The need for professionals to volunteer their time in crisis situations and to reach across time and culture in the service of humanitarian interventions will likely not abate in the near future. This article provides readers with multiple venues for considering the ethical dimensions present in crisis and humanitarian interventions. Core ethical concerns common to helping situations are magnified in crisis work. In addition, issues unique to the nature of volunteer and crisis work must also be considered. Using hypothetical case (...) examples, bioethical principles, and ethical decision-making models, helping professionals are encouraged to go beyond their particular ethical codes in contemplating ethically and clinically sensitive volunteering. (shrink)

In this article, we examine conceptual and practical issues pertaining to relationship boundaries within the helping profession. Although our focus is primarily on relationships between mental health professionals and clients, there are considerable implications for a new approach to ethically structuring and understanding the construct of "required distance" in many human-interactive professions, such as teaching, religious leadership, public administration, and others. We define the concept of boundary as applied to human relationships, provide examples of boundary breaks, and raise questions regarding (...) how to evaluate the significance and morality issues raised by specific boundary breaks. Questions and dilemmas are presented regarding boundary setting and accidental or deliberate boundary breaking. Representative dangers present in boundary breaks are identified, and examples are provided. Possible beneficial outcomes are also discussed. Finally, a suggested protocol for assessing a proposed boundary break is provided, much of which is drawn from the work and thinking of Laura Brown, applied more generally in this article, with additions from our perspectives. (shrink)

Background: One of the ethical imperatives for a valid consent process in clinical medication trials is that the process be guided by and recorded in an informed consent document (ICD). Concerns have been expressed, however, about readability and participant understanding of ICDs, which are often 10–20 pages long. Objective measures of readability and understanding have been used to support these concerns in several articles, but surprisingly the voice of trial participants on ICDs has not been heard in previous studies. Hence, (...) this study compares participants' subjective views on readability and their understanding of ICDs with those ICDs' objective readability scores. It also evaluates whether family, friends, and additional aids would foster better understanding of the ICD. Methods: Sixty current trial participants rated the readability and their understanding of deidentified standard ICDs. These had been sourced from two multicenter international Phase III trials on medication for diabetes mellitus and cancer. Results: Less than 10% of participants considered the ICDs difficult to read or difficult to understand in spite of objective readability scores at levels of about 12th grade education, but about a quarter considered the ICDs to be too technical. Participants gave mixed responses about friends or family members helping or the need for videos, pictures, additional reading material, and frequently answered questions (FAQ) sheets as an aid to their understanding. Conclusions: These findings suggest individual clinical trial participants should be engaged on their views of an ICD, for doing so is part of informed consent as a process rather than consent being merely focused on written information. Such participant-specific engagement should guide whether family and friends, videos, pictures, additional reading material, and FAQ sheets would be of assistance in improving understanding. (shrink)

Owen Flanagan argues in this book for a more psychologically realistic ethical reflection and spells out the ways in which psychology can enrich moral philosophy. Beginning with a discussion of such "moral saints" as Gandhi, Mother Teresa, and Oskar Shindler, Flanagan charts a middle course between an ethics that is too realistic and socially parochial and one that is too idealistic, giving no weight to our natures.

The purpose of this study was to illuminate the ethically difficult situations experienced by care providers working in a nursing home. Individual interviews using a narrative approach were conducted. A phenomenological-hermeneutic method developed for researching life experience was applied in the analysis. The findings showed that care providers experience ethical challenges in their everyday work. The informants in this study found the balance between the ideal, autonomy and dignity to be a daily problem. They defined the culture they work in (...) as not supportive. They also thought they were not being seen and heard in situations where they disagree with the basic values of the organization. The results are discussed in terms of Habermas’s understanding of modern society. Care settings for elderly people obviously present ethical challenges, particularly in the case of those suffering from dementia. The care provider participants in this study expressed frustration and feelings of powerlessness. It is possible to understand their experiences in terms of Habermas’s theory of modern society and the concept of the system’s colonization of the life world. (shrink)

What does it mean to get hooked by a work, whether a bestseller or a classic, a TV series or a painting in a museum? What is this aesthetic experience that makes us feel captivated? What do works of art do, and how, in particular, do they bind us to them? In "Hooked," Rita Felski builds an aesthetics premised on our attachments rather than our free agency and challenges the ethos of critical aloofness that is so much a part (...) of modern intellectuals' self-image. The result is sure to be as widely read, and as controversial, as Felski's 2015 book, "The Limits of Critique." Felski looks at several "attachment devices." One of these is "attunement"--those affinities and stirrings that often fall below the threshold of consciousness. Why, for example, are we drawn to a painting or piece of music in ways we struggle to explain, while being left cold by others whose merits we duly acknowledge? Another attachment device is "identification"--a widespread response to fiction that is often invoked by critics but usually treated as synonymous with either identity or empathy. But Felski shows that identifying has no neat fit with identity categories, and it can trigger ethical, political, or intellectual affinities that have little to do with co-feeling. What people most commonly identify with, Felski argues, are characters who are alluring, arresting, or alive, not in spite of their aesthetic qualities but because of them. This kind of identification is not limited to naïve readers or over-invested viewers, but is also a defining aspect of what scholars in the humanities do. Relatedly, academic "interpretation" emerges here as another circuit of connection: critics forge ties to the works they explicate, the methods they use, the disciplinary identities they inhabit. "Hooked" returns us to the fundamentals of aesthetic experience, showing that the social meanings of artworks do not lie encrypted in their depths, within reach only of expert critics, but are generated within the embrace of captivated audiences. (shrink)

So geschaftig die internationale Nietzsche-Forschung auch ist, bleibt doch weithin unklar, was eigentlich gemeint ist, wenn wir von Nietzsches Philosophie sprechen. Handelt es sich um ein Gefuge von Lehrsatzen Wille zur Macht, Ewige Wiederkunft des Gleichen, Ubermensch? Wie sollen philosophisch interessierte Leserinnen und Leser damit umgehen, dass Nietzsche sich offensichtlich unentwegt selbst ins Wort fallt und jede doktrinale Festlegung verweigert? Ist das nur eine billige literarische Strategie, um das eigene Gefuge von Lehrsatzen interessanter zu machen? Oder handelt es sich vielmehr (...) um den Versuch, den Glauben an Philosophie als Gefuge von Lehrsatzen grundsatzlich zu problematisieren? Vielleicht ist Nietzsches Philosophie etwas vollig Anderes: eine andere Praxis. Der bekannte Nietzsche-Forscher Andreas Urs Sommer stellt und beantwortet in diesem Band grundlegende Fragen zum Umgang mit Nietzsches Texten, die so ganz anders zu funktionieren scheinen als landlaufige philosophische Texte. Die dafur erforderliche philosophische Hermeneutik muss auf einem sicheren philologisch-historischen Fundament stehen. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Notes.

" -- "New Scientist" Intended for anyone attempting to find their way through the large and confusingly interwoven philosophical literature on consciousness, ..

Contemporary Western moral philosophy in harmony with classical Chinese philosophy, especially Buddhism.

In his book, Andreas Urs Sommer reflects on the question of what it really means when everybody’s appealing to values, all the time – the question, fundamentally, of what values actually are. Values explores both of these points, arriving at two intriguing suggestions: Maybe what we call values are just a set of elaborate fictions. And maybe those fictions serve some very important purposes.

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Nihilism Skepticism Nihilism and Skepticism.

This book re-assesses the life and legacy of Swami Vivekananda from the vantage point of socially-engaged religion in a time of global dislocations and inequities. Due to the complexity of Vivekananda as a historical figure on the cusp of a new era, few works offer a nuanced, academic examination of his liberative vision and legacy.

Flanagan (1991) was the first contemporary philosopher to suggest that a modularity of morals hypothesis (MMH) was worth consideration by cognitive science. There is now a serious empirically informed proposal that moral competence is best explained in terms of moral modules-evolutionarily ancient, fast-acting, automatic reactions to particular sociomoral experiences (Haidt & Joseph, 2007). MMH fleshes out an idea nascent in Aristotle, Mencius, and Darwin. We discuss the evidence for MMH, specifically an ancient version, “Mencian Moral Modularity,” which claims four (...) innate modules, and “Social Intuitionist Modularity,” which claims five innate modules. We compare these two moral modularity models, discuss whether the postulated modules are best conceived as perceptual/Fodorian or emotional/Darwinian, and consider whether assuming MMH true has any normative ethical consequences whatsoever. The discussion of MMH reconnects cognitive science with normative ethics in a way that involves the reassertion of the “is-ought” problem. We explain in a new way what this problem is and why it would not yield. The reason does not involve the logic of “ought,” but rather the plasticity of human nature and the realistic options to “grow” and “do” human nature in multifarious legitimate ways. (shrink)

La "cause de la phénoménologie" s'est trouvée défendue et illustrée en France par de multiples oeuvres, qui, au-delà même de la réception des pensées de Husserl et de Heidegger, ont aujourd'hui des effets en retour sur les pays germaniques d'où la phénoménologie est originaire. Organisées par Christian Sommer et Jean-Claude Monod, deux journées d'étude ont réuni aux Archives Husserl de Paris les principaux représentants de la "nouvelle phénoménologie" en France. Les textes du présent volume évoquent et réévaluent les évolutions, les (...) thèmes et les débats qui ont marqué le champ phénoménologique français depuis le début des années 1980. (shrink)

Disagreement on law’s relationship to morality has long been driven by disagreement about our ordinary concept. Until recently, however, there had been no systematic investigation of lay intuitions. In this paper, we advance this nascent effort. Across two studies (N = 697), our findings reveal that most people consider law to be more than a matter of political circumstance alone. Contrary to the expectations of most contemporary philosophers, morality (both substantive and procedural) emerges as a key influence on judgments of (...) legal validity: many people say that conduct prohibited by immoral statutes is not truly illegal, and that immoral conduct which was never explicitly prohibited is truly illegal. This suggests that people often treat law as a dual character concept that, like the concepts of scientist or of artist, features autonomous concrete and abstract dimensions. (shrink)

Across two studies, a wide age range of participants was interviewed about the nature of death. All participants were living in rural Madagascar in a community where ancestral beliefs and practices are widespread. In Study 1, children (8–17 years) and adults (19–71 years) were asked whether bodily and mental processes continue after death. The death in question was presented in the context of a narrative that focused either on the corpse or on the ancestral practices associated with the afterlife. Participants (...) aged 8 years and older claimed that death brings an end to most bodily and mental processes. Nevertheless, particularly in the context of the religious narrative, they claimed that certain mental processes continue even after death. This assertion of an afterlife was more evident among adults than children, especially with respect to cognitive processes, such as knowing and remembering. In Study 2, 5‐ and 7‐year‐olds were asked similar questions in connection with the death of a bird and a person. Seven‐year‐olds consistently claimed that bodily and mental processes cease at death, whereas 5‐year‐olds were unsystematic in their replies. Together, the two studies replicate and extend findings obtained with Western children showing that, in the course of development, different conceptions of death are elaborated—a biological conception in which death terminates living processes and a religious conception in which death marks the beginning of a new form of spiritual existence. (shrink)