Grzegorczyk, A. O pewnych formalnych konsekwencjach reizmu.--Hiż, H. O rzeczach.--Kołakowski, L. Determinizm i odpowiedzialność.--Kotarbińska, J. Tak zwana definicja dejktyczna.--Ossowska, M. Norma prawna i norma moralna u Petrażyckiego.--Ossowski, S. Od "Kodeksu natury" do "Sprzysiężenia równych."--Lazari-Pawłowska, I. Tworzenie pojęć nauk humanistycznych według koncepcji Leona Petrażyckiego.--Pawłowski, T. Klasyfikacja sztuczna a klasyfikacja naturalna w biologii.--Pelc, J. Szkic analizy znaczeniowej terminu "ideologia dzieła literackiego."--Poznański, E. Operacjonalizm po trzydziestu latach.--Przełęcki, M. Postulat empiryczności terminów przyrodniczych.--Pszczołowski, T. Prakseologiczne pojęcie pracy.--Stonert, H. Analiza logiczna teorii atomistycznej w klasycznej (...) chemii.--Szaniawski, K. O indukcji eliminacyjnej.--Wallis, M. Koncepcje biologiczne w humanistyce. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to study a particular family of non-deterministic semantics for modal logics that has eight truth-values. These eight-valued semantics can be traced back to Omori and Skurt (2016), where a particular member of this family was used to characterize the normal modal logic K. The truth-values in these semantics convey information about a proposition’s truth/falsity, whether the proposition is necessary/not necessary, and whether it is possible/not possible. Each of these triples is represented by a unique (...) value. In this paper we will study which modal logics can be obtained by changing the interpretation of the $$\Box $$ modality, assuming that the interpretation of other connectives stays constant. We will show what axioms are responsible for a particular interpretations of $$\Box $$. Furthermore, we will study subsets of these axioms. We show that some of the combinations of the axioms are equivalent to well-known modal axioms. We apply the level-valuation technique to all of the systems to regain the closure under the rule of necessitation. We also point out that some of the resulting logics are not sublogics of S5 and comment briefly on the corresponding frame conditions that are forced by these axioms. Ultimately, we sketch a proof of meta-completeness for all of these systems. (shrink)

As with any historical study, including that of knowledge and ideas, the progress of the semiology of the theater is subject to periodicity. The aim of any division into periods is to obtain a global view, even at the price of simplifications, but it can also bring out the hidden aspects of the phenomena under study.The semiology or semiotics of the theater, that is, the application of the idea of sign to the art of the spectacle, has a long past, (...) in which several stages may be distinguished, and first of all those that I would call the presemiology and the protosemiology of the theater. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to present a proof to the conclusion that is impossible to traverse an infinite series (in particular, an infinite series of past moments). This may also show (given additional assumptions) that the series of past moments cannot be infinite. In the first section I formulate five theses concerning traversing, successive addition and successive subtraction and I present the idea of the argument: if it were possible to traverse an infinite past, it should be in (...) principle possible to go back, which is, however, impossible. The main body of the paper is concerned with working out a simple mathematical representation of some structural features of processes like traversing and successive addition. I also make a crucial distinction between completion of a process at a particular time and its timeless "completion" in infinite time. In section V, I present the formal proof and defend it against a possible objection of question-begging. Finally, I suggest that my argume. (shrink)

Argues that the key distinction between human and nonhuman social cognition consists in our complex, diverse and flexible capacities to shape each other's minds in ways that make them easier to interpret.

Argues that the key distinction between human and nonhuman social cognition consists in our complex, diverse and flexible capacities to shape each other's minds in ways that make them easier to interpret.

Discusses philosophical ethics in the canonical Gospels, both in its normative (formal and material) dimension, and in a descriptive dimension (as science about morality). It argues that the ethics present in the Gospels has a universal and non-denominational character, although it is not reduced to it. The author argues that in the Gospels Jesus mad acceptance and the implementation of ethical goods, values and material norms dependent on the level of ethical awareness of his recipients. --Book cover.

Hilary Putnam (1926–2016) was prone to change his mind on variety of philosophical issues and almost constantly to modify his views. The last period of the development of his philosophy is known as the phase of commonsense or natural realism, eloquently presented in his 1994 Dewey Lectures. This paper is focused on three facets of his position and tries to identify three difficulties it encounters. Firstly, Putnam claims that in the contemporary realism debate we have, on the one hand, proponents (...) of extravagant metaphysical realism, and, on the other hand, advocates of various versions of irresponsible antirealism. Unfortunately, the delineation of the debate is too coarse-grained, since there are many forms of metaphysical realism, and lumping together various antirealisms is confusing and unhelpful. Secondly, Putnam’s naïve direct realism in the philosophy of perception seems incompatible with his transactional account of perception. Thirdly, for some time Putnam was under a spell of Wittgensteinian quietism that distorted the true character of his philosophical ideas. (shrink)