as a paternalistic encounter in which the...

The law tends to think that there is no difficulty about identifying humans. When someone is born, her name is entered into a statutory register. She is ‘X’ in the eyes of the law. At some point, ‘X’ will die and her name will be recorded in another register. If anyone suggested that the second X was not the same as the first, the suggestion would be met with bewilderment. During X's lifetime, the civil law assumed that the X who (...) entered into a contract was the same person who breached it. The criminal law assumed that X, at the age of 80, was liable for criminal offences ‘she’ committed at the age of 18. This accords with the way we talk. ‘She's not herself today’, we say; or ‘When he killed his wife he wasn't in his right mind’. The intuition has high authority: ‘To thine own self be true’, urged Polonius.1 It sounds as if we believe in souls—immutable, core essences that constitute our real selves. Medicine conspires in the belief. If you become mentally ill, a psychiatrist will seek to get you back to your right mind. The Mental Capacity Act 1985 states that when a patient loses capacity the only lawful interventions will be interventions which are in that patient's best interests,2 and that in determining what those interests are the decision-maker must have …. (shrink)

In March 2020, the Government produced a document entitled “Responding to COVID-19: The Ethical Framework for Adult Social Care”. In this article, we summarise the key features of the proposed ethical framework and subject it to critical analysis. We highlight three primary issues. First, the emphasis placed on autonomy as the primary ethical principle. We argue if ever there was a context in which autonomy should dominate the ethical analysis, this is not it. Second, we examine the interface between ethics (...) and law which is largely overlooked in the document. Finally, we explore the surprising lack of attention paid to the concept of responsibility and communal obligations within the framework. (shrink)

We are very grateful to Richard Ashcroft 1 and Andrew McGee 2 for their thoughtful and articulate criticisms of our views. 3 Ashcroft has disappointingly low aspirations for the law. Of course he is right to say that the law is not a ‘self-sufficient, integrated and self-interpreting system of doctrine’. The law is often philosophically incoherent and internally contradictory. But it does not follow from this that all areas of the law are philosophically unsatisfactory. And if that were true, the (...) response should not be Ashcroft’s contemptuous despair, but a determination to make it better. Ashcroft would say that such idealism is unrealistic in the light of the very nature of ‘the Law’: ‘...a complex assemblage of institutions, rules, accredited persons, practices and systems’. That isa radically ‘legal realist’ position and is plainly unsustainable. We can demonstrate its unsustainability while demonstrating both that he is wrong... (shrink)

The law tends to think that there is no difficulty about identifying humans. When someone is born, her name is entered into a statutory register. She is ‘X’ in the eyes of the law. At some point, ‘X’ will die and her name will be recorded in another register. If anyone suggested that the second X was not the same as the first, the suggestion would be met with bewilderment. During X's lifetime, the civil law assumed that the X who (...) entered into a contract was the same person who breached it. The criminal law assumed that X, at the age of 80, was liable for criminal offences ‘she’ committed at the age of 18. This accords with the way we talk. ‘She's not herself today’, we say; or ‘When he killed his wife he wasn't in his right mind’. The intuition has high authority: ‘To thine own self... (shrink)

We are very grateful to Richard Ashcroft1 and Andrew McGee2 for their thoughtful and articulate criticisms of our views.3 Ashcroft has disappointingly low aspirations for the law. Of course he is right to say that the law is not a ‘self-sufficient, integrated and self-interpreting system of doctrine’. The law is often philosophically incoherent and internally contradictory. But it does not follow from this that all areas of the law are philosophically unsatisfactory. And if that were true, the response should not (...) be Ashcroft’s contemptuous despair, but a determination to make it better. Ashcroft would say that such idealism is unrealistic in the light of the very nature of ‘the Law’: ‘…a complex assemblage of institutions, rules, accredited persons, practices and systems’. That isa radically ‘legal realist’ position and is plainly unsustainable. We can demonstrate its unsustainability while demonstrating both that he is wrong to tar all areas of the law with the same brush and wrong to deny that medical ethics are ‘intellectually and metaphysically prior to medical law’. Take the law of murder which, of course, is part of ‘medical law’. It is surely trite to observe that humans thought that killing people was wrong before they started penalising murder. Ethics generated the law. There is nothing elusive or incoherent about the philosophical foundations of the law of murder. Human life is thought to matter. To kill is both to cause a harm and to commit a wrong. There is more than something of the straw man in Ashcroft’s elaboration of his argument. For he chooses, of all things, autonomy and, in particular, its invocation in the law of consent. Lawyers’ eyebrows will rise at his assertion that ‘while the concept of “autonomy” has an explanatory role in discussions of the …. (shrink)

The “doctrine of double effect” has a pleasing ring to it. It is regarded by some as the cornerstone of any sound approach to end-of-life issues and by others as religious mumbo jumbo. Discussions about “the doctrine” often generate more heat than light. They are often conducted at cross-purposes and laced with footnotes from Leviticus.

The idea of the Good Life – of what constitutes human thriving, is, implicitly, the foundation and justification of the law. The law exists to hold societies together; to hold in tension the rights of individuals as against individuals, the rights of individuals as against various types of non-humans such as corporations, and the rights of individuals individuals as against the state. In democratic states, laws inhibit some freedoms in the name of greater, or more desirable freedoms. The only justification (...) for law is surely that it tends to promote human thriving. But what is the Good Life? What does it mean to live a thriving life? There has been no want of discussion, at least since the great Athenians. But surprisingly, since human thriving is its sole raison d’etre, the law has been slow to contribute to the conversation. This book aims to start and facilitate this conversation. It aims to: -make lawyers ask: ‘What is the law for?’, and conclude that it is to maximise human thriving -make lawyers ask: ‘But what does human thriving mean?’ -make judges and advocates ask: ‘How can a judgment about the best interests of a patient be satisfactory unless its basis is made clear?’. (shrink)

If the law is to regulate the lives of those who suffer from depression, it is vital that lawyers understand the condition. This edited collection outlines the questions that arise from cases of depression by drawing together viewpoints from lawyers, philosophers, clinicians, and first-hand accounts from sufferers.

The contributions in this volume represent a detailed exploration of the salient legal and theoretical puzzles arising out of the body-as-property question, and a collation of the broad spectrum of analyses on offer.

Healthcare professionals are expected to deliver care that is consistent with clinical guidelines. In this article, we show that the English courts are increasingly willing to be persuaded by written guidelines when determining the standard of care in cases of alleged clinical negligence. This reflects a wider shift in the approach taken by courts in a number of common law jurisdictions around the world. However, we argue that written guidelines are still only one element that courts should consider when determining (...) the standard of care. It is possible to deliver perfect care that deviates from professional guidelines and even to deliver negligent care by uncritically following a guideline that is flawed. We further argue that written guidelines are relevant beyond defining the accepted standard of care. This is because the decision to deviate from a guideline suggests the existence of multiple approaches that should be discussed with patients as part of ensuring informed consent. It is therefore likely that written guidelines will become an even more prominent feature of the medicolegal landscape in future years. (shrink)

In the wake of three high-profile judicial decisions concerning the use of human biological materials, the editors of this collection felt in 2011 that there was a need for detailed scholarly exploration of the ethical and legal implications of these decisions. For centuries, it seemed that in Australia and England and Wales, individuals did not have any proprietary interests in their excised tissue. Others might acquire such interests, but there had been no clear decision on the rights or otherwise of (...) the persons from whom the tissue was obtained. In 2009, however, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales recognised a limited exception to this position in Jonathan Yearworth and others v North Bristol NHS Trust . In that case, the Court held that the appellants, who had deposited semen samples for freezing before they undertook treatment for cancer, had “for the purposes of a claim in negligence … ownership of the sperm which they had ejaculated”. One year later, the Supreme Court of Queensland, Australia, took a similarly property-based approach to determining how a semen sample stored shortly before death should be dealt in Bazley v Wesley Monash IVF . According to that court, the co-executors of the estate had sufficient proprietary interests in the semen to legally demand its return from the laboratory where it was held. In 2011, the New South Wales Supreme Court similarly found that the widow of a recently deceased man had a right to possession of his semen in Joceyln Edwards; Re the estate of the late Mark Edwards .In the editors’ view, these decisions signalled a turning point in the Anglo-Australian jurisprudence in this area, taking the law a step beyond the decisions of the late 20th century such as R v Kelly , in which possessory rights were found …. (shrink)

An examination of the philosophy of Anne Conway (1631-1679) and the main aspects of her fascinating work, Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy.

The law of informed consent to medical treatment has recently been extensively overhauled in England. The 2015 Montgomery judgment has done away with the long-held position that the information to be disclosed by doctors when obtaining valid consent from patients should be determined on the basis of what a reasonable body of medical opinion agree ought to be disclosed in the circumstances. The UK Supreme Court concluded that the information that is material to a patient’s decision should instead be judged (...) by reference to a new two-limbed test founded on the notions of the ‘reasonable person’ and the ‘particular patient’. The rationale outlined in Montgomery for this new test of materiality, and academic comment on the ruling’s significance, has focused on the central ethical importance that the law now accords to respect for patient autonomy in the process of obtaining consent from patients. In this paper, we dispute the claim that the new test of materiality articulated in Montgomery equates with respect for autonomy being given primacy in re-shaping the development of the law in this area. We also defend this position, arguing that our revised interpretation of Montgomery’s significance does not equate with a failure by the courts to give due legal consideration to what is owed to patients as autonomous decision-makers in the consent process. Instead, Montgomery correctly implies that doctors are ethically obliged to attend to a number of relevant ethical considerations in framing decisions about consent to treatment, which include subtle interpretations of the values of autonomy and well-being. Doctors should give appropriate consideration to how these values are fleshed out and balanced in context in order to specify precisely what information ought to be disclosed to a patient as a requirement of obtaining consent, and as a core component of shared decision-making within medical encounters more generally. (shrink)

Members of oppressed groups are often silenced. One form of silencing is what Kristie Dotson calls “testimonial smothering”. Testimonial smothering occurs when a speaker limits her testimony in virtue of the reasonable risk of it being misunderstood or misapplied by the audience. Testimonial smothering is thus a form of epistemic paternalism since the speaker is interfering with the audience’s inquiry for their benefit without first consulting them. In this paper, we explore the connections between epistemic injustice and epistemic paternalism through (...) the phenomenon of silencing. We argue that when you silence your testimony as a result of epistemic injustice it is an act of epistemic paternalism and that it is epistemically permissible. In fact, self-silencing resulting from epistemic injustice is a particularly clear example of permissible epistemic paternalism. (shrink)

In Arendt's Judgment: Freedom, Responsibility, Citizenship, Jonathan Peter Schwartz claims that Arendt's theory of political judgment formed the core of her political thought, and that understanding it correctly makes it possible to grasp the systematic thread that runs through her diverse body of work.

In her foreword to Science Next, Elizabeth Edwards wrote of science as a tool for social progress: "Innovation is not simply the abstract victory of knowledge [or] the research that gave me years to live; the next science can advance human flourishing and serve the common good. That's the kind of world I want to leave for my children, and for yours." With these words, she joined a tradition that goes back to America's founders, who saw America itself as a (...) "great experiment." Yet while no one can deny that science undergirds the American Dream, it has long been fertile terrain for the "culture wars." Along with arguing the pros and cons of abortion and healthcare, policymakers must now grapple with advancements that raise questions about what it means to be human: we've decoded the genome, but should we modify it to enhance certain "desirable" traits? If we can, should we prolong life at any cost? Will we soon be counting robots, cyborgs, and chimeras among our friends and family?The first book to unpack our love/hate relationship with science from our country's origins to today, The Body Politic is essential reading for science buffs and concerned citizens alike.Jonathan D. Moreno is editor of the Center for American Progress' online magazine Science Progress and professor of bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania. Author and editor of many seminal books and articles on science and science policy, he divides his time between Philadelphia, PA, and Washington, DC. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant’s “abstract” concept of dignity is contrasted with the “empathy-linked” approach. Because the empathy-link approach gives a central role to a patient’s desires and interests, it is a more plausible account than the Kantian approach (defended by J. David Velleman), which places dignity over and above a patient’s interests and desires. This distinction is brought to bear on issues of assisted suicide, the moral status of the embryo, genetic choices, and how a psychotherapist should “listen” to her patients.

Suppose that Ann says, “Keith knows that the bank will be open tomorrow.” Her audience may well agree. Her knowledge ascription may seem true. But now suppose that Ben—in a different context—also says “Keith knows that the bank will be open tomorrow.” His audience may well disagree. His knowledge ascription may seem false. Indeed, a number of philosophers have claimed that people’s intuitions about knowledge ascriptions are context sensitive, in the sense that the very same knowledge ascription can seem true (...) in one conversational context but false in another. This purported fact about people’s intuitions serves as one of the main pieces of evidence for epistemic contextualism. (shrink)

Some philosophers defend the fact-relative view of moral rights against harm:Whether B infringes A's right not to be harmed by ϕ-ing depends on what will in fact occur if B ϕs. B's knowledge of, or evidence about, the exact consequences of her ϕ-ing are irrelevant to the question of whether her ϕ-ing constitutes an infringement of A's right not to be harmed by B.In this paper I argue that the fact-relative view of moral rights is mistaken, and I argue for (...) an alternative view whereby our rights against harm depend on what we can reasonably demand of others. I illustrate the importance of this conclusion with a discussion of liability to defensive harm. (shrink)

Non-Humean accounts of lawhood are said to founder on the Inference Problem, which is the problem of saying how laws that go beyond the regularities can entail the regularities. I argue that the Inference Problem has a simple solution – the Axiomatic Solution – on which the non-Humean only needs to outfit her laws with a law-to-regularity axiom. There is a remaining Epistemic Bulge, as to why one should believe that the posit-so-axiomatized is to be found in nature, but the (...) non-Humean can flatten the bulge. Lawhood serves as a case study of how fundamental posits can do their business. (shrink)

In the debates regarding the ethics of human organoid biobanking, the locus of donor autonomy has been identified in processes of consent. The problem is that, by focusing on consent, biobanking processes preclude adequate engagement with donor autonomy because they are unable to adequately recognise or respond to factors that determine authentic choice. This is particularly problematic in biobanking contexts associated with organoid research or the clinical application of organoids because, given the probability of unforeseen and varying purposes for which (...) a donor’s organoids could be employed and given the different ways in which a donor can relate to her biospecimens, a donor can value her organoids differently in different contexts and her reasons for autonomously permitting use of her cells and tissues in one case may not support an autonomous decision in another. In response, this paper has three aims: firstly, to make the case for why organoid biobanks ought to respect donor autonomy conceived as authentic choice; secondly, to explore the autonomy-respecting limits of established and widely prevalent models of biobank consent; and thirdly, to propose certain conditions that organoid biobanks ought to support or facilitate in order to respect donor autonomy. (shrink)

What conception of causation is at work in the law? I argue that the law implicitly relies on a contrastive conception. In a liability case where the defendant's breach of duty must be shown to have caused the plaintiff's damages, it is not enough to consider what would have happened if the cause had not occurredthe law requires us to look to a specific replacement for the effect, which in this case is the hypothetical outcome in which the plaintiff came (...) off better. In place of I suggest the more explicit An explicitly contrastive approach can thus potentially help the lawyer phrase her causal question in a more explicit way, while shedding light on our conception of causation. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In Making Things Up, Bennett defends the intriguing idea that causation should be included among the building relations. I critique Bennett’s arguments for inclusion, and claim that inclusion distorts her own treatments of causation, relative fundamentality, and absolute fundamentality. Instead, I argue for treating causation and grounding as separate species of generative, explanatory difference-making.

This paper discusses Cécile Laborde’s book, Liberalism’s Religion. First, I pose some questions about how Laborde’s central proposal—disaggregating religion—is meant to solve the two most serious challenges that she argues confront existing liberal egalitarian theories. Second, I respond to some of the objections Laborde presses against my conception of political liberalism. Third, I argue that Laborde is mistaken in adopting accessibility as the appropriate standard for reasons within public justification. Finally, I suggest that Laborde’s view is, in the end, too (...) accommodating to perfectionism in politics. Her view allows laws and public policies to promote particular religions or controversial conceptions of the good life when certain conditions are met, but this, I argue, is inconsistent with the foundational ideals of freedom and equality. (shrink)

I would like to begin by thanking all of the commentators for their insightful analyses of ‘Genetic information, insurance and a pluralistic approach to justice’; I learnt a great deal from them all. Naturally, I cannot do justice to all of their criticisms in this brief response; instead, I shall use their remarks to prompt some clarificatory points about my arguments in the hope that this will help readers to draw their own conclusions about the various points of disagreement. My (...) aim in the paper was modest; I aimed to argue that considerations of justice do not speak unequivocally against the use of Genetic Test Results (GTRs) in insurance, and that a pluralist approach may lend support to some limited uses. This represents a compromise position between outright prohibition, and using GTRs in an insurance market in accordance with purely commercial principles. Notably, this conclusion is compatible with the thought that there may be other very strong moral reasons in favour of prohibition. These include concerns about privacy, as well as the consequentialist and human rights considerations that Tiller and Delatycki rightly highlight.1 Of course, considerations of justice are not orthogonal to questions regarding the right against genetic discrimination, since such a right might plausibly be supported by appeal to broadly egalitarian considerations. Indeed, one important challenge for the rights-based argument for prohibition is to defend the strong degree of genetic exceptionalism it connotes. As I briefly suggested in the paper, broadly egalitarian arguments might be invoked in an attempt to justify at least some degree of genetic exceptionalism here. Notably though, in her commentary, Feiring expresses scepticism about the view of genetic exceptionalism that is implicit in my acceptance of the idea that the use of GTRs in insurance warrants its own specific guidance.2 Given the different …. (shrink)

How should we understand good philosophical inquiry? Ernest Sosa has argued that the key to answering this question lies with virtue-based epistemology. According to virtue-based epistemology, competences are prior to epistemic justification. More precisely, a subject is justified in having some type of belief only because she could have a belief of that type by exercising her competences. Virtue epistemology is well positioned to explain why, in forming false philosophical beliefs, agents are often less rational than it is possible to (...) be. False philosophical beliefs are often unjustified—and the agent is thereby less rational for having them—precisely because these beliefs could not be formed by exercising competences. But, virtue epistemology is not well positioned to explain why, in failing to form some true philosophical beliefs, agents are less rational than it is possible to be. In cases where agents fall short by failing to believe philosophical truths, the problem is not that they believe things they shouldn’t, but that they lack beliefs they ought to have. We argue that Timothy Williamson's recent critique of the a priori/a posteriori distinction falls prey to similar problem cases. Williamson fails to see that a type of belief might be a priori justified if and only if, even without any special confirming experiences, agents fall short by failing to have this type of belief. We conclude that there are types of beliefs that are deeply a priori justified for any agent regardless of what epistemic competences the agent has. However, we also point out that this view has a problem of its own: it appears to make the acquisition of a priori knowledge too easy. We end by suggesting that a move back towards virtue-based epistemology is necessary. But in order for this move to be effective, epistemic competences will have to be understood very differently than in the reliabilist tradition. (shrink)

A standard view in the epistemology of imagination is that imaginings can either provide justification for modal beliefs about what is possible (and perhaps counterfactual conditionals too), or no justification at all. However, in a couple of recent articles, Kind (2016; Forthcoming) argues that imaginings can justify empirical belief about what the world actually is like. In this article, I respond to her argument, showing that imagination doesn't provide the right sort of information to justify empirical belief. Nevertheless, it can (...) help us take advantage of justification that we already have, thereby enabling us to form new doxastically justified beliefs. More specifically, according to the view I advocate, imagination can contribute to one's satisfaction of the proper basing condition – which turns propositional justification into doxastic justification – but without conferring any new justification that the subject isn't already in possession of upon their beliefs. Very little attention has been devoted to the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification in the literature on imagination, and the view I here argue for takes up a yet-to-be occupied position. (shrink)

In Ordinary Objects, Thomasson pursues an integrated conception of ontology and metaontology. In ontology, she defends the existence of shoes, ships, and other ordinary objects. In metaontology, she defends a deflationary view of ontological inquiry, designed to suck the air out of arguments against ordinary objects. The result is an elegant and insightful defense of a common sense worldview. I am sympathetic—in spirit if not always in letter—with Thomasson’s ontology. But I am skeptical of her deflationary metaontology.