[First paragraph] According to a widely accepted opinion, the most typical characteristic and even the constitutive element of science is measurement, i.e., those processes of measuring upon which science is based. For a long time this has caused a general orientation of disciplines seeking to call themselves "science"; toward a certain form of quantification; in order to achieve the prestigious title of "science"; some form of measurement, of whatever kind, had to be introduced into the area of study.

Regroupement d'articles et d'essais sous deux grands titres : le monde de la science et de la technique; la rencontre avec la dimension éthique. [SDM].

When we think about our way of seeing, appreciating and understanding the different forms and manifestations of the life of the mind in human civilization, we become aware of a rather surprising fact. We are ready and spontaneously inclined to place them in a historical perspective and consequently to judge them according to a “historical consciousness”, with practically only one exception, that of science. No one finds it difficult to admit that the poetry of Homer, Virgil, Dante, Goethe or Baudelaire (...) has always been an authentic poetry, attaining the heights of absolute value and even at times being incomparable, all the while recognizing that to understand this poetry, to appreciate its nobility and penetrate its meaning the effort must be made to put it within its historical context (and ideally to put oneself within that context) rather than to judge it according to the modes and forms of the poetry of our own day. What we have just said regarding poetry also applies to music, the fine arts, philosophy, law, social and political institutions, ethical concepts, religions and customs. In the case of science, on the other hand, such a historical consciousness is almost entirely lacking, even among cultivated people: the history of the sciences is not normally a part of the store of knowledge of these people, but this situation, far from being the cause of such a lack of historical consciousness, is rather the consequence. This is because we are unconsciously persuaded that science is not properly speaking a historical phenomenon; we have the impression that it has not had a real history. (shrink)

Depuis la Grèce, en dépit des rêves d'une langue bien faite, les philosophes s'expriment dans des langues qui sont le partage de peuples différents. Or, peut-on inscrire le discours de l'universel dans le champ limité d'une langue particulière? Le français fait sa joie des analyses sèches, comme l'on parle d'une pointe sèche qui grave le cuivre nu. Celui qui saurait le conduire vers la synthèse, pourtant, aurait reconnu, selon le mot de von Humboldt, " l'énigme de cette langue ". Le (...) colloque de Nice, " Philosopher en français ", a tenté d'approcher une telle énigme. Trente-deux chercheurs internationaux ont croisé leurs exposés selon quatre thèmes : la philosophie française au XXe siècle ; la philosophie française et les courants internationaux ; l'histoire française de la philosophie ; le philosophe français et le style. Tous mettent l'accent sur l'approche " à la française ", comme disait Montaigne, des grandes questions théoriques et cherchent à définir ce qu'il en est du style français en philosophie. J.-F. M. (shrink)

In medicine the understanding and interpretation of the complex reality of illness currently refers either to an organismic approach that focuses on the physical or to a 'holistic' approach that takes into account the patient's human sociocultural involvement. Yet as the papers of this collection show, the suffering human person refers ultimately to his/her existential sphere. Hence, praxis is supplemented by still other perspectives for valuation and interpretation: ethical, spiritual, and religious. Can medicine ignore these considerations or push them to (...) the side as being subjective and arbitrary? Phenomenology/philosophy-of-life recognizes all of the above approaches to be essential facets of the Human Condition (Tymieniecka). This approach holds that all the facets of the Human Condition have equal objectivity and legitimacy. It completes the accepted medical outlook and points the way toward a new `medical humanism'. (shrink)

The first part of this book is of an epistemological nature and develops an original theory of scientific objectivity, understood in a weak sense (as intersubjective agreement among the specialists) and a strong sense (as having precise concrete referents). In both cases it relies upon the adoption of operational criteria designed within the particular perspective under which any single science considers reality. The "object" so attained has a proper ontological status, dependent on the specific character of the criteria of reference (...) (regional ontologies). This justifies a form of scientific realism. Such perspectives are also the result of a complex cultural-historical situation. The awareness of such a "historical determinacy" of science justifies including in the philosophy of science the problems of ethics of science, relations of science with metaphysics, and social dimensions of science that overstep the traditional restriction of the philosophy of science to an epistemology of science. It is to this "context" that the second part of the book is devoted. (shrink)

Modern natural science followed Galileo’s proposals regarding ontology, epistemology and methodology, limiting investigation to a few measurable properties of bodies by the adoption of the experimental method. Force appeared as a specialization of the traditional concept of efficient cause within the new science of Mechanics, which was soon able to incorporate practically all branches of physics. The concept of system had been introduced into scientific vocabulary in the seventeenth century and the limitations of the mechanistic approach in physics emerging by (...) the end of the nineteenth century prompted Bertalannfy to deeply re-elaborate it as System Theory. This permitted him to complement the analytic outlook with a rigorous characterization of the notion of organized totalities. This could be applied to life sciences and several other scientific domains, allowing rigorous treatment of traditional concepts such as finality, and new concepts like complexity and interdisciplinarity. (shrink)

Perspectivism is often understood as a conception according to which subjective conditions inevitably affect our knowledge and, therefore, we are never confronted with reality and facts but only with interpretations. Hence, subjectivism and anti-realism are usually associated with perspectivism. The thesis of this paper is that, especially in the case of the sciences, perspectivism can be better understood as an appreciation of the cognitive attitude that consists in considering reality only from a certain ‘point of view’, in a way that (...) can avoid subjectivism. Whereas the way of conceiving a notion is strictly subjective, the way of using it is open to intersubjective agreement, based on the practice of operations whose nature is neither mental nor linguistic. Therefore, intersubjectivity is possible within perspectivism. Perspectivism can also help understand the notion of ‘scientific objects’ in a referential sense: they are those ‘things’ that become ‘objects’ of a certain science by being investigated from the ‘point of view’ of that science. They are ‘clipped out’ of things by means of standardized operations which turn out to be the same as those granting intersubjectivity. Therefore this ‘strong’ sense of objectivity, which is clearly realist, coincides with the ‘weak’ one. The notion of truth appears fully legitimate in the case of the sciences, being clearly defined for the regional ontology of each one of them and, since this truth can be extended in an analogical sense to the theories elaborated in each science, it follows that are real also the unobservable entities postulated by those theories. (shrink)

The issue whether science can be correctly submitted to ethical judgment has been widely debated especially in the 1960s. Those who denied the legitimacy of such a judgment stressed that this would entail an undue limitation of the freedom of science; those who defended such a limitation laid stress on the great dangers that an uncontrolled growth of scientific knowledge has already produced and would continue to produce against humankind. This sterile debate can be settled by recognizing that scientific knowledge (...) can and must be evaluated, as far as its validity is concerned, exclusively through the methodological criteria admitted by the professionals of the single scientific disciplines concerned, and no ethical judgment is pertinent from this point of view. Nevertheless, if we consider science as a particular system of social activities, entailing concrete procedures, conditions and applications, the ethical evaluation of these actions is pertinent and correct. A second question is whether or not the inclusion of these ethical investigations in the specific domain of philosophy of science is correct. If one conceives philosophy of science simply as an epistemology of science consisting in a logical-methodological investigation about the language of scientific theories, this broadening would appear spurious. This view, however, is too narrow and dated: a fully fledged philosophical investigation on the complex phenomenon of science cannot prevent important outlooks and instruments of the philosophical inqujiry from legitimately pertaining to the philosophy of science. (shrink)

Philosophy of Science, understood as a special philosophical discipline, was born only at the beginning of the twentieth century as part of the effort for overcoming the “foundational crisis” that had affected especially mathematics and physics. Therefore, it was conceived as an investigation about the features and reliability of scientific knowledge and for a few decades was deeply marked by the philosophical approach of logical empiricism. This cognitive point of view persisted also when, after Kuhn’s work, the attention focused on (...) the scientific activity in order to understand scientific change and a sociological model replaced the view that empirical adequacy and logical consistency are the factors that determine the change of scientific theories. Ethical, social and political considerations regarding science ware considered inappropriate and potentially dangerous since they violate the alleged “neutrality of science” with respect to values. Nevertheless, the strict intertwining of science and technology in contemporary “technoscience” has produced a wide debate regarding the practical aspect of technoscientific activity that has the intrinsic features of a philosophical debate. Therefore, it is natural and advisable that the entire wealth of the philosophical disciplines be called to contribute to the specific complex discourse of the Philosophy of Science. (shrink)

This volume has 41 chapters written to honor the 100th birthday of Mario Bunge. It celebrates the work of this influential Argentine/Canadian physicist and philosopher. Contributions show the value of Bunge’s science-informed philosophy and his systematic approach to philosophical problems. The chapters explore the exceptionally wide spectrum of Bunge’s contributions to: metaphysics, methodology and philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of physics, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of social science, philosophy of biology, philosophy of technology, moral philosophy, social and political (...) philosophy, medical philosophy, and education. The contributors include scholars from 16 countries. Bunge combines ontological realism with epistemological fallibilism. He believes that science provides the best and most warranted knowledge of the natural and social world, and that such knowledge is the only sound basis for moral decision making and social and political reform. Bunge argues for the unity of knowledge. In his eyes, science and philosophy constitute a fruitful and necessary partnership. Readers will discover the wisdom of this approach and will gain insight into the utility of cross-disciplinary scholarship. This anthology will appeal to researchers, students, and teachers in philosophy of science, social science, and liberal education programmes. 1. Introduction Section I. An Academic Vocation Section II. Philosophy Section III. Physics and Philosophy of Physics Section IV. Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind Section V. Sociology and Social Theory Section VI. Ethics and Political Philosophy Section VII. Biology and Philosophy of Biology Section VIII. Mathematics Section IX. Education Section X. Varia Section XI. Bibliography. (shrink)

Contents: Evandro AGAZZI: Introduction. Part One: PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS. Paul HORWICH: Realism and Truth. Evandro AGAZZI: On the Criteria for Establishing the Ontological Status of Different Entities. Aristides BALTAS; Con-straints and Resistance: Stating a Case for Negative Realism. Michel PATY: Predicate of Existence and Predictability for a Theoretical Object in Physics. Part Two: OBSERVABILITY AND HIDDEN ENTITIES. François BONSACK: Atoms: Lessons of a History. Alberto CORDERO: Arguing for Hidden Realities. Bernard d'ESPAGNAT: On the Difficulties that Attributing Existence (...) to «Hidden» Quantities May Rise. Massimo PAURI: The Quantum, Space-Time and Observation. Part Three: APPLICATIONS TO QUANTUM PHYSICS. David ALBERT: On the Phenomenology of Quantum-Mechanical Superpositions. Gian Carlo GHIRARDI: Realism and Quantum Mechanics. Michel CROZON: Experimental Evidence of Quark Structure Inside Hadrons. (shrink)

Después de haber analizado las razones que indujeron a las antiguas matemáticas griegas y de que Aristóteles sólo admitiera una débil forma de lo infinito, se explora una ampliación de este concepto más allá de sus referencias numéricas y geométricas. El infinito puede expresar la “inagotable” riqueza ontológica de los atributos de las entidades individuales o, en otro sentido, el infinito puede ser entendido como aquello “ilimitado”. En este segundo sentido la “negación” se presenta como una fuerza positiva en la (...) formación del sentido ontológico de lo infinito.After having analyzed the reasons that induced ancient Greek mathematics and Aristotle to admit only a weak form of the infinite a broadening of this notion beyond its numerical and geometrical references is explored. The infinite can express the “inexhaustible” ontological richness of the attributes of individual entities or, in another sense, the infinite can be understood as the “unlimited”. In this second sense the “negation” appears as a positive force in the shaping of the ontological meaning of the infinite. (shrink)

The two volumes to which this is apreface consist of the Proceedings of the Second International Conference on History and Philosophy of Science. The Conference was organized by the Joint Commission of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science (IUHPS) under the auspices of the IUHPS, the Italian Society for Logic and Philosophy of Science, and the Domus Galilaeana of Pisa, headed by Professor Vincenzo Cappelletti. Domus Galilaeana also served as the host institution, with some help from the (...) University of Pisa. The Conference took place in Pisa, Italy, on September 4-8, 1978. The editors of these two volumes of the Proceedings of the Pisa Conference acknowledge with gratitude the help by the different sponsoring organizations, and in the first place that by both Divisions of the IUHPS, which made the Conference possible. A special recognition is due to Professor Evandro Agazzi, President of the Italian Society for Logic and Philosophy of Science, who was co opted as an additional member of the Organizing Committee. This committee was otherwise identical with the Joint Commission, whose members were initially John Murdoch, John North, Arpad Szab6, Robert Butts, Jaakko Hintikka, and Vadim Sadovsky. Later, Erwin Hiebert and Lubos Novy were appointed as additional members. (shrink)

Modern cosmology, though a confluence of relativity theory and elementary particle physics, and with the help of very sophisticated mathematical models, tries to encompass the Universe as a whole, and to propose theories regarding its origin and evolution. But this cannot work without the evolution of several philosophical issues, concerning the epistemological status of this enterprise, its implicit or explicit extra-scientific presuppositions, as well as the real sense and interpretation of the theories and principles involved. This book provides a survey (...) of these different aspects, for it gives some essential elements of the scientific background necessary for understanding the main issues of modern cosmology, and at the same time offer a discussion of the problems arising in it; problems which are never purely scientific, nor purely philosophical. Science and philosophy are therefore again deeply interrelated, at the moment where man tries to understand the Universe and his place in it. And this not only because the legitimacy of calling cosmology a science implies the acceptance of intellectual approaches which overstep the usual criteria of physical science and have a deep philosophical connotation, but also because the evolutionary way of thinking, strongly backed by cosmology, reinforces the role of this approach in the philosophy of science and in philosophy in general. (shrink)

Man kann die wissenschaftliche Tätigkeit so betrachten, daß sie von einem "wissenschaftlichen System" ausgeführt wird, welches zugleich offen und adaptiv ist und dessen allgemeines Ziel darin besteht, objektives Wissen zu produzieren und zu verbreiten. WS nimmt aus seiner Umgebung Eingaben von "Nachfrage", "Unterstützung", "Ablehnung" entgegen und reagiert auf kreative Art und Weise darauf. Sein Funktionieren ist bedingt durch die Verträglichkeit seines Ziels mit denjenigen aller andern sozialen Subsysteme, die eine Maximierung der internen Variablen von WS ausschließen mögen, um das gesamte (...) soziale System zu optimieren. Dies ist nichts anderes als ein systemtheoretischer Ausdruck für den Begriff der Verantwortung der Wissenschaft: er ist nicht streng ethisch, aber schließt die Erwägung ethischer Normen des ganzen sozialen Systems mit ein. (shrink)

Until the middle of the present century it was a commonly accepted opinion that theory change in science was the expression of cumulative progress consisting in the acquisition of new truths and the elimination of old errors. Logical empiricists developed this idea through a deductive model, saying that a theory T superseding a theory T must be able logically to explain whatever T explained and something more as well. Popper too shared this model, but stressed that T explains the old (...) known facts in its own new way. The further pursual of this line quickly led to the thesis of the non-comparability or incommensurability of theories: if T and T are different, then the very concepts which have the same denomination in both actually have different meanings; in such a way any sentence whatever has different meanings in T and in T and cannot serve to compare them. owing to this, the deductive model was abandoned as a tool for understanding theory change and scientific progress, and other models were proposed by people such as Lakatos, Kuhn, Feyerabend, Sneed and Stegmüller. The common feature of all these new positions may be seen in the claim that no possibility exists of interpreting theory change in terms of the cumulative acquisition of truth. It seems to us that the older and the newer positions are one-sided, and, in order to eliminate their respective shortcomings, we propose to interpret theory change in a new way.The starting point consists in recognizing that every scientific discipline singles out its specific domain of objects by selecting a few specific predicates for its discourse. Some of these predicates must be operational and they determine the objects of the theory concerned. In the case of a transition from T to T, we must consider whether or not the operational predicates remain unchanged, in the sense of being still related to the same operations. If they do not change in their relation to operations, then T and T are comparable. If the operational predicates are not all identical in T and T, the two theories show a rather high degree of incommensurability, and this happens because they do not refer to the same objects. Theory change means in this case change of objects. But now we can see that even incommensurability is compatible with progress conceived as the accumulation of truth. Indeed, T and T remain true about their respective objects, and the global amount of truth acquired is increased. (shrink)

RESUMENLa idea del progreso de la humanidad se ha basado, en los últimos dos siglos, en el progreso científico-técnico. Por otra parte, se ha considerado a la ciencia como el paradigma de la racionalidad. Las consecuencias negativas producidas por el progreso científico-técnico están provocando un rechazo radical, en diversas capas sociales, de la ciencia y de la racionalidad; y la idea de progreso se ha invertido en la añoranza del pasado. Superando esta imagen neopositivista de la ciencia, el trabajo intenta (...) recuperar para el futuro del ser humano tanto la racionalidad, como la ciencia y la posibilidad del progreso. La racionalidad debe fundarse en valores positivos para el futuro de la humanidad. Por su parte, el progreso debe ser entendido como una tarea por hacer en cada momento, como el compromiso en la realización de aquellos ideales, utilizando la ciencia y la técnica como sus instrumentos más valiosos. PALABRAS CLAVEPROGRESO-CIENCIA-TECNICA-VALORESABSTRACTOver the last two centuries, the idea of human progress has relied upon scientific-technological progress. Meanwhile, science has been considered the paradigm of rationality. however, the negative consequences of scientific-technological progres are causing a radical rejection, at differents social levels, of science and racionality; and the idea of prgress has become a longing for the past. Going beyond this neopositivist image of science, the paper tries to recover rationality, science and the possibility of progress for the future of humanity. Rationality should be based on positive values evisaged to advace it. Progress should be conceived as an open, permanent task using science and technology as its most valued instruments. KEYWORDSPROGRESS- SCIENCE-TECHNOLOGY-VALUES. (shrink)

v. 1. I problemi della filosofia, di E. Agazzi et al.

When it is spoken of scientific representations it is often understood that science can offer "only" representations but does not enable us to know reality. This tenet is the inheritance of a gratuitous and inconsistent presupposition that affected modern philosophy during almost two centuries, according to which we know our representations and not things, and we have to find warranties in order to believe that such representations correspond to reality. The present paper analyzes this presupposition, shows its inconsistency and, through (...) a discourse regarding the relations between thought and ontology, between sense and reference of the intellectual constructions, between abstract encoding of properties and concrete exemplification of the same by means of operational criteria of reference, justifies the cognitive purport of scientific representations, including the mathematical representations of physical phenomena. (shrink)

Modern philosophy of science was, initially, an epistemology of science based on the logical analysis of the language of science. It was superseded by a “sociological epistemology,” according to which the acceptance of scientific statements and theories depends on conditioningscoming from the social context and powers, and this view has fueled anti-scientific attitudes.This happened because the sociological turn still expressed an epistemology of science. Science, however, is not only a system of knowledge, but also a complex human activity. Hence, ethical, (...) political, social, religious issues appear legitimate if they concern “doing science.”Therefore, we must “rethink” philosophy of science, accepting in it also an axiology of science that could enable us to retain the cognitive value of science and at the same time to make techno-scientific activity compatible with the satisfaction of a great variety of values that inspire our societies. (shrink)

After a brief survey of the different meanings of consistency, the study is restricted to consistency understood as non-contradiction of sets of sentences. The philosophical reasons for this requirement are discussed, both in relation to the problem of sense and the problem of truth. The issue of mathematical truth is then addressed, and the different conceptions of it are put in relation with consistency. The formal treatment of consistency and truth in mathematical logic is then considered, with particular attention paid (...) to the relation between syntactic and semantic properties of sets and calculi. After the crisis of mathematical intuition and the dominance of the formalistic view, it seemed that consistency could totally replace the requirement of truth in mathematics, also in the sense that the existence of "objects" of axiomatic systems could be granted by their consistency. A rejection of this claim is presented, whose central point is a detailed analysis of the theorem that any consistent set S of sentences of first order logic has a model. A critical scrutiny shows that this model is very peculiar, being offered by the elements of the same language that is being interpreted, and the satisfiability conditions for any sentence being constituted by the mere fact of belonging to S. Though not being insignificant from a metatheoretical point of view, this theorem fails to endow consistency with an "ontological creativity", that is, with the capability of providing a model ontologically distinct from the language itself. A final discussion regarding the different "ontological regions" and the referential nature of truth clarifies the different aspects of the whole issue discussed. (shrink)

RésuméCe travail est consacréà l'examen critique de l'itinéraire qui conduit Maxwell, à partir de l'intuition des lignes de forces de Faraday, à sa conception du champ électromagnétique, à ses célèbres équations et enfin à la théorie électromagnétique de la lumière. L'auteur montre et discute la manière dont Maxwell, qui avait fondé sa théorie sur un modèle élastique, l'a convertie en une pure théorie du champ sans pour autant renier une philosophie naturelle de caractère mécaniste.

These are some of the topics discussed in this book, both theoretically and with reference to concrete cases.